1. Chapter 6
Pragmatics

2. 6.1 Introduction When a diplomat says yes, he means ‘perhaps’;
When he says perhaps, he means ‘no’;
When he says no, he is not a diplomat.
When a lady says no, she means ‘perhaps’;
When she says perhaps, she means ‘yes’;
When she says yes, she is not a lady.
    Voltaire (Quoted, in Spanish, in Escandell 1993.)

3. These lines are surely correct in reminding us that more is involved in what one communicates than what one literally says; more is involved in what one means than the standard, conventional meaning of the words one uses. The words ‘yes,’ ‘perhaps,’ and ‘no’ each has a perfectly identifiable meaning, known by every speaker of English (including not very competent ones). However, as those lines illustrate, it is possible for different speakers in different circumstances to mean different things using those words.

4. How is this possible? What's the relationship among the meaning of words, what speakers mean when uttering those words, the particular circumstances of their utterance, their intentions, their actions, and what they manage to communicate? These are some of the questions that pragmatics tries to answer; the sort of questions that, roughly speaking, serve to characterize the field of pragmatics.

5. Background of “Pragmatics”
Charles Morris (1903 – 1979) was concerned with the study of the science of signs, which he called semiotic. He distinguished 3 branches of semiotics:

6. Syntax addresses the formal relations of signs to one another,
semantics the relation of signs to what they denote,
and pragmatics the relation of signs to their users and interpreters.

7. Semiotics tries to separate “objective” definitions of the structure and meaning of words and sentences in syntax and semantics from subjective and context dependent senses (often: requests or demands of actions) in pragmatics.

8. Pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and the users of those forms. In this three-part distinction, only pragmatics allows humans into the analysis.

9. Definitions and Background

10. Definitions 1 “Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.”
2 “ Pragmatics is the study of contextual
meaning”
3 “ Pragmatics is the study of how more gets
communicated than is said”
4 “ Pragmatics is the study of the expression of
relative distance.” ( Yule:2008).
Pragmatics is a study of language in use.

11. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how
the gap between sentence meaning and
speaker’s meaning is bridged.

12. pragmatic studies look for principles
pragmatic studies look for principles. Principles are not black and white; you can obey them to some extent and violate them to some extent. For example, one principle says we should tell the truth and another says we should be polite in our speech.

14. In pragmatics we always deal with processes
In pragmatics we always deal with processes. In a pragmatic inquiry, we deal with an ever-unfolding process-as the discourse goes on and on, the extra meaning of some words becomes clearer and clearer.

15. Examples (1) A: I could eat the whole of that cake
[implicature: I compliment you on the cake]
B: Oh thanks
(2) A: Do you have coffee to go?
[Implicature: Sell me coffee to go if you can]
B: Cream and sugar?

17. 6.2 Micropramatics
I was waiting for the bus, but he just drove by without stopping.
To study the meaning of such pieces of language in smaller contexts is called micropragmatics. Phenomena such as reference, deixis, anaphora, and presupposition, are the topics in this field.

18. The research on the analyses of larger chunks of language, such as a whole conversation, an article or even a chapter of a novel or one act of a play in the user interaction concerning the mechanisms by which speakers/writers encode their message in skilful ways and how hearers/readers arrive at the intended meanings in spite of the differences between the literal meaning and the intended meaning is called macropragmatics.

19. 6.2.1 Reference
In the referential theory (naming theory), it is assumed that the words we use to identify things are in some direct relationship to those things:
(1)a: Can I look at your Shakespeare?
b: Sure, it’s on the shelf over there.

20. The key process here is called inference
The key process here is called inference. An inference is any additional information used by the hearer to connect what is said to what must be meant.
In pragmatics, the act by which a speaker or writer uses language to enable a hearer or reader to identify something is called reference.

21. 6.2.2 Deixis
Deixis, which means “pointing” via language, the interpretation of many words and expressions by reference to the situational context of the utterance, Any linguistic form used to do this “pointing” is called a deictic expression, or indexical.

22. In English, there are some words that cannot be interpreted at all unless the context, especially the physical context of the speaker, is known. These are words like here, there, this, that, now, and then, as well as most pronouns, such as I, we, you, he, her, them. Some sentences of English are actually impossible to understand if we do not know who is speaking, about whom, where and when.
(2) You’ll have to bring that back tomorrow, because they aren’t here now.

