1. How Efficient are Brazilian Courts? Answering it with DEA Luciana Yeung* + Paulo Furquim de Azevedo* *Escola de Economia de São Paulo - Fundação Getúlio Vargas + INSPER INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH iDEAs 2009

2. Summary Discussions about inefficiency in courts are not new in Brazil, but quantitative research on this topic is. Discussions about inefficiency in courts are not new in Brazil, but quantitative research on this topic is. We use DEA to measure efficiency of State Courts. We use DEA to measure efficiency of State Courts. Results show evidence that data collection needs improvement. Results show evidence that data collection needs improvement. Also, efficiency varies greatly across the states. Also, efficiency varies greatly across the states. Finally, management quality and internal organization of courts may have some still unmeasured and important impacts. Finally, management quality and internal organization of courts may have some still unmeasured and important impacts.

3. Overview “Brazilian courts are in a state of crisis”. “Brazilian courts are in a state of crisis”. Conservative estimates show that an average process takes 1000 to 1500 days. Conservative estimates show that an average process takes 1000 to 1500 days. Judges have, in any point in time, 10.000 cases waiting to be decided. Judges have, in any point in time, 10.000 cases waiting to be decided. The Supreme Court adjudicates, every year, more than 130 thousand cases (11 Justices). The Supreme Court adjudicates, every year, more than 130 thousand cases (11 Justices). Very few empirical research has been carried out on the subject. Very few empirical research has been carried out on the subject.

4. Literature using DEA Lewin, Morey and Cook (1982) for criminal courts in the US. Lewin, Morey and Cook (1982) for criminal courts in the US. Kittelsen and Førsund (1992) for district courts in Norway. Kittelsen and Førsund (1992) for district courts in Norway. Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jiménez (1996) for High Courts in Spain. Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jiménez (1996) for High Courts in Spain. In Brazil: Sousa and Schwengber (2005) for courts in Rio Grande do Sul (FDH and Order-M efficiency). In Brazil: Sousa and Schwengber (2005) for courts in Rio Grande do Sul (FDH and Order-M efficiency).

5. Our Model and Data CCR (Constant Returns to Scale) CCR (Constant Returns to Scale) Output Oriented Output Oriented Both choices are supported by the literature and, more importantly, by the structural organization of Brazilian courts. Both choices are supported by the literature and, more importantly, by the structural organization of Brazilian courts. Data from “Justiça em Números” issued by the National Council of Justice (CNJ), years 2004 to 2006, 25 out of 27 states. Data from “Justiça em Números” issued by the National Council of Justice (CNJ), years 2004 to 2006, 25 out of 27 states. Outputs: number of adjudications over workload (new cases filed in t + “leftovers” from t-1. Outputs: number of adjudications over workload (new cases filed in t + “leftovers” from t-1. Inputs: number of judges, staff and computers. Inputs: number of judges, staff and computers.

6. Results and Analysis Tables 2, 3 and 4: Efficiency Measures Tables 2, 3 and 4: Efficiency Measures National average close to 0.60, but wide variation across different states. National average close to 0.60, but wide variation across different states. Table 5: Cross Year Comparison Table 5: Cross Year Comparison Some clear efficient units, and some clear inefficient units. Some clear efficient units, and some clear inefficient units. Many “inconsistent” results, especially for year 2005. Many “inconsistent” results, especially for year 2005. Efficiency performance not related to economic wealth of the state. Efficiency performance not related to economic wealth of the state.

7. Correlation = -0.005

8. A Potential New Explanation DEA shows that the traditional justification for court inefficiency, namely lack of resources, is not supported. DEA shows that the traditional justification for court inefficiency, namely lack of resources, is not supported. Instead, management of internal organization seems to matter (recent project by National Council of Justice). Instead, management of internal organization seems to matter (recent project by National Council of Justice). Preliminary index of “quality of internal organization” to capture aspects of management. Preliminary index of “quality of internal organization” to capture aspects of management. The result: 77.8% (“optimistic” view) or 56% (“cautious” view) of correlation between the index and DEA-efficiency. The result: 77.8% (“optimistic” view) or 56% (“cautious” view) of correlation between the index and DEA-efficiency.

9. End of Presentation Thank you! Luciana Yeung (luciana.luktai.yeung@gmail.com) Paulo Furquim de Azevedo