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1 Brief PRP-PRF Recap CS255 Winter ‘06

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2 PRPs and PRFs PRF: F: K X Y such that: exists “efficient” algorithm to eval. F(k,x) PRP: E: K X X such that: 1. Exists “efficient” algorithm to eval. E(k,x) 2. The func E( k, ) is one-to-one 3. Exists “efficient” algorithm for inverse D(k,x)

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3 Secure PRF For b=0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as: Def: F is a secure PRF if for all “efficient” A: PRF Adv[A,F] = | Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is “negligible.” Chal. b Adv. b=0: k K, f F(k, ) b=1: f Funs[X,Y] x i X f(x i ) b’ {0,1}

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4 Secure PRP For b=0,1 define experiment EXP(b) as: Def: E is a secure PRP if for all “efficient” A: PRP Adv[A,E] = | Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is “negligible.” Chal. b Adv. b=0: k K, f E(k, ) b=1: f Perms[X] x i X f(x i ) b’ {0,1}

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5 PRF Switching Lemma Example PRPs: 3DES, AES, … –For AES: K = {0,1} 128, X = {0,1} 128 –AES PRP Assumption: All 2 80 –time algs A have PRP Adv[A, AES] < 2 -40 PRF Switching lemma: Any secure PRP is also a secure PRF. If E is a PRP over (K,X) then for any q-query adversary A: | PRF Adv[A,E] - PRP Adv[A,E] | < q 2 / 2|X|

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6 Using PRPs and PRFs Security always defined using two parameters: –What “power” does adversary have? examples: Adv sees only one ciphertext (i.e. one-time key) Adv sees many PT/CT pairs (CPA) –What “goal” is adversary trying to achieve? example: Semantic security: learn info about PT from CT. one-time key Many-time key (CPA) CCA Sem. Sec. Steam-ciphers Det. ctr-mode (rand) CBC (rand) ctr-mode Later Goal Power

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7 Semantic Security for one-time key E = (E,D) a cipher defined over (K,M,C) For b=0,1 define EXP(b) as: Def: E is sem. sec. for one-time key if for all “efficient” A: SS Adv[A, E ] = | Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is “negligible.” Chal. b Adv. kKkK m 0, m 1 M : |m 0 | = |m 1 | C E(k, m b ) b’ {0,1}

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8 Semantic security (cont.) Sem. sec. no “efficient” adversary learns info about PT from a single CT. Electronic Code Book (ECB): not sem. sec. for messages that contain more than one block. –To break ECB adversary uses: m 0 = “ Hello World ” m 1 = “ Hello Hello ” Two blocks

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9 Constructions Examples of sem. sec. systems: – SS Adv[A, OTP] = 0 for all A – Deterministic counter mode from a PRF F : E DETCTR (k,m) = Stream cipher built from PRF (e.g. AES, 3DES) m[0]m[1]… F(k,0)F(k,1)… m[L] F(k,L) c[0]c[1]…c[L]

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10 Det. ctr-mode security Theorem:For any L>0. If F is a secure PRF over (K,X,X) then E DETCTR is sem. sec. cipher over (K,X L,X L ). In particular, for any adversary A attacking E DETCTR there exists a PRF adversary B s.t.: SS Adv[A, E DETCTR ] = 2 PRF Adv[B, F] Hence: Since PRF Adv[B, F] is negligible (since F is a secure PRF) then SS Adv[A, E DETCTR ] must be negligible.

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11 Proof PRF Chal b SS Adv A (given)PRF Adv B (us) m 0, m 1 X L Choose f r {0,1} 0, 1, …, L f(0), f(1), …, f(L) c i m r [i] f(i) X (c 0, c 1, …, c L ) X L r’ {0,1} If r=r’ output 0, else output 1 b=1: f Funs[X,X] Pr[EXP(1)=0] = Pr[r=r’] = ½ b=0: f F(k, ) Pr[EXP(0)=0] = ½ ½ SS Adv[A, E DETCTR ] Hence, PRF Adv[F, B] = ½ SS Adv[A, EDETCTR]

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12 Semantic Security for many-time key E = (E,D) a cipher defined over (K,M,C) For b=0,1 define EXP(b) as: Def: E is sem. sec. under CPA if for all “efficient” A: SS CPA Adv[A, E ] = | Pr[EXP(0)=1] – Pr[EXP(1)=1] | is “negligible.” Chal. b Adv. kKkK m 0, m 1 M : |m 0 | = |m 1 | C E(k, m b ) b’ {0,1} x i M E(k,x i )

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13 Randomized Encryption Fact: stream ciphers are insecure under CPA. Fact: No deterministic encryption can be secure under CPA. If secret key is to be used multiple times encryption algorithm must be randomized !!

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14 Construction 1: CBC Cipher block chaining with a random IV. E(k, ) m[0]m[1]m[3]m[4]IV E(k, ) c[0]c[1]c[3]c[4]IV ciphertext

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15 CBC: CPA Analysis CBC Theorem: For any L>0, If F is a secure PRP over (K,X) then E CBC is a sem. sec. under CPA over (K, X L, X L+1 ). In particular, for a q-query adversary A attacking E CBC there exists a PRP adversary B s.t.: SS CPA Adv[A, E CBC ] 2 PRP Adv[B, F] + 2 q 2 L 2 / |X| Note: CBC is only secure as long as qL << |X| 1/2

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16 Construction 2: rand ctr-mode m[0]m[1]… F(k,IV)F(k,IV+1)… m[L] F(k,IV+L) c[0]c[1]…c[L] IV IV - Picked fresh at random for every encryption msg ciphertext

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17 rand ctr-mode: CPA analysis Randomized counter mode: random IV. Counter-mode Theorem: For any L>0, If F is a secure PRF over (K,X,X) then E CTR is a sem. sec. under CPA over (K,X L,X L+1 ). In particular, for a q-query adversary A attacking E CTR there exists a PRF adversary B s.t.: SS CPA Adv[A, E CTR ] 2 PRF Adv[B, F] + 2 q 2 L / |X| Note: ctr-mode only secure as long as q 2 L << |X| Better then CBC !

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