23. Out of context, we cannot understand this sentence because it contains a number of expressions such as you, that, tomorrow, they, here, now which depend for their interpretation on the immediate physical context in which they were uttered.

24. For example, who does you refer to
For example, who does you refer to? What time on earth does tomorrow refer to? Such expressions are very obvious examples of bits of language which we can only understand in terms of speaker’s intended meaning.

25. Five types of deixis
1. Person deixis: me, you, him, them.
2. Time deixis: now, then, tonight, last week, and this year.
3. Space/spatial/place deixis: here, there, and yonder.

26. 4. Discourse deixis: temporal/spatial in the previous/next paragraph, or Have you heard this joke? in this chapter.
5. Social deixis: honorifics (such as Professor Li)
Honorifics encode the speaker’s social relationship to another party, frequently but not always the addressee, on a dimension of rank.

27. There are other aspects of social deixis, for example, some linguistic expressions may be used to encode specific kinship relations (e.g. Li Jie [李姐] in Chinese).

28. A melamed [ Hebrew teacher] discovering that he had left his comfortable slippers back in the house, sent a student after them with a note for his wife. The note read: `Send me your slippers with this boy`. When the student asked why he had written `your` slippers, the melamed answered: `Yold! [Fool!] If I wrote “my” slippers, she would read “my slippers and would send her slippers. What could I do with her slippers? So I wrote “your” slippers, she'll read “your slippers and send me mine.`

29. Anaphora
Anaphora is coreference of one expression with its antecedent. The antecedent provides the information necessary for the expression’s interpretation. This is often understood as an expression “referring” back to the antecedent.

30. (4)A: Can I borrow your dictionary?
B: Yeah, it’s on the table.
antecedent, anaphor or anaphoric expression.
indirect anaphora or bridging reference :
(5) I walked into the room. The windows looked out to the bay.

31. 6.2.4 Presupposition Entailment is not a pragmatic concept.
It is defined as what logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance.
Sentences, not speakers, have entailments.

32. Speakers have presuppositions while sentences have entailments.
Example:
Susan’s sister bought two houses.
This sentence presupposes that Susan exists and that she has a sister.
This sentence has the entailments that Susan’s sister bought something; now she has 2 houses, a house, and other similar logical consequences. The entailments are communicated without being said and are not dependent on the speaker’s intention.

33. We take entailment relations to be those that specifically arise from linguistic structure.
Generally speaking, entailment is not a pragmatic concept (i.e. having to do with the speaker meaning), but it is considered a purely logical concept.

34. Presupposition: The information that a speaker assumes to be already known. (The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Language, 1987) 
Implicit meanings conveyed by the speaker through the use of particular words.
e.g. "The Cold War has ended" presupposes that the existence of the entities it refers to, in this case the "Cold War".

35. Presupposition:
The relationship between two propositions.
Mary’s cat is cute. (p)
Mary has a cat. (q)
p >>q = p presupposes q
If the speaker denies the proposition p (NOT p), the presupposition q doesn’t change.
Mary’s cat isn’t cute. (NOT p)
Not p >>q = Not p presupposes q

36. Constancy under negation:
Presupposition:
Constancy under negation:
The presupposition of a statement will remain true even when that statement is negated.

37. Other examples of constancy under negation:
p: Dave is angry because Jim crashed the car.
q: Jim crashed the car
p >> q
NOT p: Dave isn’t angry because Jim crashed the car
NOT p >> q

38. p: Mr. Singleton has resumed his habit of drinking stout.
q: Mr. Singleton had a habit of drinking stout.
p >> q
NOT p: Mr. Singleton hasn’t resumed his habit of drinking stout.
NOT p >> q

39. In any language, there are some expressions or constructions which can act as the sources of presuppositions. This kind of expressions or constructions is called presupposition-triggers.

40. presupposition-triggers ( >> stands for “presupposes”):
A. Definitive descriptions
(1) John saw/didn’t see the man with two heads.
>> There exists a man with two heads.
B. Factive verbs
(2) John realized/didn’t realize that he was in debt.
>> John was in debt.
C. Change of state verbs
(3) Joan began/didn’t begin to beat her husband.
>> Joan hadn’t been beating her husband.

