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Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology American Physical Society Dr. Daniel Gerstein Under Secretary (Acting) Science & Technology Directorate.

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Presentation on theme: "Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology American Physical Society Dr. Daniel Gerstein Under Secretary (Acting) Science & Technology Directorate."— Presentation transcript:

1 Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology American Physical Society Dr. Daniel Gerstein Under Secretary (Acting) Science & Technology Directorate November 3, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, November 2009 “The effective dissemination of a lethal biological agent within an unprotected population could place at risk the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The unmitigated consequences of such an event could overwhelm our public health capabilities, potentially causing an untold number of deaths. The economic cost could exceed one trillion dollars for each such incident.”

2 Dimensions of Emergencies 2 Low High Existential Low Psycho- Social Impact (Fear, Societal Cohesion, Survival) High Extreme Extent of Damage (Life, Property, Economic) SLTT Response Federal Lead Disasters (big emergency) Catastrophes (really big emergency) 1 State threatening (ability of government to function/survive in doubt) 2001 Anthrax 9/11 Katrina * * Spanish Flu * * 2009 Flu Pandemic Chernobyl * Haitian Earthquake * 2003 SARS * Japanese Earthquake & Tsunami * Cyber Dimensions of Possible Future Emergencies Minor Emergencies * * 2001 UK Foot & Mouth Disease Outbreak * 1995 Aum Shinrikyo

3 Aerosol Release2001 Anthrax Attacks 1 gmvia letters1-2 kgvia cropduster Biological Weapons Present Diverse Risks 3

4 Nature of the Biological Threat 4 4 Historical Perspective Biotech & Dual Use Concern Likelihood of Event BWC EIF Rajneeshee Attack Aum Shinrikyo Inspire Magazine Advanced Manufacturing Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Human Genome Project Amerithrax Attack First Synthetic Cell Recombinant DNA Gene Modification Open-Source Biosynthetics Poliovirus Synthesized Synthetic Pathogens Selective DNA Isolation H5N1 Articles UK FMD Outbreak SARS H1N1 Pandemic Zaire ebolavirus (ZEBOV) West Nile Virus in USA Insider Threat E. Coli (Germany) State –like capabilities in hands of non-state actors Sverdlovsk Anthrax Release “Proliferation” of BSL-3+ labs DIY Bio State-Sponsored BW Programs State BW Use Accident, Misuse or Bioterror Naturally Occurring (perhaps Black Swan) Biological Event Future Rapid naturally occurring disease spread Role of Bioinformatics H7N9 MERS-CoV

5 Examining the Potential for Bioterror Years -10 Years Today + 10 Years +20 Years +30 Years Why did the Rajneeshes fail? Why did Aum Shinrikyo fail? What did we learn from the Anthrax attacks? P Viable Attack 1.0 P Viable Attack = f {Capabilities, Intent, Knowledge} What does this tell us about the potential for a bioterror attack in the future? Project Bacchus Dr. Eckert Wimmer Dr. Mark Butler Dr. Steven Kurtz Amerithrax Project Bacchus Dr. Eckert Wimmer Dr. Mark Butler Dr. Steven Kurtz Amerithrax 77 BW events in over 100 years Dr. Jerzy Mierzejewski Dr. William Patrick task 77 BW events in over 100 years Dr. Jerzy Mierzejewski Dr. William Patrick task (-) (+)

6 Agriculture Threat Space  Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs) are endemic, spreading, and emerging globally on six continents  FADs could be easily introduced intentionally (agroterrorism) or accidentally (food imports, foreign travelers)  FMD is widely considered to be the number one agricultural threat to the US  An “across the nation” outbreak of a FAD like foot-and-mouth disease could result in losses of up to $60 billion (USDA, 2005) resulting from control measures and protective embargoes 6 Foot and Mouth Disease

7  Massively lethal, proven to work – with 1960s technology  Essential materials, know-how cheap, widely available, dual-use: hard to track, easily hidden  Attribution issue – Difficult for states to respond to attacks  Reload potential: self-replicating organisms; risk multiple attacks  Mitigation requires specific countermeasures quickly and in quantity  Contagious disease introduces new dynamic  Potency, diversity, and accessibility of biothreats will increase as bioscience advances Bioweapons are a Strategic Threat 7 State-like capabilities in the hands of small groups and individuals …

