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Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory.

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Presentation on theme: "Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory."— Presentation transcript:

1 Photos placed in horizontal position with even amount of white space between photos and header Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL The Nuclear Options: Decision Analysis at the Nexus of Engineering and Policy Jarret Lafleur, Ph.D. Homeland Security & Defense Systems Center Sandia National Laboratories Livermore, California AIAA Society & Aerospace Technology Technical Committee Meeting January 13, 2014

2 Presentation Roadmap  About Sandia  U.S. Nuclear Policy Context  Highlights from Recent Work  Structure for the Nuclear Force Structure Discussion  Diversity and Deterrent Force Reliability  Cost Estimation Office 2

3 ABOUT SANDIA 3

4 = NNSA Labs = Science = Nuclear Energy = Environmental Management = Fossil Energy = Energy Efficiency & Renewables Argonne Brookhaven Lawrence Berkeley Oak Ridge Pacific Northwest Idaho Los Alamos Sandia Ames Thomas Jefferson Fermi National Energy Technology Princeton Lawrence Livermore Stanford Linear Accelerator Center Savannah River National Renewable Energy LEGEND U.S. DOE National Laboratories 4

5  DOE/NNSA National Security Laboratory  Broad mission in developing science and technology applications to meet our rapidly changing, complex national security challenges  Safety, security and reliability of our nation’s nuclear weapon stockpile Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional Service in the National Interest 5 Sandia began as the Z Division of Los Alamos in 1945, as a single-purpose engineering organization for non-nuclear systems in nuclear weapons. Became Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and a DOE national lab in Today Sandia is a multiprogram lab that engages a broad spectrum of national security issues. Sandia began as the Z Division of Los Alamos in 1945, as a single-purpose engineering organization for non-nuclear systems in nuclear weapons. Became Sandia Laboratory in 1948 and a DOE national lab in Today Sandia is a multiprogram lab that engages a broad spectrum of national security issues. Sandia’s Origin

6  On-site workforce: 11,200  FY10 regular employees: 8,400  FY10 budget: $2.5B Technical Staff (3,844) by Degree (End of FY08) Mechanical Engineering 16% Electrical Engineering 19% Other Engineering 15% Other Fields 17% Physics 6% Chemistry 4% Math 2% Other Science 4% Computing 16% Top 3 hire fields comprise approximately 55% of technical hires Disciplines of Most Technical Hires (FY03 – FY05) Top 5 hire fields are approximately 70% of technical hires Top 11 hire fields represent approximately 90% of technical hires  CS CE  EE  ME  Physics  Chemistry  Chemical Eng  Materials Science  Math  Biology  Nuclear Eng  Aerospace Eng Sandia’s People 6

7 Sandia’s Five Mission Areas  Nuclear Weapons  Defense Systems and Assessments  Energy, Resources and Nonproliferation  Homeland Security and Defense  Science, Technology and Engineering 7

8 U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY CONTEXT 8

9 U.S. Nuclear Policy  The U.S. will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons  Reductions in numbers and role in U.S. national security strategy  May not be reached quickly  As long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, to:  Deter potential adversaries  Assure allies and partners they can count on America’s commitments 9 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Source: 1 2

10 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Includes active and inactive warheads. Several thousand additional warheads are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Source: U.S. Nuclear Policy  One way the U.S. demonstrates commitment to the first goal is through constraints on the second goal:  No nuclear tests  No new warheads or nuclear military capabilities  However, weapons and platforms continue to age.  A number of decisions in the next two decades on warhead and delivery platform life extension and replacement programs will have a long-term impact on the composition and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 10

11 The U.S. Nuclear Triad AirLandSea Source: B-2 Spirit Source B-52 Stratofortress Source: LGM-30G Minuteman III Source: Ohio-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Source: ballistic-missile--fbm-.html Trident II D5 Fleet Ballistic Missile B61 Bomb B83 Bomb Air Launched Cruise Missile 11