41. D. Iteratives
(4) The flying saucer came/didn’t come again.
>> The flying saucer came before.
E. Temporal clauses
(5) While Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics, the rest of social science was/ wasn’t asleep.
>> Chomsky was revolutionizing linguistics.
F. Cleft sentences
(6) It was/wasn’t Henry that kissed Rosie.
>> Someone kissed Rosie.
G. Comparisons and contrasts
(7) Carol is/isn’t a better linguist than Barbara.
>> Barbara is a linguist.

42. 1. Existential presupposition:
Entities named by the speaker and assumed to be present
- noun phrase.
- possessive constructions
“David’s car is new” we can presuppose that David exists and that he has a car.

43. 2. Factive presupposition:
identified by the presence of some verbs such as "know“, "realize“, “be glad”, “be sorry”, etc.
Factive verbs:
Tracy realized Pat ate a sandwich.
Pat regretted eating a sandwich.
Pat liked eating a sandwich.
I was aware of the class cancellation on Monday.
They announced the winner of the contest.

44. 3. Lexical presupposition:
In using one word, the speaker can act as if another meaning will be understood. For instance:
Mary stopped running. (>>He used to run.)  You are late again. (>> You were late before.)
Are you still such a bad driver? (>> You were a bad driver)
"stop“, "again“ “still” are taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept.
Some lexical triggers:
Change of state verbs:
Pat stopped eating a sandwich (at 2pm).
Pat started eating a sandwich (at 2pm).
Verbs of judgment:
Tracy blamed Pat for eating the sandwich.
Tracy faults Pat for eating the sandwich.

45. 4. Structural presupposition:
It is the assumption associated with the use of certain structures.
wh-question constructions.
When did she travel to the USA? ( >> she travelled)
Where did you buy the book? (>> you bought the book)
The hearer perceives that the information presented is necessarily true, or intended as true by the speaker..

46. 5. Non- factive presupposition:
It is an assumption referred to something that is not true.
For example, verbs like "dream", "imagine" and "pretend" are used with the presupposition that what follows is not true.
I dreamed that I was rich. (>> I was not rich) We imagined that we were in London. (>> We were not in London)

47. 6. Counterfactual presupposition:
It is the assumption that what is presupposed is not only untrue, but is the opposite of what is true, or contrary to facts.
If you were my daughter, I would not allow you to do this. ( >> you are not my daughter)
If I were rich I would buy a Ferrari. (>> I’m not rich)

48. Examples:
The unicorn is waiting in the garden.
#Yet there are no unicorns.
Pat knows that the unicorn is waiting in the garden.

49. Entailment, presupposition, both or neither?
(1) Jane bought a cake.
(2) Someone bought a cake.

50. Test for entailment (1) Jane bought a cake. (2) Someone bought a cake.
Is there any situation in which (1) is true but (2) is false?
NO: (1) entails (2).

51. Test for presupposition
(1) Jane bought a cake.
(2) Someone bought a cake.
Is (2) a background assumption of (1)? In saying (1), do I assume that (2) is taken for granted?

52. Test for presupposition
(1) Jane bought a cake.
(2) Someone bought a cake.
Is (2) a background assumption of (1)? In saying (1), do I assume that (2) is taken for granted?
NO: (1) does not presuppose (2).

53. Another test for presupposition
(1) Jane bought a cake.
(2) Someone bought a cake.
Check negation, interrogative, and embedded sentences to see if presupposition is preserved.

54. Presuppositions can be cancelled.
John: Did you enjoy the concert last night?
Mary: Well, no. I didn’t enjoy it because I didn’t go.

55. 6.3 Macropragmatics
More often than not, we don’t confine our study to individual utterances, but extend our analysis to larger pieces of language, for the simple reason that language use is an intricate process.

56. In macropragmatics, there have been different theories
In macropragmatics, there have been different theories. Philosophers, in their search for answers to their philosophical puzzles, turned to language studies. They came up with several approaches to how language is used and how certain problems seem to be explained by language in use. They often refer to these approaches as philosophy of language but linguists prefer to call it pragmatics. What follows is an introduction to some influential theories on language use.

57. Speech act theory
Speech act theory was proposed by J. L. Austin and has been developed by J. R. Searle.
Basically, they believe that language is not only used to inform or to describe things, it is often used to “do things”, to perform acts.
Speech acts: actions performed via utterances.
e.g. You are fired.

58. Performatives and Constatives
I announce you husband and wife.
I bet you ten dollars it will rain tomorrow.
I declare the meeting open.
I need the salt.
Constatives: sentences that are used to state or describe things.
Performatives: sentences that are used to do things. This kind of sentences cannot be true or false.

