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Army Transformation A Full Spectrum Force

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1 Army Transformation A Full Spectrum Force
10/06/99 DAMO-FD “Soldiers On Point for the Nation” Army Transformation A Full Spectrum Force Information Briefing Copy __ of __ Copies

2 Purpose Agenda To outline the transformation strategy Why change
This briefing provides information on the Army’s transformation from it’s current force (equipment, structure, doctrine, etc.) to a new, lighter, more lethal, full spectrum capable force. Specific points contained in the briefing : How the Army has changed since Desert Storm, and why those changes, even though needed and accomplished, are not enough to ensure the Army remains a force fully responsive to the National Security Strategy. Articulates key aspects of the Army Vision. Details the strategy to transition the Army, as well as information on budgetary and operational impacts. Agenda Why change Army Vision Transformation Strategy

3 The Environment Has Changed
WMD Use on Homeland More Nuclear States Major Competitor Information Warfare Asymmetric Warfare Disintegrated Transnational Dangers WMD Proliferation ? Rogue Past: Cold War Focused on Europe Near-term ( ) the United States does not expect to confront a major competitor. Threats emerge from regional instability and conflicts emerging from the fragmentation of states. Potential regional competitors will field industrial age forces with a relatively limited proliferation of advanced military technologies. Asymmetric threats will emerge but those threats will remain largely limited to traditional concepts and techniques including WMD, missiles, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. Mid-term ( ) global competitor may emerge . Advanced military technologies will be more destructive and more difficult to discern from commercial technologies. Regional threats will continue to consist primarily of industrial age forces but with some highly evolved capabilities derived from the proliferation of advanced technologies. Some expansion of asymmetric concepts and doctrine to include the employment of yet unforeseen esoteric techniques, which may exploit social, cultural, and environmental change, e.g. urbanization. The proliferation of information technologies will also provide the catalyst for limited information warfare capabilities that can be used for coherent, operational purposes. Far-term ( ) emergence of a major military competitor with advanced, post-industrial age forces. Still unlikely to challenge the U.S. military symmetrically but will attempt to develop asymmetric challenge. Regional competitors will have gained some post-industrial age capabilities in addition to their traditional forces. This era will also see the development of advanced asymmetrical capabilities and significantly more sophisticated information warfare capabilities. Near-term: No major competitor Asymmetric threats will develop Regional Competitor Information Warfare Asymmetric Warfare WMD Proliferation Rogue States Transnational Dangers Threat to U.S. Homeland Proliferation of Advanced Technologies Key Uncertainties-- Russia & China Mid-term: Competitor may emerge Asymmetric threat expands Far-term: Major military competitor emerges Advanced asymmetrical capabilities

4 The Army Has Changed…. …So We Must Do More
We have maintained our ability to win the Theater Wars… We Have Changed… The changes to the Army since Desert Storm should not go unrecognized. We are currently implementing a change in the heavy division structure that reduces it’s size by almost 20%. These changes reduce significantly the deployment requirements for these forces, as well as the in theater logistical support. We have taken steps to improve the lethality of lighter forces. We have fielded night vision devices, modular weapons, Javelin Anti-Tank missiles, and C2 improvements. We treat the soldier as a system and develop and distribute equipment keenly aware of the synergism (both positive and negative) of these developments. Last year we conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of our light force modernization strategy and made adjustments. We have fielded brigade sets of equipment at potential hot spots as well as afloat. This effort has greatly reduced the time required to get heavy forces into theater. LTG Kern has remarked that it took brigades in the 24th ID 60 days to deploy from FT Stewart to Kuwait in support of Desert Storm, we have done that 6 times, deploying brigade in less than 6 days. But the changes we made aren’t enough. It will take us >15 years to modernize the AC, and full RC modernization is unfunded. The deployment improvements are mostly in support of MTW’s, and movement of forces with mobility, lethality and survivability to SASO’s is slower than we would like. Modernization effort is hampered by huge recapitalization bill…a bill that grows as the equipment ages. Changed Heavy Division design -reduced 3.5 divisions Fielded 7+ brigade sets of Prepo (APS) Embedding digitization in our equipment Develop light force modernization plan But it isn’t enough to meet contingency requirements ... Our equipment must be more deployable Modernization programs stretched Recapitalization cost unfinanced …So We Must Do More

