1. Stronger, Smarter, More Secure and Resilient Cyber-Physical Power Grid Congressional Research and Development Caucus B-369 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC Friday, May 15, 2015, Noon– 1:30pm Dr. S. Massoud Amin * – Chairman, IEEE Smart Grid – ASME Energy Pubic Policy Task Force – Chairman, Board of Directors, Texas Reliability Entity (TexasRE) – Board of Directors, Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) – Director, & Endowed Chair, Technological Leadership Institute; Professor of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University Distinguished Teaching Professor; Univ. of Minnesota * Support from EPRI, NSF, ORNL, Honeywell and SNL is gratefully acknowledged.

2. Electric Power Infrastructure: Interdependencies, Security, and Resilience Presidential Policy Directive 21: “Energy and communications infrastructure especially critical because of their enabling functions across all critical infrastructure areas” DOE: “A resilient electric grid… is arguably the most complex and critical infrastructure.” The vast networks of electrification are the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th century – U.S. National Academy of Engineering

3. Adaptive Infrastructures The Smart Infrastructure for a Digital Society Excellent Power System Reliability Exceptional Power Quality Integrated Communications A Secure Energy Infrastructure A Complex Set of Interconnected Webs: Security is Fundamental

4. Adaptive Infrastructures Threat Evolution: Malicious Code Hours Time Weeks or months Days Minutes Seconds Class II Human response: difficult/impossible Automated response: possible Early 1990sMid 1990sLate 1990s20002003 Class III Human response: impossible Automated response: unlikely Proactive blocking: possible Contagion Timeframe File Viruses Macro Viruses e-mail Worms Blended Threats “Warhol” Threats “Flash” Threats Class I Human response: possible source: Massoud Amin, EPRI, January 27, 1998

5. Adaptive Infrastructures Critical System Dynamics and Resilience Capabilities Variability and uncertainty are inherent in complex networked interdependent socio-technological systems A system of systems view is necessary to measure, monitor, understand and manage complex work. Necessary to understand “normal” Anticipation of disruptive events Look-ahead simulation capability Fast isolation and sectionalization Adaptive islanding Self-healing and restoration re·sil·ience, noun, 1824: The capability of a strained body to recover its size and shape after deformation caused especially by compressive stress; An ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change Resilience enables “Robustness”: A system, organism or design may be said to be "robust" if it is capable of coping well with variations (internal or external and sometimes unpredictable) in its operating environment with minimal damage, alteration or loss of functionality.

6. Adaptive Infrastructures September 11, 2001 Tragedies

7. Adaptive Infrastructures Infrastructure Security We are “Bullet Proof” “The Sky is Falling” The Truth Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program Massoud Amin, EPRI, September 27, 2001

8. Adaptive Infrastructures Infrastructure Security: The Threat Electric power systems constitute the fundamental infrastructure of modern society and therefore an inviting target for three kinds of terrorist attacks: Attacks upon the system –Power system itself is primary target with ripple effect throughout society Attacks by the system –Population is the actual target, using parts of the power system as a weapon Attack through the system –Utility networks provide the conduit for attacks on broad range of targets Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program Massoud Amin, EPRI, September 27, 2001

9. Adaptive Infrastructures Steps Toward Ensuring Security EPRI’s Electricity Infrastructure Security Assessment considers six broad areas: –System-Wide Vulnerability Assessment –Grid Security –Cyber and Communications Threats –Distribution System, Disaster Mitigation & Recovery –Generation/Environment –Power Markets Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program Massoud Amin, EPRI, September 27, 2001

10. Adaptive Infrastructures ISI Areas: Addressing System Vulnerability to Various Attack Modes, Reducing Their Impact, and Rapid Recovery Strategic Spare Parts Inventory: Reducing recovery time from terrorist attack or natural disaster by providing spare parts of existing equipment and by developing standardized “recovery transformers” with multiple voltage taps Vulnerability Assessment (VA): Determining the impact of potential terrorist attacks on power system components throughout the end- to-end electricity supply chain “Red Team” Attacks: Launch mock assaults on the computer and information networks of selected utility systems, probing for weaknesses in a manner similar to the FAA’s Red Team efforts Secure Communications: Scoping study to determine how to develop a secure, private communications network for the electric power industry, as an alternative to Internet-based systems Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program Massoud Amin, EPRI, October 8, 2001

