1. CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 10 Jonathan Katz

2. Crypto pitfalls? 1. Bad cryptography, bad implementations, bad design 2. Even good cryptography can be ‘circumvented’ by adversaries operating ‘outside the model’ 1.Systems are complex, and your model may not exactly match reality 2.Side channel attacks 3. Even the best cryptography only shifts the weakest point of failure elsewhere

3. Recommendations and warnings

4. Crypto libraries  Use existing, high-level crypto libraries –cryptlib –GPGME –Keyczar –These provide an appropriate interface to crypto algorithms  Avoid low-level libraries (like JCE) – too much possibility of mis-use  Avoid writing your own low-level crypto

5. Random number generation  Do not use “standard” PRNGs; use cryptographic PRNGs instead  E.g., srand/rand in C: –srand(seed) sets state=seed (where |seed| = 32 bits) –rand(): state = f(state), where f is some linear function return state –Generating a 128-bit key using 4 calls to rand() results in a key with only 32 bits of entropy!  Related issues led to exploit in Netscape v1.1

6. More on PRNGs  Crypto PRNGs have different requirements –Indistinguishable from random by any efficient algorithm –Constantly re-seeded with new entropy to ensure forward security –Should be impossible to guess or perturb internal state E.g., if entropy comes from file timestamps  “Cold boot” issues –Server just rebooted and needs randomness….is there enough entropy after being up just a few seconds?

7. Integrity protection  Encryption does not provide integrity!  Use authenticated encryption (e.g., encrypt-then- MAC) in the symmetric-key setting when confidentiality and integrity are required –…and even if you only want confidentiality…  Use public-key encryption secure against chosen- ciphertext attacks

8. Avoid weak algorithms  Be careful allowing too much flexibility in negotiation of crypto algorithms –Leads to a ‘parameter selection’ attack  Difficult to adjust if fatal flaw found in weak algorithm –E.g., Upgrading encryption to add integrity protection: Old: CBC-encrypted New: Add integrity protection using a MAC Bright idea: get old credential; decrypt; re-encrypt with new key + MAC Do you see the flaw?

9. Implementation flaws  (These are crypto-specific; and do not include general issues such as preventing buffer overflows, etc. that we will cover later)  Must implement crypto exactly as specified!  if (0 == strncmp(userHash, myHash, 20)) allow; –strncmp compares up to the first null character –What if my hash starts with a 0 byte??

10. Implementation flaws  Must implement crypto exactly as specified!  PKCS#1 pads data as follows: 00 01 FF … FF 00 H(m)  Bad implementation of signature verification? –Exponentiate, strip off padding, and compare to H(m)  Makes forgery easier!  Every bit of padding must be checked

11. Delimiting tokens  E.g., Amazon Web Services v1 –Split query at & and = ; concatenate and apply MAC –The following are then equivalent: …?GoodKey1=GoodValue1BadKey2BadValue2 …?GoodKey1=GoodValue1&BadKey2=BadValue2  Wordpress cookie flaw –token: HMAC(username.expirytime) –Create account for username=‘admin0’ and go…  Using timestamps to prevent replay –Is MAC(withdraw $101.1/23/09) = MAC(withdraw $10.11/23/09)?

12. Case studies

13. “Why Cryptosystems Fail”  Limited disclosure of crypto failures…  Insider attacks –By bank clerks, maintenance engineers, … –Poor prevention/detection/auditing mechanisms –Poor key management –Insecure delivery of ATM cards/PINs  Reduced entropy of PINs  Use of “home-brewed” encryption schemes

14. System goals and assumptions  A user should need both their ATM card and their PIN in order to withdraw money –“Two-factor authentication”  Assumptions: –PIN must be short –ATM card cannot perform cryptographic operations

15. Threat model  Attacker can –Read discarded receipts… –Eavesdrop on channel from ATM to bank –Inject messages on channel from ATM to bank –Impersonate the ATM to a user

16. Desired security  If an attacker does not have a user’s ATM card, should be infeasible to withdraw money from that user’s account (even if the PIN is guessed)  If an attacker does not have a user’s PIN, the best an adversary can do is guess it repeatedly –1/10000 chance each time –Prevent unlimited guessing

17. One system ATM Account # PIN Bank #, PIN If F K (#) = PIN: return “ok” ok This is similar, but not identical, to how ATMs work today

18. Attacks  Eavesdrop on PIN and account # ; manufacture rogue ATM card  Replay “ok” message! –Solution: use authentication with replay protection  Impersonate an ATM to a customer –Can this be prevented without implementing crypto on the ATM card? (Hint: how could the bank authenticate directly to the user?)

19. Another system ATM Account # c=Enc K (PIN) PIN Bank #, c, PIN If D K (c) = PIN: debit account #, return “ok” ok No binding between account # and PIN!

20. Another system ATM Account # PIN Bank # If F K (#) = PIN: “authenticated” balance withdraw amt If amt ≤ balance, dispense cash Do you see an attack? encrypted