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What Is My Role in Information Survivability? Why Should I Care? Julia H. Allen Networked Systems Survivability CERT ® Coordination Center Software Engineering.

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Presentation on theme: "What Is My Role in Information Survivability? Why Should I Care? Julia H. Allen Networked Systems Survivability CERT ® Coordination Center Software Engineering."— Presentation transcript:

1 What Is My Role in Information Survivability? Why Should I Care? Julia H. Allen Networked Systems Survivability CERT ® Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University ® CERT, CERT Coordination Center and Carnegie Mellon are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

2 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 2 Survivability Focuses on sustaining the mission in the face of an ongoing attack; requires an enterprise-wide perspective Depends on the ability of networks to provide continuity of service, albeit degraded, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents Requires that only the critical assets need the highest level of protection Complements current risk management approaches that are part of an organization’s business practices Includes (but is broader than) traditional information security

3 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 3 Agenda Motivation Perspectives/Questions Protecting critical assets Identifying risks to critical assets Role of SEPG?

4 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 4 The Problem “We wouldn’t have to spend so much time, money, and effort on network security if we didn’t have such bad software security.” [Viega, McGraw 02] “It is bad software that results in [security] vulnerabilities in the first place.” [Viega, McGraw 02] “There is little evidence of movement toward improvement in the security of most products. We continue to see the same types of vulnerabilities in newer versions of products that we saw in earlier versions. Technology evolves so rapidly that vendors concentrate on time to market, often minimizing that time by placing a low priority on the security of their products.” [Pethia, 2001]

5 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 5 Who Is Saying This? “Security models should be easy for developers to understand and build into their applications.” “Our products should emphasize security right out of the box.” “As software has become ever more complex, interdependent and interconnected, our reputation as a company has in turn become more vulnerable.” “So now, when we face a choice between adding features and resolving security issues, we need to choose security.” “Eventually, our software should be so fundamentally secure that customers never even worry about it.”

6 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 6 E-commerce sales soar “Business-to-business electronic commerce grossed more than $100 billion in 1999, and this figure is expected to reach the $1 trillion mark by “Total e-commerce, including both business- to-business and business-to-consumer transactions will account for an estimated $6.8 trillion by 2004.” [Brian L. Stafford, director of the United States Secret Service, Roll Call, July 23, 2001]

7 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 7 Growth in Number of Incidents Reported to the CERT/CC

8 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 8 Attack Trends Increased automation, speed of attack tools Increased attack tool sophistication Faster discovery of vulnerabilities Increasing permeability of firewalls Increasing asymmetric threat Increasing threat from infrastructure attacks

9 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 9

10 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 10 Attack Impacts Loss/compromise of sensitive data System downtime; lost productivity System damage Financial loss Loss of reputation, customer confidence Other organizations’ systems affected

11 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 11 Agenda Motivation Perspectives/Questions Protecting critical assets Identifying risks to critical assets Role of SEPG?

12 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 12 SPI Perspective Dealing primarily with software developers and their management chain End objective is to produce quality systems and products, on schedule and on budget Security typically addressed during the software development life cycle during the O&M phase as an add-on/after the fact consideration for COTS software, as a provider responsibility

13 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 13 Security Improvement Perspective Typically dealing with an organization’s infrastructure provider, their management chain, and the CIO End objective of providing a functional and secure operational infrastructure for all users, within tight budget constraints (competing for internal dollars)

14 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 14 Questions to Consider As a software developer, am I responsible for: Following secure programming practices? Protecting my work from viruses and other compromises? Identifying suspicious behavior on my system and network? Minimizing rework and downtime? Backup and recovery of my critical data? Ensuring that the software I rely on (such as the operating system, applications packages, tools, other COTS) is secure?

15 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 15 Questions to Consider (cont.) As a SEPG member Do I consider security improvement as within my area of interest/responsibility? If not, why not? What have I learned about making SPI work that could aid in bringing about a continuous security improvement process? Am I not in one of the best possible positions to help make this happen?

16 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 16 Why Is Security Improvement So Hard? Abstract, concerned with hypothetical events A holistic, enterprise-wide problem; not just technical No widely accepted metrics Disaster-preventing rather than payoff-producing (like insurance) Installing security safeguards can have negative aspects (added cost, diminished performance, inconvenience)

17 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 17 Agenda Motivation Perspectives/Questions Protecting critical assets Security Knowledge in Practice Identifying risks to critical assets Role of SEPG?

18 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 18 Security Improvement Security preserving confidentiality, integrity, availability avoiding critical asset disclosure, modification, loss/destruction, interruption Improvement assessment action planning taking action feedback Risk management (enterprise-wide, not at KPA level)

19 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 19 Security Knowledge in Practice and SKiP are service marks of Carnegie Mellon University Security Knowledge in Practice SM

20 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 20 Security Knowledge in Practice and SKiP are service marks of Carnegie Mellon University Security Knowledge in Practice SM

21 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 21 Vendor Provides: “One Size Fits All” mentality Abundant services and features Open access to data objects Emphasis on ease of use Vulnerabilities Little to no guidance on how to securely configure Security Knowledge in Practice

22 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 22 Vendor Provides: “One Size Fits All” mentality Abundant services and features Open access to data objects Emphasis on ease of use Vulnerabilities Little to no guidance on how to securely configure Security Knowledge in Practice

23 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 23 Harden/Secure: Configure operating system as the minimum essential (disable/remove unneeded software/services) Install applicable patches Use secure applications where available Install tools such as virus scanners Close lenient access controls (deny first, then allow) Enable logging Security Knowledge in Practice

