1. MBMC Public Goods and Tax Policy

2. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 2 Introduction Questions How big, exactly, should government be? What goods and services should government provide? How should government raise revenue?

3. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 3 Introduction Questions What other powers should government have to constrain the behavior of its citizens? How should the various powers of government be apportioned to local, state, and federal levels?

4. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 4 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods Public Good  A good or service that, to at least some degree, is both nonrival and nonexcludable

5. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 5 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods Nonrival Good  A good whose consumption by one person does not diminish its availability for others Nonexcludable Good  A good that is difficult, or costly, to exclude nonpayers from consuming

6. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 6 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods Pure Public Good  A good or service that, to a high degree, is both nonrival and nonexcludable

7. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 7 Government Provision of Public Goods Pure public goods are provided by government because: For-profit private firms would find it difficult to recover their costs of production. Since the MC of serving additional users is zero once the good has been produced, then charging for the good would be inefficient.

8. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 8 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods Collective Good  A good or service that, to at least some degree, is nonrival but excludable Pure Private Good  One for which nonpayers can easily be excluded and for which each unit consumed by one person means one less unit available for others

9. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 9 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods Pure Commons Good  One for which nonpayers cannot easily be excluded and for which each unit consumed by one person means one less unit available for others

10. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 10 The Classification of Private, Public, and Hybrid Goods Commons good (fish in the ocean) Public good (national defense) Private good (wheat) Collective good (pay-per-view TV) LowHigh Nonrival Nonexcludable Low High

11. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 11 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods A pure public good should be provided by the government only when the benefit exceeds the cost. The cost of the public good is the sum of the explicit and implicit costs incurred to produce it.

12. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 12 Government Provision of Public Goods Public Goods versus Private Goods The benefit of the public good is the sum of the reservation prices of all people who want the good.

13. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 13 Government Provision of Public Goods Paying for Public Goods Not everyone benefits equally from a public good or service. Therefore, the most equitable way to pay for the public good or service is to tax people in proportion to their willingness to pay.

14. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 14 Government Provision of Public Goods Example Will Prentice and Wilson buy a water filter?

15. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 15 Government Provision of Public Goods Example Scenario  Prentice and Wilson own adjacent property on Cayuga Lake  Zebra mussels require each to add chlorine to their water intake  They can buy and share a filtration system for $1,000  Wilson earns twice as much as Prentice  Wilson is willing to pay $800 and Prentice $400  The benefit, $1,200 > than the cost, $1,000

16. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 16 Government Provision of Public Goods Example The Outcome  Sharing is efficient  Barriers to sharing the cost oCost of negotiation oFree rider problem oReluctance to share information

17. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 17 Government Provision of Public Goods Example Will government buy the water filter if there is an “equal tax” rule”?

18. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 18 Government Provision of Public Goods Example Assume  There is a “nondiscrimination” tax rule.  A majority of the citizens must approve the provision of a public good.

19. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 19 Government Provision of Public Goods Example The Outcome  A head tax will collect $500 each from Prentice and Wilson.  Prentice has a $400 reservation price, and will vote against it.

20. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 20 Government Provision of Public Goods A head tax is a regressive tax. Head Tax  A tax that collects the same amount from every taxpayer Regressive Tax  A tax under which the proportion of income paid in taxes declines as income rises

21. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 21 Government Provision of Public Goods Observation A head tax rule will rule out the provision of many worthwhile public goods.

22. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 22 Government Provision of Public Goods Example Will the government buy the filter if there is a proportional tax on income? Proportional Income Tax A tax under which all taxpayers pay the same proportion of their incomes in taxes

23. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 23 Government Provision of Public Goods Example With a proportional tax:  Wilson pays $667 and Prentice pays $333.  Both amounts are below their reservation prices.  They would approve the filtration system.  Economic surplus would increase: oWilson: $800 - $667 = $133 oPrentice: $400 - $333 = $67 oTotal increase = $200

24. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 24 Government Provision of Public Goods Economic Naturalist Why don’t most married couples contribute equally to joint purchases?

25. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 25 Government Provision of Public Goods Economic Naturalist Scenario  Hillary earns $2,000,000/yr  Bill earns $20,000/yr Observation  What would happen if they choose to contribute equally on all purchases?

26. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 26 Government Provision of Public Goods Economic Naturalist Observation  Different individuals are free to consume whatever quantity and quality of most private goods they choose to buy, but jointly consumed goods must be provided in the same quantity and quality for all persons.

27. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 27 Government Provision of Public Goods Economic Naturalist Income elasticity of demand for public goods and services is greater than 1. A head tax would reduce the economic surplus. A progressive tax increases economic surplus.

28. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 28 Government Provision of Public Goods Progressive Tax One in which the proportion of income paid in taxes rises as income rises.

29. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 29 Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Private Good Q1Q1 Price ($/unit) Q2Q2 24 D1D1 18 249 D2D2 + + 36 Market demand is the horizontal summation of the individual demand curves.

30. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 30 Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Private Good Q = Q 1 + Q 2 Price ($/unit) 24 9 D = D 1 + D 2 = = 60 Market demand is the horizontal summation of the individual demand curves.

31. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 31 Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Public Good Q2Q2 Price ($/unit) Q1Q1 Price ($/unit) 8 36 D2D2 24 36 D1D1 18 24 A public good demand curve is the vertical summation of the individual demand curves

32. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 32 Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Public Good Q 8 D = D 1 + D 2 42 Price ($/unit) 36 A public good demand curve is the vertical summation of the individual demand curves

33. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 33 The Optimal Quantity of Parkland Acres of parkland $1,000s/acre 200 A0A0 A*A* 140 80 Demand Marginal cost

34. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 34 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Advantages of Using Government to Provide Public Goods Cost of adding a tax is relatively low Minimizes the difficulty in determining who will bear what share of the tax burden May be the only feasible provider

35. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 35 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Disadvantages of Using Government to Provide Public Goods One-size-fits-all approach will not satisfy everyone’s demand for public goods. Many people may oppose mandatory taxation.

36. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 36 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Private Provision of Public Goods Alternatives to using taxes to fund public goods:  Funding by donation  Development of new means to exclude nonpayers  Private contracting  Sale of by-products

37. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 37 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Economic Naturalist Why do television networks favor Jerry Springer over Masterpiece Theatre?

38. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 38 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Economic Naturalist Assume  Springer has 20% market share  Masterpiece Theatre has 18% market share  Springer viewers are willing to pay $10 million  Masterpiece Theater viewers are willing to pay $30 million  Detergent advertising pays for the show and chooses the largest audience

39. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 39 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Economic Naturalist Outcome  The indirect financing of public goods may reduce the economic surplus.  Public control of programming may be inefficient.  The pay-per-view alternative limits the audience and reduces efficiency because the MC of another viewer is zero.

40. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 40 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Private Provision of Public Goods Observations  The mix in the public and private provision of public goods and services will vary by society and groups within society.  Technology for delivery and paying for public goods and services and people’s preferences will influence the mix of public and private financing of public goods.

41. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 41 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Example By how much is economic surplus reduced by a pay-per-view charge?

42. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 42 Lost surplus from $10 viewing fee Pay-per-view Fee = $10 10 million viewers Broadcast TV No fee MC of additional viewers = 0 20 million viewers Loss in economic surplus $50 million The Loss in Surplus from a Pay-per-View Fee Viewing households Cost ($/episode) 20 10,000,00020,000,000 10

43. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 43 The Loss in Surplus from a Pay-per-View Fee Viewing households (millions) Cost ($/episode) 15 30 5 20100 How would your answer differ if the demand curve had instead been as shown?

44. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 44 The Optimal Quantity of a Public Good Private Provision of Public Goods Observations  Charging a positive price for a good whose MC = 0 will reduce the economic surplus.  The more elastic the demand, the greater the loss in economic surplus.

45. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 45 Additional Functions of Government Externalities and Property Rights Two roles of government:  Regulation of activities that generate externalities  Defining and enforcing property rights

46. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 46 Additional Functions of Government Local, State, or Federal Advantages of local and state government:  Better communication and response to the citizens  Local choices will reflect the unique preferences of the residents

47. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 47 Additional Functions of Government Local, State, or Federal Advantages of federal government:  Economies of scale in defense spending  Positive and negative externalities may be nationwide

48. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 48 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Why does check-splitting make the total restaurant bill higher?

49. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 49 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Scenario  10 people going to dinner agree to split the check evenly  Sven is choosing between chocolate mousse (price = $6; reservation price = $3) and bread pudding (price = $10; reservation price = $4)  Price to Sven is $.60 for the mousse or $1.00 for the pudding

50. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 50 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Economic surplus:  Mousse = $3.00 - $0.60 = $2.40  Pudding = $4.00 - $1.00 = $3.00 All diners will order desert and have an economic loss of $6.00. If they had paid individually, no one would have desert.

51. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 51 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Why do legislators often support one another’s pork barrel spending programs?

52. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 52 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Pork Barrel Spending A public expenditure that is larger than the total benefit it creates, but that is favored by a legislator because his or her constituents benefit from the expenditure by more than their share of the resulting extra taxes

53. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 53 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Logrolling The practice whereby legislators support one another’s legislative proposals

54. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 54 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Scenario  A congressional district with one-hundredth of the taxpayers  The local representative delivers a project that creates $100 million in benefits and costs $150 million  Districts share of the cost : o$150 million/100 = $1.5 million

55. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 55 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Economic Naturalist Outcome  Economic surplus to district residents: o$100 million - $1.5 million = $98.5 million Question Why would legislator A support a project in legislator B’s home district?

56. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 56 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Rent-Seeking Inefficiency occurs when:  The gains from a government program are concentrated in the hands of a few beneficiaries.  The costs are spread among many.

57. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 57 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Rent-Seeking Assume  Price support bill will raise sugar prices by $0.10/lb.  Average American consumes 100 pounds of sugar per year.  Demand for sugar is inelastic.

58. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 58 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Rent-Seeking Outcomes  Consumer expenditures on sugar will increase by slightly less than $10/year.  Revenues to the sugar industry will increase by $1 billion/year.

59. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 59 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process What Do You Think? Why don’t citizens vote out legislators who support such bills?  Hints oRational ignorance oFree riders

60. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 60 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Rent-Seeking The socially unproductive efforts of people or firms to win a prize

61. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 61 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example Why would anyone pay $50 for a $20 bill?

62. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 62 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example The rules:  Initial bid of $0.50  Succeeding bids must exceed the previous bid by at least $0.50  When bidding stops, the 1st and 2nd highest bidders must pay their respective bids  The highest bidder receives the $20  The second highest bidder gets nothing

63. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 63 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example Who will make the opening bid?

64. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 64 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example How much will cellular phone companies bid for an exclusive license?

65. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 65 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example Scenario  Wyoming will choose one of two companies to provide cellular phone service o1 year franchise oEconomic profit = $20 million oThe franchise will go to the applicant that spends the most on lobbying oApplicants cannot collude

66. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 66 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example Outcomes  If both spend the same, they have a 50% chance at $20 million or an expected profit of $10 million minus the lobbying cost.  If collusion occurred they would each bid the same small amount.  When each spends $10 million, their expected profit = 0. o(.50 x $20 million) - ($10 million)

67. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 67 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Example An alternative:  Pick the company based on the price they promise to charge for their services

68. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 68 Sources of Inefficiency in the Political Process Starve the Government What do you think?  Is it efficient to reduce government waste by reducing tax collections?

69. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 69 What Should We Tax? The objectives of the tax system are to: Raise sufficient revenue to finance public goods and services. Minimize the side-effects of the taxes.

70. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 70 What Should We Tax? Observations From 1969 to 1998 the federal government ran a budget deficit. The federal government finances the deficits by borrowing. The borrowing may crowd out private investment spending.

71. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 71 What Should We Tax? Crowding Out Government borrowing that leads to higher interest rates, causing private firms to cancel planned investment projects

72. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 72 4 S + T 22 Taxes may reduce economic efficiency. Assume Supply and demand embody all relevant costs and benefits Equilibrium is socially optimal Impose $2,000 tax, the equilibrium is not socially optimal The Loss in Surplus from a Tax on Cars Quantity (miilions of cars/year) Cost ($1,000s/car) S 20 6

73. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 73 What Should We Tax? Observations The economic loss of a tax may be offset by the surplus created from the public good or service. Minimize the deadweight loss from a tax by taxing goods and services with an inelastic demand and supply.

74. MBMC Copyright c 2007 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 16: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 74 What Should We Tax? Observations If production creates negative or positive externalities, a tax may increase the economic surplus.

75. MBMC End of Chapter End of Chapter