1. JUNE 4-5, 1942

2. EARLY 1942 EVENTS THE DOOLITTLE RAID: WHEN? APRIL 18-19, 1942 WHERE? WESTERN PACIFIC, JAPAN ISLANDS WHO? U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS / FORCE BOMBERS U.S. NAVY Lt. COL. JAMES DOOLITTLE, U.S.A.A.F. IS C/O 16 B-25 BOMBERS (80 OFFICERS & AIRMEN) WHY? RETALIATION FOR PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TO BOOST U.S. MILITARY & PUBLIC MORALE PROBLEM? HOW TO GET AIR GROUP CLOSE ENOUGH TO JAPAN W/OUT DETECTION HOW TO GET CREWS / PLANES TO SAFETY RESULTS? TOKYO BOMBED W/LITTLE DAMAGE CASUALTIES: U.S. – 3 KIA, 8 POW (4 DIE IN CAPTIVITY – 3 EXECUTED, 1 OF DISEASE), 15 B-25 BOMBERS JAPAN – 50 DEAD, 400 WOUNDED STRATEGIC RESULTS: JAPAN WITHDRAWS CARRIER GROUP FROM INDIAN OCEAN TO DEFEND JAPAN JAPAN DECIDES TO ATTACK MIDWAY ISLAND

3. LT. COL. JAMES H. DOOLITTLE, USAAF

4. THE REAL DOOLITTLE

7. U.S. ARMY B-25 BOMBER

11. DOOLITTLE’S B-25 LAUNCHES FROM U.S.S. HORNET, APRIL 18, 1942

14. DOOLITTLE’S B-25s OVER TOKYO HARBOR, APRIL, 1942

16. DOOLITTLE RAIDER IN JAPANESE CAPTIVITY, APRIL, 1942

17. THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA WHEN? MAY 4-8, 1942 WHERE? CORAL SEA, S.PACIFIC (near Australia) WHO? IJN COMBINED FLEET (carriers & battleships) USN – 2 CARRIER TASK FORCES (define) AUSTRALIA – DESTROYER FORCES WHY? JAPAN ATTEMPTING TO… STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION IN S. PACIFIC OCCUPY PORT MORESBY (New Guinea) EXTEND CONTROL IN SOLOMON ISLANDS SO WHAT? DIRECT THREAT TO AUSTRALIA RESULTS? FIRST BATTLE TO EMPLOY LARGE-SCALE CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS HEAVY FIGHTING / LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES CASUALTIES: JAPAN – 1 CARRIER SUNK, 1 DAMAGED, 966 KIA U.S. – 1 CARRIER SCUTTLED, 1 HEAVILY DAMAGED, 656 KIA STRATEGIC EFFECT? JAPAN CANNOT OCCUPY PORT MORESBY 2 JAPANESE CARRIERS UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE AT MIDWAY U.S. & ALLIES NOW HAVE TIME TO PREPARE NEW GUINEA INVASION

21. MIDWAY ISLAND, CENTRAL PACIFIC

22. AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942

23. FLEET ADMIRAL CHESTER NIMITZ, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

24. REAR ADMIRAL RAYMOND SPRUANCE, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK FORCE 16, BATTLE OF MIDWAY

25. VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM HALSEY, U.S. NAVY, ORIGINAL C/O, TASK FORCE 16

27. REAR ADMIRAL FRANK JACK FLETCHER, COMMANDING OFFICER, TASK FORCE 17, BATTLE OF MIDWAY

28. LCDR JOSEPH ROCHEFORT, U.S. NAVY, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE & CRYPTOGRAPHY DIVISION

29. ADMIRAL ISORUKU YAMAMOTO, COMMANDING OFFICER, IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY

30. ADMIRAL CHUICHI NAGUMO COMMANDING OFFICER, IJN CARRIER STRIKE FORCE, BATTLE OF MIDWAY

32. MIDWAY: PREPARING FOR BATTLE JAPANESE GOALS: ELIMINATE U.S. STRATEGIC POWER IN PACIFIC ALLOW JAPAN TO STRENGTHEN / TAKE ADVANTAGE OF RECENT CONQUESTS WOULD ENSURE NO REPEAT OF DOOLITTLE RAID HOW? / WHAT WAS THE STRATEGY? LURE U.S.NAVY CARRIERS INTO TRAP & ELIMINATE THEM A THREAT TO HAWAII WOULD FORCE U.S. TO RESPOND W/ CARRIER FORCES ATTACK & OCCUPY MIDWAY ISLAND

35. MIDWAY: ORDER OF BATTLE JAPANESE FORCES*: 4 CARRIERS 2 BATTLESHIPS 15 SUPPORT SHIPS 248 AIRCRAFT U.S. FORCES: 3 CARRIERS 25 SUPPORT SHIPS 233 CARRIER-BASED PLANES 127 LAND-BASED (Midway Island) PLANES *THESE FIGURES ONLY INCLUDE FORCES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN COMBAT AT MIDWAY

