Presentation on theme: "1 Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped? ◘ Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory November 1, 2006 ◘ Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky."— Presentation transcript:
1 Can the Spread of Nuclear Weapons be Stopped? ◘ Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory November 1, 2006 ◘ Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky
2 During Cold War Deter with nuclear Triad: ICBM’s, Strategic Bombers. SNBM’s Nuclear war fighting abandoned in plan MAD Mutual Assured Destruction
3 The Cold War is over -- but… Current Doctrine Deter, assure, dissuade, defeat Pre-empt, with nuclear weapons if necessary “all options” open “capabilities based,” not “threat based” Nuclear weapons play “smaller role” Adaptive planning NUTS Nuclear Use Target Selection
4 Nuclear Weapons Risks Remain US – Russia nuclear weapons release Regional Conflict (e.g. India and Pakistan) Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Risk = Probability x consequences increased decreased This Talk Not addressed in this talk
5 Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation are not the same States can be deterred. Terrorists can not. No evidence that new proliferant states are greater or lesser risks for transferring nuclear weapons or the tools to make them to terrorists.
6 Nonproliferation – a nonpartisan goal Presidential Debate: September 30, 2004 Mr. Lehrer: “…so it is correct to say that if somebody’s listening to this, that you agree…the single most serious threat you believe –both of you believe is nuclear proliferation.” Mr. Bush: “I do –in the hands of a terrorist enemy.” Mr. Kerry: “Weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation.” …but…
7 In the History of Mankind, all newly developed technologies have been “dual purpose” have spread over entire globe This precedent must be broken for nuclear weapons Knowledge is not a bar to proliferation today
8 Cornerstone of Nonproliferation Regime is Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) Came into force 1970 Signed and Ratified by all Nations except –Israel –India –Pakistan –North Korea withdrew Review Conferences every 5 years Made a Treaty of Indefinite Duration at 1995 Review Conference
9 The NPT Bargain 1.Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) 2.US, Russia, UK, China and France are NWS 3.NWS do not give NW or NW tools to NNWS 4.NNWS do not receive such material
10 The NPT Bargain (continued) 5.NNWS have “inalienable right” to nuclear power. 6.NWS work in good faith toward prohibition of NWs and General Disarmament (no specified timetable; implication is to deemphasize role of NW in international relations 7.NNWS must negotiate Safeguards with IAEA
11 United States Soviet Union United Kingdom France China Israel India South Africa Pakistan Belarus North Korea Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South Africa became NNWS Ukraine Kazakhstan NPT in force Number of States with Nuclear Weapons 1970 “I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” John Kennedy, 1963 Rate of 1 new NWS every 5 yrs
12 Historical Summary of Military Fissile Material & Nuclear Weapons Programs Nuclear Weapons Programs begun before 1970 when NPT came into force, succeeded and are still ongoing United States Russia United Kingdom France China Israel India Programs ended by 1970 Programs ended after 1970 Sweden Canada Australia Egypt ArgentinaBrazil RomaniaSouth Africa SpainSouth Korea SpainSwitzerland TaiwanLibya Yugoslavia
13 Historical Summary (cont’d) Intentions suspected but no NW program identified Algeria Syria Programs started after 1970 Succeeded and ongoing Pakistan North Korea Are suspected to be actively seeking nuclear weapons Iran Factions within advocated for/sought NW, but ceased by 1970 Inherited NW, but now non- NW State party to NPT Belarus Kazakhstan Ukraine Italy Japan GermanyNorway
14 The Bad News The Non-Parties to NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea) Latency: Capability of NNWS versus Intent NW policies of NWS –U.S. redesign efforts –Only China proclaims “No First Use.” –U.S. pre-emptive policies The physical facts: Uranium Isotope enrichment & Plutonium reprocessing can be part of peaceful power program --- but: Enrichment & Reprocessing can shorten lead time to acquire NW after withdrawal from NPT
15 NWSNNWS Conversion Nuclear Power Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Power Enrichment Spent Fuel LEU ? Reprocessing HEULEU Spent Fuel Pu ? Reprocessing HEU, PU Uranium Ore The Fuel Cycle Under the NPT IAEA Safeguards
16 INTENT TECHNICAL CAPABILITY OF NNWS IRANBRAZIL “Latency” or likelihood of acquiring nuclear weapons JAPAN
17 Brazil 1951 (Dual Purpose) Brazil establishes National Research Council Swimming Pool Research Reactor fueled by HEU Brazil bought 625 MW e “turnkey” reactor
18 Brazil (continued) Military 1970 Brazil military government Six 1.3 GW e reactors by 1998 Attempts to import European centrifuges 1980 Three parallel military programs Air Force – laser enrichment Army – natural uranium graphite reactor Pu Navy – centrifuge program
19 Brazil (continued) Peaceful Program 1988 Brazil approves new Constitution: no nuclear weapons ~1990 Argentina and Brazil elected civilian Presidents 1991 Argentina and Brazil terminate weapons programs and signed mutual “peaceful uses” treaty, establishing bilateral monitoring agency
20 Brazil (continued) 1994 Quadrilateral Agreement: Argentina, Brazil, bilateral agency, IAEA But centrifuge program continues. Domestic design more capable than P-1. Claimed purpose: Prestige, Independence; but large hydropower resources
21 Iran 1957 – US-Iran Nuclear Cooperation agreement 1968 Iran signs NPT; ratified in 1970 Plans to construct 23 nuclear power plants by 2001! Starts Bushehr plant with German contractor Invests in European Nuclear Energy Consortium
22 Iran (continued) 1979 Iranian Revolution 1984 – 1988 Bushehr damaged by Iraqi bombardment 1985? or Pakistan and China signed 2 yrs later nuclear cooperation agreements with Iran. Tech transfers by Khan Organization. 1995Iran contracts with Russia to finish Bushehr
23 Iran (continued) 2002Iranian dissidents reveal existence of Natanz enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant 2003Iran suspends enrichment under pressure from EU 2004Iran breaks centrifuge seals 2005Iran resumes conversion April ‘06Iran claims 3.5% enrichment; running 164 centrifuges
24 IRAN (continued) Intent? Iran not fully cooperative with IAEA Safeguards No evidence of NW program Fatwa by Supreme Leader forbidding NW Inalienable right to Fuel Cycle Need for Independence?