8 U.S. Government & DHS Biodefense Programs 8 One Health BSAT Regulations Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) Export Controls Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Engagement (State & Defense) Biorisk Management: Biosafety, Biosecurity, Bioethics BWC WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) UNSCR 1540 Australia Group Bilateral arrangements Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Biological Threat Spectrum Natural Disease Outbreak Unintended Consequences Accidents Negligence Vandalism, Sabotage Deliberate Use of BW Biodefense issues are:  International & Interagency  Complex & Multidisciplinary  Inherently dual use FAO & OIE

9 PPD-8 National Preparedness System: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery DHS Interest in Countering WMD 9 Laws & Treaties UNSCR 1540 NPT Other International INTERPOL Australia Group Coalition of the Willing Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) U.S. Initiatives Export Control & Border Security (EXBS) Counter Terrorism (CT) Layered defense Shared Outcomes Build Partner Capacity Catch Cheaters Deterrence Goals WHO International Health Regulations Wassenar Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) BWC & CWC HSPD-10 Biodefense GNDA “Beyond the Border” DHS Initiatives Bilateral arrangements SAFE Port Act

10 Department of Homeland Security 10 The Department  Organizations: 22 to 1 …  Personnel: DHS = ~230K; HSE = ~3.5M  Culture of law enforcement  Coordination vs. direction  Department of Homeland Security  First Responders across U.S.  Critical Infrastructure Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) Federal State Local Tribal Territorial International … the 16 critical infrastructure sectors

11  One of 10 DHS Components  Provides key technical & analytical capacity for DHS  Supports DHS, Component and HSE requirements with innovation  Operationally focused  S&T statistics:  ~1.2% of DHS Budget  ~1,100 personnel  Federal, contractor, IPAs  Highly technical staff  Six primary commodity areas  First responders, borders & maritime, cyber, chem-bio defense, explosives, resilience  Highly collaborative  Components & HSE  State & Local  Interagency & International  Industry & Private sector  Laboratories  5 Internal Labs  Explosives, biodefense, chemical, urban environment  Adding new agricultural biodefense lab  Responsible for usage of DOE Labs & FFRDCs S&T At A Glance DHS S&T Mission: Strengthen America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) 11

12 Systems Analysis – Biodefense ExampleDeliverables Maximizing Operational & Technology Returns in Challenging Fiscal Times 12 What is a comprehensive biodefense strategy? How does the Department of Homeland Security fit into the national biodefense architecture? What are the seams and gaps in the architecture? Identify Threats, Risks & Opportunities. Develop Objectives & Priorities Fill Requirements & Gaps S&T’s Value Added PropositionFrom R&D to r&D A B  Operationally focused … focused technology options & operational process enhancements  Innovative … develop innovative, systems- based solutions to complex homeland security problems  Building Partnerships … technical depth and reach to leverage technology solutions from federal, state, local and tribal governments, universities, and the private sector - across the US and internationally

13 DHS Biodefense: Strategy to Capability 13 Strategic Guidance Operational Directives Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-10 Requirements HSPD-18 Medical Counter- Measures Against WMD (2007) PPD-8 National Preparedness (2011) PPD-2 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (2009) HSPD-9 Defense of U.S. Agriculture & Food (2004) HSPD-10 Biodefense for the 21st Century (2004) Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery Biological Select Agent & Toxin Executive Order (2010) DHS Concerns Knowledge Management Threat Characterization Detection & Surveillance Forensics & Attribution Response & Recovery Bioterrorism Foreign Animal Disease Food Contamination Emerging Infectious Disease Interagency & International Collaboration Homeland Security Act 2002 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (2010) Countering Biological Threats (2009) U.S. Federal Law Natural Disease Outbreak Unintended Consequences Accidents Negligence Vandalism, Sabotage Deliberate Use of BW Biological Threat Spectrum

