1. Protection: A Theoretical View Lt Col (retd) Jim Storr PhD

2. Introduction

3. Doctrine? ‘Command’ is defined as ' … the direction, coordination and control of military forces.' ‘Control’ is ‘the process by which a commander … organises, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him…' So Command = direction + coordination + control; and Control = organisation + direction + coordination Thus Command + = direction + coordination + 2 x control; Control ?

4. Why 'do' Force Protection? It keeps people alive; uninjured, healthy: –Humanitarian considerations –Morale –Commander's duty –Legal obligations Maintains operational effectiveness

5. Clausewitz How good is your early 18 th Century German? Zweck Mittel Ziele

6. The Dialectic An interchange of Ends (aims) and Means Ways, Ends and Means? Also, an interchange between enemy and friendly forces

7. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces

8. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims

9. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

10. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

11. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

12. Force Protection? Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Preventing this

13. Force Protection? Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means To enable us to do this

14. Example 1: 1982

15. Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness (SA)‏ Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.

16. Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties. All just a wee bit 'Cold War'

17. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Northern Ireland Improvements in countering IEDs keep soldiers alive... but you can't stop terrorists inventing new kinds of bombs... so you're always reacting? The terrorist always has the initiative?

18. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland But: –Link intelligence, tactics, organisations, scientific advice, EOD policy, training, EW,... –Wargame –Couple them very closely into a very responsive system –You can then react very quickly to changes in the threat –... and begin to predict, and even pre-empt, changes in the threat

19. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland And: –.... so you can begin to reduce the terrorist's initiative –... and he's no longer 'doing' terror – What do you call a terrorist who can't 'do' terror?

20. Deductions Force Protection can have operational- level consequences You are removing, or at least affecting, his MEANS; and thus also his aims

21. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means You are now doing this

22. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means...and preventing him doing this

23. The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means What is this?

24. Countering IEDs A lot of very expensive technology? The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule Deductions: –1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology –2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

25. Countering Irregular Activity A lot of very expensive technology? The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule Deductions: –1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology –2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

26. Other Examples Urban and rural multiple patrolling Helicopter top cover to rural foot patrols Many of these measures are highly asymmetric They will not translate directly to other theatres

27. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?

28. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes?

29. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes? No

30. Conclusions

31. 1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

32. 1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Force Protection is not just about this

33. 1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means It's also about this

34. 1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Which directly affects this

35. 1: The Dialectic Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means Hence we can win

36. Deductions (2)‏ Tactical Force Protection measures can have operational level consequences: They can deny the insurgent, or terrorist, the ability to achieve his aims; and hence contribute directly to operational success

37. Deductions (3)‏ Issues such as minor unit tactics can be twice as important as technology Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it That requires suitable organisations and processes at the theatre, or campaign, level.

38. Questions?

39. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means

40. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Own Means Own Aims Enemy Aims Enemy Means