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Deterrence – or Destruction? Comparative Nuclear Doctrine.

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2 Deterrence – or Destruction? Comparative Nuclear Doctrine

3 I. Modern Deterrence Theory A.The cult of the bomber, 1919-1939: 1.Giulio Douhet: Opening hours of any major war  destruction of cities with explosives, gas, incendiaries  panic and social collapse 2.1922, 1932-4: Attempts to ban bombers 3.Deterrence failed: Britain actually initiated city warfare in World War II (disproportionate response to German error) 4.Mass killing / city destruction generally didn’t have the expected effect on civilian morale 5.Britain actually preferred German countervalue targeting (cities) to counterforce targeting (military forces)

4 B. Types of Deterrence 1.General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence: Distinction between overall strength (10,000 warheads) and threat in particular situation (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles)

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6 B. Types of Deterrence 1.General vs. Specific/Immediate Deterrence: Distinction between overall strength (10,000 warheads) and threat in particular situation (willing to go to war over Cuban missiles) 2.Direct vs. Extended Deterrence: Attempting to deter attacks on self vs. others (i.e. South Korea, West Germany) 3.Existential Deterrence: Capability exists to become a threat (i.e. Japan’s nuclear program)

7 C. Rational Deterrence Theory (RDT) 1.Foundations = bargaining theory, especially game theory at RAND and other “think tanks”game theory 2.Focuses on manipulating information, costs, and probability of victory to prevent rational opponents from engaging in some behavior

8 3. Requirements of Success under RDT a.Clarity: Threat must be understood Failures: The “Doomsday Device,” tactical nukes in CubaDoomsday Device b.Credibility: Opponent must believe threat will be carried out if line is crossed Failures: Nuclear threats over Berlin Wall, Vietnam c.Cost: Threat must be great enough to outweigh benefits of crossing the line Failure: Sanctions on USSR over Afghanistan invasion d.Restraint: Opponent must believe threat will NOT be carried out if line is NOT crossed Failures: WMD Inspections before current Iraq conflict, Hitler declares war on America e.Rationality: Opponent must weigh costs and benefits Possible failures: Paraguayan War, Nuclear war termination?

9 D. Dilemmas of Deterrence 1.Security Dilemma: Increased costs and credibility also mean decreased restraint (increased incentives to initiate conflict) 2.Vulnerability Dilemma: If you don’t attempt to counter deterrent threat, maybe you intend to strike first… (US urges Soviets to harden silos) 3.Rationality Dilemma: Known rationality can be exploited by opponent (as in our bargaining game, or counterforce first strike). Solution = “threat that leaves something to chance” – but this decreases restraint, increasing incentives for enemy to pre-empt

10 Exercise: By Dawn’s Early Light Threats to deterrence? Causes of escalation? How to terminate a nuclear war?

11 E. Does deterrence work? 1.Inherent uncertainty: If opponent does nothing, is deterrence working? 2.General deterrence creates bias: Perhaps having to state a threat means it is unlikely to succeed… 3.Quantitative studies: US-USSR crises accurately described by RDT (responses consistently calibrated to threats, not randomly over time as predicted by political psychology)

12 4. Results from Case Studies (Morgan 2003) a.Success more likely when challenger motivated by prospective gains than fear of domestic or international loss b.Deterrence successes occur early, before crises develop c.Military superiority unnecessary for deterrence (consistent with RDT – and French nuclear doctrine…)

13 5. Nuclear weapons possession suppresses conventional conflict spiral

14 6. Deterring Terrorists: Unexpectedly Violent Retaliation is Key

15 II. Game Theory: Formalizing Deterrence A.Assumptions 1.Rational choice (Transitive and Connected Preferences) – Note that preferences do not need to be “reasonable” or “sensible,” just consistent 2.Strategic interaction – My choices affect which choices are best for you

16 B. Elements 1. Players – Two or more (Nuclear: Usually two) 2. Strategies – The choices players have 3. Outcomes – The results of the players’ choices (what the world looks like afterwards) 4. Payoffs (Preferences) – How much each player values each Outcome (since the same outcome can be valued differently by different people)

17 C. Games in Normal (aka Strategic) Form: The Matrix Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A Outcome 1 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 2 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Strategy B Outcome 3 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff Outcome 4 Player 1 Payoff, Player 2 Payoff This form is used to represent simultaneous choice

