1. Introduction to science studies: from philosophy via history to sociology
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
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2. Introduction to science studies: from philosophy via history to sociology
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
The intro’s bird’s eye view may be visually compressed by this iconlgraphy of great philosophers of science, nemaly a development from a platonic (Plato), positivist (neo-platonic?), historicist (Kuhnian) view of science to an externalist, sociological and ultra-pragmatic view (Sander)
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3. Why philosophy of science ?
Why study philosophy of science ?
Simple answer: A human being = a thinking animal. To think is also to ponder. To ponder is also to self-reflect: Why do I do what I do? Do I do it the right way? Is it good for me and others? Could it be better?
Why do I do research?
Possible answers: It’s fun. It make me understand the world better. I can make a living of it - perhaps even a career? I can give something back to society. It’s worth the efforts for its own sake.
And what is research, really??
is science something special?
just a tool to predict or manipulate nature?
does it carve nature at its joints?
Humankinds only hope for survival?
These questions (and suggestions) have all kinds of implications, and philosophy - as well as history & sociology of science - provide ressources to approach them
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4. A crash course tour in the history of philosophy of science: 1
A crash course tour in the history of philosophy of science: 1. Plato and...
Plato ( BC) and the Pythagorean view of nature
”the real” = the mathematical harmony present in nature
”Science” (i.e. physics, philosophy of nature) ≈ Knowledge of this harmony ≈ insight into the fundamental structure of the universe
confer Galileo ( ): the book of nature stands open to our gaze, yet we have to understand its language - mathematics - to be able to read it!
Pythagoreans: Mathematical relations, which fit phenomena count as explanations of why things are as they are
Rival point of view (e.g. Geminus, 1st Cent. BC): mathematical hypothesis ≠ physical theories about the structure of the universe. Thus, distinguish between
to ”save the appearances” by superimposing mathematical relations on the phenomena
to explain why phenomena are as they are
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5. A crash course tour in the history of philosophy of science: 1. ... Ptolemy
Ptolemy (c AD)
More than one model can be constructed to save the appearances of planetary motions: A moving-eccentric model may be equivalent to an epicycle-deferent system
—> This lead to a tradition saying that the astronomer should construct mathematical models to save the appearances but should not theorize about ”the real motions” of the planets.
Picture from
A planet orbits point x in a circular path called the epicycle. The deferent is the circular path that point x takes around the centre of motion, C. This is not the same point as the location of the Earth. The offset is called the eccentric. Different planets would have different eccentrics, deferents and epicycles. The resultant path traced out by a planet could account for retrograde motion and variations in brightness.
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6. ... to make a long history short
Philosophy of science before the 19th Century:
No clear distinction between scientists and philosophers of science. Philosophical issues was discussed by scientists having different ideals of science, e.g.:
realism (science aims at making true theories about the structure of the workd) vs. instrumtalism (science aims at making models useful to account for observations and making precictions)
inductivism (knowledge from observations) vs. hypothetical-deductive view of science
Three compeeting traditions
the Platonic-pythagorean (e.g., astronomy)
the Aristotelian (e.g., natural history)
the Archimedian (e.g., mechanics)
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7. Next quick-step: Positivism
Here is Carnap.
He was a positivist.
However, ”positivism” means different things!
- at least 4 meanings:
Rudolf Carnap
( )
Classical positivism (19th Century): Comte
Logical positivism/empiricism (20th C.): Carnap et al
NB: this is the mother of ”philosophy of science” sensu an institutionalized field of academic research!
Commonsense positivism or positivism as an ethos
Positivism as a pejorative
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8. 19th Century: Comte’s positivism
A. Comte
( )
Comte was one of the big ”system builders” of the 19th C.;
his ”positive philosophy”, in Cours de Philosophie Positive (6 volumes, ) witness the emergence of a self-conscious scientific (or scientist?) spirit
The positive is:
What is real (non-imagined)
no loose speculations, but the real and experience-based
What is useful
skepticism regarding ”armchair philosophy”
What is certain (beyond discussion)
What is precise
distancing the vague and opaque in contemporary phylosophy
What is edifying
Philosophy should helt build up, not break down
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9. 19th Century: Comte’s positivism
A. Comte
( )
• ”positive philosophy” - the idea of enlightenment and belief in progress
• founder of sociology; one of the ”systems builders” of the 19th C.
