1. Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator Training

2. 2 Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Topic 1 Psychology of Fear & Trust Topic 2 The Food System as a Target of Attack Topic 3 Natural Disasters, Terrorism & Catastrophic Events

3. 3 Learner Outcomes Module 2 Learner Outcomes Compare and contrast fear and trust as adaptive survival processes. Describe the positive and negative consequences of fear, denial and panic as adaptive responses to heightened risk. Identify the factors that make the food system vulnerable to intentional attack.

4. 4 Learner Outcomes Learner Outcomes - continued  Compare and contrast characteristics of a natural or “traditional” disaster and an intentional terrorist attack.  Describe the psychological consequences of natural disasters and terrorism within the context of fear and trust.

5. Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism module two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism topic one The Psychology of Fear & Trust

6. 6 TRUST Slowly acquired Readily extinguished Difficult to re-establish FEAR Rapidly acquired Slow to extinguish Easily re-established Fear & Trust Fear & trust are two adaptive survival processes

7. 7 Adjustment to risk SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005 Lowperceived riskHigh Reactions change as risk increases. Acceptance Fear Denial Panic

8. 8 We accept most risks well SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005 Humans usually adapt well to risk. Acceptance Fear Denial Panic Frequently Rarely

9. 9 FEAR as a adjustment reaction Fear is our natural reaction in a crisis. It is automatic It comes early It is temporary It is a small over-reaction It may need guidance It serves as a rehearsal It reduces later over-reaction Fear is a useful response. Let it happen! Fear is a useful response. Let it happen!

10. 10 Reactions to perceived risk Over-reaction is our initial reaction to a new, potentially serious risk. We pause We become hyper-vigilant We personalize the risk We take extra precautions that are probably unnecessary, or at least premature. SOURCE: Peter Sandman

11. 11 Heightened Fear Leads to Denial Less common than fear More dangerous than fear More common response than panic Denial is reduced when: Legitimize the fear Action – do something Decision – given range of actions

12. 12 What is panic? A sudden strong feeling of fear that prevents reasonable thought or action. While “panicky feelings” are common… panic is rare.

13. 13 Response to the 2001 anthrax scare In the 3 impacted cities: 1% - purchased gas masks 5% - purchased antibiotic prescriptions (80% of these did not take prescriptions) 98% opened mail as usual 3% consulted doctor about anxiety

14. 14 “Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic” “Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic” Do NOT ‘Fear Fear’ or ‘Panic Panic’ Most people can cope & manage their fear To “Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic” can result in unwise strategies: Withhold information Over assure

15. 15 Applying the concepts Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak August-September, 2006 Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak August-September, 2006

16. Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism module two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism topic two The Food System as a Potential Target of Attack

17. 17 “I, for the life of me, cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.” Tommy Thompson, former HHS Secretary December 3, 2004 AP Photo

18. 18 Food Safety… Security… Defense Naturally occurring or unintentional contamination Access to adequate food supply Intentional attack on the food system Food Security Food Safety Food Defense

19. 19 Food system vulnerabilities  Exposed crops  High concentrations of livestock and poultry  Vulnerability points along the farm-to-fork chain  Large batch sizes in processing  Imported foods from a complex and global supply chain  Growth in niche and foreign markets

20. 20 Strategic vulnerabilities Ease in obtaining crop and animal pathogens Mass contamination could yield huge consequences with minimal effort Low risk in being detected, caught, or accidentally contaminated Substantial economic and psychological impact – even in the case of a threat or hoax

21. 21 Beyond the Terrorist: Who are the perpetrators? Usual suspects Criminals Extortionists Subversives - political ideologists Terrorists Usual suspects Criminals Extortionists Subversives - political ideologists Terrorists The not so obvious Disgruntled employees Competitors Mentally ill The not so obvious Disgruntled employees Competitors Mentally ill

22. 22 Weapons of Attack: Bioterrorism Diseases/Agents Weapons of Attack: Bioterrorism Diseases/Agents Category A examples: Anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, viral hemorrhagic Category B examples: Brucellosis, E.coli, salmonella, ricin, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) Category C: Emerging pathogens that could be engineered Source: CDC

23. 23 Foodborne disease costs INDUSTRY Product recall Poor publicity Loss of reputation Legal liability costs Increased insur- ance costs Loss of business Closure CONSUMER Pain & suffering Medical costs Loss of income Loss of leisure & enjoyment Increased insurance Physical rehab Long term care Death expenses PUBLIC Health care Legislation Plant inspection Medical investigation & surveillance Prosecution costs Education costs Clean-up & disinfection SOURCE: Food Alert

24. 24 Recent FOOD DEFENSE events 1984 751 people became ill after members of a religious cult contaminated salad bars in 10 restaurants in Oregon with Salmonella typhimurium Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh AP Photo First came the stomach cramps and nausea. Next came dizziness and disorientation. It was the chills, fever, diarrhea and vomiting that finally sent them to their doctors. Nearly a thousand of them…

25. 25 Recent FOOD DEFENSE events 1989 Terrorists phoned the U.S. embassy in Santiago and claimed to have laced all Chilean grapes with cyanide Chilean Fruit Pulled From Shelves as U.S. Widens Inquiry on Poison By PHILIP SHENON, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES Published: March 15, 1989

26. 26 Post Sept. 11, 2001 events 2002 Three Israeli-Arabs were arrested in Jerusalem for allegedly planning a mass poisoning of Israeli patrons at a local café.

