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Wireless Security - What Were They Thinking? Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi

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Presentation on theme: "Wireless Security - What Were They Thinking? Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi"— Presentation transcript:

1 Wireless Security - What Were They Thinking? Brad “RenderMan” Haines RenderLab.net & Church of Wifi Render@Renderlab.Net

2 Introduction Who am I? Why am I here? Why are you here? Scope of this talk Why you should stay awake

3 Caveats “It is not the goal of this presentation to tell you not to use wireless networks, but make you aware of the risk so you can make informed decisions about your usage of wireless technology and do everything possible to protect your organizations network infrastructure, data and integrity of its client computers” - Paul Asadoorian

4 Why are you here? 10/2003: Lowe's –Botbyl and Timmins access an unencrypted, unauthenticated wireless LAN in Southfield, Michigan –Obtain access to internal servers across 7 US states –Crash PoS system while planting CC sniffing software –Apprehended by FBI, both plead guilty to charges 3/2004: BJ's –Wholesale merchant reports that a "small fraction" of its 8- million customers may have had CC#'s stolen –FTC asserts charges against BJ's for unencrypted wireless networks, default usernames/passwords and insufficient monitoring –BJ's settles, recording $10M in legal costs, agrees to thorough external audits every other year for 2 decades

5 Why are you here? 1/2007: TJX –Marshalls department store in St. Paul Minnesota WEP-protected WLAN compromised –Estimates between 45.7 million and 200 million payment card numbers revealed –451,000 drivers licenses and SS#'s also compromised –Forrester Research estimates the cost of the breach could surpass 1 billion dollars in 5 years

6 Why are you here? 6/2005: GE Money –Branch in Finland reports €200,000 stolen –Investigators traced attack to unprotected consumer WLAN –Initial investigation against owner revealed suspect not guilty, unprotected WLAN used to hide tracks –Further investigation reveals GE Money data security manager and accomplices stole account information

7 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines

8 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timelines Most public attacks against unprotected networks WEP attacks effective 6+ years after critical flaws announced Emerging attacks of today not solved with standards Lowe's BJ's GE Money TJX

9 Where it all started 802.11b - Released October 1999 2.4Ghz, 11Mbit (4.5 nominal) Popularity exploded with Apple Airport Quickly took off and integrated into everything 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering 11 channels (North America) WPA added later

10 Where it went from there 802.11a - Released October 1999 5 Ghz, 54Mbit (~20 nominal) Shorter range, less penetration Not backwards compatible with 802.11b 12 channels (North America) More restrictions on use 40 bit (later 64, 128 bit) WEP, MAC filtering WPA added later

11 Where it went from there 802.11g - Released October 2003 2.4Ghz, 54Mbit (19 nominal) Quickly integrated into new devices Backwards compatible with 802.11b 11 channels (North America) WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) + WEP

12 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

13 Where it all started to go wrong 802.11 broadcast beacons Wardriving hit big after Defcon 9 (2001) Shipped default open, anyone can connect Wardriving community grew exponentially Apple Airport ramped up sales and usage

14 Wardriving “The benign act of detecting wireless networks while in motion” - Blackwave Wireless networks are radios, Every card is a capable reciever Network information is broadcast with each packet – Network name, encryption status, associated clients all detectable Add GPS for making cool maps Wigle.net – 12,000,000+ nets with location (Oct, 2007)

15 Wireless is everywhere $30 for an AP at a computer shop Most laptops come with WiFi built in Personally discovered ~175,000 devices (~100,000 in Edmonton and area) #17 on wigle.net (soon to be 16) Hotels, Airports, conferences, coffee shops, restaurants, etc... Can all be detected and catalogued

16 It's Everywhere!

17 Wardriving The presence of networks no longer secret Many people ignorant of the issue Wardriving brought the issue to the forefront w/ pretty maps Worldwide Wardrive brought it to the media (and CSIS) Not a huge issue Cloaking does nothing to help, it's a radio!

18 Where it all started to go wrong MAC addresses can be observed without connecting Changing your own MAC address is easy –A simple perl script makes it easy in linux: –http://www.michiganwireless.org/tools/sirmacsalot/ Simple program to change it in Windows –http://www.codeproject.com/tools/MacIdChanger.asp Only useful in keeping authorized users from connecting unauthorized things

19 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

20 Kismet De facto free site survey tool Listens to all 802.11x traffic (monitor mode) Detects 'cloaked' networks Can include GPS for maps Remote drone sniffers for distributed monitoring Kismet-Newcore promises more features Linux native, some windows support (Kiswin, airpcap) Should be in every wireless toolkit

21 Kismet

22 Netstumbler Windows based 'Active' scanner GPS capability Signal to noise graph Useful for quick surveys, antenna alignment, etc

23 Netstumbler

24

25 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

26 Hostspot Impersonation Hot spots gain popularity Cafe's. Airports, hotels, etc No discrimination of identical SSID's 'Drift' to other networks Man in the middle attacks, credential snarfing, etc Airsnarf, etc

27 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

28 WEP – What were they thinking? Based on RC4 (weak), 40 bit – Export restrictions Limited computing power onboard 64-128 bit added later after export laws relaxed No standard key generation specified – incompatibilities between brands Many tried, a lot failed open Who wants to type out a 64 char HEX key?