• a conception of the system of sciences: Unity and universalism, and a historical tendency towards unification of all sciences
Comte’s progressionist philosophy of history:
The theological stage - belief in supernatural powers
Animism
Polytheism
Monotheisme
The metaphysical stage - belief in abstract powers
Isolated speculation
Branches of philosophy
Philosophical systems
The scientific stage belief in invariant patterns
Specific matters of fact
Fewer and fewer, more general facts (theories)
Sociology
Biology
Chemistry
Physics
Astronomy
complexity
generality
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10. 20th Century: Logical positivism
A forerunner to logical positivism:
Ernst Mach ( )
”The goal which it [physical science] has set itself is the simplest and most economical abstract expression of facts” (from the Essay ”The economical nature of physical inquiry” ).
Mach held that scientific laws are summaries of experimental events, constructed for the purpose of human comprehension of complex data. Thus scientific laws have more to do with the mind than with reality as it exists apart from the mind.
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11. Logical positivism, the Vienna Circle, 1923 - 1936
Rudolf Carnap
( )
Otto Neurath
( )
Moritz Schlick
( ),
1932: Positivism
and Realism
Alfred J. Ayer
( ),
1936: Language,
Truth, and Logic
Ludwig Wittgenstein
( )
Herbert Feigl
( )
Carl G. Hempel
( )
Hans
Reichenbach
( )
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12. 20th Century: Logical positivism
The Second International Congress for the Unity of Science, København, June , 1936
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13. Logical positivism - some characteristics
The total
knowledge is
cumulative
Rationality, ”positive knowledge”
Anti-metaphysical: sharp distinction between Science / Non-science
(analytic and
synthetic)
knowledge
’nonsense’
( incl. Hegel and Heidegger in philosophy and nazism in politics)
Source of knowledge: observations + logic (cf. ”logical empiricism”)
Laws and theories
data data data
Induction
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14. Logical positivism - some characteristics
Language has a logical structure
What is meaningful = what is verifiable
(by implication, metaphysics is considered as meaningless)
A mirrowing relation between language and reality (the ”Fido-Fido-theory”)
Fido’s bread
logical positivism’s favourite
philosophy of language
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15. Logical positivism - some characteristics
Laws, theories
Construction of general knowledge through induction and deduction: ”the hypothetical-deductive method”
Induction
Deduction
Data, facts,
observations
Predictions,
explanations
Unified science (methodological monism) ... Mathematical physics becomes the ideal science
Theory-reduction and logical analysis are seen as tools for unified science
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16. Logical positivism - summary of its characteristics
Analytic/synthetic distinction
all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of geometry: analytic and synthetic!
Verificationist theory of meaning
The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as sharply separated
”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
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17. the language of Observation
the language of Theory
the language of Observation
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18. Logical positivism - summary of its characteristics
Analytic/synthetic distinction
all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of geometry: analytic and synthetic!
Verificationist theory of meaning
The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as sharply separated
”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
Logic as a main tool for philosophy
Deductive logic as a guaranty of truth, - but what about inductive logic !? It became important to develop an inductive logic. Carnap did a great work, but ultimately failed.
Context of Discovery (opdagelsessammenhængen) vs. Context of Justification (begrundelsessammenhængen)
Philosophy takes care of C.o.Just. while History and Psychology studies the C.o.Disc.
(implied): a teleological picture of the scientific method (as intrinsicly goal-directed towards objective knowledge) with an asymmetry between expanations of ’good’ and ’bad’ science. Only bad science, pseudoscience, etc., needs ’external’ historical or psychological explanations.
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19. Logical positivism - summary of its characteristics
Science should be value-free
Emphasis on ”facts” and the objectivity of science.
Objectivity conceived as methods to secure a mirror-like relation between theories and observations
Methodological reductionism: theory-reduction
Ontological reductionism: physicalism (i.e., the belief that the world is ultimately of a physical nature) or eventually phenomenalism (as in Mach: sense impressions are the ultimate stuff of all knowledge)
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20. Further senses of “positivism” - as a pejorative / skældsord
In some contexts, ”positivist” is used as expressing criticism or disapproval:
”Do you think that the social sciences should only contribute knowledge to form a basis for ”a piecemal social engineering” as Popper would have it?! - that’s plein positivism!”