12 Recent Cases for Triad Leg Elimination 12 Source: publications/assets/triad-monograph.pdf Source: Source: Rationale Russia overflight precludes non-Russia ICBM use ICBMs invite high risks of nuclear use based on rushed decision- making Rationale Of any other diad, ICBM/SLBM is most similar in deterrent value and stability to the triad The U.S. is already on a path toward such a de facto ICBM/SLBM diad Rationale SSBN-X expected to cost nearly $350 billion over 50 years Survivability is maintained by the aggregate of the air and land legs In likely nuclear use scenarios, capable nuclear offense is more important than a survivable defense Air Land Sea Johnson et. al., Mitchell Inst. / Northrop Grumman, 2009 Cartwright et. al., Global Zero, 2012 Jacobs, CSIS, 2012

13 STRUCTURE FOR THE NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE DISCUSSION Highlights from Recent Work 13

14 ? Triad Analyses: A Typical Approach Brainstormed Force Structure #1 e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21 st century.” Brainstormed Force Structure #3 Brainstormed Force Structure #2 14 Challenge: How to judge one alternative against another? Here, each evaluation was coupled with an implicit definition of objectives. ProsCons Evaluation ProsCons Evaluation ProsCons Evaluation Broad Objectives

15 A Formal Decision Analysis Approach Broad Objectives Brainstormed Force Structure #1 Brainstormed Force Structure #3 Brainstormed Force Structure #2 15 Structured Criteria Note: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance. How well does each alternative perform with respect to each criterion? Evaluation e.g., “Field the optimal U.S. nuclear force structure for the 21 st century.”

16 A Formal Decision Analysis Approach 16 What is an underlying, unifying value hierarchy for U.S nuclear force structure decisions? Structured Criteria Note: Structuring objectives into criteria is not synonymous with specifying their relative importance.

17 Literature Value Hierarchy Analysis 17 Note: This work makes no judgements on the validity of authors’ arguments. It examines only the structure of the arguments’ perceivable value hierarchies.

18 A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks 18 Capacity to Promote Peace

19 A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks 19 Capacity to Promote Peace Non-Nuclear Defense and Security Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons … [but] make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary …” President Barack Obama, April 2009

20 A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks 20 Capacity to Promote Peace Non-Nuclear Defense and Security Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Resilience = Additional lower tiers exist During-Conflict Action Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement Denial of Benefits Imposition of Costs During Crisis Strategic Means Ends Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy Penetrability Command and Control Integration Force Endurance Promptness Range Number of Deliverable Weapons Third-Country Overflight Avoidance Military Capability Destruction Near-Term Damage Long-Term Damage Survivability Political Leadership Destruction Industrial Capacity Destruction Population Destruction Note: This hierarchy adopts the decomposition of deterrence from the Dec DoD Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept. Means vs. Ends Metrics

21 A Possible Unifying Hierarchy Strategic Nuclear Force Evaluation Criteria Costs Risks 21 Capacity to Promote Peace Non-Nuclear Defense and Security Credible Deterrence via Nuclear Weapons Limiting and Reducing Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Resilience = Additional lower tiers exist Scenario #1 During-Conflict Action Pre-Conflict Restraint Encouragement Denial of Benefits Imposition of Costs During Crisis Strategic Means Ends Scenario #2Scenario #3Scenario #4Scenario #5 Cross-Cutting Means Accuracy Penetrability Command and Control Integration Force Endurance Promptness Range Number of Deliverable Weapons Third-Country Overflight Avoidance Military Capability Destruction Near-Term Damage Long-Term Damage Survivability Political Leadership Destruction Industrial Capacity Destruction Population Destruction Philosophy: Overall deterrence can be considered a “portfolio” of specific deterrences.

22 How is such a hierarchy useful?  Provides list of criteria to address in a balanced, complete argument  Offers guidance on which criteria are logical components of others  Provides simple mental model of objectives, enhancing communication  Provides a pathway for quantitative, multi-objective decision analysis  Provides list of criteria authors should have addressed in a balanced, complete argument  Offers guidance on whether authors are arguing about competing criteria at the same logical tier  Helps isolate sources of disagreement between arguments  Provides visibility into which objectives the authors valued more highly than others 22 For the Policy AdvocateFor the Policy Analyst

