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Nym: An anonymous, secure, peer-to-peer instant messenger By Seth Cooper, Adam Hoel, Elliott Hoel, Jeff Holschuh, and Hilde Schmitt.

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Presentation on theme: "Nym: An anonymous, secure, peer-to-peer instant messenger By Seth Cooper, Adam Hoel, Elliott Hoel, Jeff Holschuh, and Hilde Schmitt."— Presentation transcript:

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2 Nym: An anonymous, secure, peer-to-peer instant messenger By Seth Cooper, Adam Hoel, Elliott Hoel, Jeff Holschuh, and Hilde Schmitt

3 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly 24.26.105.25 John Doe 137.22.4.60 Server Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

4 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather Bill O’Reilly John Doe Server Confidential Information Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

5 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather Bill O’Reilly John Doe Server Confidential Information Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

6 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather Bill O’Reilly John Doe Big Tobacco Lawsuit Server Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

7 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather Bill O’Reilly John Doe Big Tobacco John Doe: 137.22.4.60 Server Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

8 AOL Instant Messenger AOL Dan Rather Bill O’Reilly John Doe Big Tobacco Lawsuit and job loss Server Dan Rather: 162.27.1.102 Bill O’Reilly: 24.26.105.25 John Doe: 137.22.4.60 IP Addresses

9 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe Dan Rather Amy Csizmar Dalal Bill O’Reilly Jeff Ondich

10 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe 137.22.4.60 Dan Rather 162.27.1.102 Amy Csizmar Dalal 207.251.23.142 Bill O’Reilly 24.26.105.25 Jeff Ondich 82.65.100.55

11 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe john_doe Dan Rather dan_rather Amy Csizmar Dalal amy_csizmar_dalal Bill O’Reilly bill_oreilly Jeff Ondich jeff_ondich

12 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe john_doe Dan Rather dan_rather Bill O’Reilly bill_oreilly Confidential Information To bill_oreilly To dan_rather

13 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe john_doe Dan Rather dan_rather Bill O’Reilly bill_oreilly Confidential Information To bill_oreilly

14 Nym: Not just another AIM John Doe john_doe Dan Rather dan_rather Bill O’Reilly bill_oreilly Big Tobacco ? Lawsuit Job = Safe

15 Goals Implement a peer-to-peer network that provides: Implement a peer-to-peer network that provides: Decentralization Decentralization Anonymity Anonymity Security Security Reliability Reliability Scalability Scalability

16 Decentralization Significantly minimize the application’s reliance on a central server Significantly minimize the application’s reliance on a central server Peer-to-peer communication Peer-to-peer communication Normally centralized tasks are distributed among nodes Normally centralized tasks are distributed among nodes

17 Decentralization in Nym Message routing, searching, presence updates and text messaging functionality occurs between peers without the help of any central servers. Message routing, searching, presence updates and text messaging functionality occurs between peers without the help of any central servers. However, on first launch a client connects to a node that caches the IP addresses of other Nym clients. However, on first launch a client connects to a node that caches the IP addresses of other Nym clients.

18 Anonymity Anonymity is the state of having an undisclosed identity. Anonymity is the state of having an undisclosed identity. On a network, anonymous communication must ensure that information related to the source of a message (e.g. the originating machine’s IP address) cannot be determined. On a network, anonymous communication must ensure that information related to the source of a message (e.g. the originating machine’s IP address) cannot be determined.

19 Why is anonymity important? According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation: According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation: “Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority...It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation…at the hand of an intolerant society.”

20 Anonymity in Nym Pseudonyms Pseudonyms Virtual addressing Virtual addressing Decentralization Decentralization Security Security Nondeterministic/probabilistic routing Nondeterministic/probabilistic routing

21 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

22 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

23 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Packet sent Broadcast Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

24 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Packet sent Broadcast Packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

25 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Packet sent Broadcast Packet sent Packet received Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

26 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Response packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

27 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Response packet sent Packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

28 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan Response packet sent Packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

29 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B Response packet sent Packet sent Packet received Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

30 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

31 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B Node E Bill O'Reilly Packet sent Nym Network

32 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B Node E Bill O'Reilly Packet sent Nym Network

33 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B Node E Bill O'Reilly Packet sent Nym Network

34 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Packet sent Packet received Nym Network

35 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Packet sent Broadcast Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

36 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Packet sent Broadcast Packet sent Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Packet received Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

37 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Response packet sent Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

38 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Response packet sent Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

39 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Response packet sent Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan B C Packet sent Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

40 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Response packet sent Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B C Packet sent Packet received Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

41 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Routing Demo Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

42 Node A John Doe Node B Node C The channel list builds up… Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

43 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Now, we can route! Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Nym Network

44 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Now, we can route! Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly Select a node at random from the Dan column: Nym Network

45 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Now, we can route! Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly So send to node C: Node D Dan Rather Nym Network

46 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Note that there is a natural weighting of nodes in the list Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly This means that there are preferred routes. Node D Dan Rather Nym Network

47 Node A John Doe Node B Node C Sometimes, we pick at random from an unweighted channel list Node D Dan Rather Node A’s Channel List Bill Dan C B B C C B C Node E Bill O'Reilly This prevents any routing patterns that may occur. Nym Network