11. Adaptive Infrastructures What can be Done? Vulnerability Assessment Profile Threats (Determine Intent & Capabilities) Develop Attack Scenarios * Assess Vulnerabilities to each Attack Apply War Gaming Theory Assess Risks (probability of successful attack x impact) Identify Likely Targets Develop Counter- measures * Evolving spectra of targets and modes of attack Source: EPRI Infrastructure Security Initiative (ISI) and Enterprise Information Security (EIS) Program Massoud Amin, EPRI, September 27, 2001

12. Smart Grid Interdependencies Security, Efficiency, and Resilience

13. The National Plan for Research and Development In Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection The area of self-healing infrastructure was recommended in 2005 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of three thrust areas for the National Plan for research and development in support of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)

15. Technology development, transition and Implementation: … the really hard part Steps in STEM-based R&D to enable secure, efficient, resilient and adaptive infrastructure Markets and Policy framework, implementation, and evaluation Wind-tunnel testing of designs, markets and policy Making the business case for the opportunity Decision Support Dashboard: Have a plan …

16. Regional Cooperation: Hybrid Networks Centralized & Microgrids Local/Nearby… Regional/National International/Faraway Decentralized Centralized Possible Transitional and Hybridization Options in a Wide Range of Assessed Scenarios: Short- and Long-term Strategies, Decision Pathways, ROI, Economic and Societal Objectives, Policies, and Disruptions (including dollars, watts, GHG emissions, risks/benefits – private and public) Depending on assessments noted herein, we: Modernize, Retrofit, and Hybridize Legacy Infrastructure Leap-Frog for Isolated Localities or for Clean Slate Designs Local Microgrids International Cooperation: Primarily Large Centralized Generation Over the next five years, smart microgrids will play a growing role in meeting local demand, enhancing reliability and ensuring local control of electricity.smart microgrids will play a growing role in meeting local demand, enhancing reliability and ensuring local control of electricity Emerging developments and challenges the smart grid community must address: For a brief overview and some details on microgrids, and this transition, please see: http://smartgrid.ieee.org/search?searchword=Microgrids&category=smart_grid&x=0&y=0

17. Examples of SG Technologies & Systems

18. New Challenges for a Smart Grid Need to integrate: –Large-scale stochastic (uncertain) renewable generation –Electric energy storage –Distributed generation –Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles –Demand response (smart meters), AMI, Data Analytics, … Need to deploy and integrate: –New Synchronized measurement technologies –New sensors –New System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) Critical Security Controls

19. Paradigm Shift – Data at MN Valley Coop Before smart meters –Monthly read –480,000 data points per year After smart meters –15-60 minute kWh –Peak demand –Voltage –Power interruptions –480,000,000 data points per year

20. Battery Powered 1B Water Meters 1B Gas Meters Battery Powered 1B Water Meters 1B Gas Meters Industry Needs to Connect 50 Billion Devices by 2020 An unsolved problem costing billions per year in wasted resources requires radically improved wireless performance and lower cost Courtesy of On-Ramp Wireless, Inc. All rights reserved. Underground Millions of miles of Pipelines & Circuits Underground Millions of miles of Pipelines & Circuits In Vaults 100M meters In Vaults 100M meters Indoors 1B sensors Indoors 1B sensors

21. Security needs Physical Security –Transmission Equipment –System Security: Preventing system impact and Protecting critical substations –Standards Cyber Security

22. Security: What should we be trying to protect Fuel Supply and Generation Assets Transmission and Distribution Controls and Communications Other Assets

23. Security: What issues impede Protection Inability to share information Increased cost of security Widely dispersed assets Widely dispersed owners and operators Finding training and empowering security personnel Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) controls and communications Siting constraints Long lead-time equipment Availability of restoration funds R&D focused on vulnerabilities

24. Electrical-Gas Interdependency There has been a proliferation of natural gas This has resulted in a shift to use gas for generation, especially as older plants using other fuels are retired Pipeline capacities are an issue during cold weather New England governors and other parties are bringing forward creative ideas to make long-term commitments to build new capacity Additional gas pipeline capacity, accompanied by supply contracts, is required to meet the growing demand for natural gas for power generation

