1. Rational Animals? Conscious Behavior? Psych 1090 Lecture 16

2. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing; Drink deep or taste not the Pierian spring: There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, And drinking deeply sobers us again…. Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism, pt. ii

3. but rather attempt to devise clear, clean, testable hypotheses…. One must be careful, in a relatively young field, that of animal consciousness not to become intoxicated by the excitement of examining the new area, excitement of examining the new area,

4. Or, at least, put our knowledge into perspective… And, of course, one issue with respect to consciousness involves rationality…. Because one tends to assume that conscious decisions are rational… That is, that an individual wouldn’t consciously do something stupid…

5. Now, we’ve spent the semester looking at how nonhumans solve complex problems in ways that are often similar to that of humans…. Nevertheless researchers sometimes find, in subjects that otherwise appear quite intelligent, behavior that doesn’t seem rational

6. Or rational at least by human standards… Do these ‘irrational’ actions mean that the animals are not intelligent or unconscious? Are consciousness, rationality, and intelligence interchangeable? Are these terms even interchangeable for humans?

7. Sometimes an animal may respond in a task in a way that is different from that of humans because of a different evolutionary or social history… that is, because behavior patterns different from those that would be exhibited by humans in such a situation increased fitness in the past

8. Thus the animal may react in a way that, by human standards, seems irrational…. The inability of Boysen’s chimpanzees to inhibit their choice of a larger amount of candies, even after experiencing that whatever they choose will always go to their partner is such an example…it doesn’t happen in the ‘real’ world is such an example…it doesn’t happen in the ‘real’ world

9. So how can we judge animal consciousness if we are having trouble judging animal rationality? How can we devise experiments and collect data without relying on our human biases?

10. Well, actually, life isn’t quite that difficult, because, most of the time, the intelligent response is indeed also rational, because, most of the time, the intelligent response is indeed also rational, according to both animal and human expectations

11. Even though there is a big question as to whether it is fair to judge animals on the basis of human-biased tests we’ve seen that most of the time, human and animal cognitive processes seem remarkably similar at least in kind, if not in degree

12. Remember the studies on the counter- singing wrens and the great tit’s TI And, too, most of the studies that we’ve seen with dolphins, apes, and other birds Most of the time, when the animals seemed to fail, it was usually the fault of the experimental design, not the animals’ intelligence

13. So, one might suspect that issues of consciousness would follow along the same lines… That any difference would be of degree, rather than kind… But consciousness is a much trickier subject, and experiments are far more difficult

14. The field of consciousness continues to be rife with controversy…. Of a type and level only seen before with respect to animal ‘language’ And, of course, some believe that the two fields are connected… Because language allows communication about the self

15. Assertions about nonhuman consciousness range from claims ranging from  emergent levels in Cambrian organisms (Hameroff, 1997)  to levels comparable to humans (Griffin, 1992)  to denial of the need to study such phenomena (Kennedy, 1992; Blumberg and Wasserman, 1995) at all….

16. But consciousness studies have become fashionable, and thus must proceed in as scientific a manner as possible Though we will see that isn’t a simple matter at all!

17. The main issues:  Defining conscious behavior  Do we gain anything by positing conscious behavior?  How do we define it?  How is it related to awareness? awareness? intentionality? intentionality? cognitive ability? cognitive ability?

18. To examine consciousness, scientists attempt to simplify, contrast, and isolate its aspects; for example, it has been studied as  working memory  controlled (vs. autonomic) behavior  attention (i.e., related to goal selection, vigilance, spatial orientation, or focus)

19. I propose we look at it as a way of processing information in the environment…. which has drawbacks because it doesn’t deal directly with describing what one is experience individually but has advantages with respect to transparency of what is being studied

20. Two main aspects of consciousness are generally studied: perceptual and reflexive consciousness Perceptual consciousness is the simpler aspect to study… It simply involves awareness of one’s sensory perceptions :

21. Perceptual consciousness assumes that an organism is aware that it is processing information, and maybe of the senses being used (e.g., is searching for a particular color or scent, or trying to label it in some way) but is not necessarily aware that it is aware of the process

22. So think of how you know that something is “red” or “green” Or how you recognize that something is the wrong color…. You don’t necessarily go through the thoughts of “oh, wow, aren’t I smart that I know that broccoli shouldn’t be orange” You just process “wrong color”

23. BUT a critical issue is that perception isn’t consistent across species… So just because you see something as “white”, doesn’t mean that a parrot or a bee—that see in ultraviolet— Also see it the same way… And being aware of this fact takes us to the next level..

