1. Property Right (Bromley) Claim to a benefit stream that a govt. will agree to protect through the assignment of duty to others who may wish to interfere with this benefit stream. A social relationship involving benefit streams, rights holders, and duty bearers.

2. Alternative forms of property Private Property – one owner Common Property – multiple owners Open Access – no owners, no duties

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Property Protects again abuse and waste Promotes investment Promotes market transactions to re-allocate for efficiency Externalities! Discount rate? May be high social costs of assigning and policing individual rights.

4. Alternative Solutions for Externalities Privatization Government regulation Common Property!

5. Problems of Government Regulation Rent-seeking Information problems (local knowledge) Enforcement problems

6. Garret Hardin’s Tragedies are Cases of Open Access Freedom to have children Freedom to enter labor market Commons for cows: incentive for individuals to try to increase number of cows until group returns decrease Externalities! Harden says “mutual coercion” can make us more free!

7. Common Property Regime (CPR) Based on social institutions and cooperation Use is excluded outside group Use is regulated inside group Equity and sharing are important (Also known as Common Pool or Commons)

8. Common Property is a social system of rules Ownership entails duties, privileges, mutualities that bind joint owners to the resource and to each other (Malinowski, 1926). Rules coordinate household use to maximize group benefits

9. Common Property Likely to be associated with marginal, low-income situations – insufficient surplus for establishing private property (Runge) May be associated with resources with high uncertainty Individual benefits from joint action sufficiently large to offset transactions costs “Transactions costs” may be offset by enjoyment of social interaction!

10. Economists’ dismal view about cooperation Prisoner’s Dilemma – although cooperation is optimal, it is not a Nash equilibrium Free-riding Rent-seeking Runge: some free-riding may be tolerated. Mancur Olson: “priviledged” group is where benefits of group provision are sufficient for a subgroup to provide a collective good

11. Economists’ Types of Goods Private GoodsCommon Property Club Public Goods Exclusionary Non-exclusive Rival Non-rival

12. Evidence for Cooperation, especially in smaller “local” groups Mutual Aid (Kropotkin, 1914) presents history of social groups engaging in mutualism and cooperation

13. Prisoner’s Dilemma and Problems of Cooperation Note: repeated PD – Tit-for-Tat – can be cooperative (Axelrod). Communication improves cooperation!

14. Assurance Game: there are multiple Nash equilibria: how to find the “right” one? (5,5)(3,2) (2,3)(4,4) Player 1 Coop. Defect Player 2 Coop. Defect

15. Success of Commons (Runge) As heterogeneity of group increases, it is harder to maintain commons Institutions should foster coordinated expectations Internal group incentives to maintain and enforce CPR should be strong “Social costs” of maintaining CPR may be lower when rules are part of customs Reputation loss in a small group is a high cost! Fairness!

16. Important for Success of Commons (Ostrom) Common understanding and acceptance of rules, rationale for commons Mutual trust and reciprocity Common values Behavior/ resource utilization is visible, or there is a monitoring system Punishment of offenders

17. Do Commons Conserve Resources? Discount rate question, as for private property Feedback control system is needed (knowledge of ecological system)

18. Why Common Property or Private Property? Nature of the resource (fugitive or uncertain) Transactions costs to exclude Technologies for harvest or control Scale of society

19. Evolution of Property Systems Some believe that common property evolves toward privatization Successful CPR implies an effective local capacity to adjust to changing conditions

20. Sources of Commons Demise Loss of control Government may usurp local ability to resolve problems Population expansion New technologies

21. No Universal Prescription for any PR Regime (Runge) Different types of institutions are responsive to different types of resources/ local environments. Institutions are responsive to local factors of production and costs and benefits of alternative rules. Appropriate institutions must respect traditions and constraints of local needs.

22. Four Attributes for Studying the Commons (Oakerson) Physical and Technical Attributes Jointness: rules are such that one person’s use does not subtract from another’s. Exclusion: individually regulated; or only excluded to those outside community. Indivisibility: can resource be divided? cost?

23. Attributes cont. Decision-making arrangements: Rules that structure individual and collective choices. Organizational and Institutional rules. Who decides what in relation to whom. Types: (1) operational rules; (2) collective choice; (3) external arrangements.

24. Attributes cont. Patterns of Interaction Social norms, customs, etc. that determine how group members interact. Outcomes Pareto optimality/improvement: can anyone be made better off and no one worse off? Equity and distribution

25. Local Commons (Seabright) Local: the situation precludes open access e.g. assets in small communities; irrigation Global: absence of power of any particular state to affect problems e.g. global climate change

26. Importance of Informal Solutions to Local Problems (Seabright) Separate production from distribution Provide for investment in future production Recognize that life is a series of repeated games Improve opportunities for communication Improve level of trust (social capital)

27. Formal Incentives for Cooperation (Seabright) Privatization & tradability may destroy trust Link one common property to another, so that mis-use has a cost. Price versus quota: quota easier to administer Rotation schemes: perceived fairness Specialize functions: separate management and monitoring Avoid management by the state; decentralize!