1. Adventures in Large Scale HTTP Header Abuse Zachary Wolff

2. About Me SIEM Deployments, Research Engineer for LogRhythm (Labs) | 2+ years Threat Research Analyst for Webroot Software | 2+ years

3. Lets Talk About HTTP Headers Browser Web Server

4. Standard Fields for Request & Response defined in RFC- 2616 (RTFRFC) GET / HTTP/1.0 is a legitimate request but may not return expected results RFC sets no limits on size of header, field name, value or number of headers Most webservers now impose their own limits : HTTP Headers Basics IIS v4 – 2MB v5 – 128K-16KB* V6 – 16 KB* V7 – 16 KB* Apache v2.3 – 8KB* *Per Header Field

5. Existing/Past HTTP Header Attacks

6. The Premise I want to break some logging applications!

7. par exemple, to begin

8. Round 1: Begin Original Premise: GET Request returns 302, 200, (valid response) then send a second GET with a malicious User Agent string* to see if we can get 500 response 1.Crawler to collect URL’s 2.Python script to send attack/test UA String 3.Store results in SQLite3 DB 4.Profit!

9. Round 1: Results Data set: 400K URL’s Lots of 500’s! Lots of smaller, low traffic site, some bigger high traffic sites Various different errors….

10. Round 1: Results Custom 500’s…

11. Regular expression parsing errors….

12. le yawn.. Non verbose IIS Errors…

13. Not as boring, generic apache 500 and the x.x.gov sites….?

14. Round 1: Conclusion What did we find? Some SQL injectable 500’s Possible application level DOS Lots of websites are not expecting malicious Header requests… Further exploration is warranted

15. the Question How extensive is the problem of improper HTTP header handling?

16. Round 2: Begin 1.Need a more effective way to identify vulnerabilities 2.Lets attack/audit more than just User-Agent Header 3.Expand beyond backtick, additional attack strings 4.Larger sample set, 1.6 Million URL’s 5.Must be able to store and access very large set of result data efficiently (Shodan is amazing)

17. Round 2: Vulnerability Identification 500’s are ok, but much to broad What is a good indication of a possible SQLi vulnerability? Run regular Expression against HTML.data response to match on, “you have an error in your sql syntax”

18. Round 2: Vulnerability Identification Improved error detection, basic SQLi & beyond *Thanks to @j0emccray for contributing to regEx list

19. Beyond RegEx based Error Detection Byte Anomaly Detection Added (--bad) Compare content-length of response data from original/clean GET to data from malicious GET. * Set margin of alert to 150 bytes above and 150 bytes below clean request, log results (including HTML response data) to file

20. Round 2: Additional Header Fields Let’s test: Host, From*, X-Forwarded-For, Referer, User-Agent, Non existent Header Smart Mode (-s) : Will look at all Header fields returned by the server and test those (minus whitelist of rarely dynamic Headers) Cookies!

21. Cookie Support Cookie Support added. Server Sends us this: PyLobster Responds with this: And the server says?

22. Round 3: Updates Updated Testing Values: “,;,%00, %00’

23. Round 2: Design “I Improved the crawler to harvest 500K+ URL’s a day. You should put my picture in your whitepaper” Output additions (beyond SQLite): Elasticsearch Indexing support added (fast, efficient, JSON to webinterface) Flat File logging Mark Vankempen, LogRhythm Labs

24. More Improvments Added Footprint mode (-g) 1.Generate random(ish) Hash or value 2.Save to key.txt file in same directory as pylobster.py 3.Activate Footprint mode:./pylobster.py –g pyLobster will now send your unique string/hash as a request like so: Then, Wait for it… Days, Weeks, Months Google/Bing/duckduckgo your hash/string to discover unprotected Log directories ;)

25. pyLobsters maiden voyage Ready Begin! pyLobster is currently a single threaded tool so I divided my 1.6 Million URL’s into 78 unique lists and spawned 78 instances #!/bin/bash nohup python pyLobster.py -f a --bad -s -l -g & nohup python pyLobster.py -f b --bad -s -l -g & nohup python pyLobster.py -f c --bad -s -l -g & nohup python pyLobster.py -f d --bad -s -l -g & And so on……

26. PyLobster’s Maiden Voyage Results Sending a null byte in your HTTP Headers will catch a fair bit of IDS attention ;) Grep response HTML on regEx error match directory to find patterns & specific components/module/application/CMS vulnerabilities. (highest value finding: one vulnerable component can lead to many others, shared DB’s as well) Various vulnerable components identified

27. Findings: Breakdown by RegEx # * Out of 1.6 Million Unique URL’s, 14,500 Error RegEx’s Matched! *0,1 & 2 are MySQL errors, 18 & 19 are PHP

28. Findings: Error Breakdown by Test String Of the 14,500 Error RegEx’s Matched

29. Findings: Error breakdown by HTTP Header *Cookies: 1584

30. Findings: error #0, breakdown by header field Error #0: “you have an error in you SQL syntax"

31. Findings: Footprint Mode Footprint Mode 12/13/2012  02/25/2013 

32. Foot Print Mode 3/27/2013 

33. Findings: (--bad) Byte Anomaly Detection Results Work to be done…. grep over dir for [wordpress|joomla|error|pass.*=|cms|.*?|] Sort response files by size for like errors Sort by status code response & file size

35. Defending Against HTTP Header Attacks Raise developer awareness that any dynamically handled Header values need to be seen as user input and processed accordingly Audit your sites HTTP Header Processing (pyLobster on github, SQLmap now supports custom Header testing too. bingo!) Proactively review/monitor your web logs

36. This: Creates this Log trail:

37. The End Thank you! @nopslip https://github.com/nopslip/pyLobster Zacharywolff@gmail.com