48 Security Confidentiality Confidentiality Information should be kept secret from unauthorized parties. Information should be kept secret from unauthorized parties. Integrity Integrity Information should be tamper evident. Information should be tamper evident. The authenticity of the source of information should be verifiable. The authenticity of the source of information should be verifiable. Availability Availability Services should be resilient to malicious attacks Services should be resilient to malicious attacks

49 Security in Nym Link-to-link encryption Link-to-link encryption Digital signing and verifying of text messages Digital signing and verifying of text messages

50 Link-to-link versus end-to-end Link-to-link encryption Link-to-link encryption Messages are encrypted and decrypted at each node in the network Messages are encrypted and decrypted at each node in the network Messages intercepted by parties outside the network will be unable to read the encrypted text Messages intercepted by parties outside the network will be unable to read the encrypted text End-to-end encryption End-to-end encryption Messages are encrypted with a secret key by the sender and are not decrypted until they reach the recipient Messages are encrypted with a secret key by the sender and are not decrypted until they reach the recipient

51 The Man-in-the-Middle Secure end-to-end encryption is impossible in an anonymous network Secure end-to-end encryption is impossible in an anonymous network An intermediary node between the sender and recipient can easily intercept a key exchange. An intermediary node between the sender and recipient can easily intercept a key exchange. Link-to-link encryption Link-to-link encryption More robust against man in the middle attacks More robust against man in the middle attacks

52 Link to link (Symmetric key) A 56-bit DES key is generated and exchanged when a connection is made with a neighbor A 56-bit DES key is generated and exchanged when a connection is made with a neighbor Both parties share this key, but no one else knows it Both parties share this key, but no one else knows it Much quicker than asymmetric encryption Much quicker than asymmetric encryption

53 RSA public/private key pair RSA key pair is generated from username and password RSA key pair is generated from username and password Public key is essentially the virtual address Public key is essentially the virtual address Asymmetric key pair is only used for digital signatures Asymmetric key pair is only used for digital signatures To send a message to someone, sign it with your private key To send a message to someone, sign it with your private key The recipient uses your public key to validate it The recipient uses your public key to validate it

54 Digital Signatures Allow us to verify Allow us to verify who a message is from who a message is from that the message has not been changed since it was sent that the message has not been changed since it was sent Use the SHA-1 hash algorithm Use the SHA-1 hash algorithm Takes the message (under 2^64 bits) Takes the message (under 2^64 bits) Returns 160 bit “message digest” Returns 160 bit “message digest” Use RSA key pair Use RSA key pair

55 How digital signatures work User AUser B At Login Username A Password A Public Key A Private Key A Username B Password B Public Key B Private Key B Virtual Address B Virtual Address A

56 How digital signatures work User AUser B Public Key A Private Key A Public Key B Private Key B

57 How digital signatures work User A Message text User B

58 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 User B

59 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B

60 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B Message

61 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B Message text Digital signature Message

62 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B Message text Message digest SHA-1 Digital signature Message

63 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B Message text Message digest SHA-1 Digital signature Decrypt with Public key A Message digest Message

64 How digital signatures work User A Message text Message digest SHA-1 Encrypt with Private key A Digital signature User B Message text Message digest SHA-1 Digital signature Decrypt with Public key A Message digest Compare Message

65 Instant Messaging Text communication Text communication Presence notification Presence notification Contact list maintenance Contact list maintenance Distributed search Distributed search User friendly interface User friendly interface

66 DEMO

67 Tradeoffs and Limitations Anonymity Anonymity Statistical analysis Statistical analysis Textual analysis Textual analysis Accidental disclosure Accidental disclosure Scalability Scalability Test results and predictions Test results and predictions Reliability Reliability Routing loop avoidance Routing loop avoidance

68 Extensions Increased fault tolerance for dropped packets and routing loops Increased fault tolerance for dropped packets and routing loops Group chat Group chat Testing and research on anonymity scheme Testing and research on anonymity scheme

69 Acknowledgements Amy Csizmar Dalal and the CS department for guidance and support Amy Csizmar Dalal and the CS department for guidance and support Michael N. Tie and ITS for helping make our equipment work Michael N. Tie and ITS for helping make our equipment work MUTE and Jason Rohrer MUTE and Jason Rohrer Our friends and family for putting up with us Our friends and family for putting up with us You all for being here today You all for being here today

70

71 References Rohrer, Jason. “MUTE Technical Details” http://mute-net.sourceforge.net/technicalDetails.shtml Rohrer, Jason. “MUTE Technical Details” http://mute-net.sourceforge.net/technicalDetails.shtml http://mute-net.sourceforge.net/technicalDetails.shtml http://www.bouncycastle.org/ http://www.bouncycastle.org/ http://www.bouncycastle.org/ Sun Microsystems http://java.sun.com Sun Microsystems http://java.sun.comhttp://java.sun.com Freenet http://freenet.sourceforge.net Freenet http://freenet.sourceforge.nethttp://freenet.sourceforge.net RFC 3921: XMPP http://www.xmpp.org RFC 3921: XMPP http://www.xmpp.orghttp://www.xmpp.org “The Gnutella Protocol Specification v0.4” http://www9.limewire.com/developer/_protoc ol_0.4.pdf “The Gnutella Protocol Specification v0.4” http://www9.limewire.com/developer/gnutella_protoc ol_0.4.pdf http://www9.limewire.com/developer/_protoc ol_0.4.pdf http://www9.limewire.com/developer/gnutella_protoc ol_0.4.pdf

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