5 The Army Vision A vision points direction, provides focus and promotes change It enables strategic alignment, synchronization and synergy Provides the fundamental basis for strategic thinking, planning and programming Provides a context for decision and guidance for RDA, resource allocation and organizational development Intent Increase strategic responsiveness Improve operational jointness Develop leaders for war fighting as well as change Complete full AC\RC integration Man war fighting units Soldiers/civilian/family member well being “...light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.” “Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint…” “When we deploy, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight.”

6 MOD Task Force Process Dep Chief of Staff for Intel Threat Briefing
Briefed to: Senior Army Planning Group 4 Star Conference Army Commanders Conference 2 Star Forum Office Secretary of Defense Dep Chief of Staff for Intel Threat Briefing Began with June with issue of CSA vision Systematic evaluation of requirements, goals and opportunities for change Every modernization program was evaluated based upon: Capability required by TAP CSA’a intent Army’s vision Programs with high pay off were recommended for acceleration Programs with acceptable alternatives or risk were nominated for cancellation based upon affordability. Although cancelled the operational requirement for every one of these programs remains. Working Integrated Product Team Analysis The Army Plan - capability to system crosswalk System Analysis Recommendations Overarching Integrated Product Team Analysis Operational Feasibility Technological Feasibility Quantitative/Qualitative analysis Impact Analysis Operational Political Industrial Base Other Acceleration Package Restructure Package Draft Program Budget Decision

7 Strategic Responsiveness Goals
1 Brigade Hours 1 Division Hours 5 Divisions Days Improving Strategic Responsiveness. CAA conducted an additional analysis of the actual deployment for Task Force Hawk utilizing the proposed courses of action. This analysis demonstrated the significant differences in deployability to a SSC of these options. This analysis indicated: Heavy brigades (Bde XXI) does not improve deployability of the force over that of Task Force Hawk’s. Medium brigades provide significant improvement over current performance. The CSA’s goal of placing a force anywhere in the world within 96 hours can be achieved with a medium force, given no significant restriction in Maximum on Ground (MOG).

8 Modernization Strategy
Maintain the Army’s ability to do anything the American people ask of us while improving our capability to do it better, faster and more cheaply than any other option available. Retain the capability to win two near-simultaneous theater wars by maintaining critical combat overmatch in legacy systems. Transform the Army from its current Cold War organization and equipment into a force that better utilizes its full spectrum capabilities in a more strategically deployable force. Organize this force around a common unit design and common family of combat systems that is C130 deployable. Develop the objective system that is both deployable and enjoys the combat overmatch and survivability of the combat systems of today. This transformation process will begin immediately! Investments in today’s technology allow us to form surrogate units to stimulate doctrine development, organization design, and leadership training. Ultimately, heavy and light forces will converge on similar capability in a family of systems on a common platform. When technology permits, transformation to an all wheeled force will erase the line between light and heavy units. Throughout the process, transformation actions will retain today’s light force deployability while providing it the lethality and mobility for decisive outcomes our heavy forces currently enjoy. Continued upgrades and selective new procurement will retain heavy force lethality through overmatch while transitioning its deployability to that of the light forces. Refocused research, development, and acquisition support this transformation with the ultimate goal of producing a family of combat systems that are C130 deployable yet capable of fighting and surviving like the combat systems of today. This ultimate goal will allow us to significantly lighten the force without compromising combat capability. As an interim measure, creation of a new, medium type unit that is strategically deployable yet capable of sustained combat upon arrival in the theater of operations will begin the transformation. Organizational redesign and equipment enhancement will improve the lethality of light and early entry forces.