36. COMPARING FORCES JAPAN: ADVANTAGES LARGER NAVAL FORCE MOST IMPORTANTLY – MORE CARRIERS MORE EXPERIENCED NAVAL CREWS MORE EXPERIENCED PILOTS CONFIDENCE MOMENTUM JAPAN: DISADVANTAGES FEW, IF ANY NAVAL CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOGRAPHY WAS INFERIOR TO U.S. BATTLE PLAN IS COMPLICATED: JAPANESE FORCES CANNOT SUPPORT EACH OTHER WHY? THEY ARE DISPERSED OVER LARGE AREA OVERCONFIDENCE – UNDERESTIMATION OF U.S. CAPABILITIES (at that time)

37. COMPARING FORCES(cont’d.) U.S.: ADVANTAGES CODEBREAKING / CRYPTOGRAPHY U.S.: DISADVANTAGES LESS EXPERIENCED CREWS FEWER SHIPS, esp. CARRIERS INFERIOR TORPEDO PLANES INFERIOR FIGHTER PLANES U.S. CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE CARRIERS WHAT ROLE DO U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CODEBREAKERS PLAY IN THE BATTLE? IJN NAVAL CODE (IJN-25) WAS BROKEN BY THE U.S. CODES PROVED MIDWAY WAS JAPAN’s PRIMARY TARGET

38. U.S. NAVY TASK FORCE 16 CARRIERS, BATTLE OF MIDWAY U.S.S. HORNET (above) U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (right)

39. U.S.S. YORKTOWN, TASK FORCE 17

40. U.S. NAVY SBD “DAUNTLESS” DIVE BOMBER

41. U.S. NAVY “DAUNTLESS” DIVE BOMBER

42. U.S.N. SBD “DAUNTLESS” DIVE BOMBER MOVING TO TAKEOFF POSITION (note Pre-War insignia & color scheme on plane)

45. U.S.NAVY TBD “DEVASTATOR” TORPEDO PLANE

46. U.S. NAVY TBD DEVESTATOR VARIATIONS – note the Pre-war markings & color scheme; also note the aerial bomb on lower variant

47. U.S.NAVY TBD “DEVASTATOR” TORPEDO PLANE

48. U.S.N. TBD “DEVESTATOR” IN FLIGHT PREPARATION

51. U.S. NAVY GRUMMAN F-4-F “WILDCAT” FIGHTER

54. U.S. NAVY BREWSTER F2A-3 “BUFFALO” FIGHTER

57. JAPANESE CARRIER SORYU JAPANESE CARRIER HIRYU

58. JAPANESE CARRIER KAGA

59. JAPANESE CARRIER AKAGI

60. NAKAJIMA BN5 “KATE” TORPEDO PLANE (ABOVE) ; AICHI D3-A “VAL” DIVE BOMBER (BELOW)

61. IJN NAKAJIMA BN5 “KATE” TORPEDO BOMBER

62. MITSUBISHI A6M “ZERO” FIGHTER

65. COURSE OF BATTLE JUNE 4: 0620 hrs: JAPANESE ATTACK MIDWAY HEAVY AIR LOSSES FOR U.S. MIDWAY DAMAGED, BUT AIRFIELDS REMAIN INTACT SO WHAT? U.S. CAN STILL LAUNCH ATTACKS FROM ISLAND IJN WILL HAVE TO PREP. FOR 2 nd ATTACK ON MIDWAY 0500 hrs.: U.S. ATTACK JAPANESE CARRIERS w/MIDWAY- BASED PLANES 0715 hrs.: NAGUMO ORDERS CARRIER TORPEDO PLANES REARMED W/ CONTACT BOMBS (Why?) 0800 hrs.: IJN SCOUT PLANES SIGHT U.S FLEET NAGUMO ORDERS HALT TO ARMING OF PLANES – ORDERS BOMBS REMOVED & REPLACED BY TORPEDOS PROBLEM: NAGUMO MUST WAIT FOR MIDWAY STRIKE FORCE PLANES TO LAND THEN HE WILL LAUNCH PLANES AGAINST U.S. CARRIERS SO WHAT? U.S. FLEET HAS ALREADY LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK PLANES

