Exploit Intelligence ProjectExploit Intelligence Project Intel-driven case study from 2011 How do we use intel to mitigate a threat? What are optimal defenses for mass malware? How do crimepacks acquire exploits? Is security research being applied by crimepack authors? Separate what could happen from what is happening
Low Quality ExploitsLow Quality Exploits Memory Corruption (19) Defeated by DEP14 Defeated by ASLR17 Defeated by EMET19 Logic Flaws (8) No Java in Internet Zone4 No EXEs in PDFs1 No Firefox or FoxIt Reader2
Developed ElsewhereDeveloped Elsewhere DEP Bypasses (5) Developed by APT3 Developed by Whitehats2 Developed by Malware Authors0 Logic Flaws (8) Discovered by APT0 Discovered by Whitehats8 Discovered by Malware Authors0
Java is a Path ForwardJava is a Path Forward Malicious HTML Google Chrome IE8 DEP/ASLR Bypass DEP/ASLR Bypass Sandbox Escape Integrity Escalation Java Shell
Derived Optimal DefensesDerived Optimal Defenses Recommended to defend against crimepacks in 2011: 1.Enable DEP on browser and plugins 2.Remove Java from Internet Zone 3.Secure Adobe Reader configuration 4.Use EMET when possible / where needed Then, continue to monitor threat intel for changes…
Crimepacks in 2013Crimepacks in 2013 Standard desktop builds use DEP/ASLR/Sandboxes 2009: Windows XP, IE7, Flash 9, Office 2007, Java 6 2013: Windows 7, IE9, Flash 11, Office 2010, Java 7 Blackhole / Cool, Sweet Orange, and Gong Da Have these kits invested in bypassing our new defenses? How have crimeware packs dealt with the pressure?
The World is ChangingThe World is Changing Source: StatCounter January 2011 – August 2013 Browser Versions
Close Encounters of the EIP KindClose Encounters of the EIP Kind Crimepacks acquire capabilities for Windows 7+ through divine intervention
Exploit OriginsExploit Origins All memory corruption exploits came from APT campaigns or the VUPEN blog. All Java exploits came from security researchers: Jeroen Frijters TELUS Security Labs Adam Gowdiak (Security Explorations) Stefan Cornellius Sami Koivu via ZDI Michael Schierl via ZDI “Whitehats Shrugged” IE / Flash Java
Cool Exploit KitCool Exploit Kit Premium version of Blackhole, by the same author Launched a $100k bug bounty for improved exploits Only offered as a hosted service to prevent source leaks As a result, Cool has several unique exploits: CVE-2011-3402: Windows Kernel TTF font (Duqu) CVE-2012-1876: IE 9 (VUPEN Pwn2Own) CVE-2012-0775: Reader 9/10 (self-developed?) No privesc included for these targets, relies on payload
How did we stack up?How did we stack up? DEP, remove Java, secure Reader, EMET as necessary Safe from all but TTF font exploit w/o patching! Systems being deployed now w/o Java are out of reach Win7, IE9, Reader X, EMET as necessary Mixed messages coming from this data Success! We have pushed crimepacks to the margins Warning! It is easy to predict if you will get owned
The Advanced Persistent ThreatThe Advanced Persistent Threat How effective are exploit mitigations against this threat?
Aurora et al.Aurora et al. Highly regarded technical capabilities Prolific developers of zero-day exploits Original source for many crimepack exploits Pioneered “watering hole” attack campaigns Notable for successful compromises of Google, Bit9 Continues to cross paths with Trail of Bits Exploit profiled in Assured Exploitation Elderwood Exploit Kit dissection and analysis
Elderwood Think, a “startup” for Aurora to invest in Developed several reusable vuln disc / exploit tools Requires less-skilled people to operate the tools Launch zero-day watering holes on a regular basis Released new attacks every ~3 months in 2011/2012 4 Internet Explorer, 5 Adobe Flash zero-days Dozens of prominent websites compromised (CFR)
Quality Exploits?Quality Exploits? Elderwood 50% of the time Flash, Java, and Office plugins available Internet Explorer 8 All Computers Modest exploit mitigations are surprisingly effective!
It’s Easy to Get BetterIt’s Easy to Get Better ElderwoodNYU-PolyDavis Plugins RequiredFlash, Office, Java.NETNone Version SupportIE8 / Win XPIE8 / Win7IE9 / Win7 Reliability~50%~95%~99% FeaturesHardcoded ROP Dynamic ROP Time to Develop? (probably 8 hrs)~5 days~10 days ExperienceProfessionalAmateur
Reality RSA – phishing email with malicious Excel doc Exploited Flash vuln no longer viable in IE Google – IE6 in remote office to total control of Gmail They found the ONE guy in Google using IE6 Amateurs push as hard as they can. Professionals push as hard as they have to. Rapid discovery and shift to low cost attack vectors
APT DiscoveriesAPT Discoveries Maybe we should try to make protections that cannot be bypassed by CS undergrads with 40 hrs of training? We need to push harder since the professional bad guys can own things without caring about mitigations APT can get better, we know they will, but is it prudent not to act just because you know they will respond?
Taming the TigerTaming the Tiger Use the Kill Chain and Courses of Action the way they were intended
Variety of ApproachesVariety of Approaches or “An APT breached my network despite my $750,000 IPS and $2,000,000 SIEM. What other vendor products should I buy to protect myself?” –Jerkface
Phishing ResistancePhishing Resistance “99% of the security breaches it investigated in 2012 started with a targeted spearphishing attack.” –Mandiant “If you go from 35 to 12% on fire, you’re still on fire.” –Zane Lackey
Final ConclusionsFinal Conclusions Let’s make defenses that bored undergrads can’t take out in one semester, that would be cool! Let’s build things that help understand your adversary’s capability and intent. Let’s use the defenses we have. They work, and they work against the people you care about. Thanks Andrew Ruef and Hal Brodigan!