27. 27 Post Sept. 11, 2001 events Fall, 2002 A China restaurateur added a chemical (rat poisoning) to a competitor’s food. 38 people died and hundreds were sent to hospitals. Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Monday, September 30, 2002 China Sentences Rat Poison Killer to Death

28. 28 New Zealand FMD Hoax Rural community near urban center (Auckland) May, 2005 New Zealand Prime Minister received letter claiming Food and Mouth Disease (FMD) was introduction on Waiheke Island. Was eventually determined to be a hoax. Cost was $1.5-2 million in compensation costs to dairy farmers on island.

29. 29 False claims & hoaxes Can seriously disrupt political, economic or psychological well-being Copy cats are common & can interfere with actual response efforts Internet is easy & effective tool for spreading false rumors

30. 30 Consumer attitudes & expectations about food defense Goal: Learn consumers priorities on spending for terrorism defense – food relative to other targets Conducted by: The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota & sponsored by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in April, 2005 Sample: 4000+ adult Americans internet responses; weighted to represent population

31. 31 Highlights of survey findings Over 90% of people believe there will be another terrorist attack in this country in the next four years. There is less likely to be a terrorist attack on the food system than on other economic sectors. Government and food processors are held the most responsible for both food safety & food defense, but government bears more responsibility for food defense.

32. 32 Survey highlights - Survey highlights - continued Retailers bear more responsibility & should bear more cost for food safety than food defense Consequences of an attack on the food system are more serious than on other sectors. Consumers would spend more to protect against a terrorist attack on the food system or against a chemical or biological release than they would for protecting airlines.

33. Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism module two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism topic three Natural Disasters, Terrorism and Catastrophic Incidents

34. 34 Natural and ‘traditional’ disasters Types of natural or traditional disasters Fire, floods, earthquakes, drought, hurricanes, tsunamis, mechanical failures, explosions, etc. Disasters due to acts of human error (accident) or neglect Airplane crash, fire, building collapse, mislabeled product, etc.

35. 35 Characteristics of natural events Well-defined time frame in terms of beginning and ending Sensory cues are readily available Where is the danger? Where is safety?

36. 36 Terrorist events Types of terrorist events CBRNE categories: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive Food defense focuses on chemical & biological Goal of terrorism is primarily psychological – eroding sense of security & safety

37. 37 Characteristics of terrorist events Intentional criminal acts directed toward others Mysterious agents and/or source of symptoms Random and outside of our control Potential permanent & catastrophic harm & loss No well-defined beginning or end May not provide routine sensory cues

38. 38 Response to terrorist event MYSTERY intensifiesFEAR These characteristics create a different and unique emotional charge than a natural or traditional disaster.

39. 39 Food terrorism challenges Contamination may not be discovered for days or even weeks after the event Even a threat or hoax involving the food supply can trigger mass anxiety and significant economic loss May be significant number of ‘unknowns’ (‘mystery’)

40. 40 Catastrophic potential Unfamiliar Decision processes not understood Lack of personal control Involuntary exposure Delayed effects Children at risk Risk to future generations Lack of trust in relevant institutions Much media attention Previous history Unclear benefits Potentially irreversible effects Origins caused by human actions (vs. act of nature) Factors associated with increased public concern (fear) - Covello, in NRC, 1989

41. 41 Risk Communication Goal of terrorism is to create contextual fear and to eliminate trust in the various critical US infrastructures In response, Risk Communication can: Reduces the mystery of the agents OR Help tolerate the mystery/uncertainty when faced significant ‘unknowns’ Less mystery yields less fear which yields more trust

42. 42 Take Aways Don’t ‘fear fear’ or experience ‘panic panic’ Most people can cope & manage their fear If we ‘fear fear’ official reactions to terrorist attacks may provoke unnecessary & unwise steps: Withholding information Over assurance

43. 43 Take Aways – Take Aways – continued Food defense addresses an intentional attack on the food system; food safety pertains to natural or accidental contamination. The dynamic nature of the food system makes it particularly vulnerable to attack.

44. 44  Listen to public’s concerns & understand audience For Effective Food Defense BestPractices