24. Thus, reflective consciousness is quite a bit more complicated… Thus, reflective consciousness is quite a bit more complicated… It does involve awareness of one’s thoughts, executive control and attribution of mental states to others—Theory of Mind

25. To determine human consciousness, we often rely on self-report… We ask “What were you thinking when you did X?” But we can’t do this for animals… Even those with some ‘language’ abilities

26. So, the goal of this lecture is to Posit simple stances on  brain function in order to provoke debate on the issues  evolutionary continuity  relationships between cognitive abilities and awareness

27. Perceptual and reflective consciousness are functions of a brain’s associative and representational capacities… The richer these capacities, the greater the possible scope of consciousness BUT…these capacities—and their similarity to those of humans—

28. do not ensure consciousness only the possibility of consciousness And, species, within their maximum possible level of consciousness, exhibit different extents of awareness appropriate to the particular situation

29. Humans, presumably conscious, often act without conscious awareness of the factors controlling their behavior… For example: If they did not…. a lot of psychiatrists would be out of work a lot of psychiatrists would be out of work many ‘automatic’ behavior patterns would not exist many ‘automatic’ behavior patterns would not exist

30. I start by proposing a separation between ‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness’ I call complex, higher-order cognition ‘awareness’ and this awareness can be a level of consciousness (e.g., perceptual consciousness) without being isomorphic to ‘full’ consciousness

31. Some precedent for this division exists in the early work of David Chalmers, even though he then redefines awareness as coherent with consciousness… who is known as one of the kingpins of the recent writings on consciousness

32. A caveat: Parallels between studies of ‘animal’ consciousness and that of ‘animal’ language and ‘animal’ counting suggest care that animals are not excluded simply because they do not match human abilities exactly care that animals are not excluded simply because they do not match human abilities exactly care that simpler categories are not overinterpreted so that the fullest level of competence is not missed care that simpler categories are not overinterpreted so that the fullest level of competence is not missed

33. These points are particularly important, because, as we have seen, animals are often capable of doing more than we can determine by our relatively primitive means of study but they also sometimes are incapable of doing tasks at the same level as humans

34. If, for example, we say that an animal’s ability to label a few objects or to request a few objects is “language” We are then unlikely to examine more complicate aspects of their cognitive or communicative abilities… for example, simple grammars, recursion, etc…

35. To see just how complicated this can be, let’s look at “insight”…the raven- string studies are an example… “Insight” is usually considered an entirely unconscious process… in which an animal is unaware of how current information is being processed…

36. Or how multiple sets of information are integrated to achieve a solution to the posited problem… But insight must have at least some rudimentary level of awareness… The individual—human or nonhuman—is clearly aware of the need to solve the problem And of the fact that relevant information exists….

37. In general, researchers studying animal cognition assume subjects That is, already exhibit some level of perceptual awareness…. But different levels of awareness are likely necessary for different tasks form representations about perceived data form representations about perceived data then process such information…. then process such information….

38. Which in and of itself is important because it means that if we don’t design the tasks appropriately— i.e., with enough complexity— We might not see consciousness that does indeed exist

39. I therefore posit levels of awareness, roughly paralleling those of Thomas’ (1980, 1996) hierarchy of cognitive behavior I then suggest what level of awareness appears necessary for accomplishing each task The contrast between these levels will help us analyze the issue

40. Simple associative learning: level 0 A rat presses a lever at the appearance of a specific green block to get food; no other objects are present and no other responses are required We aren’t even discussing match- to-sample or some kind of choice; this is ‘errorless’ learning

41. In nature, such behavior likely corresponds to fixed-action patterns… Response may be a ‘habit system’ a neural pathway that stores response tendencies but no representation—no concept of ‘green’, ‘block’, etc. of the type proposed by Mishkin and his colleagues…

42. Simple choice of ‘nonmatching’: Level 1 Pigeon learns to peck green button when given a red sample and red/green choices As we’ve seen, the pigeon actually doesn’t learn to choose green but rather learns to avoid red

43. It doesn’t learn ‘greenness’, ‘redness’ But it doesn’t seem aware of rule or of following it…. because it doesn’t immediately transfer to new, similar situations or necessarily realizes that it is even being trained on ‘oddity’, but to follow a rule…