23 DIVERSITY AND DETERRENT FORCE RELIABILITY Highlights from Recent Work 23

24 Increased Risk of Common Mode Failure Increased adversary risk Diversity and Technical Risk 24 Component Diversity Increased Development & Production Costs Increased Cost of Surveillance, Maintenance Cost Notional Enterprise Risk and Cost Enterprise Risk Highly CommonHighly Diverse Available at: “As the stockpile ages and becomes both smaller and less diverse … there is inevitably less flexibility to adjust for technical failures that could arise … Mitigating technical risk, therefore, will cause us in the near term to … seek to preserve diversity of warhead types in the overall stockpile.” “[LEP options for the W-78 ICBM warhead] study will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types.” Diagram excerpted from McDowell and Walker, “Lifecycle Opportunities and Challenges with an Interoperable Warhead Approach”, Sandia National Laboratories

25 Triads, Diads, and Interoperability 25 Warhead Interoperability Decisions Triad vs. Diad Decisions Nuclear Force Diversity Risk of Technical Failure Can quantitative methods further inform these decisions? influence influences influence Reliability engineering encompasses a set of tools and techniques that describe the probability that a system is functional over a given time interval.

26 Deterrent Force Reliability:The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is functional at a given time. Deterrent Force Unreliability:The probability that at least one form of a credible nuclear deterrent force is not functional at a given time. Reliability Block Diagram:A graphical representation of how the components of a system are structured with regards to the system’s state of functionality. Series System S1 S2 Parallel System S1 S2 “Easy” to break More difficult to break or Deterrent Force Failure Probability Symbol (= 1–R) Deterrent Force Reliability Terminology and Background 26

27 Today’s Force Structure ICBM SSBN NN NEP W87 NN NEP W78 NN NEP W88 NN NEP W76 B-2 NN NEP W80 NN NEP B83 NN NEP B61 B-52 Deterrent Force Reliability 27 ALCM SLBM Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption vs. (notional)

28 Deterrent Force Reliability Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad ICBM SSBN NN NEP Warhead NN NEP Warhead B-2 NN NEP W80 NN NEP B83 NN NEP B61 B ALCM SLBM NN NEP Warhead vs. Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption (notional)

29 Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Land) ICBM SSBN NN NEP Warhead NN NEP Warhead B-2 NN NEP W80 NN NEP B83 NN NEP B61 B-52 Deterrent Force Reliability 29 ALCM SLBM Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption NN NEP IW vs. (notional)

30 Ex. Reduced-Diversity Triad, 1 IW (Sea) ICBM SSBN NN NEP IW NN NEP Warhead B-2 NN NEP W80 NN NEP B83 NN NEP B61 B-52 Deterrent Force Reliability 30 ALCM SLBM Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption NN NEP Warhead vs.

31 (notional) Leg Elimination Options ICBM SSBN NN NEP W87 NN NEP W78 NN NEP W88 NN NEP W76 B-2 NN NEP W80 NN NEP B83 NN NEP B61 B-52 Deterrent Force Reliability 31 ALCM SLBM Deterrent Force Failure Probability vs. Single-Element Failure Probability Assumption 500 times higher than baseline triad vs. 1,000,000 times higher than baseline triad 1,000 times higher than baseline triad

32 COST ESTIMATION OFFICE Highlights from Recent Work 32

33 Cost Estimation Office  Compared to previous decades, constrained federal budgets have produced heightened awareness of cost considerations in weapon system development trade studies.  Sandia is leading development of a parametric cost estimation capability for early-phase weapon life extension program cost trades. 33 “A central finding of the book is that government officials [over the past six decades] made little effort to ensure that limited economic resources were used as efficiently as possible so that nuclear deterrence could be achieved at the least cost to taxpayers. While the costs of individual programs were debated from time to time, the near total absence of data documenting either annual or cumulative costs of the overall effort made effective democratic debate and oversight all but impossible …” Brookings Institution Press, 1998 Sample Modern Parametric Cost Estimation Tools:

34 Aerospace & Defense Interactions January February March April Jan. 23, 2013 El Segundo, CA Aerospace Corporation Concept Design Center Concurrent Engineering Group Jan. 22, 2013 Pasadena, CA NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Team X Concurrent Engineering Group March 26, 2013Pasadena, CA NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Cost and Risk Analysis Workshop April 24, 2013 Washington, DC DoD Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation Advanced Systems Cost Analysis Organization Jan. 11, 2013 Dallas, TX Lockheed Martin Aeronautics ADP (Skunk Works) Cost Est. Group 34

35 QUESTIONS? 35


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