25. Recommendations – Security, Privacy, and Resilience 1 (4) Facilitate, encourage, or mandate that secure sensing, “defense in depth,” fast reconfiguration and self-healing be built into the infrastructure. Continue developing regional planning of a more redundant and less vulnerable transmission grid Continue developing operational tools to more accurately forecast the availability of natural gas supply for generators and improve unit commitment decisions

26. Recommendations – Security, Privacy, and Resilience 2 (4) Mandate consumer data privacy and security for AMI systems to provide protection against personal profiling, real-time remote surveillance, identity theft and home invasions, activity censorship and decisions based on inaccurate data Support alternatives for Utilities that wish to eliminate the use of wireless telecom networks and the public Internet to decrease grid vulnerabilities –Include options for utilities to obtain private spectrum at a reasonable costs

27. Recommendations – Security, Privacy, and Resilience 3 (4) Improve the sharing of intelligence and threat information and analysis to develop proactive protection strategies, –Includes development of coordinated hierarchical threat coordination centers – at local, regional and national levels –May require either more security clearances issued to electric sector individuals or treatment of some intelligence and threat information and analysis as sensitive business information, rather than as classified information

28. Recommendations – Security, Privacy, and Resilience 4 (4) Speed up the development and enforcement of cyber security standards, compliance requirements and their adoption. Facilitate and encourage design of security from the start and include it in standards Design communications and controls systems for more limited failures including better EMP withstand capabilities Increase investment in the grid and in R&D areas that assure the security of the cyber infrastructure (algorithms, protocols, chip-level & application-level)

29. Recommendations – Markets and Policy 1 (2) Use the National Institute of Standards and Technology Smart Grid Collaboration or the NARUC Smart Grid Collaborative as models to bridge the jurisdictional gap between the federal and the state regulatory organizations on issues such as technology upgrades and system security More transparent, participatory and collaborative discussion among federal and state agencies, transmission and distribution asset owners, regional transmission operators and independent system operators and their members and supporting research to improve understanding of mutual impacts, interactions and benefits

30. Recommendations – Markets and Policy 2 (2) Continue working at a federal level on better coordination of electricity and gas markets to mitigate potential new reliability issues due to increasing reliance on gas generation Update the wholesale market design to reflect the speed at which a generator can increase or decrease the amount of generation needed to complement variable resources

31. Recommendations 1. Facilitate, encourage, or mandate that secure sensing, “defense in depth,” fast reconfiguration and self-healing be built into the infrastructure 2. Mandate security for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure, providing protection against Personal Profiling, guarantee consumer Data Privacy, Real-time Remote Surveillance, Identity Theft and Home Invasions, Activity Censorship, and Decisions Based on Inaccurate Data 3. Wireless and the public Internet increase vulnerability and thus should be avoided 4. Bridge the jurisdictional gap between Federal/NERC and the state commissions on cyber security 5. Electric generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption need to be safe, reliable, and economical in their own right. Asset owners should be required to practice due diligence in securing their infrastructure as a cost of doing business 6. Develop coordinated hierarchical threat coordination centers – at local, regional, and national levels – that proactively assess precursors and counter cyber attacks 7. Speed up the development and enforcement of cyber security standards, compliance requirements and their adoption. Facilitate and encourage design of security in from the start and include it in standards 8. Increase investment in the grid and in R&D areas that assure the security of the cyber infrastructure (algorithms, protocols, chip-level and application-level security) 9. Develop methods, such as self-organizing micro-grids, to facilitate grid segmentation that limits the effects of cyber and physical attacks

32. Energy Infrastructure, Economics, Efficiency, Environment, Secure Communications and Adaptive Dynamic Systems Adaptive Systems (self-healing) Economics Efficiency Incentives Private Good Electric Power Reliability Public Good Complex, highly nonlinear infrastructure Evolving markets, rules and designs “if you measure it you manage it  if you price it you manage it even better”… Technologies, Designs, Policies, Options, Risks/Valuation “Prices to Devices” Society (including Policy & Environment)

33. IEEE Smart Grid http://smartgrid.ieee.orghttp://smartgrid.ieee.org

36. Summary Recommendations Support holistic, integrated approach in simultaneously managing fleet of assets to best achieve optimal cost-effective solutions addressing the following: –Aging infrastructure –Grid hardening (including weather-related events, physical vulnerability, and cyber-physical security) –System reliability Urgently address managing new Smart Grid assets such as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and intelligent electronic devices