18 1. Solving a Normal/Strategic- Form Game Without Math a. Where do the numbers come from? PREFERENCES. First step is always rank-ordering outcomes for each player. b. Nash Equilibrium  Neither player could do any better by unilaterally changing its strategy choice c. To Solve: Examine each cell to see if either player could do better by unilaterally choosing a different Strategy, given that its opponent does nothing different. Example: Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,33,4 Strategy B 0,04,2

19 Solving a Game Without Math Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,33,4 Strategy B 0,54,2 c. Not every game has a Nash Equilibrium (prediction = instability / switching between strategies) Example:

20 Solving a Game Without Math Player 2 Player 1 Strategy AStrategy B Strategy A 2,53,4 Strategy B 0,04,1 d. Some games have multiple Nash Equilibria (prediction = one of the following outcomes…) Example:

21 C. Common Strategic-Form Games 1. Prisoners’ Dilemma Prisoners’ Dilemma a. Both players end up worse, even though each plays rationally! Player 2 Player 1 Remain SilentConfess Remain Silent Misdemeanor, Misdemeanor Life, Walk Free Confess Walk Free, LifeFelony, Felony

22 b. Using PD to model Arms Races (The Security Dilemma) Note that payoff structure is just like a PD Player 2 Player 1 Don’t ArmArm Don’t Arm Status Quo, Status Quo Conquered, Victorious Arm Victorious, Conquered Status Quo – Weapon Costs, Status Quo – Weapon Costs

23 2. Chicken: Who will swerve?

24 What If: You could throw your steering wheel out the window? Player 2 Player 1 SwerveDrive Straight Swerve Status Quo, Status Quo Wimp, Cool Drive Straight Cool, WimpDEAD, DEAD

25 Nuclear Crises and Chicken: The Cuban Missile Crisis Key distinction: In Chicken, each player would rather be the (nice) sucker than have both players be nasty  Not so in PD USSR US Don’t Install Missiles Install Missiles Do Nothing Status Quo, Status Quo Defeat, Victory Blockade Victory, DefeatWW III, WW III

26 Problem 1: An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis Pakistan India Assemble Weapons Don’t Assemble Assemble Weapons Hair Trigger India can first- strike Don’t Assemble Pakistan can first-strike Status Quo 1.Determine preferences for each side (discussion) 2.If Pakistan assembles, what does India want to do? 3.If Pakistan doesn’t assemble, what does India want to do? 4.If India assembles, what does Pakistan want to do? 5.If India doesn’t assemble, what does Pakistan want to do? 6.Identify any Nash equilibria 7.Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?

27 Problem 2: An India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis, Phase Two Pakistan India Don’t StrikeStrike Don’t Strike SQ: 0 dead, SQ: 0 dead Lose: 10 Million dead, Win: 1 Million dead Strike Win: 100,000 dead, Lose: 20 Million dead Stalemate: 5 Million dead, Stalemate: 10 Million dead 1.Determine preferences for each side (discussion) 2.If Pakistan doesn’t strike, what does India want to do? 3.If Pakistan strikes, what does India want to do? 4.If India doesn’t strike, what does Pakistan want to do? 5.If India strikes, what does Pakistan want to do? 6.Identify any Nash equilibria 7.Translate this into the real world – what does game theory predict?

28 D. Games in Extensive Form: The Tree 1. Extensive form adds information: a. What is the order of moves? Example: “If you do this, then I will do that.” b. What prior information does each player have when it makes its decision? 2. Elements a. Nodes – Points at which a player faces a choice b. Branches – Decision paths connecting a player’s choices to the outcomes c. Information Sets – When a player doesn’t know which node it is at d. Outcomes – Terminal nodes

29 3. Solving an Extensive Form Game a. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium – Eliminates “non- credible” threats from consideration b. Process = Backwards induction – “If they think that we think…”

30 E. Games of Deterrence: Credible Threat and Restraint War Cap B FS B SQ Preferences A: Cap B SQ War FS B B: SQ FS B War Cap B Attack Don’t Attack Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke Deterrence Success!!! Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

31 E. Games of Deterrence: Credible Threat But No Restraint War Cap B FS B SQ Attack Don’t Attack Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke Deterrence Fails!!! Preferences A: Cap B SQ War FS B B: FS B SQ War Cap B Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

32 E. Games of Deterrence: Restraint, But No Credible Threat War Cap B FS B SQ Attack Don’t Attack Nuke Don’t Nuke Don’t Nuke Deterrence Fails!!! Preferences A: Cap B SQ War FS B B: SQ FS B Cap B War Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