”Sociology reduced to quantitative statistics! What a positivistic idea !”
Remember the ”Positivismusstreit” in German social science in 1950s and 1960s: What kind of social science should there be, — should it be ”critical” or merely ”descriptive”, ”marxist” or ”positivist” ?
This controversy keeps reappearing.
E.g., the controversy over the ’right’ of scientists and scholars to have special measures of quality in research in the natural, the human and the social sciences.
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21. Further senses of “positivism” - as an ethos
What is an ethos?
”the ethos of science” (R. Merton)
A practically-moral way to take a stance or act, an attitude, a set of social norms and values
May be expressed at special occasions, in salutary speeches etc.; but more often an ethos is expressed in actions and not in words.
(not a consistent philosophical position)
(not an ideology in the sense of ”false consciousness” or a ”political agenda”)
An ideology in the sense of a non-scientific ”practical everyday stance”
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22. “The positivist ethos of science”
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or ”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is foreign to science.
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23. “The positivist ethos of science”
The exaxt wording of the ethos in the slide above is mine (C.E.), but it is seen in many contexts. Here is the so-called CUDOS version, due to a founder of the sociology of science, Robert K. Merton:
According to Merton, the ethos of science can be expressed in the norms
Communism (knowledge is a common good)
Universality (science is for all disregarding social, political, religious etc. background)
Disinterestedness (objectivity)
Organized Skepticism (the system of critical testing and evaluation)
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24. “The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
Scientism?!
Ethnochauvinism?
“The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or ”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is foreign to science.
demand of just one method is wildly restrictive
emphasis on certainty is
a dead end,
and leads philosophically to skepticism
like ”art pour l’art” - a naive view of science. Should society pay indefinitely ?!
A social contract (or payback) is needed !
a naive conception of how science in fact develops
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25. “The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
Knowledge cannot fully be accounted for like that. Values and knowledge cannot be separated
“The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
Can science justify itself ?
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or ”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is foreign to science.
Should this free the scientist of special responsibility?
you cannot always
separate use of knowledge from achievement of knowledge
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26. “The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
Can the scientist always distinguish between his role as a scientist and his active interests in funding, patents, or his role as a politically engaged citizen ?
“The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
There are many forms of expertise - not only scientists are experts!
Science is often political
althouth it pretends to appear neutral
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or ”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is foreign to science.
What we consider to be science today
May be considered ideology tomorrow or in 50 years
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27. “The positivist ethos of science” - in crisis ?
A dangerous illusion to think you can free science of ethical involvement and responsability
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or ”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is foreign to science.
Today, science and technology are tightly interwoven activities
(”technoscience”)
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28. And now on to history …
Cf. the title of presentation: Introduction to science studies: from philosophy via history to sociology
Positivism: focus on science as a product (context of justification of knowledge)
Kuhn, briefly:
focus on science as a micro-social historical process
View of theories as conceptual structures embedded in historically situated social framework (paradigms)
Questioning the continuity and cumulative nature of knowledge (revolutions)
Context of discovery and context of justification is not so neatly separated: The paradigm frames beforehand how to ask questions and how to interpret a discovery - thus, he sets out to understand the context of normal-science practice on a deeper level.
Thomas S. Kuhn ( )
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29. HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Kuhns scheme of
scientific development:
Contrast to positivism and Popper:
The development of science is not trivially cumulative, but discontinous
Anomalies (not ”falsification”) is a part of normal science
Scientific development is a question of not only ”theory”, but also social factors and values. Science is not foreign to values. Even ”data” are ”theory-ladden” and thus connected to the wider conceptual scheme that a paradigm constitutes.
No definitional demarcation criterium: ”Science” as a concept is a cluster of family likenesses (as concepts like ”game”).
Pre-paradigmatic science
Normal Science
(puzzle solving)
Crisis (if some anomalies          become too serious)
Revolution
New Normal Science
etc.
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30. HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Characteristics of Kuhn as a founder of the HPS tradition:
Kuhn is an internalist: ”the social” as a set of factors influencing science is mainly of an intellectual character and mainly manifest within the development of a paradigm, and especially in between paradigms
Kuhn is an externalist regarding the phases of crisis & extraordinary science between two rival paradigms: Here, social factors external to science may play a role in the process of science.
