1. 1 Currency Wars: Global Money in 2010 Jeffrey Frankel Harpel Professor of Capital Formation & Growth, Harvard University Macquarie Securities Boston, December 8, 2010

2. 2 Currency Wars Chronology, Fall 2010 September 15 Japan buys $20 b, for ¥, September 15 Japan buys $20 b, for ¥, after a 6-year absence from FX markets;after a 6-year absence from FX markets; thereby joining Switzerland, the other floater to have appreciated in 2008-09 GFC and to have fought it by FX intervention.thereby joining Switzerland, the other floater to have appreciated in 2008-09 GFC and to have fought it by FX intervention.

3. 3 September 27: warning from Brazil’s Finance September 27: warning from Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega: “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” I.e., countries everywhere are trying to push down the value of their currencies, to gain exports & employment, I.e., countries everywhere are trying to push down the value of their currencies, to gain exports & employment, a goal that is not globally consistent.a goal that is not globally consistent. Currency Wars chronology, continued

4. 4 Renewed flows to emerging markets in 2010 have met with $ purchases in FX intervention Renewed flows to emerging markets in 2010 have met with $ purchases in FX intervention Brazil, Korea, Thailand, India & others must manage inflows:Brazil, Korea, Thailand, India & others must manage inflows: Appreciation Appreciation Buying $ to prevent appreciation Buying $ to prevent appreciation Capital controls? Capital controls? Currency Wars chronology, continued

5. 5 October 15: October 15: U.S Treasury postpones semi-annual report to Congress on currency manipulation although there has clearly been little appreciation of the RMB since China announces more flexibility in June.although there has clearly been little appreciation of the RMB since China announces more flexibility in June. (All a repeat of 2005.)(All a repeat of 2005.)

6. 6 November November After inflation rises to 4.4% in October, China raises i & reserve requirements and adopts new price controls.After inflation rises to 4.4% in October, China raises i & reserve requirements and adopts new price controls. US core inflation falls to 0.6% for year, the lowest since 1957.US core inflation falls to 0.6% for year, the lowest since 1957. => fears of deflation trap.=> fears of deflation trap. Currency Wars chronology, continued

7. 7 Nov. 17 As European sovereign debt crisis resurfaces in Ireland, € hits 7-week low (1.3 $/€).Nov. 17 As European sovereign debt crisis resurfaces in Ireland, € hits 7-week low (1.3 $/€). Nov.20-21 Fed announces QE2 (signaled since August):Nov.20-21 Fed announces QE2 (signaled since August): will purchase $600b. will purchase $600b. Short-term market reaction: $ depreciates Short-term market reaction: $ depreciates Immediate attacks on Fed action -- Immediate attacks on Fed action -- Palin & conservatives: “debauching the currency”Palin & conservatives: “debauching the currency” German & China: $ depreciation is a deliberate salvo in currency warsGerman & China: $ depreciation is a deliberate salvo in currency wars Currency Wars chronology, continued

8. 8 The reactions of most emerging markets show they learned two lessons from the 1990s currency crises: Advantages of holding forex reserves: Advantages of holding forex reserves: Lower frequency & severity of crises.Lower frequency & severity of crises. Advantages of floating: Advantages of floating: Speculators don’t have a target to shoot at;Speculators don’t have a target to shoot at; Accommodate shocks;Accommodate shocks; Discourage unhedged $ liabilities.Discourage unhedged $ liabilities. Such currency mismatch leads to bad balance sheet effects when devaluation comes. Such currency mismatch leads to bad balance sheet effects when devaluation comes. How did these lessons fare in the global crisis of 2008-09? How did these lessons fare in the global crisis of 2008-09?

9. 9 Reserves Even though many developing & emerging market countries described themselves as floating, Even though many developing & emerging market countries described themselves as floating, most took advantage of the boom of 2003-2008 to build up reserves to unheard of heights, most took advantage of the boom of 2003-2008 to build up reserves to unheard of heights, in the aftermath of the crises of 1994-2001.in the aftermath of the crises of 1994-2001. in contrast to past capital booms (1975-81, 1990-97). in contrast to past capital booms (1975-81, 1990-97).