33 Problem Three: Deterring the USSR Given USSR NFU Doctrine NWar EUR SQ Invade Europe Don’t Invade Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke CWin US Win USSR NWar CON NWin US

34 Problem Three: If the US is willing to trade New York for Bonn NWar EUR SQ Invade Europe Don’t Invade Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke CWin US Win USSR NWar CON NWin US Preferences USUSSR NWin US Win USSR SQ CWin US NWar EUR NWar CON CWin US Win USSR NWin US

35 Problem Three: If the US is NOT willing to trade New York for Bonn NWar EUR SQ Invade Europe Don’t Invade Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke Nuke Don’t Nuke CWin US Win USSR NWar CON NWin US Preferences USUSSR NWin US Win USSR SQ CWin US NWar EUR Win USSR NWar CON NWar EUR CWin US NWar CON NWin US

36 F. Problems of Game Theory 1. Simple two-player games assume: a. Common knowledge of preferences – I know exactly what you want, so I can predict your behavior Common knowledge of preferences b. Terminal nodes – the game actually ends “for good” c. Both players ignore third-party decisions (i.e. other nuclear powers, or potential proliferators) 2. Real world violates these conditions (in many if not most cases) 3. Adding concealed preferences, N players, and infinite play is mathematically possible – but the result is infinitely many equilibria (the “folk theorem”) 4. Lesson: Games constrain the strategies of rational players (some are better than others), but can not prove a single strategy is “best” under real-world conditions

37 III. Elements of Nuclear Doctrine A.Goals 1.Deterrence – Make it irrational for enemies to attack 2.Compellence – Allow leaders to force changes in others’ behavior 3.Warfighting – Increase odds of victory in war

38 B. Key dimensions 1.Size of force – Minimal to dominant 2.Command and control – Hierarchy to delegation 3.Employment – First strike to last resort 4.Force composition – Land, Sea, Air 5.Missions – Demonstrations to all-out war 6.Targeting – Counterforce vs. Countervalue

39 IV. How do doctrines emerge? A.Realism – External threats 1.All states pursue national interest. Keys: preventing national destruction or defeat, bargaining from a position of strength 2.Implications: a.Deterrence theory: If you want peace, prepare for war b.Public declarations are “cheap talk” – states at war abandon scruples and treaties c.States try to prevent rivals from gaining superiority

40 3. Realist Nuclear Policies a.Escalation dominance: Be able to beat any rival at any level of escalation (conventional, tactical nuclear, strategic nuclear) b.Preserve autonomy: Do not bargain away decision-making power over weapons c.Preserve security: Defend the state with alliances, civil defense, military defense

41 B. Strategic Culture Theory 1.Domestic politics determines policy 2.Implications a.Dominant ideology (historical analogies, Marxism, Maoism, etc) shapes war plans b.Doctrines have symbolic importance  prestige, shame, pride matter for policy c.Civilians target military doctrines which threaten domestic popularity

42 C. Organizational Politics A.Military organizations develop doctrines in unique ways 1.Militaries focus on military missions, neglecting politics 2.Militaries pursue parochial interests

43 2. Implications a.Military control  offensive doctrines (e.g. preventive war, inevitable escalation, counterforce targeting) b.Follow-on imperative  new weapons establish vested interests, perpetuate the organization after its initial purpose

44 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s),

45 ICBMs and SLBMs: Speed, Reach, and Penetration

46 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs,

47 A MIRVed ICBM: The Minuteman III

48 MIRV Test: Time-Lapse Photo

49 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s),

50 PGMs and Guided Cruise Missiles

51 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD,

52 Defense: ABM, BMD, SDI, etc.

53 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD, ASAT

54 ASAT: A threat to early-warning satellites

55 D. Technological change 1.All theories agree that technological change (new weapons available) can change doctrines 2.Key inventions: Nuclear weapons (1945), thermonuclear weapons (1952), satellites (1957), ICBMs and SLBMs (late 1950s), MIRVs, PGMs and guided cruise missiles (1980s), ABM/BMD, ASAT, stealth

