1. Higher Education Bridge CA (HEBCA) – What’s Relevant, What’s Next? (Scott Rea) Fed/Ed December 2006

2. 2 Overview What are the drivers for PKI in Higher Education? –Stronger authentication to resources and services of an institution –Better protection of digital assets from disclosure, theft, tampering, and destruction –More efficient workflow in distributed environments –Greater ability to collaborate and reliably communicate with colleagues and peers –Greater access (and more efficient access) to external resources –Facilitation of funding opportunities –Compliance

3. 3 Overview Potential Killer Apps for PKI in Higher Education –S/MIME –Paperless Office workflow –EFS –Strong SSO –Shibboleth/Federations –GRID Computing Enabled for Federations –E-grants facilitation

4. 4 Creating Silos of Trust Dept-1 Institution Dept-1 SubCA CA SubCA CA SubCA CA SubCA USHER

5. 5 LOA: Levels of Assurance Not all CAs are created equal –Policies adhered to vary in detail and strength –Protection of private keys –Controls around private key operations –Separation of duties –Trustworthiness of Operators –Auditability –Authentication of end entities –Frequency of revocation updates

6. 6 HEBCA : Higher Education Bridge Certificate Authority Bridge Certificate Authority for US Higher Education Modeled on FBCA Provides cross-certification between the subscribing institution and the HEBCA root CA Flexible policy implementations through the mapping process The HEBCA root CA and infrastructure hosted at Dartmouth College Facilitates inter-institutional trust between participating schools Facilitates inter-federation trust between US Higher Education community and external entities

7. 7 HEBCA What is the value presented by this initiative? –HEBCA facilitates a trust fabric across all of US Higher Education so that credentials issued by participating institutions can be used (and trusted) globally e.g. signed and/or encrypted email, digitally signed documents (paperless office), etc can all be trusted inter- institutionally and not just intra-institutionally –Extensions to the Higher Education trust infrastructure into external federations is also possible and proof of concept work with the FBCA (via BCA cross-certification) has demonstrated this inter-federation trust extension –Single credential accepted globally –Potential for stronger authentication and possibly authorization of participants in grid based applications –Contributions provided to the Path Validation and Path Discovery development efforts

8. 8 Solving Silos of Trust Dept-1 Institution Dept-1 SubCA CA SubCA CA SubCA CA SubCA USHER HEBCA FBCA CAUDIT PKI

9. 9 HEBCA Project - Progress What’s been done so far? –Operational Authority (OA) contractor engaged (Dartmouth PKI Lab) –MOA with commercial vendor for infrastructure hardware (Sun) –MOA with commercial vendor for CA software and licenses (RSA) –Policy Authority formed –Prototype HEBCA operational and cross-certified with the Prototype FBCA (new Prototype instantiated by HEBCA OA) –Prototype Registry of Directories (RoD) deployed at Dartmouth –Production HEBCA CP produced –Production HEBCA CPS produced –Preliminary Policy Mapping completed with FBCA –Test HEBCA CA deployed and cross-certified with the Prototype FBCA –Test HEBCA RoD deployed –Infrastructure has passed interoperability testing with FBCA

10. 10 HEBCA Project - Progress What’s been done so far? –Production HEBCA development phase complete –Issues Resolved Discovery of a vulnerability in the protocol for indirect CRLs Inexpensive AirGap Citizenship requirements for Bridge-2-Bridge Interoperability –Majority of supporting documentation finalized HEBCA Cross-Certification Criteria and Methodolgy HEBCA Interoperability Guidelines Draft Memorandum of Understanding HEBCA Subscriber Agreement HEBCA Certificate Profiles HEBCA CRL Profiles HEBCA Secure Personnel Selection Procedures Business Continuity and Disaster Plans For HEBCA Operations –PKI Test Bed server instantiated –PKI Interoperability Pilot migrated –Reassessment of community needs –Audit process defined and Auditors engaged –Participation in industry working groups –Almost ready for audit and production operations

