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Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Nash Equilibrium.

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Presentation on theme: "Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Nash Equilibrium."— Presentation transcript:

1 Lectures in Microeconomics-Charles W. Upton Nash Equilibrium

2 Modeling an Industry Competitive Industry – Many Firms Monopoly – One Firm Duopoly (Oligopoly) – A Few Firms

3 Nash Equilibrium Modeling an Industry Competitive Industry – Many Firms Monopoly – One Firm Duopoly (Oligopoly) – A Few Firms –Cournot –Bertrand –Might there be other approaches?

4 Nash Equilibrium Different Problems A can build an expensive or cheap car. B can build an expensive or cheap car. There are four possible outcomes (E,E), (E,C), (C,E), (C,C) What will happen?

5 Nash Equilibrium Different Problems Firm A can build an expensive or a cheap car. Firm B can build an expensive of cheap car. There are four possible outcomes (E,E), (E,C), (C,E), (C,C) What will happen? Which, if any of those outcomes is a Nash Equilibrium?

6 Nash Equilibrium Firms must end up at a Nash Equilibrium, named after John Nash A Nash Equilibrium –Each person or firm is acting rationally

7 Nash Equilibrium A Nash Equilibrium Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions

8 Nash Equilibrium A Nash Equilibrium Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

9 Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A

10 Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A Does the Cournot model predict we will end up at a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

11 Nash Equilibrium Cournot q A = 45 – (1/2)q B q B = 45 – (1/2)q A Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

12 Nash Equilibrium The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market MC = 0 D Does the Bertrand Model predict we will end up at a Nash Equilibrium? Yes

13 Nash Equilibrium The Bertrand Model Demand function is as shown. Firm with lowest bid gets all the market. In case of tie, firms split market MC = 0 D Each person or firm is acting rationally No one believes his actions will change other decisions No one has an incentive to change

14 Nash Equilibrium Some Questions about Nash Equilibrium Nash Equilibrium is useful for studying problems where there are just a couple of players.

15 Nash Equilibrium This slide left blank

16 Nash Equilibrium Nash and Duopolies Does there have to be a Nash Equilibrium? No

17 Nash Equilibrium Nash and Duopolies Does there have to be a Nash Equilibrium? Does there have to be only one Nash Equilibrium? No

18 Nash Equilibrium End ©2003 Charles W. Upton


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