44. The task is, however, fairly unnatural: For example, to avoid pebbles mixed with grain, the pigeon would not learn to recognize pebbles but rather would learn to recognize grain

45. Evidence for “learning sets”: Level 2 The organism, after solving a series of discrimination problems with new object pairs, acquires a win/stay-lose/shift accuracy after ~ 200 problems i.e., to always choose the striped object even if the stripes are different colors or sizes

46. This subject has not only acquired a rule…. but also is aware enough that it can transfer the rule across situations with significant savings in time— Though not enough for immediate transfer to novel types of stripes something about stripes leading to food

47. In nature, such behavior may be exhibited by some foragers…. We’ve seen that hummingbirds that fully empty a flower’s nectar—i.e., win-shift— quickly transfer across inflorescences but do not transfer quickly to win-stay in an operant laboratory setting

48. Concepts of categories: Level 3 The subject, after learning to sort specific familiar items into ‘food’ and ‘not food’ (without sampling)…. Correctly sorts untrained items that it has seen before but that have not been part of training

49. sorts not only with respect to the category rule, The subject but remembers previous experiences to help sort the new items…. i.e., was this thing edible? that is, can integrate data, and works off of some aware representation/memory

50. The integration of information may not be performed consciously… which is why we can claim only a level 3 We have no simple way of questioning the animal to determine why it is making the sort the way it is but we know the sort is via a concept

51. Such behavior is likely exhibited by animals that engage in a number of different foraging strategies…. The subject is not simply responding with respect to color or shape that is, with respect to inherent attributes Clearly separating out food from nonfood items…

52. Level 3 is also shown by an animal that responds, e.g., on the basis of relative size, for it must  sort based on a rule that involves no intrinsic properties of an object,  compare items to determine the answer, and  thus integrate two different sets of information

53. Recursive tasks: Level 4 Alex, shown a tray of green and blue balls and blocks–-a heterogeneous set-- responds to “How many blue block?”

54. have representations of the two colors and the two objects tied to their labels, He may be subitizing, not consciously counting, but he IS aware of each of the items Alex must: and maintain the representation during the enumeration

55. Number used by Alex Number of objects 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6 9 7 1 2 1 1 11 4 1 1 8

56. Such behavior is also likely exhibited by countersinging songbirds in territorial defense…

57. They often act after determining which neighbor is singing, which song is being sung (that is, after integrating representations of a specific bird and a specific song), and also choose their response after determining the number of repetitions of the song….

58. Representation of hidden items: Level 5 A subject not only solves a complex Piagetian object permanence task, following where an item is when it is shown to be in the experimenter’s hand and then is surreptitiously hidden or tracking an item in a classic “shell game” type of hiding

59. but also demonstrates knowledge of what was hidden The subject is tricked into believing “x” is hidden, but finds “y” and reacts in surprise/anger And not just that something of ‘interest’ disappeared….

60. remember item, Subject must track its movement over time and space, know how to extract the item, and react to the cognitive dissonance

61. Still, may not be aware of the process used The subject is not using something like a ‘go to last place the object was seen’ or a ‘go to last place the experimenter touched’ rule Because they’d consistently fail to retrieve the item…

62. Such a level of awareness is likely shown by birds that remember not only where they have cached an item, but when and the specific nature of the item cached…

63. Playing “games”: Level ? Alex, given 7 various items, is asked for the color of the one that, for example, is wood and triangular

64. We’ve seen that when he works at the task, he does very well…

66. But, on occasion, Alex gives each of the six possible wrong answers in a row, twice…. Statistically, he can’t be wrong in that way just by chance… 12/12 incorrect trials?

67. use recursion to decode a symbolic inquiry to determine the designated attribute of the one item defined by the conjunction of two other attributes, In order to respond incorrectly, he must: search for the item, encode its attribute, then avoid that label for twelve trials

68. Such behavior indicates at least some level of awareness… It might not be the same level as an adult human, or even a human child But there clearly is some choice involved that is contrary to what might be ‘rationally’ expected

69. Now, this experiment and the one on object permanence were not designed to study consciousness However, a simple information- processing model cannot account for the birds’ behavior patterns…. Will positing some level of consciousness or awareness help?

