1. The Tonkin Gulf Incident Making the Vietnam War Official

4. Gulf of Tonkin Incident two separate incidents involving naval forces of North Vietnam and the US in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin 1.On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox engaged three North Vietnamese torpedo boats, resulting in damage to the three boats. 2.On August 4 the Maddox reported a second engagement with North Vietnamese vessels. This second report was later concluded to be incorrect

7. Background The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration Johnson's supported military escalation in Vietnam After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more American forces to support the Saigon government

8. Background According to the U.S. Naval Institute, covert actions against North Vietnam had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. The night before the launching of the actions against North Vietnam facilities, a covert team was captured in North Vietnam territory Also that night two flights of CIA-sponsored Laotian fighter-bombers attacked border outposts well within southwestern North Vietnam The Hanoi government assumed that they were all a coordinated effort to escalate military actions against North Vietnam. The Hanoi government assumed that they were all a coordinated effort to escalate military actions against North Vietnam.

9. The 1 st Incident On July 31, 1964, the Maddox had begun its intelligence collection mission in the gulf The Maddox was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles from the North's coast On August 2, Maddox claimed it was attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol boats 28 miles away from the North Vietnamese coast in international waters

12. The 1 st Incident Maddox evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its guns, forcing the patrol craft away U.S. aircraft were launched then attacked the retiring patrol boats, claiming one as sunk and one heavily damaged Maddox, suffering very minor damage retired to South Vietnamese waters

13. The 2 nd Incident On August 4, another North Vietnamese patrol off the North Vietnamese coast was launched This time the Maddox was to close to no more than 11 miles from the coast of North Vietnam During an evening and early morning of rough weather and heavy seas, they received radar, sonar, and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by the North Vietnamese navy

16. The 2 nd Incident For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies. At 1:30 am Washington time, Maddox sent a cable in which he admitted that the attack may never have happened and that there may have been no Vietnamese craft in the area One hour later, Maddox sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft."

17. The 2 nd Incident At 6 pm Washington time, Maddox cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the Maddox probably fired a torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not seen. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing ship's own propeller beat"

18. Consequences President Johnson, who was up for election that year, launched retaliatory air strikes and went on national television Although Maddox had been involved in providing intelligence support for South Vietnamese Defense Secretary McNamara denied that the U.S. Navy had supported South Vietnamese military operations in the Gulf He thus characterized the attack as "unprovoked" since the ship had been in international waters

23. Consequences As a result of his testimony, on August 7, Congress passed a joint resolution titled the Southeast Asia Resolution, which granted President Johnson the authority to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia The Resolution gave President Johnson approval "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

24. The Aftermath Just a few days after the incident, President Johnson commented privately: "For all I know, our Navy was shooting at whales out there." In 1981, Captain Herrick of the Maddox re- examined the ship's log and determined that the first torpedo report from August 4th, which Herrick had maintained had occurred—the "apparent ambush"—was in fact unfounded