59. It is argued that even non-performative sentences are used to perform acts.
“It’s such a fine day today” (suggesting an outing).
So it is claimed that all sentences, in addition to whatever they mean, perform specific actions or “do things” through specific forces.

60. Three types of speech acts
After rejecting the distinction between performatives and constatives, Austin put forward his new model: a speaker while producing an utterance is in most cases performing three acts simultaneously.

61. Types of a speech act Is this your pen? (A says to B)
Definitions
Example :
Is this your pen?
(A says to B)
Locutionary act
the act of saying something, the literal meaning of the utterance
The act of uttering it with its literal meaning: ‘Is this your pen?’
Illocutionary act
the extra meaning of the utterance produced on the basis of its literal meaning
It may be a request for B to pick up the pen on the floor, or a request for B to lend A the pen, depending on the specific context.
Perlocutionary act
the effect of the utterance on the hearer, depending on specific circumstances.
The actual result may or may not be what A intended to have.

62. It’s stuffy in here.
In fact, we might utter it to make a statement, a request, an explanation, or for some other communicative purposes. This is also generally known as the illocutionary force of the utterance.
But how do people know which speech act is intended? A possible answer is to specify felicity conditions —circumstances under which it would be appropriate to interpret something as a particular type of speech act.
For example, if a genuine order has been given, the hearer must be physically capable of carrying it out (“Get me a star” is not), and must be able to identify the object involved.

63. a. Husband: That’s the phone. b. Wife: I’m in the bathroom.
The literal meaning is taken care of by semantics and the effect of an utterance is subject to many factors, including social psychology, more than linguistics can cope with. So, what speech act theory is most concerned with is illocutionary act. It attempts to account for the ways by which speakers can mean more than what they say. It is also designed to show coherence in seemingly incoherent conversations.
a. Husband: That’s the phone.
b. Wife: I’m in the bathroom.
c. Husband: Okay.

64. Can you tell the different speech acts performed in the utterances?
(1) I believe he is innocent.
(2) Get out of here!
(3) Next time, I’ll arrive on time.
(4) I’m sorry for the trouble I brought to you.
(5) I announce you husband and wife.

65. Classification of illocutionary acts
Searle suggests five basic categories of illocutionary acts:

66. S=speaker; X=situation
Types
Explanation
S=speaker; X=situation
Examples
representative
stating or describing, saying what the speaker believes to be true
Words fit the eternal world
S believes X
a. Chomsky didn’t write about peanuts.
b. The earth is a globe.
directive
trying to get the hearer to do something
The world fits words
S wants X
a. Open the door!
b. Gimme a cup of coffee. Make it black.
commissive
committing the speaker himself to some future course of action
S intends X
a. I promise to go there tomorrow.
b. I will buy a pen for you.
expressive
expressing feelings or attitude towards an existing state
Words fit the internal world
S feels X
a. I’m really sorry.
b. Congratulations!
declaration
bring about immediate changes by saying something
Words change the world
S causes X
a. You are fired.
b. We find the defendant guilty.

67. Indirect speech acts
A different approach to distinguishing types of speech acts can be made on the basis of the three basic sentences types.
(1)a. declarative: You wear a seat belt. (statement)
b. interrogative: Do you wear a seat belt? (question)
c. imperative: Wear a seat belt! (command/request)
Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, we have a direct speech act.

68. A declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act, but a declarative used to make a request is an indirect speech act.
(2)a. It’s cold outside.
b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.
Interrogative: assumed ability (“Can/Could you?”) future likelihood (“Will/Would you?”)
(3)a. Could you pass me the salt, please?
b. Would you open this for me?

69. Indirect speech acts Requests are often performed indirectly.
You don’t want the addressee to stand in front of the TV.
What will you say?
a. Move out of the way!
b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?
c. I can’t see the screen.
d. It’s harmful to your eyes.
Requests are often performed indirectly.
Why do people tend to use indirect speech acts in daily communication?

70. 6.3.2 The cooperative principle

71. To ensure a successful communication, collaboration is a necessary factor. In much of the preceding discussion, we have assumed that speakers and listeners involved in conversations are generally cooperating with each other.
For example, in accepting speakers’ presuppositions, listeners normally have to assume that a speaker who says ‘my car’ really does have the car that is mentioned and isn’t trying to mislead the listener.