9 IBCT Operational Concept
Full spectrum Rapidly deployable Combat capable on arrival Maintains freedom of maneuver Decisive action from deliberate maneuver & dismounted Infantry assault Operational mobility via C-130 Internetted combined arms Complex and urban terrain Increased deployability and decreased sustainment footprint Reach back Operates under a Division, Corps or ARFOR HQ The initial Brigade is a full spectrum, combat force. It is a divisional brigade . Its two core qualities are high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through dismounted Infantry assault. The major fighting components are its motorized infantry battalions. The brigade has a unique Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron to enhance situational awareness.

10 Interim Brigade Combat Team
DIV/CORPS AUGMENTATION C4ISR CA SPT HUMINT A L/M Rocket/Cannon MP O O O HHC The new Brigade will be full Spectrum Capable It will be rapidly deployable (anywhere in the world 96 hours from notification) It maintains a freedom of maneuver through high tactical mobility and situational understanding It is capable of combat upon its arrival in combat C130 deployable It is effective in complex urban terrain Common platform increases deployability and decreases sustainment footprint Requires reach back for Joint effects and C4ISR It operates under a Division, Corps or R4 Headquarters BSB O O O O O O O O O O O O MI O O O SIG

Full Spectrum Capable : Responsive and dominant at every point on the operations spectrum Structure flexible organizational structure enables us to generate formations capable of succeeding at any point on this spectrum and provides the nation an array of forces that are versatile, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable, equipped and trained for effectiveness in any mission tasked to the Army. Strategic Responsiveness: Strategic responsiveness is achieved through the combination of forward deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement and force projection. In addition to organizational changes we will aggressively reduce our deployed logistics footprint. Near term actions focus on accelerating key systems that enable strategic depolyability. These systems will enhance logistics C2 necessary to achieve just-in time logistics. This provides dual benefit of enhancing strategic deployability through reducing the amount of equipment to be moved and reducing the logistical footprint by reducing the amount of material in theater. Focused RDA: Focused and consistent investments that exploit technological development to provide the most critical desired capabilities within the required timeframe to ensure a technological superior force over all potential adversaries. MODERNIZATION GOALS Full Spectrum Capable Force Light forces more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile Early entry forces capable of decisive combat operations Strategic Responsiveness Make heavy forces more deployable Reduce deployed logistics footprint Focused Research Development and Acquisition Science and Technology Critical recapitalization

12 Light, Lethal Initiatives
“...light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.” Budget Estimate Submission - BES 01-05 Recommended initiatives to make the light force more lethal, survivable, and mobile consist of: Continue the TOW Fire and Forget program initiated in the FY01 budget. Accelerate HIMARS from one battery in FY05 to 2 battalions. The system will be fielded in the light Corps Artillery units of the AC and the NG. Accelerate LW155 from an FUE of FY05 to FY03. This completes the buy in FY06. The system will be fielded in the light Corps Artillery units of the AC and the NG. Accelerate LOSAT from one battalion in FY06 to a FUE of FY04 with 2 battalions equipped by FY06. In POM02, examine Land Warrior for possible buyback. The program was decremented in the FY01 budget build due to technological problems. If these problems are resolved, restore the program. In POM02, accelerate TUAV. The program is currently in competition. Once a contractor is selected, acceleration can be determined. Fire & Forget Anti-Tank missile Initiate Program Accelerate High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 2 Battalions by FY05 Accelerate Light Weight 155MM Howitzer 2 years to FY 03 Line Of Sight Anti-Tank buy Adds Battalions in FY04/FY06 Program Objective Memorandum - POM 02-07 Land Warrior Buyback Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Acceleration

13 Strategic Responsiveness
“Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint…” Budget Estimate Submission - BES 01 Logistics Command and Control (C2) Accelerate programs Global Combat Support System - Army Combat Service Support Control System Movement Tracking System Transportation Coord Auto Info for Movement II Deployability Interim Brigades Recommended initiatives to make the heavy forces more responsive consist primarily of logistics C2 systems. The OIPT recommends accelerating the procurement of GCSS-A, CSSCS, MTS, TC AIMS II. In POM02, if feasible, accelerate the Joint Modular Lighter System to provide for enhanced JLOTS. Program Objective Memorandum - POM 02-07 Joint Modular Lighter System Initiates procurement Aerocraft Science & Technology Joint Transport Rotorcraft Science & Technology