14 HSPD 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century DHS Efforts 14  Biological Threat Characterization  Material threat assessments  Lab studies  Bio-Defense Knowledge Center  Risk Assessments Threat Awareness Prevention & Protection  Dual-Use Research of Concern  Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) vaccine  Protocols and Standards  Compliance Assurance Program Office  Promoting international standards for BSAT and BWC compliance  White Powder Sampling  BioAssays & biological materials repository  Next Gen Bio Detection  Detect-to-Protect for high value assets  Rapid Biodetection  Environmental sampling  National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) Surveillance & Detection Response & Recovery  Operational Tools for remediation & decontamination  Bioforensic Research and Development  Systems Approaches for developing guidance  Underground Transport Restoration  Anthrax reaerosolization to examine the properties of dry powder anthrax to determine guidance, countermeasures and decontamination strategies

15 Risk Assessment Technical Approach  Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Methodology  Consistent method for aggregating risk from a large set of scenarios with consideration of uncertainty  Useful for comparing risks against one another in a manner that captures uncertainty  Provides decision-makers with the opportunity to ask the ‘what-if’ questions. Can consider relative value of potential risk mitigation strategies Consequences are the expected public health and economic impacts of an attack Risk is a function of likelihood and consequences. Terrorism risk assessments are ‘end-to-end,’ integrating likelihood and consequences of terrorism events Likelihood is the probability that an adversary acquires, produces, and disseminates a weapon [Risk] = [Likelihood] X [Consequences] 15

16 Enhanced Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Process Intelligence and Scientific Communities expert elicitation Validate Input Data Use Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methodology to explore risk space Identify and validate key scenarios within the risk space Range of outcomes by agent, scenario, etc. Scenario of interest 4 Validate Results 5 Conduct sensitivity analysis – also provide to key external audiences for use in conducting further analysis 6 7  Publication of risk assessment document and briefing of results  Use of the Bioterror Risk Assessment for Interagency and DHS operational planning and resource prioritization 16

17 Complicating Factor #1: Dealing with the Number & Diversity of Key Actors 17 Must develop common understanding of the threat, lexicon, plans, procedures, communications, etc. 17 Non-state Actors Department of Justice Department of Homeland Security Private Industry Department of Defense First Responders Academia? Others? International

18 Complicating Factor #2: Requires a Systemic Approach to the Issue 18 Zone 2: Finding & Securing Materials In Transit  INTERPOL  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  International Agreements  Port & Maritime Security  INTERPOL  Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)  International Agreements  Port & Maritime Security Zone 3: Finding & Securing It in the Homeland  Federal, State, Local assets  Border Security  Port Security  US Coast Guard  Others … Zone 1: Securing WMD Material at the Source Left of loss: “Is everything where it should be?”  Personnel Reliability  Access Controls  Inventory Management  Detection, Alarms  Physical Protection  Emergency Response  Personnel Reliability  Access Controls  Inventory Management  Detection, Alarms  Physical Protection  Emergency Response Towards a layered defense …

19 Complicating Factor #3: Need to Maximize Outcomes 19

20 DHS S&T Contributions to Biodefense International & Academic S&T Labs Successes (Examples) Chem-Bio Division …Save lives & protect Nation’s infrastructure against chemical, biological & agricultural threats & disasters.  DOE National Labs  Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)  Department of Agriculture  Others … Interagency  Foot & Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine  Rapid point of care diagnostics  Medical Countermeasures Development (MCM) support  “White Powder” standard  Assay development standards  Threat characterization studies  Bioterror Risk Assessment (BTRA)  Bioforensics 20 Areas of Concern (Examples) Agricultural Vaccines International BSAT Standards Resilience Communication Crisis Management Local Response Capability Forecasting Future Threats Public Biothreat Education Supply Chain Security Int’l/Domestic Response Training Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) Decon of CI/KR (Ag & Bio)

21  All response is local! Feds will not arrive immediately and state and locals will be overwhelmed  US health care system and 90% of critical infrastructure is in private hands  What is appropriate investment in preparation for routine hazards vs. high consequence events of indeterminate probability?  How can we educate and train responders and the public for rare events?  How can we collaborate internationally more effectively? Reality Check 21


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