56 Stealth technology

57 V. History: The Major Powers A.The United States 1.The Monopoly a.US immediately uses weapons against cities (countervalue targeting) b.US reserves future weapons for invasion of Japan (counterforce targeting of beaches) c.End of World War II  Iran crisis. US threatens USSR. Truman: “We're going to drop it on you.” d.US believes A-Bomb gives it power of compellence, not merely deterrence “The bombing of Hiroshima was the greatest event in world history since the birth of Jesus Christ.” - Senator Brien "Mr. Atom" McMahon, 1952“The bombing of Hiroshima was the greatest event in world history since the birth of Jesus Christ.” - Senator Brien "Mr. Atom" McMahon, 1952

58 2. Massive Retaliation a.US adopts policy of containment (NSC-68) – prevent Soviet expansion b.Massive retaliation promised disproportionate response to USSR transgressions c.Massive retaliation failed i.Not credible – US failed to respond to Chinese intervention in Korea, East German riots of 1953, Hungary 1956, etc. ii.Increased Soviet vulnerability – USSR believed US might strike first in crisis, so USSR needed to pre-empt iii.End of US dominance threatened to “de- couple” US from European war (US unwilling to trade New York for Bonn)

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60 3. Flexible Response a.Problem: US threat to escalate immediately to global thermonuclear war is not credible b.Solution: Prepare for each step on “ladder of escalation.” Goal = “escalation dominance”

61 Ladder of escalation. From Herman Kahn, On Escalation, 1965

62 c. Implementing flexible response i.The Triad: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs for different purposes (bombers can be recalled, ICBMs are fast and accurate, SLBMs are survivable but inaccurate) ii.Preparation for both countervalue and counterforce strategies (deter – and limit damage if deterrence fails) iii.Conventional build-up in Europe, deployment of tactical nuclear weapons iv.US acts to restrain unauthorized weapon use (locks and codes) v.Acceptance of MAD – Limits on ABMs negotiated

63 4. Military influence over US policy a.Strong military has become interest group vying for government funds b.“Predelegation” – i.Begins in 1957, continues through end of Cold War (and beyond?) ii.US Commanders given authority to order retaliatory nuclear attacks if President unreachable (also given the unlock codes)

64 c. Military resistance to nuclear warfighting: LNOs i.Problem for civilian strategists: US nuclear war plan (SIOP) had no contingency calling for less than a few hundred nuclear weapons ii.Eisenhower demands revisions to allow use of single weapons for political purposes (limited retaliation, response to conventional war) iii.So does Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan….yet SIOP never updated to include LNOs!

65 d. Circumvention of civilian control Air Force forced to install locks (PALs) on nuclear weapons during 1960s. –PALs require secret code to physically enable weapon. Even if missile launched, warhead won’t detonate without code. Prevents unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Air Force quietly sets code to 00000000 – and tells just about everyone involved in the launch process! 1977: Congressional hearings lead Air Force to finally pick new codes

66 e. “Team B” and worst case scenarios CIA issues report on Soviet intentions – White House Chief of Staff Rumsfeld and others accuse it of being too optimistic CIA director Colby stands by the results. President Ford fires him, appoints Rumsfeld as Sec. Defense, and replaces Colby with future President George H.W. Bush, who (reluctantly) agrees to allow the “competitive analysis” by an outside panel chosen by Rumsfeld Richard Pipes (hard-line Sovietologist) selected to head “Team B” to re-examine the findings -- hires other hardliners (e.g. neo-conservative Wolfowitz) as members and advisers

67 f. Effects of Team B Report i.Wrong in nearly every factual respect – argues that Soviet economic chaos is an illusion, that defense budget is twice actual size, that Soviets have advanced weapons US experts consider impossible (research funds are the evidence), etc. ii.Core notion is that USSR becomes more aggressive as power increases – suggests that MAD is insufficient for deterrence and US buildup is needed

68 iii. Worst-case projections Example: Actual US survivability vs. Team B estimates

69 iv. Increased support for buildup Public support was never high, but did increase in the late 1970s, pressuring Carter 1980s: DoD puts out “Soviet Military Power” each year, similar to Team B analysisSoviet Military Power From 1983 

70 6. Hints of a new warfighting doctrine a.AirLand Battle – 1980s doctrine envisions tactical nuclear strikes as part of conventional operations, not last resort when conventional war fails b.SDI – US plans to move away from MAD by eliminating USSR ability to destroy US (proves impossible with 1980s technology)

71 c. Renewed Civil Defense Efforts “Everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around. Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors, and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it!”“Everybody's going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around. Dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors, and then throw three feet of dirt on top. It's the dirt that does it!” – T.K. Jones, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Nuclear Forces, 1982.