66. COURSE OF BATTLE PROBLEMS? FOR IJN? YES… THEY HAVEN’T LAUNCHED PLANES AGAINST U.S. FLEET FLIGHT DECKS / HANGAR DECKS ARE COVERED w/BOMBS, TORPEDOES, & FUEL LINES FOR U.S.? YES… THEIR PLANES WERE LAUNCHED w/OUT COORDINATION PLANES GET SEPARATED ON FLIGHT TO IJN SO… TORPEDO PLANES HAVE NO FIGHTER COVER 0920 – 1000 hrs.: U.S. TORPEDO PLANES ATTACK SEVERE LOSSES (ex. TORPEDO SQUADRON 8) CRITICAL MOMENT: JAPANESE COMBAT FIGHTER PATROL COVERING CARRIERS IS DRAWN DOWN TO SURFACE CHASING TORPEDO PLANES 1020 hrs.: U.S. DIVE BOMBERS ARRIVE OVER IJN CARRIERS IJN FIGHTER PLANES CANNOT STOP THEM (why?) 3 DIVE BOMBER SQUADRONS ATTACK 3 IJN CARRIERS HIT SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FATAL FIVE MINUTES: KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU ALL HIT & SUNK HIRYU LAUNCHES AIRSTRIKE IMMEDIATELY U.S.S. YORKTOWN IS ATTACKED BY IJN DIVE BOMBERS & TORPEDO PLANES – HEAVILY DAMAGED; SINKS ON JUNE 7 HIRYU IS SUNK AFTER U.S. ATTACK IN AFTERNOON

67. AERIAL RECONAISSANCE PHOTO, MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942

68. MIDWAY ISLAND AIRFIELD LOCATIONS

70. LCDR JOHN THACH, U.S. NAVY

72. THE “THACH WEAVE”

73. BATTLE OF MIDWAY, BATTLE SEQUENCE, JUNE 4, 1942

75. LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON, SQUADRON C/O, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S. HORNET

76. VT-8, TORPEDO SQUADRON 8, U.S.S. HORNET

77. JUST A WORD TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I THINK WE ARE READY. WE HAVE HAD A VERY SHORT TIME TO TRAIN AND WE HAVE WORKED UNDER THE MOST SEVERE DIFFICULTIES. BUT WE HAVE TRULY DONE THE BEST HUMANLY POSSIBLE. I ACTUALLY BELIEVE THAT UNDER THESE CONDITIONS WE ARE THE BEST IN THE WORLD. MY GREATEST HOPE IS THAT WE ENCOUNTER A FAVORABLE TACTICAL SITUATION, BUT IF WE DON’T, AND THE WORST COMES TO WORST, I WANT EACH OF US TO DO HIS UTMOST TO DESTROY OUR ENEMIES. IF THERE IS ONLY ONE PLANE LEFT TO MAKE A FINAL RUN IN, I WANT THAT MAN TO GO IN AND GET A HIT. MAY GOD BE WITH ALL OF US. GOOD LUCK, HAPPY LANDINGS, AND GIVE ‘EM HELL. LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON, C/O TORPEDO 8, JUNE 4, 1942

78. LCDR JOHN C. WALDRON TAKING OFF DECK OF U.S.S. HORNET

80. U.S.NAVY DAUNTLESS DIVE BOMBERS BEGIN THEIR ATTACK, JUNE 4, 1942

81. U.S. NAVY DIVE BOMBERS OVER FLAMING IJN CARRIER, BATTLE OF MIDWAY, JUNE 4, 1942

82. BASIC U.S.N. DIVE BOMBING TACTICS

86. “THE FATAL FIVE MINUTES”, BATTLE OF MIDWAY, 1942

88. BOMB STRIKES ON IJN CARRIER AKAGI BATTLE OF MIDWAY, JUNE, 1942

90. RESULTS CASUALTIES: IJN: 4 CARRIERS SUNK 1 CRUISER SUNK 248 AIRCRAFT DESTROYED 2,013 KIA U.S.: 1 CARRIER SUNK (U.S.S. YORKTOWN) 1 DESTROYER SUNK (U.S.S. HAMMAN) 150 AIRCRAFT DESTROYED 307 KIA

91. U.S.S. YORKTOWN HIT BY TORPEDO

94. IJN “KATE” TORPEDO PLANE AFTER TORPEDO RELEASE ON U.S.S. YORKTOWN

101. U.S.S. YORKTOWN SINKING

103. U.S.S. YORKTOWN AT 17,000 FEET BELOW PACIFIC OCEAN SURFACE

104. EFFECTS ALLIES 1 st MAJOR VICTORY AGAINST JAPAN ELIMINATES JAPAN’s OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY WHY? HIGH CASUALTIES FOR VETERAN PILOTS HIGH CASUALITES FOR CARRIER CREWS EXPERIENCED PEOPLE CAN’T BE QUICKLY REPLACED LOSS OF 4 CARRIERS CAN’T BE QUICKLY REPLACED SETS THE STAGE FOR U.S. INVASIONS OF SOLOMON ISLANDS & NEW GUINEA THE TURNING POINT IN THE PACIFIC THEATRE OF WORLD WAR II