1. 1 Game Theory Quick Intro to Game Theory Analysis of Games Design of Games (Mechanism Design) Some References

2. 2 John von Neumann The Genius who created two intellectual currents in the 1930s, 1940s Founded Game Theory with Oskar Morgenstern (1928-44) Pioneered the Concept of a Digital Computer and Algorithms (1930s)

3. 3 Robert Aumann Nobel 2005 Recent Excitement : Nobel Prizes for Game Theory and Mechanism Design The Nobel Prize was awarded to two Game Theorists in 2005 The prize was awarded to three mechanism designers in 2007 Thomas Schelling Nobel 2005 Leonid Hurwicz Nobel 2007 Eric Maskin Nobel 2007 Roger Myerson Nobel 2007

4. 4 Game Theory Mathematical framework for rigorous study of conflict and cooperation among rational, intelligent agents Market Buying Agents (rational and intelligent) Selling Agents (rational and intelligent) Social Planner In the Internet Era, Game Theory has become a valuable tool for analysis and design

5. 5 Microeconomics, Sociology, Evolutionary Biology Auctions and Market Design: Spectrum Auctions, Procurement Markets, Double Auctions Industrial Engineering, Supply Chain Management, E-Commerce, Procurement, Logistics Computer Science: Algorithmic Game Theory, Internet and Network Economics, Protocol Design, Resource Allocation, etc. Applications of Game Theory

6. A Familiar Game Sachin Tendulkar IPL Franchisees 1 2 3 4 Mumbai Indians Kolkata Knight Riders Bangalore RoyalChallengers Punjab Lions IPL CRICKET AUCTION

7. 7 Sponsored Search Auction Advertisers CPC Major money spinner for all search engines and web portals

8. DARPA Red Balloon Contest 8 Mechanism Design Meets Computer Science, Communications of the ACM, August 2010

9. Procurement Auctions Buyer SUPPLIER 1 SUPPLIER 2 SUPPLIER n Budget Constraints, Lead Time Constraints, Learning by Suppliers, Learning by Buyer, Logistics constraints, Combinatorial Auctions, Cost Minimization, Multiple Attributes Supply (cost) Curves

10. 10 KEY OBSERVATIONS Players are rational, Intelligent, strategic Both conflict and cooperation are “issues” Some information is “common knowledge” Other information is “private”, “incomplete”, “distributed” Our Goal: To implement a system wide solution (social choice function) with desirable properties Game theory is a natural choice for modeling such problems

11. 11 Strategic Form Games (Normal Form Games) S1S1 SnSn U 1 : S R U n : S R N = {1,…,n} Players S 1, …, S n Strategy Sets S = S 1 X … X S n Payoff functions (Utility functions)

12. 12 Example 1: Coordination Game B A RVCEMG Road RVCE 100,1000,0 MG Road 0,010,10 Models the strategic conflict when two players have to choose their priorities

13. 13 Example 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma No Confess NC Confess C No Confess NC - 2, - 2- 10, - 1 Confess C -1, - 10- 5, - 5

14. 14 Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium A profile of strategies is said to be a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if is a best response strategy against A Nash equilibrium profile is robust to unilateral deviations and captures a stable, self-enforcing agreement among the players

15. 15 Nash Equilibria in Coordination Game B A CollegeMovie College 100,1000,0 Movie 0,010,10 Two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (College,College) and (Movie, Movie); one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

16. 16 Nash Equilibrium in Prisoner’s Dilemma No Confess NC Confess C No Confess NC - 2, - 2- 10, - 1 Confess C -1, - 10- 5, - 5 (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium

17. 17 Relevance/Implications of Nash Equilibrium Players are happy the way they are; Do not want to deviate unilaterally Stable, self-enforcing, self-sustaining agreement Provides a principled way of predicting a steady-state outcome of a dynamic Adjustment process Need not correspond to a socially optimal or Pareto optimal solution

18. 45 C 2 x/ 100 B D A Source Destination Example 3: Traffic Routing Game N = {1,…,n}; S 1 = S 2 = … = S n = { C,D }

19. 45 C 2 x/ 100 B D A Source Destination Traffic Routing Game: Nash Equilibrium Assume n = 4000 U 1 (C,C, …, C) = - (40 + 45) = - 85 U 1 (D,D, …, D) = - (45 + 40) = - 85 U 1 (D,C, …, C) = - (45 + 0.01) = - 45.01 U1 (C, …,C;D, …,D) = - (20 + 45) = - 65 Any Strategy Profile with 2000 C’s and 2000 D’s is a Nash Equilibrium

