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Fabrizio Bresciani (World Bank, Philippines)

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Presentation on theme: "Fabrizio Bresciani (World Bank, Philippines)"— Presentation transcript:

1 Land Reform, Rural Development and Poverty in the Philippines: Revisiting the Agenda
Fabrizio Bresciani (World Bank, Philippines) Nobuhiko Fuwa (Chiba University, Japan) Arsenio Balisacan (SEARCA, University of the Philippines)

2 History and salient features of land reform
PD 27 (1971): covering rice areas, setting basis for later legislation Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Operation Land Leasehold (OLL) RA 6657 (1989): launch of CARP and extension of agrarian reform to cover all agricultural lands

3 CARP’s Components Land Adjudication and Distribution / Land Tenure Improvement Program Beneficiaries Development ARC Strategy (1993): targeting support services to selected agrarian reform communities Agrarian Justice Delivery: adjudication and land valuation Emphasis between components (and within components) shifting with political conditions, challenges in the field, opportunism Distribution of lands peaked during Ramos’ administration Compulsory acquisition proved difficult to implement given loopholes and limitations in the legislation System of incentives also played a role in the bureaucracy’s response

4 Modalities of land transfer and tenurial reform:
Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) Voluntary Land Transfers (VLT) Non-private Agricultural Lands (settlements, government owned lands, landed estates) Operation Land Leasehold (OLL) Titling in Public A&D Lands (DENR): Forestry Sector CBFM/ISF

5 CARL: key legal provisions
Land cannot be rented and has to be worked by the beneficiary Cannot be sold before agrarian debt is repaid Cannot be used as collateral Rental rates are determined out of the market Land valuation carried out by Land Bank and can be challenged in regular court system

6 CARP scope, by program (2006)
Private Lands (DAR) 3,1 million Ha DENR 3.78 million Ha Non-private lands (DAR) 1.34 million Ha.

7 CARP Accomplishment (2007)
225.6% 133.4% 18.4%

8 An Incomplete Transfer of Rights? The Issue of Collective CLOAs
71% 83% 65% 86% 58% 69% Typical case for C-CLOAs: plantations, idle lands, not tenanted lands 90% of C-CLOAs issued under co-ownership (i.e. in the name of all beneficiaries) 10% are Cooperative/Farmers Organization CLOAs (title issued in name of the organization) Guidelines for Collective CLOAs in RA 6657: where clear economies of scale exist

9 The agricultural economy context

10 Poverty Trends

11 CARP’s impact on poverty
Several impact assessment studies conducted in the past Mixed or non representative results Critical lack of comprehensive data Need to “triangulate” to draw conclusive picture Resorted to provincial data constructed from the Family Income Expenditure Survey & DAR information on accomplishments in land distribution

12 CARP’s impact on poverty: key results
Positive impact on provincial growth (Balisacan and Fuwa, 2007) and hence on poverty indirectly But very small direct effect on poverty, especially during the last decade Redistribution of private land has strong effect on poverty: +10% accomplishment leads to +0.3% in rate of poverty reduction Compulsory acquisition has strongest effect on poverty: +10% leads to +0.8% in rate of poverty reduction Failure to target prime private agricultural lands and slow implementation appear as causes of disappointing progress Overall impact on poverty is positive but below expectations Program’s limitations rooted in its non-expropriatory nature and in political economy considerations

13 The ARC strategy: key characteristics
Meant to empower and capacitate agrarian reform beneficiaries Delivery of support services: post harvest facilities, farm to market roads, irrigation, technical extension CDD based approach mainstreamed in local development plans Area-based approach focusing on maximizing scope of impact Excellent tool for attracting ODA Absorbed about 30% of CARP’s regular budget annually

14 Merits and limits of the ARC strategy
Productivity higher by 15% in farms located in ARCs Incomplete coverage: only 50% of ARBs covered Targeting favors areas with medium agricultural potential and weakly correlated with poverty Extension of support services to marginal areas continues being a policy (and financial) challenge Further reinforces the higher productivity of small farms, contributing to take off of reform beneficiaries Little differentiation across communities that differ in terms of resource endowments and agricultural potential

15 Impact on land market Rentals & sharecropping relevant for accessing land Land markets works more poorly in ARCs Loss of productivity and of returns to specialization

16 Impact on access to credit
70% farms rationed in formal credit market Hypothesis: lack of individual title or collective CLOA affects negatively access to credit +1 ha of land with individual title leads to +6% probability of accessing credit, even among small farmers Cooperative membership improves access to credit Being an ARB has negative impact on access Signals impact of legal restrictions on land transferability on use of land as collateral

17 Sustainability issues
Lack of systematic data to analyze sales of reformed land Anecdotal evidence suggests phenomenon is widespread In plantation sector evidence is where phenomenon is most dramatic Loopholes in legislation do not impede but raise transaction costs of selling land Implications for repayment of the agrarian debt Key issue in the debate on CARP’s extension

18 Conclusions and (hopefully wise) policy recommendations
Slow progress and typical challenges faced by centralized agrarian reform programs Weak land administration system Some trade-off between efficiency and equity in plantation sector A scaled up decentralized approach to land reform is needed to maintain momentum Threat of compulsory acquisition should be maintained and focused on larger and more difficult holdings The role of agriculture in poverty reduction is not uniform across rural landscape. Need to identify areas where to focus resources Land distribution and support services need to go hand in hand Legal reforms also necessary to reactivate land markets Break-up of mother CLOAs needs to be addressed


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