1. The Virtue Epistemological Approach to Epistemic Rationality Shawn Shih National Chung-Cheng University, Taiwan

2. The proposal A reductionist project A hybrid theory of epistemic rationality (a) epistemic rationality → intellectual virtue (b) intellectual virtues → reliability (c) instrumental conception → the effectiveness (reliability) of means. (d) virtue perspectivism (norm externalism)

3. Two kinds of intellectual virtues Virtue epistemology : the evaluations of beliefs, judgments should be understood in terms of their relations to virtuous intellectual characters. Virtue responsibilism: focus on human inquiry, and where the primary focus of evaluation is shifted from the act or belief to the agents’ character trait (non-reductionist) Virtue reliabilism: intellectual virtues are reliable psychological faculties and stable dispositions aiming at truth (reductionist).

4. Two approaches to epistemic rationality Epistemic goal --truth or the boarder conception Goal-oriented approach: the principle of instrumental rationality completes the characterization of all kinds of rationality. Goal determined approach: the goals are themselves subject to assessments of rationality.

5. Both approaches are based on instrumental conception-- The goal of epistemic rationality is fixed and is essentially rational, which is attaining truth and avoiding falsity..

6. Perspectives in epistemic rationality Instrumental conception: the effectiveness of the means (means-end analysis) Perspectives in epistemic rationality : internalist/externalist Externalist account: the external consideration should be taken into account. Internalist account: the epistemic rationality is a function exclusively of internal considerations.

7. Internalist’s intuition The new evil demon problem Internalist’s intuition: If S is blamelessly reflecting on that P from her own perspective, then S is epistemically rational to believe that P. Conclusion: Truth is not the prerequisite of epistemic rationality.

8. Two bad implications for internalist Even the reason is not respect to P, is S epistemically rational to believe that P? Reason (reflection) is not an effective means to pursue epistemic goal.

9. The landscape Truth Virtue reliabilist reliability externalist Reason Virtue responsibilist responsibility internalist

10. Two sorts of externalist Belief externalist: generic reliabilism Norm externalist: (a) the radical norm externalist—omniscient view (b) the modest norm externalist—context-based

11. Going deeper (C1) It is the first time for Mary to exercise a means A properly to believe the proposition P1 at t1, which means A is reliable means respect to P1 in her epistemic communities, and S is epistemically rational to believe P1. (C2) All other things being equal, if Mary use means B to believe the proposition P2 at t2, t2 is after t1, however means B is not reliable with respect to P2 in her epistemic communities but means A is, then S is not epistemically rational to believe P2.

12. Virtue perspectivism (1) S has an intellectual V(C, F) relative to environment E iff S has an inner nature I such that: if (i) S is in E and has I, (ii) P is a proposition in field F, and (iii) S is in conditions C with respect to P, then (iv) S is very likely to believe P correctly with respect to P.

13. Virtue perspectivism(2) S believes P out of intellectual virtue V(C, F) iff (1) S is in an environment E such that S has intellectual virtue V(C,F) relative to E, (2)P is a proposition in F, (3)S is in C with respect to P, and (4)S believes P, then (5)S is epistemically rational to believe that P.

14. Internal aptness S believes proposition P out of sufficient virtue relative to epistemic group G iff (a) S believes P out of intellectual virtue V(C, F), and (b) the likelihood that S believes correctly when S believes out of virtue V(C, F) is at least up near the average for group G.

15. Some cases Barn Facsimiles Clairvoyance The evil demon problem

16. Conclusion In this paper, I try to understand epistemic rationality based on Sosa’s virtue perspectivism (the modest norm externalism). Simultaneously, it is a hybrid theory to combine internalist and externalist viewpoints. I believe the virtue epistemological approach is successful.