70. Let’s go back to the object permanence study and see what we can learn… We know that Alex and Grif (and probably other birds) had a representation of what had been hidden….e.g., item A So when they find B instead of A, why so they react with surprise instead of continued search? And they know that A cannot turn into B…

71. A young child merely stares at something that violates expectations; Is the birds’ behavior logical or illogical? a ‘logical’ computer would react with an error message and freeze

72. If we want to continue the computer analogy, we might argue that the birds’ anger and surprise are the “error messages” emitted by a nonhuman Might, for example, the anger actually represent a short-circuiting of the logical response to continue searching?

73. So….what is the bird really doing? Where does this all take us? What benefits do we derive from these analyses?

74. Two possibilities  Testing for awareness leads to experiments that might otherwise not be performed  As noted earlier, basic information processing interpretation cannot account for the data, and we look for something more

75. What is the logical response? Is it logical or illogical to continue searching when all logic points to the item being in the expected site? Unclear….but the subject is showing it is aware of the cognitive dissonance and the immutability of items….

76. Such behavior is clearly different from the slow extinguishing of lever pressing in an animal whose expectations are violated in an operant paradigm…. Remember that it takes sometimes hundreds of trials for the pigeon to shift from, for example, a match-to- sample to a nonmatch response For whatever reason, they don’t ‘get’ the need to switch…

77. But think about humans who continue to press the button of a vending machine when the expected candy bar does not appear… “Stupidity is the repetition of the same act and expecting a different outcome” And kicking the machine generally doesn’t work, either…

78. Thus how can we argue for consciousness based on a positive reaction (‘surprise’) when absent reactions (e.g., from the human who accepts that the vending machine is broken after 2 tries and walks away) need not denote unconsciousness?

79. Specifically, positing higher-order information processing or awareness in an individual’s reaction but not the nature of the reaction or any explanation of the reaction leads us to expect some reaction indicating cognitive dissonance when such dissonance is appropriate

80. If, however, consciousness is indeed defined—as some would—as the Then might our birds be conscious? existence of “…noncomputable, seemingly random, conscious choices with an element of unpredictabiltiy…” (Hameroff, 1998; also Barinaga, 1996;

81. We could try to argue instead for some kind of ‘proto-consciousness’ We could then argue that the birds’ acts of anger and surprise but lack of continued search are indicative of an intermediate stage in consciousness… And although the places where one would draw lines are arbitrary….

82. But if we posit consciousness of any level or any sort based on such data That is basically where I am heading we are led t a surprising conclusion… we are led to a surprising conclusion…

83. A subject thus appears most conscious when normal cognitive processes fail But this ‘something else’ may be a simple emotional state, and it must access ‘something else’ to decide how to proceed… without any logic or processing….

84. Again, where are we? Have we merely circled back to Mishkin’s ‘habit state’ In which responses are made reflexively, without any real choice or need for knowledge?

85. Well, let’s go back to the “game-playing” in the Level 5 ‘recursive’ task in which Alex give the 12 wrong answers in a row (when I let him)…. The correct answer is logical and would get him the object as a reward or the right to ask for whatever he wants…. but he chooses to respond in an intentionally illogical manner….

86. Might an organism be conscious if: it knows why it should/might respond in a given way, but opts to respond differently, either to avoid the consequences, or intentionally elicit some more interesting behavior pattern from others in its environment?

87. Another example, involving numerical competence….Let’s review one of my studies from the standpoint of possible consciousness.. During a study of number comprehension, my parrot is presented with trays consisting of x objects of one color, y objects of a second color, and z objects of a third color

89. He is asked “What color z?” which is again a task requiring that he have a symbolic representation of the number z and the various color labels He responds accurately on a dozen or so trials, demonstrating that he understands the task

90. Number Alex comprehends Number of objects 1 2 3 4 5 6 n m 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 8 8 1 1 1 1 11 2 none 5 1

91. He is then given a tray with 2 blue blocks, 3 purple blocks, 6 orange blocks and asked “What color 3?” He responds by saying “five” Despite several requests from me to answer “What color 3?”, he insists on responding “five”….

92. He clearly is not getting rewarded for this behavior in the traditional manner…. I finally asks “What color 5?”….. To which Alex responds “none” He’s getting neither a toy nor a treat, only watching me get more exasperated

93. Remember, Alex had been trained to respond “none” when shown two objects and queried “What’s same/different?” if nothing were same or different… He had spontaneously transferred use of “none” to a task on relative size when two objects did not differ in size….

