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Notes, ECON 4415, lecture 1: International trade institutions Focus: Theory + institutions Reference: Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) Some parts ”should be.

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Presentation on theme: "Notes, ECON 4415, lecture 1: International trade institutions Focus: Theory + institutions Reference: Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) Some parts ”should be."— Presentation transcript:

1 Notes, ECON 4415, lecture 1: International trade institutions Focus: Theory + institutions Reference: Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) Some parts ”should be known” Other parts: For your own interest Several internet sources Some relevant working paperswww.nupi.no

2 Important institutions The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Regional and bilateral trade agreements The OECD: For trade in services IMF and the World Bank: Developing countries, adjustment programmes UNCTAD: Opinion-shaping Aid agencies: Trade-related aid

3 Focus of lectures, institutional issues This lecture: Aspects of WTO Lecture 12: TRIPS Lecture 13: Regional trade blocs Lecture 14: Trade in services/GATS Lectures 10-11: Trade and growth, relevant for trade policy issues Various lectures: Welfare aspects

4 Is free trade good for development? Correlation between openness and growth Correlation between trade and growth But: Causality is complex Support for the ”free trade story”, but not yet fully conclusive Example: Growth in Europe and South East Asia

5 Should developing countries liberalise? New trade theory: More arguments for protection Market access abroad is always good Import protection may limit technology imports Scope for autonomous industrialisation limited under ”globalisation” Good reasons for gradual approach

6 Trade liberalisation is linked to other policies Institutions, macroeconomic policies Technological capacity, education Considerable evidence on ”threshold effects” Hence trade liberalisation is no simple cure Tariff revenues matter for poor countries But: Trade seems to be good…

7 WTO Result of ”Uruguay Round” From ”Umbrella” for three components:  GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  GATS – General Agreement on Trade in Services  TRIPS – Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Common system for Dispute Settlement Trade policy review mechanism ”Single undertaking”: Most agreements binding

8 GATT (1947..) ITO (International Trade Organization) 1948 – never came about (US opposition) GATT 1947 – provisional agreement Tariff reduction + parts of ITO Broader aspects (”UNCTAD-like” not included 1947: 23 members, one half developing

9 Negotiation rounds 5 rounds Kennedy Round : Part IV on development Tokyo Round (new agreements, development issues: ”enabling clause”) Uruguay Round (WTO, services, agriculture, TRIPS, disciplines) WTO (1995) = GATT + GATS + TRIPS ”Doha development agenda” 2001-? Seattle (1999), Doha (2001), Cancun (2003)

10 WTO: 148 members (Melchior 2003)

11 Implications of size Global organisation (ex. Russia etc.) Mainly based on consensus More complex negotiations Different interests, issue linkages ”Green room” vs. plenary sessions Difficult to create ”representative” bodies ”Give and take” vs. ”UNCTAD method”

12 Major principles of GATT/WTO Non-discrimination 1: The Most Favoured Nation principle Non-discrimination 2: National Treatment Transparency Forum for negotiations Reciprocity Member-driven organisation

13 Major exceptions to equal treatment in WTO Free trade agreements –Article XXIV of GATT, Article V of GATS Textile trade restrictions, MFA Trade preferences for developing countries National treatment: Negotiated in GATS Non-reciprocity for developing countries in negotiations Anti-dumping

14 Trade in goods: Major issues Tariff negotiations Anti-dumping and subsidies Technical barriers to trade –TBT: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade –SPS: Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Trade in textiles Trade in agriculture More, see Chapter 2 H&K

15 Tariffs, non-agriculture Gradually reduced through negotiating rounds GATT 1947 – around 40% Currently – 3-4% for industrial countries Still very important for developing countries Manufactures: More than 2/3 of DC exports

16 Too much liberalisation: Hardly the explanation of poverty? Tariffs on trade in goods after the Uruguay Round

17 Tariffs continued… Importing region High- income Developing Exporting region High- income Developing Source: Hertel and Martin (2000), see H&K p. 43.

18 Tariffs continued.. Developing countries have higher tariffs But: Industrial countries have higher tariffs for developing country products Example: Textiles ”Doha Round”: Formula approach + sectoral tariff elimination DCs: Reject binding sectoral liberalisation

19 Formulas ”Swiss formula”: t 1 =at 0 /(a+t 0 ) where t 0 is the original tariff Used in Tokyo Round Upper bound = a Current round: Modified formula, ”a” function of initial tariff level Proportional cuts in mean tariffs, higher (lower) cuts for tariffs above (below) mean

20 Tariffs versus income levels (Melchior 2003)

21 Implications Only weak correlation tariff/ income levels Great dispersion among poor countries Large gaps old vs. New members Bound tariffs much higher than applied Not a consistent system of non-reciprocity Problem: How to differentiate between developing countries

22 Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) Chapter 12, H&K 1960s: ”Part IV”, non-reciprocity, non- binding language 1960s: GSPs, colonial background 1971: Temporary ”waiver” from GSP Tokyo Round: Enabling clause – made waiver permanent

23 GSP Industrial countries: Tariff preferences for DCs EU, US: More differentiated approach EU: Lomé waiver expires, FTAs instead Norway: Extensive GSP for manufactured goods But: Tariff liberalisation eliminates effect

24 Problems with SDT GSP is non-binding The benefits of GSP are modest GSP makes DCs more protectionist? LDCs well-defined, DCs self-nominated Differentiation between DCs difficult Possible solution: More differentiation between DCs? ”GSP-like” measures in other areas? Binding rather than voluntary measures?

25 ”Anti-preferences”: The textile regime of the WTO Textiles: Still high tariffs MFA (textile quota regime): Network of bilateral quota agreements To be phased out by January 2005 Slow implementation, anger from developing countries Will quotas be replaced by other restraints? Other quotas: Eliminated in Uruguay Round

26 Example: Norway’s textile quotas Extremely protective around 1980, then gradually liberalised When quotas were lifted, the share of developing countries increased from 32 to 65% in 4 years (Melchior 1994) Big welfare loss due to quotas Free trade with Western Europe Today: Fully liberalised in Norway


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