10. 10 When the 2008-09 global financial crisis hit, When the 2008-09 global financial crisis hit, those countries that had taken advantage of the 2003-08 boom to build up reserves did better.those countries that had taken advantage of the 2003-08 boom to build up reserves did better. Frankel & Saravelos (2010). Frankel & Saravelos (2010). Aizenman (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor (2009) Aizenman (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh & Taylor (2009) Vs. Blanchard (2009) and Rose & Spiegel (2009) Vs. Blanchard (2009) and Rose & Spiegel (2009) This had also been the most common finding in the many studies of Early Warning Indicators in past emerging market crises. This had also been the most common finding in the many studies of Early Warning Indicators in past emerging market crises.

11. 11 EWIs: The variables that show up as the strongest predictors of country crises in 83 studies are: (i) reserves and (ii) currency overvaluation Source: Frankel & Saravelos (2010)

12. 12 Best and Worst Performing Countries -- F&S (2010), Appendix 4

13. 13 F & Saravelos (2010): Bivariate

14. 14 F & Saravelos (2010): Multivariate

15. 15 Floating Most medium-income Emerging Market countries reacted to the currency crises of the 1990s by increasing exchange rate flexibility Most medium-income Emerging Market countries reacted to the currency crises of the 1990s by increasing exchange rate flexibility with the major exception of Eastern Europe.with the major exception of Eastern Europe. The flexibility has helped. The flexibility has helped.

16. 16 Poland, the only continental EU member with a floating exchange rate, was also the only one to escape negative growth in the global recession of 2009 Source: Cezary Wójcik, 2010 (de facto) % change in GDP

17. 17 Depreciation boosted net exports; contribution to GDP growth > 100% Contribution of Net X to GDP: 2009: 2,5 3,4 3,2 3,4 GDP growth rate: 1,7 Source: Cezary Wójcik kroon / $ Estonia Latvia lats / $ zlotys / $ The Polish exchange rate increased by 35%.

18. 18 Capital flows to emerging markets, especially Asia, recovered quickly from the 2009 recession. These countries again show big balance of payments surpluses Goldman Sachs

19. 19 Although China continues the most salient case, Korea, Singapore & Taiwan are also adding heavily to reserves. GS Global ECS Research

20. 20 Others, such as India & Malaysia, are currently taking the inflows in the form of currency appreciation, more than reserve accumulation. GS Global ECS Research less-managed floating (“more appreciation-friendly”) more-managed floating

21. 21 In Latin America as well, inflows have returned, less-managed floating (“more appreciation-friendly”) more-managed floating GS Global ECS Research but as appreciation in Chile & Colombia. but as appreciation in Chile & Colombia. reflected mostly as reserve accumulation in Peru,

22. 22 Fear of non-cooperative “competitive devaluation” is an argument for fixed exchange rates Fear of non-cooperative “competitive devaluation” is an argument for fixed exchange rates rooted in the 1930s.rooted in the 1930s. That is why the architects of the post-war monetary order chose fixed exchange rates at Bretton Woods, NH, in 1944.That is why the architects of the post-war monetary order chose fixed exchange rates at Bretton Woods, NH, in 1944. But it is now used to argue that China should move from fixing to floating. But it is now used to argue that China should move from fixing to floating. US Congressmen don’t care about regimes;US Congressmen don’t care about regimes; they just want a stronger RMB vs. $.they just want a stronger RMB vs. $. Is the currency war metaphor appropriate?

23. 23 Economic historians have decided competitive devaluation under 1930s conditions was not a problem after all. Economic historians have decided competitive devaluation under 1930s conditions was not a problem after all. True, countries couldn’t all devalue against each other, True, countries couldn’t all devalue against each other, But they could and did all devalue against gold But they could and did all devalue against gold which worked to ease global monetary policy,which worked to ease global monetary policy, just what was needed. just what was needed. Is the currency war metaphor applicable? continued

24. 24 The same is true today: The same is true today: The Fed’s QE2 won’t just raise the money supply in the US;The Fed’s QE2 won’t just raise the money supply in the US; it will also loosen globally,it will also loosen globally, to the extent that foreign central banks react by buying $ to the extent that foreign central banks react by buying $ to prevent their own currencies from appreciating.to prevent their own currencies from appreciating. which is what much of the world needs.which is what much of the world needs. For those who don’t need it, because they are already in danger of overheating, they can allow appreciation, and so calibrate however much expansion they want. For those who don’t need it, because they are already in danger of overheating, they can allow appreciation, and so calibrate however much expansion they want. Multilateral cooperation is not necessary for this. Multilateral cooperation is not necessary for this. Is the currency war metaphor applicable? continued