20. 45 C 2 x/ 100 B D A Source Destination Traffic Routing Game: Braess’ Paradox Assume n = 4000 S 1 = S 2 = … = S n = {C,CD, D} U 1 (CD,CD, …, CD) = - (40+0+40) = - 80 U 1 (C,CD, …, CD) = - (40+45) = - 85 U1 (D,CD, …, CD) = - (45+40) = - 85 Strategy Profile with 4000 CD’s is the unique Nash Equilibrium 0

21. 21 Nash’s Beautiful Theorem Every finite strategic form game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium; Computing NE is one of the grand challenge problems in CS Game theory is all about analyzing games through such solution concepts and predicting the behaviour of the players Non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory are the major categories

22. 22 MECHANISM DESIGN Game Theory involves analysis of games – computing NE, DSE, MSNE, etc and analyzing equilibrium behaviour Mechanism Design is the design of games or reverse engineering of games; could be called Game Engineering Involves inducing a game among the players such that in some equilibrium of the game, a desired social choice function is implemented

23. Example 1: Mechanism Design Fair Division of a Cake Mother Social Planner Mechanism Designer Kid 1 Rational and Intelligent Kid 2 Rational and Intelligent

24. Example 2: Mechanism Design Truth Elicitation through an Indirect Mechanism Tenali Rama (Birbal) Mechanism Designer Mother 1 Rational and Intelligent Player Mother 2 Rational and Intelligent Player Baby

25. 25 William Vickrey (1914 – 1996 ) Nobel Prize: 1996 Winner = 4 Price = 60 1 2 3 4 40 45 60 80 Buyers Buyers 1 Mechanism Design: Example 3 Vickrey Auction

26. 26 Four Basic Types of Auctions1n Seller Buyers Buyers Winner = 4 Price = 60 1 2 3 4 Dutch Auction Dutch Auction Vickrey Auction Vickrey Auction Winner = 4 Price = 60 1 2 3 4 50 First Price Auction 55 60 40 40 45 60 80 1 n Auctioneer or seller English Auction Buyers Buyers 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55, 58, 60, stop. 100, 90, 85, 75, 70, 65, 60, stop.

27. 27 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanisms Only mechanisms under a quasi-linear setting satisfying Allocative Efficiency Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility Vickrey ClarkeGroves

28. 28 Concluding Remarks Game Theory and Mechanism Design have numerous, high impact applications in the Internet era Game Theory, Machine Learning, Optimization, and Statistics have emerged as the most important mathematical tools for engineers Algorithmic Game Theory is now one of the most active areas of research in CS, ECE, Telecom, etc. Mechanism Design is extensively being used in IEM It is a wonderful idea to introduce game theory and mechanism design at the BE level for CS, IS, EC, IEM; to be done with care

29. 29 REFERENCES Martin Osborne. Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press, 2003 Roger Myerson. Game Theory and Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1997 A, Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green. Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995 N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. Vazirani Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007

30. 30 REFERENCES (contd.) Y. Narahari, Essentials of Game Theory and Mechanism Design IISc Press, 2012 (forthcoming) http://www.gametheory.net A rich source of material on game theory and game theory courses http://lcm.csa.iisc.ernet.in/hari Course material and several survey articles can be downloaded Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri, and Hastagiri Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions, Springer, 2009

31. Cooperative Game with Transferable Utilities

32. Divide the Dollar Game There are three players who have to share 300 dollars. Each one proposes a particular allocation of dollars to players.

33. Divide the Dollar : Version 1  The allocation is decided by what is proposed by player 0  Characteristic Function

34. Divide the Dollar : Version 2  It is enough 1 and 2 propose the same allocation  Players 1 and 2 are equally powerful; Characteristic Function is:

35. Divide the Dollar : Version 3  Either 1 and 2 should propose the same allocation or 1 and 3 should propose the same allocation  Characteristic Function

36. Divide the Dollar : Version 4  It is enough any pair of players has the same proposal  Also called the Majority Voting Game  Characteristic Function

37. Shapley Value of a Cooperative Game Captures how competitive forces influence the outcomes of a game Describes a reasonable and fair way of dividing the gains from cooperation given the strategic realities Shapley value of a player finds its average marginal contribution across all permutation orderings Unique solution concept that satisfies symmetry, preservation of carrier, additivity, and Pareto optimality 37 Lloyd Shapley

38. Shapley Value : A Fair Allocation Scheme  Provides a unique payoff allocation that describes a fair way of dividing the gains of cooperation in a game (N, v)

39. Shapley Value: Examples Version of Divide-the-Dollar Shapley Value Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 (150, 150, 0) ( 300, 0, 0) (200, 50, 50) (100, 100, 100)