72 7. Reagan’s Dream a.Soviet leader Gorbachev seeks rapprochement with West b.Gorbachev proposes universal, total nuclear disarmament (1986) – Reagan accepts proposal immediately c.US and USSR begin rapid series of arms control treaties i.INF: Bans IRBMs from Europe ii.Start I: Huge cuts in warheads and launchers iii.Start II: Abolished MIRVs (Never implemented)

73 8. After the Cold War: Warfighting Resurgent? a.Interest groups fight cancellation of Cold War weapons systems (B-2 bomber, Seawolf submarine, etc.) b.New threats, new weapons? i.US reaffirms policy of nuclear deterrence against non-nuclear countries under Bush ii.Nuclear labs push for development of “third generation” nuclear weapons: Congress cuts funds in mid-1990s iii.US withdraws from ABM treaty to pursue BMD (2002); Russia responds by withdrawing from START II c.Hawks’ Goal = prevent US from being deterred by others or self-deterred by overly-large weapons

74 B. The Soviet Union and Russia 1.Stalinism a.Stalin demands “the bomb” to deter US nuclear attack b.Stalin also forbids development of military doctrine for use of weapon (weapon is entirely political) c.USSR doesn’t deploy usable weapons for years after first test

75 Public Bluster, Private Fears? "I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a serious force. Atomic bombs are intended to frighten people with weak nerves.""I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a serious force. Atomic bombs are intended to frighten people with weak nerves." –- Joseph Stalin "Only the imperialists will perish in an Atomic war.""Only the imperialists will perish in an Atomic war." –- V. Molotov, 1949

76 2. The development of a doctrine a.Khrushchev adopts warfighting strategy – use nuclear weapons to open gaps for exploitation by armor b.Goal = eventual Soviet superiority (already enjoyed over China) c.Strict civilian control maintained i.Communist Party fear of “Bonapartism” ii.Justified by argument that long crisis will precede nuclear war (so no need for quick response) iii.Kruschev publicly claims “If you start a war, we may die but the rockets will fly automatically” – but never builds an automatic system

77 3. 1960s: Implementing Warfighting Doctrine a.USSR assumes European war will rapidly escalate to global thermonuclear war b.Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared (but even internal documents always describe attacks as responses to invasion or attack) – never fully adopted

78 c. Civil Defense

79 3. 1960s: Implementing Warfighting Doctrine a.USSR assumes European war will rapidly escalate to global thermonuclear war b.Pre-emptive counterforce strategy prepared (but even internal documents always describe attacks as responses to invasion or attack) – never fully adopted c.Civil defense – limit damage in event of war, create hardened shelters for leaders (retain civilian control during wartime)

80 4. Détente: Did it make a difference? a.Late 1960s – Soviets privately shift to second-strike plans, harden missile silos b.Strategic parity: US acknowledges USSR as equal and gives up compellence BUT Soviets keep building ICBMs because of i. Cost (cheap) and geography (limited ports) ii. Pressure from Soviet defense industry, just like the US c.Soviet planners de-emphasize tactical nuclear use (conventional offensive believed to be quicker and tactical nukes would render military operations impossible due to contamination) d.By mid-1970s, warfighting evolved into a “no first use” flexible response doctrine, quite similar to US

81 5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia? a.Soviet leaders privately feared nuclear war. Post-Cold War evidence of nuclear fear by Brezhnev…

82 From 1995 study (declassified in 2009) “ During a 1972 command post exercise, leaders of the Kremlin listened to a briefing on the results of a hypothetical war with the United States. A U.S. attack would kill 80 million Soviet citizens and destroy 85 percent of the country's industrial capacity. According to the recollections of a Soviet general who was present, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev ‘trembled’ when he was asked to push a button, asking Soviet defense minister Grechko ‘this is definitely an exercise?’” “Virtually all interview subjects stressed that they perceived the U.S. to be preparing for a first strike.”

83 Same study: 1968 and 1981 Soviet studies: USSR could not win nuclear war even with a first strike In a European war, if NATO forces were about to overrun Soviet nuclear weapons sites, the Soviets would “destroy them” with special devices and mines “rather than use them.” Soviets studied “nuclear winter” (without using the phrase) before US scientists Early 1980s: Castro suggested the possibility of nuclear strikes against the US. The pressure stopped after Soviet officials gave Castro a briefing on the ecological impact on Cuba of nuclear strikes on the United States

84 5. Soviet Nuclear Paranoia a.Soviet leaders privately feared nuclear war. Post-Cold War evidence of nuclear fear by Brezhnev… b.…and Andropov. (Able Archer “crisis” of 1983 – did US rhetoric nearly cause a Soviet strike?) c.Dominant belief was that US would strike first, despite preparations for pre-emption.