25. 25 Indeed, the currency war critics seem to have forgotten the point of a global floating system: In some places (US), unemployment is high & inflation low, In some places (US), unemployment is high & inflation low, calling for easy monetary policy;calling for easy monetary policy; In other places (China, Brazil, India…), economies are overheating, In other places (China, Brazil, India…), economies are overheating, calling for tight monetary policy.calling for tight monetary policy. The point of a floating system is to accommodate such inevitable macro divergences smoothly. The point of a floating system is to accommodate such inevitable macro divergences smoothly. No international cooperation is needed. No international cooperation is needed.

26. 26 Would this put unfair pressure on China to choose between inflation, if it continues to keep the RMB down, and appreciation? No. Perhaps China can continue to sterilize inflows awhile longer, Perhaps China can continue to sterilize inflows awhile longer, e.g., raising bank reserve requirements.e.g., raising bank reserve requirements. True, eventually it will have to give that up.True, eventually it will have to give that up. But there is nothing unfair about making China choose between inflation and appreciation. But there is nothing unfair about making China choose between inflation and appreciation. Monetary expansion by the US is perfectly legitimate Monetary expansion by the US is perfectly legitimate especially at a time of deflation danger.especially at a time of deflation danger. If it puts pressure on China, that is far more clearly within the “rules of the game” than threatening tariffs.If it puts pressure on China, that is far more clearly within the “rules of the game” than threatening tariffs.

27. 27 Other kinds of international cooperation are needed; Other kinds of international cooperation are needed; the 1930s currency war metaphors are not totally misplaced:the 1930s currency war metaphors are not totally misplaced: Currency war could turn into trade war Currency war could turn into trade war if Congress follows through on legislation to impose (WTO-illegal) tariffs on China as punishment for non-appreciation.if Congress follows through on legislation to impose (WTO-illegal) tariffs on China as punishment for non-appreciation. Until now, the US & G20 have held the line on protectionismUntil now, the US & G20 have held the line on protectionism compared to the milder recessions of 1991 & 2001, compared to the milder recessions of 1991 & 2001, let alone the Smoot Hawley tariff of 1930. let alone the Smoot Hawley tariff of 1930. Is the currency war metaphor applicable? continued

28. 28 China would take some responsibility China would take some responsibility to reallocate its economy away from exclusive reliance on exports & manufacturingto reallocate its economy away from exclusive reliance on exports & manufacturing toward domestic consumption & services, toward domestic consumption & services, health, education, housing, environment, insurance & other services. health, education, housing, environment, insurance & other services. How? By allowing the RMB to appreciate,How? By allowing the RMB to appreciate, but also by increasing domestic demand.but also by increasing domestic demand. Meanwhile, the US would ideally also take responsibility. Meanwhile, the US would ideally also take responsibility. Even while prolonging expansionary policy this year,Even while prolonging expansionary policy this year, including fiscal expansion designed with high bang-for-the-buck, including fiscal expansion designed with high bang-for-the-buck, the US should take steps today to lock in a future return to fiscal responsibility,the US should take steps today to lock in a future return to fiscal responsibility, e.g., by putting Social Security on a firm footing. e.g., by putting Social Security on a firm footing. Ideally the US & China would reach agreement on how to address current account imbalances:

29. 29 Will Unsustainable Current Account Deficits Lead to the End of Dollar Hegemony? Some argue the US current account deficit is sustainable indefinitely. Some argue the US current account deficit is sustainable indefinitely. They believe that the US will continue to enjoy its unique “exorbitant privilege,”They believe that the US will continue to enjoy its unique “exorbitant privilege,” able to borrow unlimited amounts in its own currency able to borrow unlimited amounts in its own currency because it is the dominant international reserve asset. because it is the dominant international reserve asset.

30. 30 “Bretton Woods II” Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, & Garber (2003) : Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, & Garber (2003) : today’s system is a new Bretton Woods,today’s system is a new Bretton Woods, with Asia playing the role that Europe played in the 1960s—buying up $ to prevent their own currencies from appreciating. with Asia playing the role that Europe played in the 1960s—buying up $ to prevent their own currencies from appreciating. More provocatively: China is piling up dollars not because of myopic mercantilism, but as part of an export-led development strategy that is rational given China’s need to import workable systems of finance & corporate governance.More provocatively: China is piling up dollars not because of myopic mercantilism, but as part of an export-led development strategy that is rational given China’s need to import workable systems of finance & corporate governance.

