1. PRIAM: PRivate Information Access Management on Outsourced Storage Service Providers Mark Shaneck Karthikeyan Mahadevan Jeff Yongdae Kim

2. Collection of Personal Information on the Internet * A survey by www.epic.org on the hot 100 websites (www.100hot.com) suggested that 49 of these collect private informationwww.epic.org “For example America Online is matching its subscribers to demographic and psychographic data obtained from Donnelley Marketing” *Source: http://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.htmlhttp://www.epic.org/reports/surfer-beware.html

3. Privacy – do we have it on the Internet ? Privacy is a right that every individual should possess Apparently this concept is not true in the Internet "You have zero privacy now. Get over it“ - Sun CEO Scott McNealy Conclusion: Protecting privacy will be one the greatest challenges for the Internet

4. Outline

5. Problem Setting Alice wants to have control over her private information She wants to store it with a highly available storage provider, which she could access from anywhere Storage provider should not know what she is storing Alice - Minimal computation Alice should be able to let the people she like access some information for a limited period of time

6. Basic Architecture

7. Existing Approaches - ACL Access Control List: Owner defines an ACL and gives it to the PIP Problems PIP should be trusted. Else encrypt the data – implies more key management issues

8. Existing Approaches - Kerberos Kerberos : Owner has to play AS Problems Owner has to online Also PIP should be trusted Else encrypt files – key management problems (similar to ACL approach)

9. Existing Approaches - Lockbox Idea – encrypt the file with symmetric key and encrypt the symmetric key with public key of users who will be granted access (used in Storage Security) Problem owner has to be online to provide access to new user! Once the authorization expires – update the lockbox, has to contact PIP!

10. PRIAM PRIAM is a suite of protocols: Private Information Storage Protocol Private Information Evolution Protocol Private Information Authorization Protocol Private Information Retrieval Protocol

11. Challenge How can the PIP do updation without owner interference? There exists a function f such that:

12. Building Blocks Safe Prime: A prime p is called a safe prime if it is of the form p = 2p ’ +1, where p ’ is a prime Odd hash function Key Chain

13. Set up Owner does the following Choose two safe primes p, q and compute n=pq Pick random odd number r (blinding factor) which is co prime to φ(n) Public value : n Private values: p, q, p ’, q ’, φ(n), r

14. Private Information Storage Alice wants to store t items {m (0), m (1),…,m (t) } – after initial setup For each i, 1≤i≤t, generate an odd random number such that Compute: To store the information with PIP, Alice will send encrypted message, along with initial value of k, index i:

15. Private Information Evolution PIP updates the encryption key every night (whenever appropriate) as follows: Note, that for day j :

16. Private Information Authorization Bob wants to know some information about Alice, he must get Alice’s consent. Alice -> Bob : This message is sent over a secure channel, where r is a fixed odd random. Alice could give Bob authorization for over a period of time

17. Temporal Private Information Retrieval Querier can now recover the message as

18. Performance Evaluation CommunicationComputationStorage Private Information Storage 1Owner: tPIP: t records, t keys Owner: TJ tokens Private Information Evolution 0N0 Private Information Authorization 20Querier: T tokens Temporal Private Information Retrieval 2Querier: 10

19. Security Analysis Confidentiality Our scheme is secure against an outside attack Our scheme is secure against an inside attacker under the hardness of finding φ(n) from n Integrity: RSA guarantees this property

20. Security Analysis – Cont’d Collusion The advantage of any number of collusion is not better that that of an inside attacker with several transcripts Knowing the values of encryption keys without the knowledge of φ(n) does not help finding the inverse of a future key

21. Application – (1) Private Information on the Internet We will be able to realize privacy on the Internet using our approach. For example Alice purchasing products from a website could provide authorization to some information, with which the website could contact a PIP

22. Application – (2) Disclosure of Medical History Information Any doctor would be able to access the required medical information about a patient with his/her authorization

23. Conclusions We have proposed a scheme to achieve control over one’s private information Provide dynamic authorization No necessity to contact the PIP for key updates PIP is minimally trusted !

24. Future Work Applying to Storage Area Networks Symmetric Key Version of this scheme Supporting multiple owners Digital watermarking or traitor tracing to prevent information dissemination from an authorized querier.