85 6. The last years of the Cold War a.Soviet leaders come to believe (and proclaim to subordinates) that nuclear war is unwinnable b.Gorbachev seeks disarmament – surprisingly little opposition (consensus in favor of some type of arms control among leadership) c.Key decision = abandon pursuit of parity with US (arms race)

86 d. Irony: Warfighting plans persisted No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment of a crisis. -- Soviet Central Committee, 1985

87 The “Dead Hand” System: Underground command post If communications fail AND nuclear explosions detected by sensors… Rocket is launched with internal radio Radio broadcasts launch orders / codes to Soviet ICBMs Thus, even if all Soviet leaders killed and communications disrupted, Soviet missiles will annihilate the USA Problem: They didn’t TELL us about it!

88 7. Russian nuclear doctrine a.Conventional force reduction  renunciation of NFU policy b.New emphasis on Russia as regional hegemon (security umbrella for CIS) c.Putin’s shift: Nuclear weapons not restricted to defense of Russian independence  now to be used if crisis threatens “military security” or “international stability and peace” (not renounced by figurehead Medvedev) d.“De-Escalation” – Use a few nuclear weapons in limited conventional wars to raise costs of war for opponent, inducing peace (remember our game? C)

89 C. The United Kingdom 1.Initial impetus a.US terminates nuclear cooperation in 1946 and withdraws troops from Europe. British fear of USSR  decision to proliferate in 1947. b.Goal = influence US policy by becoming capable of joint operations to defend Europe -- or independent escalation of conventional European war to nuclear war c.1949 – USSR proliferation shocks UK, prompts crash program to proliferate

90 2. British force as complement to US power a.Britain designs “V-bomber” force around assumption of US fighter support b.Britain adopts counterforce targeting when US focuses on countervalue (fears USSR could still attack Europe even after loss of cities) – WW II example of USAAF refusal to attack V-weapon sites

91 3. Modernization and deterrence a.US-UK Defense Agreement of 1958 – US supplies H-Bomb designs, Tritium, U-235, Nevada Test Site to UK in exchange for Plutonium. b.UK diversifies arsenal because bombers are vulnerable  shifts to SLBMs c.UK now owns Trident SLBMs in common pool with US

92 D. France 1.The Fourth Republic (1945-1958): a.Initial scientific phase ends with purge of Communists from nuclear program in 1952 b.Decision to build weapons – contingency program begun after Dien Bien Phu, accelerated after “Nautilus affair,” commitment made after Suez Crisis c.Decision to test – based on declining influence in NATO (goal = increase influence)

93 US Opposes French Nuclear Ambitions Harold Stassen (special Assistant on Disarmament): “If France makes this decision, the Federal Republic will decide to do so..., then many additional states will make the same decision; and the Soviet Union will consider itself forced to provide such weapons also to other Communist states...”

94 2. De Gaulle and the “Force de Frappe” a.Gaullist Foreign policy i.Superpower balance is inherently unstable, requiring strong Europe as “Third Force” ii.France is a Great Power with a global role and a leadership role in Europe

95 b. Gaullist nuclear doctrine i.“Proportional deterrence” – France need not destroy an attacker, only punish it ii.“Multilateral deterrence” – third force needed to inject uncertainty into superpower calculations, to prevent conventional war in Europe iii.Triggering – Unstated belief that France could force US defense of Europe by threatening USSR cities if USSR invaded West Europe

96 c. Gaullism and “Flexible Response” i.France rejected idea of “firebreak” between war types in Europe BUT ii.France DID reserve nuclear weapons for after the battle for West Germany was decided, but before war entered French soil iii.French force structure was offensive – credible first-strike force

97 3. The Giscard Shift in the 1970s a.Revised foreign policy: European, Atlantic, non-nuclear security b.Adoption of flexible response i.Tactical nuclear weapons (1972) ii.Conventional force build-up and modernization iii.Secret co-operation with US on MIRV and tactical weapons (1974) – Giscard claims to have “reached the same conclusions as General de Gaulle” in public