31. 31 My own view on Bretton Woods II: The 1960s analogy is indeed apt,The 1960s analogy is indeed apt, but we are closer to 1971 than to 1944 or 1958.but we are closer to 1971 than to 1944 or 1958. Why did the BW system collapse in 1971?Why did the BW system collapse in 1971? The Triffin dilemma could have taken decades to work itself out. The Triffin dilemma could have taken decades to work itself out. But the Johnson & Nixon administrations accelerated the process by fiscal & monetary expansion (driven by the Vietnam War & Arthur Burns, respectively). But the Johnson & Nixon administrations accelerated the process by fiscal & monetary expansion (driven by the Vietnam War & Arthur Burns, respectively). These policies produced: declining external balances, $ devaluation, & the end of Bretton Woods. These policies produced: declining external balances, $ devaluation, & the end of Bretton Woods.

32. 32 There is no reason to expect better today: 1) Capital mobility is much higher now than in the 1960s. 1) Capital mobility is much higher now than in the 1960s. 2) The US can no longer rely on support of foreign central banks: neither on economic grounds (they are not now, as they were then, organized into a cooperative framework where each agrees explicitly to hold $ if the others do), neither on economic grounds (they are not now, as they were then, organized into a cooperative framework where each agrees explicitly to hold $ if the others do), nor on political grounds (these creditors are not the staunch allies the US had in the 1960s). nor on political grounds (these creditors are not the staunch allies the US had in the 1960s).

33. 33 The financial crisis caused a flight to quality which evidently still means a flight to US $. US Treasury bills in 2008-09 were more in demand than ever, as reflected in very low interest rates. US Treasury bills in 2008-09 were more in demand than ever, as reflected in very low interest rates. The $ appreciated, rather than depreciating as the “hard landing” scenario had predicted. The $ appreciated, rather than depreciating as the “hard landing” scenario had predicted. => The day of reckoning had not yet arrived. => The day of reckoning had not yet arrived. Chinese warnings (2009) may be turning point: Chinese warnings (2009) may be turning point: Premier Wen worried US T bills will lose value.Premier Wen worried US T bills will lose value. PBoC Gov. Zhou proposed replacing $ as international currency.PBoC Gov. Zhou proposed replacing $ as international currency.

34. 34 Multiple International Reserve System The € now exists as a rival to the $. The € now exists as a rival to the $. The ¥ & SF are also safe havens. The ¥ & SF are also safe havens. The SDR came back from the dead in 2009. The SDR came back from the dead in 2009. Gold made a comeback as an international reserve too. Gold made a comeback as an international reserve too. Someday the RMB will join the roster. Someday the RMB will join the roster. = a multiple international reserve currency system. = a multiple international reserve currency system.

35. 35 The euro project is looking far less successful than just a few years ago Many predictions of euro skeptics have come true: Many predictions of euro skeptics have come true: Periphery countries and core countries have had trouble reconciling asymmetric monetary needs.Periphery countries and core countries have had trouble reconciling asymmetric monetary needs. Euro members have not had enough labor mobility or flexibility to make up for it.Euro members have not had enough labor mobility or flexibility to make up for it. Efforts to prevent excessive debt & bailouts have failed:Efforts to prevent excessive debt & bailouts have failed: The Stability & Growth Pact failed with members big & small. The Stability & Growth Pact failed with members big & small. The “No bailout clause” has failed with Greece. The “No bailout clause” has failed with Greece.

36. 36 Frankfurt & Brussels made 3 mistakes regarding Greece 2002-09: Did not allow spreads to open up between sovereign debt of Greece & Germany. 2002-09: Did not allow spreads to open up between sovereign debt of Greece & Germany. Winter 2010: Did not tell Greece to go to the IMF. Preferred instead to “handle it internally.” Winter 2010: Did not tell Greece to go to the IMF. Preferred instead to “handle it internally.” Still today: No “Plan B” to restructure Greek debt (and save the bailout fund for more deserving banks & PIIGs). Still today: No “Plan B” to restructure Greek debt (and save the bailout fund for more deserving banks & PIIGs).