94. But now he had not only spontaneously transferred to using “none” to designate absence of *objects* rather than attributes….. But had also been the one to initiate such trials

95. Was he consciously manipulating the experimental situation? If so, was his motivation similar to his consistently providing incorrect answers…. That is, to obtain some specific behavior from his trainer?

96. Are we approaching some level of “theory of mind”? Has he learned by association what will annoy me or is there something more complex at work? Does he specifically want to annoy me because that is more interesting than any other reward?

97. Do we need to start examining comparative neurological capacities to determine what is happening? Has he learned how to manipulate me for his own ends? Does such behavior imply awareness at levels comparable to that of human children?

98. Koch (2004) argues that Consciousness becomes an executive decision by frontal areas of the brain… thus arguing that the brain’s ability to select particular events for processing--i.e., attention-- has a major role in structuring human consciousness

99. And, as we’ve discussed, recent studies of the avian brain (e.g., Javis and Mello, 2000; Jarvis et al. 2005 ) posit that areas once thought to be striatal and thus evolved from different areas than those that developed into human cortex are pallial and thus actually derived from the same areas…

100. I thus posit that  evolutionary homologies/convergences across taxa in brain function that lead to continuity (but not necessarily isomorphism) in cognitive processing also allow for (but do not necessarily lead to)  convergence (but not necessarily isomorphism) with respect to consciousness

101. A tentative conclusion: Positing full consciousness is unlikely to assist studies of logical, cognitive processing…. What we have defined as awareness will be responsible for such behavior…

102. But positing full consciousness will likely assist in examining subjective—emotional—aspects and the boundary between objective and subjective aspects

103. Superficial forays into the realm of consciousness are likely to provide little solid information… But, depending on the focus of the study, I suggest: intriguing information can be obtained about behavior patterns that cannot be explained through traditional paradigms

104. Now, the person who really started the modern interest in animal consciousness was Don Griffin And I’ve covered a few of his ideas already… His main argument was that the continuity of animal-human ability in many other areas argued for a continuity in consciousness

105. In his books he gives numerous examples of cognitive processes in animals that were, at the time he wrote, truly unexpected Material he dug out of old papers, such as von Frisch stating that bees seemed to learn to anticipate where the experimenter would place feeders in a study that had feeders extending further and further afield each day…

106. He argued that communication was a “window on animal minds” And forced researchers to re-analyze their data so as to look for various types of behavior that might provide evidence for consciousness… Or at least higher levels of awareness

107. One of the big issues has been the search for the “NCC”….the neural correlate of consciousness… Some brain center that can be identified in humans And for which we can then search in animals…. So far, no luck…

108. And, of course the neural issue gets muddled by things like “blindsight” Weisenkrantz has show that when specific bits of the brain in the visual cortex are destroyed, humans claim that they can’t see anything but are correct if asked to guess about what might be in front of them

109. So they are not consciously aware of something But other bits of their brain are able to produce correct responses… Is something like that what is happening in nonhumans, to give them the appearance of consciousness at times?

110. And, to get back to the emotional state issues, Researchers like Damasio argue that consciousness requires the existence of feelings…. That is, that core consciousness is how it feels to be oneself at a particular time and place…

111. And then argues for an ‘extended’ consciousness to deal w/ future and past and that core versus extended consciousness is how humans differ from nonhumans… And others, like Edelman, present related ideas about levels of consciousness

112. Another way of getting at consciousness is seeing whether an individual—human or nonhuman—knows what it knows… An ingenious test w/ monkeys at least suggested that the animals might report such abilities….

113. The monkeys see Have a delay that differs on each trial And then can choose between two buttons, R and L

114. The right R button starts a trial and asks if they have, for example, seen If they have, they touch it and receive a favorite food;

115. But touching the wrong pattern produces no food and a long delay Now, if they touch the left L button they just get a less preferred food Interestingly, when the delays were long,

116. one of the two monkeys tested always chose to take the less-preferred food than to take a chance of erring but on short delays, opted to take the test Such data suggested that the monkeys might be aware of what it was that they remembered

117. We can also re-examine Betty the tool-making crow from the level of consciousness… In the wild, these crows make tools by breaking off pieces of twigs so that what remains is a hook.. They don’t bend the twigs and they surely have no experience with metal

118. Thus Griffin argues that Betty was aware of exactly what she needed for the task And consciously figured out what might give her what she needed And how to get it done

119. So, the bottom line is that we really don’t quite know how to define consciousness in animals or humans…. But we can understand why it is important to do so and to search for it