98 4. The Elections of 1981 a.Both left (Socialists) and right (Gaullists) attack Giscard for “abandoning” the force de frappe b.Socialist victory = nuclear build-up (new delivery systems, no disarmament while superpowers have more than France) c.Tactical weapons  “prestrategic” weapons (shift away from flexible response)

99 c. Reactions to US Foreign Policy i.French fear of US SDI program (which might leave US free to fight tactical nuclear war in Europe)  cooperation with NATO on nuclear matters ii.US-USSR proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons (esp. INF in 1987)  French build-up in NATO (seeks alternatives to reliance on US)

100 5. After the Cold War a.Program reoriented to non-specific deterrence (“dissuasion”) -- Russia not presumed as enemy, nuclear response to chemical attack ruled out, force reduction to minimal survivable deterrent b.Adherence to test ban before low-yield weapon development completed in 1995 (rejection of warfighting doctrines)

101 E. China 1.Before the bomb (1949-1963) a.Korean War: US threatens use of nuclear weapons; China makes concessions b.China emphasizes nuclear disarmament, seeks no-first-use pledge from US c.Sino-Soviet Cooperation: China seeks aid from USSR for nuclear weapons. d.The Sino-Soviet Split: USSR rejects Chinese attempt to lead world revolution, sides with ally India in border dispute, refuses to give China nuclear weapons

102 2. The early program a.Initial goal = minimum deterrence and international prestige. Mao: “six bombs will do” b.China decides against opposing proliferation by rival India (hopes for divisions in Indian politics, diversion of resources from other military projects)

103 c. Policy focus = avoiding pre-emption i.Develops civil relocation for most of South China ii.Some evidence suggests early strategy was to dismantle own nuclear facilities to avoid pre-emptive strike if one appears imminent! iii.China continues to call for total nuclear disarmament and NWFZs (favors large conventional forces like China’s PLA)

104 Current NWFZs

105 c. Policy focus = avoiding pre-emption i.Develops civil relocation for most of South China ii.Some evidence suggests early strategy was to dismantle own nuclear facilities to avoid pre-emptive strike if one appears imminent! iii.China continues to call for total nuclear disarmament and NWFZs (favors large conventional forces like China’s PLA) iv.China delays ICBM research, focuses on IRBMs for use against USSR if it invades v.China adopts NFU pledge

106 3. Chinese Pragmatism a.China-US rapprochement and end of Mao’s reign  debate i.Shanghai group: Isolationists (need to focus on domestic development) ii.Moderates: Focus on foreign affairs, aligning with US against USSR b.Moderates prevail i.China deploys CSS-3 ICBM. Can reach Alaska – and nearly all of USSR

107 Current Chinese Forces

108 ii. China focuses on survivability China disperses weapons, even though it lacks advanced command and control capability Some weapons deployed in caves (no hardened silos available) Bombers sent to different airfields at random China mass produces nuclear weapons, becoming third-largest nuclear power

109 iii. China rejects warfighting No tactical nukes until at least 1978 No short-range nuclear-capable missiles! China must target cities or nothing. Deterring conventional attack unnecessary – China believes it can repel invaders

110 4. China diversifies from the 1980s a.China develops diverse weapon systems: CSS-4 ICBM (token numbers), SLBMs, even ADMs for tactical use b.Doctrine of countervalue retaliation is retained c.China seeks global NFU agreement and establishment of NWFZs

111 V. Conclusions: What determines doctrines? Applying Sagan’s theories to the evidence…

112 A. Evidence supporting realism 1.Every country changed doctrines in response to threats 2.Smaller countries adopted proportional deterrence or allied with larger power 3.US, China, USSR all adopted some version of flexible response as they reached MAD 4.Conventionally-superior forces (USSR and China) adopt NFU while others (US, UK, France) preserve right to strike first

113 B. Evidence for Strategic Culture 1.Chinese focus on “people’s war” delays tactical nuclear development 2.French nuclear program partly motivated by prestige concerns, critical to politicians across spectrum 3.USSR internal war plans “assume” capitalists attack first – triggering disproportionate response 4.USSR “dead hand” system assumes evil capitalists who will strike without warning

114 C. Evidence for Organizational Politics 1.French coup attempt triggers premature nuclear test by civilians 2.US labs find new nuclear threats after Cold War (see RNEP) 3.Russia adopts more offensive doctrine as military / security apparatus gains control (Putin) 4.US retains Triad after Cold War (follow-on imperative)


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