37. 37 Judging from spreads, 2001-07, investors put zero odds on a default by Greece or other Mediterranean countries Council on Foreign Relations

38. 38 Suddenly, in 2010, the Greek sovereign spread shot up, exceeding 800% by June. Suddenly, in 2010, the Greek sovereign spread shot up, exceeding 800% by June. Even when the Greek crisis erupted, leaders in Brussels & Frankfurt seemed to view it as a black swan, Even when the Greek crisis erupted, leaders in Brussels & Frankfurt seemed to view it as a black swan, instead of recognizing it as a close cousin of the Argentine crisis of ten years earlier,instead of recognizing it as a close cousin of the Argentine crisis of ten years earlier, and many others in history, and many others in history, including among European countries.including among European countries.

39. 39 Sovereign spreads for 5 euro countries shot up in the 1 st half of 2010 Creditworthiness: Some advanced economics have fallen, as emerging markets have risen.

40. 40 Sovereign debt worries... As predicted, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is not going away. The big emerging market countries are in much better shape, in an amazing & historic role reversal.

41. 41 A remarkable role-reversal: Debt/GDP of the top 20 rich countries (≈ 80%) is already twice that of the top 20 emerging markets; and rising rapidly. By 2014 (at ≈ 120%), it could be triple.

42. 42 Ratings for “Emerging Economies” Ratings for “Advanced Economies”

43. 43

44. 44 When does the “privilege” become “exorbitant?” if it accrues solely because of size and history, without the US having done anything to earn the benefit by virtuous policies such as budget discipline, price stability & a stable exchange rate. if it accrues solely because of size and history, without the US having done anything to earn the benefit by virtuous policies such as budget discipline, price stability & a stable exchange rate. Since 1973, the US has racked up $10 trillion in debt and the $ has experienced a 30% loss in value compared to other major currencies. Since 1973, the US has racked up $10 trillion in debt and the $ has experienced a 30% loss in value compared to other major currencies. It seems unlikely that macroeconomic policy discipline is what has earned the US its privilege ! It seems unlikely that macroeconomic policy discipline is what has earned the US its privilege ! Appendix: Will the $ lose hegemony?

45. 45 Some argue that the privilege to incur $ liabilities has been earned in a different way: Global savings glut (Bernanke) Global savings glut (Bernanke) The US appropriately exploits its comparative advantage in supplying high-quality assets to the rest of the world. The US appropriately exploits its comparative advantage in supplying high-quality assets to the rest of the world. “ Intermediation rents…pay for the trade deficits.” -- Caballero, Farhi & Gourinchas (2008)“ Intermediation rents…pay for the trade deficits.” -- Caballero, Farhi & Gourinchas (2008) In one version, the US has been operating as the World’s Venture Capitalist, accepting short-term liquid deposits and making long-term or risky investments -- Gourinchas & Rey (2008).In one version, the US has been operating as the World’s Venture Capitalist, accepting short-term liquid deposits and making long-term or risky investments -- Gourinchas & Rey (2008). US supplies high-quality assets: Cooper (2005); Forbes (2008); Ju & Wei (2008); Hausmann & Sturzenegger (2006a, b); Mendoza, Quadrini & Rios-Rull (2007a, b)…US supplies high-quality assets: Cooper (2005); Forbes (2008); Ju & Wei (2008); Hausmann & Sturzenegger (2006a, b); Mendoza, Quadrini & Rios-Rull (2007a, b)…

46. 46 The argument that the US offers assets of superior quality, and so has earned the right to finance its deficits, was undermined by the dysfunctionality revealed in the financial crisis of 2007-08. The argument that the US offers assets of superior quality, and so has earned the right to finance its deficits, was undermined by the dysfunctionality revealed in the financial crisis of 2007-08. American financial institutions suffered a severe loss of credibility (corporate governance, accounting standards, rating agencies, derivatives, etc.), American financial institutions suffered a severe loss of credibility (corporate governance, accounting standards, rating agencies, derivatives, etc.), How could sub-prime mortgages be the superior type of assets that uniquely merit the respect of the world’s investors? How could sub-prime mortgages be the superior type of assets that uniquely merit the respect of the world’s investors?