72. The Cooperative Principle
H. P. Grice (1975) suggests that there is a set of assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation. This is what he calls the Cooperative Principle (CP).
The cooperative principle is stated in the following way: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

73. The maxims The maxim of quantity
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Don not make your contribution more informative than is required.
The maxim of quality Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
The maxim of relation Make sure that whatever you say is relevant to the conversation at hand.
The maxim of manner Be perspicuous.
1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

74. Example
In the middle of their lunch hour, one woman asks another how she likes the hamburger she is eating, and receives the answer in:
A hamburger is a hamburger.
Do you think this utterance is cooperative?
What can you inferred from the sentence?

75. Conversational implicature
According to Grice, utterance interpretation is not a matter of decoding messages, but rather involves
(i) taking the meaning of the sentences together with contextual information,
(ii) using inference rules, and
(iii) working out what the speaker means on the basis of the assumption that the utterance conforms to the maxims.
The main advantage of this approach from Grice’s point of view is that it provides a pragmatic explanation for a wide range of phenomena, especially for conversational implicatures—a kind of extra meaning that is not literally contained in the utterance.

76. According to Grice, conversational implicatures can arise from either strictly and directly observing or deliberately and openly flouting the maxims, that is, speakers can produce implicatures in two ways: observance and non-observance of the maxims.
The least interesting case is when speakers directly observe the maxims so as to generate conversational implicatures.
(1) Husband: Where are the car keys?
Wife: They’re on the table in the hall.

77. However, in actual speech communication, it is often the case that speakers can not or do not observe the CP and its maxims.
(2) He is a tiger.
(3) Tom has wooden ears.
Metaphors and irony are standard examples of the flouting of the maxim of quality.

78. In (4), B violates the maxim of quantity by providing less information than is required:
(4)A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
(5) Girls are girls. (tautology.)
Assuming that the maxim of quantity is preserved after all, the hearer infers that the speaker meant something more informative. are typically “informationless” but are in fact rich in meaning.
The hearer would infer from the specific context that the speaker probably mean that girls are careful, thoughtful, and considerate or like to talk about shopping and fashion.

79. In addition, giving more information than required may also be taken as having other motives than the utterance suggests.
If a man introduces himself to a girl at a party, as in,
(6) I’m Alex from Leeds, 26, unmarried.
he would make the girl suspicious of his motive.
The maxims of relation and manner can also not be observed.
(7)A: I’m out of petrol.
B: There is garage round the corner.
(8)A: Shall we get something for the kids?
B: Yes. But I veto I-C-E-C-R-E-A-M.[p157]

80. This pattern of conversational inferences can work only on the assumption that the interlocutors share some background knowledge that allows the speaker to produce adequate utterances and the hearer to infer what was assumed by the speaker.
In other words, the speaker has to tailor his/her utterances so as to ensure that the implied meaning can in fact be recovered.

81. Properties of conversational implicature
Conversational implicature is a type of extra meaning, or inference, deriving from the word used in interaction with the context. The features are as follows:
(1) Cancellability (or defeasibility)
Conversational implicature is cancelable or defeasible if we add some other premises to the original ones.
John has two sons.
John has two sons, if not more.
(It means ‘John has at least two sons.)

82. a. You are the cream in my coffee. b. You are the cream in my coffee
a. You are the cream in my coffee. b. You are the cream in my coffee. But I’m afraid I don’t like cream in my coffee.
Cream is, generally speaking, able to make coffee more tasty and a lot of people like it. The implicature of this utterance may be that you are really nice and a good friend of mine. But if another utterance is made after it, the original implicature disappears.

83. (2) Non-detachability
The conversational implicature is attached to the meaning rather than to the form of the sentence. Therefore, it is not possible to get rid of the implicature by replacing words for synonyms, or by changing a certain construction.
A: How does your treatment for stammering work?
B: Peter Piper picked a peck of pickled pepper.

84. (3) Calculability
Conversational implicatures can be worked out through inference.
The listener judging the speaker is being cooperative is able to calculate the implicature by following procedures:
a. the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved;
b. the CP and its maxims;
c. the context of the utterance;
d. other items of background knowledge.

85. (4) Non-conventionality
The literal meaning of the sentence remains the same in all contexts, but conversational implicature will vary or disappear as the context changes.
e.g. It’s cold in here.