11. 11 HEBCA Project – Next Steps What are the next steps? –HEBCA to operate at multiple LOAs over its lifetime –Update of policy documents and procedures required to reflect the above –HEBCA to operate at Test LOA initially –Issue the limited production HEBCA Test Root –Purchase final items and bring the infrastructure online –Cross-certify limited community of interested early adopters and key federations –Validate the model and continue to develop tools for bridge aware applications

12. 12 Challenges and Opportunities Community applicability –If we build it they will come –Chicken & Egg profile for infrastructure and applications –An appropriate business plan Consolidation and synergy –Are USHER & HEBCA competing initiatives? –Benefits of a common infrastructure Alignment with policies of complimentary communities –Shibboleth / InCommon –Grids (TAGPMA)

13. 13 Challenges and Opportunities Open Tasks –Audit –Updated Business Plan –Mapping Grid Profiles Classic PKI SLCS –Promotion of PKI Test bed –Validation Authority service –Cross-certification with FBCA –Cross-certification with other HE PKI communities CAUDIT PKI (AusCERT) HE JP HE BR

14. 14 PKI - Public Key Infrastructure Security is a chain; it's only as strong as the weakest link. The security of any system is based on many links and in a PKI they're not all cryptographic. People are involved PKI requires co-ordination across the following 3 areas: –Technology (T) –Policy & Procedures (P) –Relationships & Liability (L)

15. 15 LOA: Levels of Assurance Not all IdPs are created equal –Policies adhered to vary in detail and strength (P) –Strength of private keys (T) –Protection of private keys (PL) –Controls around private key operations (TPL) –Separation of duties (PL) –Trustworthiness of Operators (L) –Auditability (TP) –Authentication of end entities (TPL) –Frequency of revocation updates (TP)

16. 16 Assertions Assertion based technology –Shibboleth uses SAML assertions A range of authentication processes supported Information about exact procedures possible but not required? Cryptographic binding of public identity to private identity possible but not required Generally short lived assertions issued Revocation not well supported –PKI uses digital certificates A range of authentication processes supported Information about exact procedures is required Cryptographic binding of public identity to private identity is required Generally longer term assertions issued Revocation required key component

17. 17 A Simplified View of E-Auth Federation Architecture Levels 1 & 2 CSPs Levels 3 & 4 CSPs -Banks -Universities -Agency Apps -Etc. Business Rules CAF Federal Agency PKIs Other Gov PKIs Commercial PKIs Bridges FBCA X-Certification SAML Assertions Digital Certificates Levels 1 & 2 Online Apps & Services Levels 3 & 4 Online Apps & Services SDT Digital Certificates

18. 18 LOA Mapping E-Auth Level 1 E-Auth Level 2 E-Auth Level 3 E-Auth Level 4 FPKI Rudimentary; C4 FPKI Medium/HW & Medium/HW-cbp FPKI Basic FPKI Medium & Medium-cbp FPKI High (governments only)

19. 19 PKI vs Shibboleth Shibboleth and PKI are complimentary technologies Shibboleth has the potential to be a PKI –Requires specific published policies & procedures (in the federation agreement? ARP?) –Must use cryptographic binding of identities –Potential to be a really good avenue for Delegated Path Discovery or Delegated Path Validation May want to use Shibboleth as a stepping stone from current IdM to a PK underlined system –Evolutionary strengthening of IdM processes Shibboleth growth shows better penetration into various communities than PKI

20. 20 PKI vs Shibboleth What are the drivers for PKI in Higher Education? –Stronger authentication to resources and services of an institution –Single Sign On within the enterprise environment –Better protection of digital assets from disclosure, theft, tampering, and destruction –More efficient workflow in distributed environments –Greater ability to collaborate and reliably communicate with colleagues and peers –Greater access (and more efficient access) to external resources –Facilitation of funding opportunities –Compliance

21. 21 PKI vs Shibboleth Potential Killer Apps for PKI in Higher Education –S/MIME –SSO –Paperless Office workflow –EFS –Shibboleth/Federations –GRID Computing Enabled for Federations –E-grants facilitation