Kuhn a relativist? Yes, but not an irrationalist: The process of theory-choise is not irrational, yet it is not following any special algorithm or predefined set of methodological norms independent of any paradigm
Kuhn’s critique of positivism: He contested some elements of the ”positivist ethos” of science ... (e.g., ”Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification”), but was more critical to positivism as a philosophy than as an ethos (or that ethos’ implications for science policy).
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31. HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
What is ”the HPS tradition” ?
Study science in context
Science is a human activity, and not a purely logical or theoretical process
To know about scientific change, one must look at how science was actually conducted. Philosophy is not enough. History of science provides important sources for analysing philosophical issues like confirmation, justification, theory choise, discoveries, controversies, etc.
Thus, Kuhn’s impact is the turn or transformation of classical (logicist) philosophy of science into an integrated study of the history and philosophy of scientific development: the HPS tradition.
”history of science without philosophy of science is blind, and philosophy of science without history of science is empty”
Norwood Russell Hanson
Hanson quotation from Wikipedia entry on HPS
HOPOS, The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science,
scistud.umkc.edu/hopos/
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32. HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Kuhn’s legacy is contested:
Kuhn the revolutionary: A relativist himself, questioning the ’objectivity’ of science and the inevitable nature of scientific progress. His own theory seemed like a revolution in (positivist) philosophy of science.
Kuhn the conservative: He distanced himself from the more philosophically-’radical’ interpretations of his work, and can be seen as a conservative regarding the implications for science policy: Society should not interfere with the everyday workings of science, and a certain amount of indoctrination in the normal-science (ph.d. student) education of scientists seems necessary.
What’s next? In the Wikipedia entry for History_and_philosophy_of_science you find that
” More recently the sociology of science and technology studies have become popular topics and a few HPS departments have become Science Studies departments, e.g., the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of New South Wales was known as the School of Science and Technology Studies (STS) from the mid-1980s until For this reason it can be argued that the fields are identical and that the difference is only one of emphasis. While it may seem that STS is a broader concept, leaving room for other approaches to science such as sociology of science, HPS departments are not usually as exclusive as a literal interpretation of the name might imply.”
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33. STS: Science and Technology Studies
HPS
STS
SSK
Barry Barnes & Davis Bloor
SSK, Sociology of Scientific Knowledge:
Barry Barnes & Davis Bloor (Edingburgh school): A Strong Programme for a SSK: you must give sociological explanations for erroneous as well as true beliefs - they should be treated symmetrically.
Harry Collins (Bath school): The sociology of scientific experiments and of forms of expertise
General sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann)
STS, Science and Technology Studies
the study of how social, political, and cultural values affect scientific research and technological innovation, and how these in turn affect society, politics, and culture
an interest in viewing science and technology as socially embedded enterprises.
an interest in studying relationships between technoscientific innovations and society, from new perspectives (e.g., and anthropology, but also literature, art history, cultural studies, gender studies, history of consciousness, medicine, law and computer science).
Concern over the direction and the risks of science and technology.
SSK Practitioners include Gaston Bachelard, David Bloor, Paul Feyerabend, Elihu M. Gerson, Thomas Kuhn, Susan Leigh Star, Anselm Strauss, Lucy Suchman, Harry Collins, and others.
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34. STS: Science and Technology Studies
Thus, STS includes studies of the pathway from research to technology
STS, Science and Technology Studies
the study of how social, political, and cultural values affect scientific research and technological innovation, and how these in turn affect society, politics, and culture
an interest in viewing science and technology as socially embedded enterprises.
an interest in studying relationships between technoscientific innovations and society, from new perspectives (e.g., and anthropology, but also literature, art history, cultural studies, gender studies, history of consciousness, medicine, law and computer science).
Concern over the direction and the risks of science and technology.
(and invoices),
and the accompanying instrumentalization of science, and the risks and uncertainties involved.
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35. Questions for discussion
1 Why is it problematic (or wrong) to claim that ”natural science is an exemple of positivist science” ?
2 Discuss what became of the idea that all sciences had certain (unifying) characteristics in common - is it all gone?
Still, there must be a difference between art and science, or religion and science - but which ones?
Isn’t true that the method of the natural sciences is the experimental method?
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