1. “MIXING BUGS AND BOMBS” An analysis of the growing biodefense footprint within the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Complex and the Implications for Policy and Public Health by Marylia Kelley Executive Director Tri-Valley CAREs Livermore, CA www.trivalleycares.org for American Public Health Association Annual Meeting Monday, October 27, 2008

2. Presenter Disclosures (1) The following personal financial relationships with commercial interests relevant to this presentation existed during the last 12 months: No relationships to disclose

3. About Tri-Valley CAREs Founded in 1983; twenty-five years monitoring the nuclear weapons complex Expanded focus to include biodefense in 2001 when the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) unveiled plans to collocate advanced biowarfare agent research with nuclear weapons at its Lawrence Livermore (CA) and Los Alamos (NM) weapon design laboratories Organizational methods include research, technical analysis, public education, political advocacy and litigation More information at www.trivalleycares.orgwww.trivalleycares.org

4. DOE Biowarfare Agent Research “Build” and operate a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) in a portable building placed in a parking lot at Livermore Lab; proceeding on the basis of a cursory “environmental assessment” (EA) Genetic modification, aerosol experiments, 50 liters Build and operate a BSL-3 in a conventional structure at Los Alamos Lab; originally proceeding on the basis of an EA, now preparing a full “environmental impact statement” (EIS) Growing DOE / Department of Homeland Security interface (NBACC West and more)

5. Implications for the International Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Dual use dilemma mixing bugs and bombs Transparency issues at classified nuclear weapons labs Limitations of Livermore Lab Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Potential impact on negotiation of stringent verification and enforcement protocols for the BWC Tri-Valley CAREs at the Meetings of States Parties to the BWC

6. Select Local and Regional Hazards DOE history of accidents, spills and releases Livermore Lab mishandles anthrax in BSL-2, breaks law, exposes workers, fails public disclosure and garners then-largest fine levied Additional risks posed by BSL-3 pathogens in Livermore Instructive examples from other U.S., international labs

7. Landmark Litigation Under the National Environmental Policy Act Suit filed against Livermore, Los Alamos BSL-3s in 2003 Differing outcomes; DOE agrees to EIS for Los Alamos, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision requires terrorism analysis for Livermore Lab BSL-3 Inadequacy of DOE’s terrorism analysis New litigation filed in 2008 Next steps, examples of expertise sought

8. Concluding Remarks Implications of mixing bugs and bombs for U.S. policy Relevance for public health professionals Questions of public health funding decisions Impacts on communities across the country – and some of the creative, resourceful public responses to date