22. 22 PKI vs Shibboleth When PKI is required –High value, high trust, high reliability transactions with end user accountability –Credentials can be leveraged for other activities besides authentication or SSO requiring end user accountability –Transactions requiring long term validity –Peer to peer transactions that want to avoid campus liabilities –Community demands it Requirement for a particular VO Widespread or global PKI in place

23. 23 Bridge-Aware Applications

24. 24 IGTF Mapping Exercises Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) General Profile against IGTF Classic Profile Federal Citizen & Commerce Certificate CA (C-4) against IGTF Classic Profile IGTF Classic Profile against C-4

25. 25 International Grid Trust Federation IGTF founded in Oct, 2005 at GGF 15 IGTF Purpose: –Manage authentication services for global computational grids via policy and procedures IGTF goal: –harmonize and synchronize member PMAs policies to establish and maintain global trust relationships IGTF members: –3 regional Policy Management Authorities EUgridPMA APgridPMA TAGPMA 50+ CAs, 50,000+ credentials

26. 26 IGTF

27. 27 IGTF general Architecture The member PMAs are responsible for accrediting authorities that issue identity assertions. The IGTF maintains a set of authentication profiles (APs) that specify the policy and technical requirements for a class of identity assertions and assertion providers. The management and continued evolution of an AP is assigned by the IGTF to a specific member PMA. –Proposed changes to an AP will be circulated by the chair of the PMA managing the AP to all chairs of the IGTF member PMAs. Each of the PMAs will accredit credential-issuing authorities and document the accreditation policy and procedures. Any changes to the policy and practices of a credential-issuing authority after accreditation will void the accreditation unless the changes have been approved by the accrediting PMA prior to their taking effect.

28. 28 Green: EMEA countries with an Accredited Authority  23 of 25 EU member states (all except LU, MT)  + AM, CH, HR, IL, IS, NO, PK, RU, TR Other Accredited Authorities:  DoEGrids (.us), GridCanada (.ca), CERN, SEE catch-all EUGridPMA members and applicants

29. 29 EUgridPMA Membership Under “Classic X.509 secured infrastructure” authorities –accredited: 38 (recent additions: CERN-IT/IS, SRCE) –active applicants: 4 (Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Morocco) Under “SLCS” –accredited: 0 –active applicants: 1 (SWITCH-aai) Under MICS draft –none yet of course, but actually CERN-IS would be a good match for MICS as well Major relying parties –EGEE, DEISA, SEE-GRID, LCG, TERENA

30. 30 Ex-officio Membership APAC (Australia) CNIC/SDG, IHEP (China) AIST, KEK, NAREGI (Japan) KISTI (Korea) NGO (Singapore) ASGCC, NCHC (Taiwan) NECTEC, ThaiGrid (Thailand) PRAGMA/UCSD (USA) General Membership U. Hong Kong (China) U. Hyderabad (India) Osaka U. (Japan) USM (Malaysia) Map of the APGrid PMA

31. 31 APgridPMA Membership 9 Accredited CAs –In operation AIST (Japan) APAC (Australia) ASGCC (Taiwan) CNIC (China) IHEP (China) KEK (Japan) NAREGI (Japan) –Will be in operation NCHC (Taiwan) NECTEC (Thailand) 1 CA under review –NGO (Singapore) Will be re-accredited –KISTI (Korea) Planning –PRAGMA (USA) –ThaiGrid (Thailand) General membership –Osaka U. (Japan) –U. Hong Kong (China) –U. Hyderabad (India) –USM (Malaysia)

32. 32 TAGPMA

33. 33 TAGPMA Membership Accredited –Argentina UNLP –Brazilian Grid CA –CANARIE (Canada)* –DOEGrids* –EELA LA Catch all Grid CA –ESnet/DOE Office Science* –REUNA Chilean CA –TACC – Root In Review –FNAL –Mexico UNAM –NCSA – Classic/SLCS –Purdue University –TACC – Classic/SLCS –Venezuela –Virginia –USHER Relying Parties –Dartmouth/HEBCA –EELA –OSG –SDSC –SLAC –TeraGrid –TheGrid –LCG *Accredited by EUgridPMA