24 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 24 Harden/Secure: Configure operating system as the minimum essential (disable/remove unneeded software/services) Install applicable patches Use secure applications where available Install tools such as virus scanners Close lenient access controls (deny first, then allow) Enable logging Security Knowledge in Practice

25 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 25 Prepare: Characterize files and directories, the operating system, processes, network traffic and performance, and inventory all hardware Develop intrusion detection and response (IDR) policies/procedures Manage data collection mechanisms Select, configure, and install IDR tools Security Knowledge in Practice

26 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 26 Prepare: Characterize files and directories, the operating system, processes, network traffic and performance, and inventory all hardware Develop intrusion detection and response (IDR) policies/procedures Manage data collection mechanisms Select, configure, and install IDR tools Security Knowledge in Practice

27 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 27 Detect: Unexpected changes Acceptable – update characterization Unacceptable - intrusion? External stimulus Patches/new versions for OS and applications New versions of tools Security Knowledge in Practice

28 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 28 Detect: Unexpected changes Acceptable – update characterization Unacceptable - intrusion? External stimulus Patches/new versions for OS and applications New versions of tools Security Knowledge in Practice

29 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 29 Respond: To an intrusion Analyze; protect evidence Contain Return systems to normal operation Increase monitoring Communicate To an external stimulus Install patch Install new tools Security Knowledge in Practice

30 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 30 Respond: To an intrusion Analyze; protect evidence Contain Return systems to normal operation Increase monitoring Communicate To an external stimulus Install patch Install new tools Security Knowledge in Practice

31 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 31 Improve: Post mortem Update policies and procedures Update response tools Support business case Security Knowledge in Practice

32 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 32 Security Knowledge in Practice

33 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 33 Agenda Motivation Perspectives/Questions Protecting critical assets Identifying risks to critical assets OCTAVE Role of SEPG?

34 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 34 Identifying Risks to Critical Assets: OCTAVE SM Self-directed method for evaluating information security risks Conducted in three phases Elicits knowledge from multiple levels of the organization Identifies critical assets and threats to assets Identifies vulnerabilities that expose threats Develops a protection strategy and risk mitigation plans Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and OCTAVE are service marks of Carnegie Mellon University

35 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 35 Identifying Risks to Critical Assets: OCTAVE SM Self-directed method for evaluating information security risks Conducted in three phases Elicits knowledge from multiple levels of the organization Identifies critical assets and threats to assets Identifies vulnerabilities that expose threats Develops a protection strategy and risk mitigation plans Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and OCTAVE are service marks of Carnegie Mellon University

36 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 36 OCTAVE Phases

37 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 37

38 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 38 Evaluating Practices Current protection strategy evaluated using surveys and discussions Provides an understanding of staff behavior in relation to a collection of good security practices Identifies current security practices organizational vulnerabilities

39 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 39 Evaluating Threats Range of threats to critical assets identified using a threat profile people using network access people using physical access system problems other problems Provides an understanding of which threats could affect critical assets Identifies threat profile for each critical asset

40 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 40 Human Actors - Network Access

41 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 41 Human Actors - Network Access

42 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 42

43 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 43

44 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 44 Evaluating Technology Vulnerabilities Identify key infrastructure components critical asset access paths how threat actors might access a critical asset Identify technology vulnerabilities using software tools catalog of known vulnerabilities

45 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 45

46 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 46 Evaluating Risks

47 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 47 Building Strategy and Mitigation Plans Protection strategy provides direction for future information security efforts structured around a catalog of practices Risk mitigation plans focus on activities to recognize or detect threats as they occur resist or prevent threats from occurring recover from threats if they occur

48 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 48 Risk Mitigation Plans Mitigation Actions 1. Establish vulnerability management practice 2. Define policies for security management across the organization 3. Define and enforce sanctions for security violations 4. Establish defined roles and responsibilities for all personnel 5. Build awareness briefing and deliver to all employees 6. Identify required security-related training for IT personnel

49 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 49 Some Keys to Success [sound familiar?] Get senior management sponsorship (visible, continuous) Select the right analysis team Scope OCTAVE to address most important operational areas Select committed participants, willing to openly communicate

50 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 50 Agenda Motivation Perspectives/Questions Identifying risks to critical assets Protecting critical assets Security Knowledge in Practice Role of SEPG?

51 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 51 Questions to Consider As a SEPG member Do I consider security improvement as within my area of interest/responsibility? If not, why not? What have I learned about making SPI work that could aid in bringing about a continuous security improvement process? Am I not in one of the best possible positions to help make this happen?

52 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 52 Net Present Value of Information Security Value that is created when barriers to e- business are removed Realized when appropriate access is facilitated

53 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 53 Six Tips for Selling Security Establish Need Before Cost Hit 'Em with Numbers Use Others' Loss to Your Advantage Put It in Legal Terms Keep It Simple

54 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 54 Six Tips for Selling Security Establish Need Before Cost Hit 'Em with Numbers Use Others' Loss to Your Advantage Put It in Legal Terms Keep It Simple

55 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 55 Opportunity for SEPGs Next big improvement push? A legitimate technology improvement process, with heightened visibility since 9/11? Career opportunity? SEPG members are in the ideal position.

56 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 56 For More Information CERT web site OCTAVE Method Implementation Guide The CERT Guide to System and Network Security Practices CERT Security Improvement Modules

57 © 2002 by Carnegie Mellon University SPIN Presentation - slide 57 For More Information CERT web site OCTAVE Method Implementation Guide The CERT Guide to System and Network Security Practices CERT Security Improvement Modules


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