25 Japan Owns about 45 tons of reactor-grade Plutonium Only about 10% of this is stored in Japan The designated purpose of this material is for use in Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) and breeder reactors. These uses have been delayed or cancelled. Reactor-grade Plutonium is useable in NW
26 North Korea (DPRK) 1985DPRK joins NPT 1991US withdraws NW from South Korea 1992DPRK concludes Safeguards Agreement with IAEA but IAEA detected 90g diversion of plutonium 1993DPRK announces intent to withdraw from NPT. IAEA demands more access to Yongbyon reactor. Many US – DPRK diplomatic contacts
27 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d October, 1994: US and DPRK sign “Agreed Framework” DPRK stop reprocessing Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to build two LWR’s and to supply fuel oil Many follow-on diplomatic moves
28 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d 1998South Korea “Sunshine Policy” Extensive diplomatic bilateral contacts, including visit by Secretary of State Albright to Pyongyang
29 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d 2001Secretary of State Powell declares to “pick up where President Clinton left off,” but retracts and diplomacy turns hostile. 2002President Bush includes DPRK in “axis of evil” in State of Union speech. Possible use of NW against DPRK included in Nuclear Posture Review.
30 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d August 2002 KEDO groundbreaking for reactors October 2002 Asst. Secretary of State James Kelly visits Pyongyang. US claims that DPRK admitted to Kelly that it had an HEU enrichment program. DPRK denies this, stating they only claimed a right to enrichment. Translation problem? DPRK enrichment program has disappeared from media.
31 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d November 2002 KEDO suspends fuel oil shipments in response to US enrichment claims. IAEA challenges enrichment. December 2002 DPRK restarts reactor, removes IAEA seals, expels inspectors.
32 North Korea (DPRK) cont’d January 2003 DPRK withdraws from NPT 2003 DPRK tells US and China it has NW Six Nation Talks; US refuses bilateral talks 2006 DPRK tests NW
33 The CTBT and Nonproliferation Long History: 1958 initiatives Partial Test ban: 1963 LTBT Reality versus Symbolism CTBT cited in all NPT Review Conferences Reality –Cost to National Security low –Technical benefit to Nonproliferation low –Cost-Benefit Ratio is Quotient of two small quantities The CTBT has been signed by most nations but is not in force. The US Administration opposes ratification. The CTBT Monitoring system is in place and is supported by the US.
34 The CTBT Matrix Options NNWS Countries No CTBT CTBT Complied with by all countries CTBT all countries cheat to extent possible without detection Highly Developed Developing Least Developed What type of NW can each country build? Conclusion: US interest served better with CTBT, obeyed or not, than without CTBT. (NAS, 2002)
35 Remedies to Proliferation What won’t work in the long run Discriminatory “Coalition of the Willing” Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Selective enforcement Divide world into fissile materials suppliers and receivers Military pre-emption of nascent nuclear facilities (Israel v. OSIRAK, 1981)
36 Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d) What may work International fuel supply and return of spent fuel to international control Strengthen IAEA; make Additional Protocol mandatory Broaden negative and positive security assurances Make withdrawal from NPT subject to U.N. Security Council Action
37 Positive & Negative Security Assurances NWS give assurances to + Come to the assistance of a NNWS threatened or attacked with NW – Not to attack a NNWS with NW unless the NNWS is allied with a NWS
38 Remedies to Proliferation (cont’d) will What will help No First UseUniversal No First Use acceptance by all NWS Drastic reduction of Nuclear Weapons stockpiles by formal Treaty by NWS Lessened reliance on military options in international relations US leadership in all of the above…because…
39 US leadership US is strongest military power measured by conventional military strength and economic power and “You cannot preach temperance from a bar stool.” …Rep. Ed Markey, 2006 And “Never negotiate with the United States unless you have a nuclear weapon.” …Indian Deputy Minister of Defense
40 Ultimately every Nuclear Nonproliferation Demands that every Nation concludes that its security and Well-Being are served better without nuclear weapons than with them.