1. Stuxnet – Getting to the target Liam O Murchu Operations Manager, Symantec Security Response 1 Feb 2011

2. Agenda Stuxnet – Getting to the target 2 Stuxnet Capabilities 1 Network Distribution Tactics 2 Intel & Targets 3 Sophistication & Success 4 Solutions & Lessons Learned 5

3. Stuxnet Features Discovery disclosed in July, 2010 Attacks industrial control systems likely an Iranian uranium enrichment facility Modifies and hides code on Siemens PLCs connected to frequency converters Contains 7 methods to propagate, 4 zero day exploits, 1 known exploit, 3 rootkits, 2 unauthorized certificates, 2 Siemens security issues, 1 target. 3 versions, June 2009, March 2010, April 2010 Stuxnet - Sabotaging Industrial Control Systems 3

4. Stuxnet is targeted Stuxnet – Getting to the target 4 Iranian Target

5. PLCs Monitors Input and Output lines – Sensors on input – switches/equipment on outputs – Many different vendors Stuxnet seeks specific Models – s7-300 s7-400 Stuxnet & PLCs 5 Programmable Logic Controller Stuxnet is Targeted Targeting a Specific type of PLC Searches for a Specific Configuration

6. Programming a PLC Simatic or Step 7 software – Used to write code in STL or other languages STL code is compiled to MC7 byte code MC7 byte code is transferred to the PLC Control PC can now be disconnected Stuxnet Infecting PLCs 6 Step7, STL and MC7

7. Attack Preparation Stuxnet – Getting to the target 7 Uranium Enrichment Facility Stuxnet Creator PLC Control PC

8. Attack Considerations Stuxnet – Getting to the target 8 Air Gap Corporate LAN Internet Etc

9. How Stuxnet Attacks Corporations Stuxnet uses 7 different methods to propagate! 1.USB drives – Zero Day 2.Print Spooler Vuln – Zero Day 3.Ms08-067 Vuln 4.Network Shares 5.P2P sharing 6.Wincc Hard coded Password 7.Step7 projects 9 Stuxnet – Getting to the target Control PC

10. Self-Replication Step 7 Project Files Stuxnet - Sabotaging Industrial Control Systems 10 MyProject.s7p ApiLog types hOmSave7 S7HK40AX S7HK41AX … xutils links listen … +00 WORD count +02 BYTE[] records types: DB 14 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 +00 WORD count +02 BYTE[] records %Step7%\S7BIN %SYSTEM32% %SYSTEM% %WINDIR% project's hOmSave7/* subdirectories s7hkimdb.dll xr000000.mdx (encrypted Stuxnet) s7p00001.dbf (Stuxnet datafile) s7000001.mdx (Stuxnet config data file)

11. Stuxnet Windows Rootkit Stuxnet - Sabotaging Industrial Control Systems 11

12. Attack Execution Stuxnet – Getting to the target 12 Air Gap Corporate LAN Internet Etc 1. Initial Delivery 3. Reporting Updates 2. Network Exploits 4. Bridge AirGap 5. Deliver Payload

13. Delivering the threat Stuxnet targeted specific companies in Iran Only 10 initial targets Resulting in over 14k infections Research was needed to identify valuable targets Companies connected to Uranium enrichment Hope to infect someone who would visit a Uranium enrichment facility Someone who worked on Uranium enrichment projects Actual delivery method is unknown Stuxnet – Getting to the target 13

14. Limited Spread Attackers wanted limited spread No Internet capable exploits used USB exploit only infects 3 machines USB exploit has deadline of 21 days All exploits have a deadline Large configuration file ~430 different settings Why did it spread so far? Stuxnet – Getting to the target 14

15. Why did it spread so far? Zero.lnk vulnerability wildly successful Step7 project infection very successful Misunderstanding of how contractors interact Misunderstanding of how connected companies are Intended? Needed to be more aggressive to succeed? Stuxnet – Getting to the target 15

16. Was Stuxnet Successful We don’t know. 1 year in the wild undiscovered Over 100k infections Majority in Iran Natanz shut down Industrial Companies Infected Reports of infections at Natanz and Busheir IAEA report states 1000 centrifuges offline in Nov 2009 Stuxnet – Getting to the target 16

17. Was Stuxnet Successful We don’t know. Discovered 3 months after USB zero day added No report of centrifuges out of action since March Gained high media attention Analysis performed Iranian authorities aware Stuxnet – Getting to the target 17

18. Sophistication First threat to target hardware Targets Uranium Enrichment Large amount of code Very configurable 4 zero days Long Reconnaissance phase Needed Hardware for testing Targets 95/98,Win2k,Winxp,Vista,Win7… 3 Rootkits PLC programming knowledge Stuxnet – Getting to the target 18

19. Sophistication It was discovered No advanced encryption C&C infrastructure easily taken down Infection information stored Blue screens?? (unconfirmed) P2P not protected Escaped outside of Iran Stuxnet – Getting to the target 19

20. New Version Not simple to create new version Cannot just drop in new zero days Target specific information required PLC programming knowledge Exploit knowledge Real danger is the idea Now people know it can be done People can start their own projects knowing it is possible Stuxnet – Getting to the target 20

21. Solutions & lessons learned Insider threat is significant – Employees are major risk IP is extremely valuable, protect it at all costs Monitor systems and networks Watch for red flags Implemented real air gaps Or accept this is not possible and protect computers inside the air gap more vigorously White listing, behavior blocking and reputation based solutions can mitigate threat. Device blocking – USBs, contractor laptops, etc.. Vigilance is key Stuxnet – Getting to the target 21

22. Response Need dedicated resources in place in advance that can switch focus to a new threat quickly Need engineers who are familiar with the latest developments in the threat landscape Need to respond quickly – critical infrastructure may be at risk Private public partnership will be important Growing market We will see more of these types of threats in the future, need to prepare for that. Stuxnet – Getting to the target 22

23. Summary Stuxnet is the first publicly known malware to intend real-world damage Required resources at the level of a nation-state While as a whole extremely sophisticated, the technique to inject code into PLCs is not Enterprises should assume attackers know how these systems work Has changed our job at Symantec We expect to see more of these threats Stuxnet – Getting to the target 23

24. White Paper Available Stuxnet Technical Details Available here: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/se curity_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdfhttp://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/se curity_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf Stuxnet – Getting to the target 24 W32.Stuxnet Dossier

25. Thank you! Copyright © 2010 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec and the Symantec Logo are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners. This document is provided for informational purposes only and is not intended as advertising. All warranties relating to the information in this document, either express or implied, are disclaimed to the maximum extent allowed by law. The information in this document is subject to change without notice. Thank you! Stuxnet – Getting to the target 25 Liam O Murchu - liam_omurchu@symantec.com