86. 6.3.3 The politeness principle
Principle which applies to conversation in addition to the cooperative principle—the Politeness Principle (PP).
In most cases, the indirectness is motivated by considerations of politeness.
Politeness is usually regarded by most pragmatists as a means or strategy which is used by a speaker to achieve various purposes, such as saving face, establishing and maintaining harmonious social relations in conversation.
Leech (1983: 80) looks on politeness as crucial in accounting for “why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean”. He thus the Politeness Principle:

87. Following Grice’s presentation of the CP, Leech puts forward six maxims of the Politeness Principle:
Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite beliefs and maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs.

88. Maxim of Tact (in directives and commissives)
(i) Minimize cost to other
(ii) Maximize benefit to other
Maxim of Generosity (in directives and commissives)
(i) Minimize benefit to self
(ii) Maximize cost to self
Maxim of Approbation (in expressives and assertives)
(i) Minimize dispraise of other
(ii) Maximize praise of other
Maxim of Modesty (in expressives and assertives)
(i) Minimize praise of self
(ii) Maximize dispraise of self

89. Maxim of Agreement (in assertives)
(i) Minimize disagreement between self and other
(ii) Maximize agreement between self and other
Maxim of Sympathy (in assertives)
(i) Minimize antipathy between self and other
(ii) Maximize sympathy between self and other
Briefly, this principle requires speakers to “minimize the expression of impolite beliefs”. These maxims can help to explain, among other things, why certain forms are more acceptable than others.

90. a. “No, I don’t want to come.”
b. “Thank you, but I’m going out that evening.”
C. “I think I’m going to have a headache”. (White lies)
Very often a superficial view is taken of politeness in spoken language—it is associated with being superficially “nice”, and with formal, mechanical extras such as the words please, and thank you and the use of special constructions such as would you mind…or could you… or I wonder if you could….
But politeness is an all-pervasive principle and also involves the content of conversation.

91. The maxim of approbation will explain why a compliment like “What a marvelous meal you cooked!” is highly valued while “What an awful meal you cooked!” is not socially accepted. Thus when criticism is inevitable, understatement is preferred as a show of reluctance to dispraise (Cf. “Her composition was not so good as it might have been”).

92. The maxim of modesty accounts for the benign nature of utterances like “How stupid of me!” and the offensive nature of “How clever of me!”
Regulated by the maxim of agreement, people tend to exaggerate their common ground first, even when much difference is to follow:
(1)A: The book is very well written.
B: Yes, well written as a whole, but there are some rather boring patches, don’t you think?

93. In the following example, notice how much effort speaker B puts into trying to hide the fact that speaker A thinks one thing (the female being discussed is “small”) and he thinks the opposite.
(2)A: She’s small, isn’t she?
B: Well, she’s sort of small…certainly not very large…but actually…I would have to say that she is large rather than small.
This conversation is very different indeed from the following simple expression of disagreement:
(3) A: She’s small, isn’t she?
B: No, she’s large.

94. If expressing disagreement is inevitable, then speakers attempt to soften it in various ways, by expressing regret at the disagreement. e.g.
I’m sorry, but I can’t agree with you.
In this example, the use of the word can’t seems to imply that the speaker would like to agree.

95. Speakers may even show reluctance to speak at all when they know they will be disagreeing—they use expressions such as well at the beginning of their utterances or they “hum and haw”.
The Maxim of Sympathy has such a regulative force that we invariably interpret (4) as a congratulation and (5) as a condolence:
(4) I’m delighted to hear about your cat.
(Most likely the cat has just won a prize in the cat-show)
(5) I’m terribly sorry to hear about your cat.
(Probably the cat has just died)

96. It is argued that when the CP and PP are in contradiction, it is generally the CP maxims that get sacrificed.
When the truth cannot be told for politeness sake, a white lie may be offered.
In fact the PP is so powerful that people are often encouraged to violate its maxims in order to ensure a cooperative discourse.
Don’t be too modest. Tell us everything you’ve achieved.
If you find anything inadequate in the paper, don’t hesitate to point it out.

97. Irony is a means to solve the conflict between the CP and PP—when the truth is too offensive to be told, an ironic utterance assumes a polite surface while delivering an unpleasant true message underneath.
An interesting area of investigation is the study of different cultures and languages in relation to the social principles of conversation.
For example, some cultures may place a very high value on the maxim of agreement and speakers may show this by repeating every word the other speaker has just said—as if they agree totally—and then giving their own opinion.