29 WEP cracking Goal is to collect enough IVs to be able to crack the key –IV = Initialization Vector, plain text appended to the key to avoid repetition Airsnort – 5-10 Million packets Injecting packets to generate more IV's (faster) Aircrack analyses the packets and gives you a key Needed 100K to 1M packets in early version (10 Min) Aircrack-PTW – Need only 40-100K (~60 seconds)

30 Aircrack

31 Jamming / Interference Physics are harsh Introduce more noise than signal Microwave oven, cordless phone, baby monitor or other sources Accidental or intentional Spectrum analyzer

32 Wavebubble

33 WPA WPA fixes many WEP flaws Based on early 802.11i draft - Stop-gap 256 bit key – Still RC4 Pre-shared key or Enterprise 802.1X Standard key generation standard – PBKDF2 Key salted with SSID TKIP, MIC (Michael) Sequence enforcement

34 Standards are hard - WPA WPA – Do more on old hardware Feared mass obsolescence Backwards compatibility Needed soon Not perfect, got the job done Fixed a lot of WEP problems, weaknesses

35 WPA2 Mandatory elements of 802.11i Uses AES (CCMP) instead of RC4 Supports PSK and 802.1X mode Very interoperable Defacto standard for wireless

36 The Devil is in the Details WPA not without problems People choose weak passphrases Susceptible to brute force attack “A key generated from a pass-phrase of less than about 20 characters is unlikely to deter attack” - 802.11i spec Cowpatty, Aircrack

37 Cracking WPA Capture WPA 4-way handshake Hash dictionary word with PBKDF2 and compare output to capture SSID salted into key CPU intensive Early programs had to start over each time

38 Cracking WPA Faster Genpmk and CoWF WPA tables Pre-hash 1.2 Million words against top 1000 SSID's = 48 gig of WPA cracking torrent goodness Time / Memory trade off - calculate once, crack many Cracks WPA v1 and v2 Drastically faster checking onsite Available after the talk and throughout the con

39 coWPAtty

40 The Devil is in the details Michael countermeasures 2 bad checks = Radio turns off Defense against injection and manipulation Several layers deep, should not normally trip “If a non-AP STA receives a deauthenticate frame with the reason code “MIC failure,” it cannot be certain that the frame has not been forged, as it does not contain a MIC. The STA may attempt association with this, or another, AP” - 802.11i spec

41 Abusing Michael Sequence enforcement, encryption need to be successful before MIC checked MIC taken of data + header Wireless multimedia specifications (QoS) Seprate counters for different QoS bits MIC does cover QoS bits which are not encrypted.....

42 Abusing Michael DataSequenceQoS WPA Encrypted MIC Checksum

43 Abusing Michael Capture high priority packet Flip QoS bits Retransmit to other counter Sequence enforcement is maintained Encrypted data decrypts successfully MIC check fails from flipped QoS bits 2 errors in 60 seconds = DoS condition Clients continue to try and connect Not in the wild, but soon...

44 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

45 Client attacks Karma Cleartext traffic = easy manipulation Airpwn Management frames cleartext and unauthenticated Void11, deauth attacks Driver attacks

46 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

47 Driver Vulnerabilities 2006 - Johnny Cache & David Maynor fuzz and break many drivers Death threats from Apple fanboys Do not even need to be connected to a network Metasploit includes some driver exploits Point n' pwn

48 Emerging threats Bluetooth – Highly overlooked Security by obscurity and 4 digit PIN Open Source protocol sniffer coming RFID – Whole other talk Speedpass broken Passports blown wide open RFID Virus

49

50

51 Standards bodies IEEE/IETF do good work We can get on wirelessly at the office, conferences It could be a lot worse Involves lots of blood, sweat, travel and politics Problems can be solved

52 Technology Vulnerabilities 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 PHY/MAC 802.11a 802.11b, EAP/TLS, EAP-MD5 Regulatory Domain Extensions QoS 802.11g, Europe 5 GHz, WPA 802.11i, WPA2, Japan 5GHz, EAP-FAST Radio Resource Mgmt, Fast Roaming, early mesh deployments MIMO, WAVE, Mesh, External Internetwork, Mgmt. Frame Protection Performance, Net. Mgmt, 3.65 GHz 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 Early wardriving, early WEP attacks Windows wardriving tools, growing attack tool sophistication Hotspot impersonation, LEAP exposed Sophisticated WEP attack tools, attacks against WPA-PSK, PHY jamming tools commodity Hotspot manipulation, QoS attacks, WIDS fingerprinting PEAP, TTLS LEAP WIDS evasion, client attacks gaining popularity, fuzzing Metasploit for Wireless Critical client driver vulns AP Fuzzing? RADIUS Fuzzing? 802.11 VA Tools? Attacks Against TKIP? 19992000200120022003200420052006200720082009 802.11 Technology and Vulnerabilities Timeline

53 The Future? RFID will be huge Bluetooth will be huge 802.11n will be 'interesting' 802.11w will solve some problems Hacker community will always be there to break things

54 Thanks Josh Wright Dragorn / Mike Kershaw Major Malfunction / Adam Laurie The Pauldotcom crew Wirelessdefense.org

55 Questions? render@renderlab.net www.renderlab.net www.churchofwifi.org www.personalwireless.org


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