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1 The Economics of Crime and Justice Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968.

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Presentation on theme: "1 The Economics of Crime and Justice Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 The Economics of Crime and Justice Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968

2 2 Topics Prisons in America Prisons in America Correctional Bureaucracy in CA Correctional Bureaucracy in CA The Serious Offender/Career Criminal The Serious Offender/Career Criminal Terrorism: A Preview Terrorism: A Preview

3 3 Bureaucracy: Readings Albert Hirshman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty Albert Hirshman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty  exit: voting with your feet  voice: political action Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy  survival of the bureaucrat

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5 5 Prisons in America Are we the land of the free and the home of the brave? Are we the land of the free and the home of the brave? Are we the gulag? Are we the gulag? Or both? Or both?

6 6 Likelihood of Going to Prison in a Lifetime 1/4 1/6 1/23 1/10 For Newborn Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U. S. Population, 1974-01 Source:

7 7 Imprisonment Rates Per 100/000 http://virlib.ncjrs.org/Corrections.asp

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10 10 12 % Current/Total 25% 1.3 million in prison; 4.3 million out but formerly in

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14 14 2.7% of Adults have been in prison, one time or another

15 15 And the % is projected to rise

16 16 If born in 2001, chances or ever going to prison 6.6%

17 17 If born a black male in 2001, lifetime chance is 32.2%, 1/3

18 18 Growth rates in State and Federal Prisoners, 1995-2002 Prisoners in 2002 Source

19 19 Comparative International Rates of Incarceration 1980

20 20 The U.S. Incarceration Rate is Higher than for Russia, and South Africa; 7 times Italy and 8 times France

21 21 CA Criminal Justice: examples Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Exit: choosing to live in a gated community Exit: choosing to live in a gated community Voice: lobbying for per se laws for DUI Voice: lobbying for per se laws for DUI Voice: lobbying for victims’ rights bills and ballot initiatives Voice: lobbying for victims’ rights bills and ballot initiatives

22 22 No Czar for CA CJS Offenses per Capita $ Expenditures Per Capita Crime Control Technology Control Costs + Damages to Victims optimum High Cost Inefficiency

23 23 No Czar for CJS Offenses increase, public demands safety Offenses increase, public demands safety Elected officials can increase police faster than they can build prisons Elected officials can increase police faster than they can build prisons Arrests rise, courts clog Arrests rise, courts clog prison capacity rises prison capacity rises number of parolees rises number of parolees rises

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26 26 Corrections Function Probation Departments Probation Departments Jails Jails  city and county Youth Authority Youth Authority California State Department of Corrections California State Department of Corrections  prisons

27 State Department of Corrections as a Proportion of California Corrections. 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 73-7475-7677-7879-8081-8283-8485-8687-8889-9091-92 Fiscal Year Share Cities and Counties, CYA Dept. of Corrections

28 28 Slide 38

29 29 California Corrections Bureaucracy Prisoner and Parole Populations Prisoner and Parole Populations  Stocks Felon New Admissions From Court Felon New Admissions From Court  Inflow to Prison Prisoners Released to Parole Prisoners Released to Parole  Outflow from Prison/Inflow to Parole Parole Violators Parole Violators  Outflow from Parole Discharges from Parole and Deaths Discharges from Parole and Deaths  Outflow from Parole

30 California Department of Corrections 1996 Prisoners 145,565 Parolees 100,935 Felon New Admits 46,487 Releases to Parole 111,532 Discharged and Died 27,691 57,984 Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators With a New Term 17,525 Parolees At Large 18,034 Discharged and Died 3,984 Absconded 29,376

31 31 Correctional Trends in California: Custodial Populations Prisoners Per Capita Prisoners Per Capita  Institutional Population  Felons  Civil Narcotics Addicts Parolees Per Capita Parolees Per Capita  Parole and Outpatient Population Supervised in California

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33 33 California Department of Corrections: Total Parole and Outpatient Population

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35 35 Correctional Trends in California: Inflows to Prison Felon New Admissions from Court Felon New Admissions from Court Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators With a New Term Parole Violators With a New Term

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37 37 Two Policy Issues Composition of New Admissions from Court Composition of New Admissions from Court Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to Prison Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to Prison

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41 41 SERIOUSNESS SURVEY (and months served in prison) RATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEHAVIORS ON A SCALE FROM ZERO( LEAST SERIOUS) TO TEN( MOST SERIOUS): MEAN 1. HOMICIDE _9.7__36 2. MASS POISONING ( e.g. TYLENOL) _8.3__ 3. FORCIBLE RAPE _9.4__66 4. ARSON: SET FIRE TO A GARAGE _7.8__ 5. SELLING HEROIN _6.2__ 6. AUTO THEFT _5.7__17 7. EMBEZZLEMENT OF $1,000 _4.6__ 8. PROSTITUTE IN A HOUSE OF PROSTITUTION _3.5__ 9. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA _2.3__13 10. SNIFFING GLUE _2.0__

