1. By Christopher Moran, Nicoara Talpes 1

2.  Solution is addressed to VMs that are web servers  Web servers should not have confidential information anyway  "A complete firewall solution can be created in the cloud by utilizing Amazon EC2’s default deny-all mode which automatically denies all inbound traffic unless the customer explicitly opens an EC2 port. “ – default for instances, protects confidentiality ◦ Meets security outlined in Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 2

3.  How does the attacker know when the victim launches new instances?  Assumes that ‘most people’ use small VMs, but those represent only 21%  A web service will not go for small instances if it has decent traffic 3

4.  Co-residence reverse engineering is highly dependent on EC2’s architecture, thus not applicable for other providers  Microsoft Azure does not have VM capability  Side-channels not useful for inferring encrypted messages  Use lab-conditions for keystroke timing tests, instead of the cloud 4

5.  Unrealistic advantages of the testbed: idle machine, no core switching  VM cross channel leakage could be explained more clearly, use examples of how an attacker might use the leakage ◦ Live example on the cloud ◦ Explanation of how a hacker might use technique  Inefficient covert-channel method : 0.2 bits/sec amounts to 720 bits/hour  Unrealistic: did not determine co-residence using more than 2 instances on a CPU 5

6.  Load-based co-residence test will not function for VMs that are not hosting web services: there is a fraction of instances unreachable  D.O.S attack impractical on a large share of victim’s instances since coverage is around 8.4 % (at paper’s budget) 6

7.  Paper did not actually do any data theft to prove it is possible.  No data for co-residence success rates for victims that have servers up for longer than two days before the attack  Extrapolation from covert channel communication between 2 VMs to side-channel model( attacker- victim) is not explained. 7

8.  No cost projection for achieving any results in the paper  Experiment should have been designed between two parties, the attackers not knowing the victim’s launch schedules, outside public information  Instances cannot be placed with extra-large VMs 8

9.  Simple solutions could be implemented by Amazon: breaking parallel placement by assigning more random IPs to new instances  Or remap VMs periodically  The paper does not justify the solution of isolating users to different hardware ◦ The point of cloud computing is sharing resources on the same machine and on-demand scaling. ◦ Pushes people to use larger instances when unnecessary 9

10.  Assuming that data on the servers is confidential, is there value gained from the techniques used?  Don’t know data hosted on VM, guesstimate machine’s use based on site and CPU activity, will not know specifics about system, intelligence learned is high level ◦ Could have poorly implemented system that overuses CPU for amount of traffic  Other keystroke timing attacks known before, this did not require co-residency ◦ Technique relies heavily on knowledge of a person’s typing style ◦ Need to know when they are typing sensitive information 10