47. 47 But the events of 2008-09 also undermined the opposing interpretation, the unsustainability position: But the events of 2008-09 also undermined the opposing interpretation, the unsustainability position: Why no hard landing for the $, as long feared? Why no hard landing for the $, as long feared? The $ appreciated after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, & US T bill interest rates fell. The $ appreciated after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, & US T bill interest rates fell. Clearly in 2008 the world still viewed Clearly in 2008 the world still viewed the US Treasury market as a safe haven andthe US Treasury market as a safe haven and the US $ as the premier international currency.the US $ as the premier international currency.

48. 48 Is the $’s unique role an eternal god-given constant? Is the $’s unique role an eternal god-given constant? Or will a sufficiently long record of deficits & depreciation induce investors to turn elsewhere ? Or will a sufficiently long record of deficits & depreciation induce investors to turn elsewhere ? Though arguments about the unique high quality of US private assets have been tarnished, the idea of America as World Banker is still alive: the $ is the world’s reserve currency, by virtue of US size & history.

49. 49 Historical precedent: £ ’s loss of premier international currency status in 20 th century By 1919, US had passed UK in By 1919, US had passed UK in 1.output (1872) 2.trade (1914) 3.net international creditor position (1914-19) Subsequently, $ passed £ as #1 reserve currency (1940-45). Subsequently, $ passed £ as #1 reserve currency (1940-45).

50. 50 From the literature on reserve currencies Determinant: 1. Size 2. Depth of Fin.mkt. 3. Rate of return Proxy:GDP FX turnover inflation, LR depreciation, Exch. rate variance

51. 51 From the literature, continued Network externalities => Tipping captured by: 1) Inertialags 2) Nonlinearitylogistic functional form in determinantsor dummy for leader GDP

52. 52 Chinn & Frankel (2005) Projection of $ vs € as shares of central banks’ foreign exchange reserves: a function of country size, financial market depth, & rate of return, with parameters estimated on 1973-98 data. Simulation assumes $ depreciation continues at 2001-04 rate. birth € of € This scenario showed € overtaking $ as top international reserve currency in 2022.

53. 53 International Currency Roles

54. 54 A multiple reserve currency system is inefficient, in the same sense that barter is inefficient: money was invented in the first place to cut down on the transactions costs of exchange. A multiple reserve currency system is inefficient, in the same sense that barter is inefficient: money was invented in the first place to cut down on the transactions costs of exchange. Nevertheless, if sound macro policies in the leader country cannot be presumed, the existence of competitor currencies gives the rest of the world protection against the leader exploiting its position by running up too much debt and then inflating/depreciating it away. Nevertheless, if sound macro policies in the leader country cannot be presumed, the existence of competitor currencies gives the rest of the world protection against the leader exploiting its position by running up too much debt and then inflating/depreciating it away.

55. 55 Gold Gold was seen as an anachronism just a few years ago: Gold was seen as an anachronism just a few years ago: the world’s central banks were selling off their stocks.the world’s central banks were selling off their stocks. Gold re-joined the world monetary system in 2009: Gold re-joined the world monetary system in 2009: The PBoC, RBI, & other Asian central banks bought gold, to diversify their reserves.The PBoC, RBI, & other Asian central banks bought gold, to diversify their reserves. Even in advanced countries, central banks appear to have stopped selling.Even in advanced countries, central banks appear to have stopped selling.

56. 56 Special Drawing Rights The SDR has made a surprising comeback as a potential international money, from near-oblivion. The SDR has made a surprising comeback as a potential international money, from near-oblivion. The G20 in 2009 decided to create new SDRs ($250b). The G20 in 2009 decided to create new SDRs ($250b). Shortly later, PBoC Gov. Zhou proposed replacing the $ as lead international currency with the SDR. Shortly later, PBoC Gov. Zhou proposed replacing the $ as lead international currency with the SDR. The IMF is now borrowing in SDRs. The IMF is now borrowing in SDRs. The proposal has been revived for an international substitution account at the IMF, to extinguish an unwanted $ overhang in exchange for SDRs. The proposal has been revived for an international substitution account at the IMF, to extinguish an unwanted $ overhang in exchange for SDRs. The SDR has little chance of standing up as a competitor to the € or ¥, let alone to the $. The SDR has little chance of standing up as a competitor to the € or ¥, let alone to the $. Still, it is back in the world monetary system. Still, it is back in the world monetary system.

57. 57 http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/index.htm