42 42 At Least Two Inefficiencies Using scarce prison space for less serious drug offenders Using scarce prison space for less serious drug offenders using scarce prison space for recycled parolees returned to custody ( drug test violators) using scarce prison space for recycled parolees returned to custody ( drug test violators) Consequence: composition of prisoners rises for drug offenders and falls for violent offenders Consequence: composition of prisoners rises for drug offenders and falls for violent offenders

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44 44 Citizen Reaction to Release of Violent Offenders Voice: Three Strikes Law Voice: Three Strikes Law  Polly Klass abduction and murder by a released violent offender

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46 46 Part II. The Serious Offender (the power of ideas) Theoretical Justification for Detention Policy Theoretical Justification for Detention Policy

47 47 Part II The Serious Offender The Serious Offender  a few serious criminals account for most crimes  if free, each serious offender would commit crimes at the rate of  per year  if there are N serious offenders, they would commit *N offenses per year, if free  if there are PR serious offenders in prison, then we save *PR offenses per year  the net observed offenses per year is:  OF = *N - *PR = (N -AD*S)

48 48 Population Serious Offenders, N Prisoners, PR

49 49 Population Serious Offenders, N Prisoners, PR If the Serious Offender Population grows faster than the Prison Population then crime gets worse

50 50 Population Serious Offenders, N Prisoners, PR If the Prison Population grows faster than the Serious Offender Population then crime gets better

51 51 Thinking About the Serious Offender Visually: subpopulations Visually: subpopulations Stocks and Flows Stocks and Flows Transitions Transitions

52 52 Mean Time Served: One Year Relations Between Stocks and Flows InflowOutflow Stock, Dec 31 100 Prisoners Jan 1, year one 100 Admits Jan 1, year two 100 releases In equilibrium: inflow = outflow Jan 1, year two 100 Admits Jan 1, year three 100 releases outflow is proportional to the stock: 100 = 1* 100

53 53 Mean Time Served: Two Years Relations Between Stocks and Flows InflowOutflow Stock Jan 1, year one 100 Admits Jan 1, year two 0 releases Jan 1, year two 100 Admits Dec 31, year one 100 prisoners Dec 31, year two 200 prisoners Jan 1, year three 100 releases Jan 1, year three 100 Admits In equilibrium: inflow = outflow outflow is proportional to the stock: 100 = 1/2* 200

54 P. 96, Lecture 6 Notes.

55 55 Illustrative Example Suppose for a career criminal, time committing crime = time behind bars, Suppose for a career criminal, time committing crime = time behind bars,  1/(  q J) = s  s is time behind bars, e.g 2 years  and  is offenses per year, e. g. 30 per year  q is probability of being arrested and convicted per offense,  J is the probability of imprisonment if convicted, e.g. 2/3  then q = 1/40 per offense, and q = 3/4 per year  and  q J, the probability of arrest, conviction  and imprisonment is 1/2

56 P. 96, Lecture 6 Notes. 1/2

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59 59 128-A8 120-127A-11 113-119B+10 106-112B11 97-105B-13 88-96C+12 76-87C5 64-75C-8 52-63D+1 40-51D0 -39D-1 0F3

60 60 Terrorism in the USA Home grown Home grown Foreign imports Foreign imports Remedies Remedies

61 61 Learning from History Skyjacking in the USA Skyjacking in the USA  first in the USA was 1961

62 62 Learning from Economics Thwarting embezzlement Thwarting embezzlement  inspection, I. E. audit

63 Recent History of US Terrorism Post 9-11 Post 9-11  Cabinet position for Homeland Security Pre 9-11 Pre 9-11 Bombings Bombings  World Trade Center, New York  Murtaugh Federal Building, Oklahoma City  Black Churches Skyjackings Skyjackings

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65 65 http://www.state.gov Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Patterns of Global Terrorism

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72 Reward: $2,000,000

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76 76 ARA: InterAmerica AF: Africa EAP: East Asia and the Pacific EUR: Europe NESA: Near East and South Asia

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78 78 Americas

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80 80 Europe

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82 82 Skyjackings The first skyjacking was a Peruvian carrier in February 1931 The first skyjacking was a Peruvian carrier in February 1931 The first skyjacking of a US carrier was a National Airlines flight destined for Key West Florida on May 1, 1961 The first skyjacking of a US carrier was a National Airlines flight destined for Key West Florida on May 1, 1961

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