34. 34 TAGPMA Bridge Working Group Recognition that there are different LOAs –in the way some credential service providers operate –Required by different applications More efficient ways of distributing Trust Anchors Interoperation with other trust federations Scott Rea is Chair, representatives from each regional PMA included

35. 35 Mapping Designations Seven (7) designations used to characterize the equivalency –Exceeds - The ENTITY CP policy provides a higher level of assurance/security than the Federal CP requirement –Equivalent - The ENTITY CP policy provides exactly the same assurance/security as the Federal CP requirement. –Comparable - The ENTITY CP contains dissimilar policy contents, but provides a comparable level of assurance to meet the security to the Federal CP requirement. –Partial - The ENTITY CP contains policy that is comparable, but it does not address the entire Federal CP requirement. –Not Comparable - The ENTITY CP contains dissimilar policy contents, which provides a lower level of assurance/security than the Federal CP requirement. –Missing - The ENTITY CP does not contain policy contents that can be compared to the Federal CP requirement in any way. –N/A – Not Applicable to ENTITY CP or required for FBCA cross certification.

36. 36 Mapping Results C-4 against IGTF Classic Profile –30 policy points evaluated –14 Comparable designations –12 Partial designations –3 Not Comparable designations –1 Not Applicable designation

37. 37 Mapping Results FBCA General against IGTF Classic Profile Basic LOA used for Comparisons –136 policy points evaluated –22 Comparable designations –33 Partial designations –12 Not Comparable designations –65 Missing designations –3 Not Applicable designations

38. 38 Mapping Results IGTF Classic Profile against C-4 –30 policy points evaluated –19 Comparable designations –1 Partial designation –10 Exceeds designations

39. 39 Next Steps 4 Paths to proceed upon –Modify Classic CA Profile to match C-4 and cross- certify with C-4 Modification is currently under way but we may have missed this window Requires all CAs to match new provisions –Create a new Profile with a higher LOA requirement that existing users may elect to comply with e.g. Classic High Profile that is compliant with C-4 –Attempt to cross-certify at Rudimentary LOA for FBCA –Undergo mapping with another bridge e.g. HEBCA at a lower LOA e.g. Rudimentary

40. 40 Proposed Inter-federations FBCA CA-1CA-2 CA-n Cross-cert HEBCA Dartmouth Wisconsin Texas Univ-N UVA USHER DST ACES Cross-certs SAFECertiPath NIH CA-1 CA-2CA-3 CA-4 HE JP AusCert CAUDIT PKI CA-1 CA-2 CA-3 HE BR Cross-certs Other Bridges IGTF C-4

41. 41 High Medium Hardware CBP Medium Software CBP Basic Rudimentary C-4 High Medium Basic Rudimentary Foundation Classic Ca SLCS MICS FPKI IGTF HEBCA/USHER Classic Strong E-Auth Level 1 E-Auth Level 2 E-Auth Level 3 E-Auth Level 4 E-AUTH

42. 42 PKI vs Shibboleth Potential Killer Apps for PKI in Higher Education –S/MIME SSO –Paperless Office workflow –EFS –Shibboleth/Federations –GRID Computing Enabled for Federations –E-grants facilitation

43. 43 Summary Shibboleth and PKI are complimentary technologies With appropriate application of policies to create the I in PKI and the requirement of cryptographic binding of identities to cover the PK in PKI, then Shibboleth can become a campus PKI (in a sense) Shibboleth may be a good stepping stone to a global PKI community (if it ever arrives) Shib can be used for various functions within an existing PKI –Delivery of credentials –Validation of credentials Global acceptance of a Shibboleth federation requires PKI Levels Of Assurance are key –It is more in the policy & liability than in the technology

44. 44 For More Information HEBCA Website: http://webteam.educause.edu/hebca/ Scott Rea - Scott.Rea@dartmouth.eduScott.Rea@dartmouth.edu