14 Recapitalization Initiatives BES 01-05
“When we deploy, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight.” Recapitalization recommendations are shown on this chart. All of these will extend the service life of critical equipment while reducing O&S costs. The Apache recommendation is under study at TRADOC with a recommendation forthcoming. Vehicles What Recapitalization Accomplishes Abrams: New engine. Corrects obsolescence problem with M1A1/ vehicle overhaul/service life extension - near zero time AH-64 Apache Longbow: A to D Model SLEP addressing air worthiness & common configuration CH-47Chinook: New Engines, remanufactured fuselage, digital cockpit UH-60 Black Hawk: Upgrade A to L(+) configuration: replace engine and drive-train, digitize cockpit, new wide chord blade, advanced flight control computer, cockpit airbag system, engine and IPU particle separators, and advanced fuel cell HEMTT: New EPA engine, Anti Lock Brake System, lube for life components and LED lights Hercules: New engine, improved transmission & brakes, improved boom & wench Tank improvement Restore Apache Accelerate CH47F Accelerate UH60L+ Accelerate HEMTT Extended Service Program Restore Hercules program

15 Proposed Divestitures
Base Kills MLRS Smart Tactical Rocket (MSTAR) Stinger Block II Command & Control Vehicle (C2V) Army Tactical Missile System Block IIA Heliborne Prophet (Air) * Wolverine (Bridger System) * Grizzly (Breacher System) Restructure Future Scout & Cavalry System (becomes an ATD w/UK) Crusader (40 tons from 55 tons & reduce the buy qty ) Recommended divestitures or restructure actions were developed based on assessment of operational and programmatic risks; and identifiable redundant or similar capability, in either the Army or through joint systems. MSTAR: ATACMS BLK II/BAT or attack aviation mitigates risk. Stinger BLK II: BLK I is an acceptable alternative. Saves ~$1B. MEADs partially mitigates. C2V: Not C-130 deployable; currently only programmed for one corps cannot conduct C2 on the move. ATACMS BLK IIA: Other Army systems have similar capability (at reduced range) or similar range (with less capability). Joint Systems have similar ranges and capability but may be limited by weather and responsiveness. Prophet (AIR): Alternatives exist (EP-3, RC-135m, U2, ARL). Can best be used with TUAV. FSCS: System on partially consistent with transformation effort. New start, limited cost. Crusader: See slides * Kill Per OSD

16 Modernization Transformation Strategy
This transformation is supported by, the ongoing digitization effort. Situational awareness will be critical to this force and the interim brigades will ultimately have that capability. However, for a number of reasons continuing with our current digitization plan enhances overll army operational capability and reduces or mitigates risk. The initial and interim brigades will trade some operational capability for increased strategic mobility. Technology available in the near to mid term (now to ~2010) will not allow the medium brigade to have capabilities throughout the spectrum equal to today's heavy brigade. Therefore we will retain 2 AC Corps, equipped with improved versions of Abrams, Bradley's, etc. to ensure our capability in MTWs, until the FCS is fielded. No decision has been made, or discussed as to what vehicle will be selected for MAV. That process is ongoing. In conjunction with our determination to retain III and XVIII Corps as a strategic hedge until later in the transition, the schedule beyond the initial brigade transition is still being coordinated. Digitization priority unchanged Retain III Corps as counterattack Corps and XVIII Corps as contingency Corps Interim vehicles…no predecisions, full and open competition Determine sequence for transformation of other units

17 Summary The Army will become Full Spectrum… Common Chassis… Common Organizations… meeting the National Security requirements of the future A phased approach coupled with a sound investment strategy will facilitate transformation We have a vision. We have a plan and program to get there. The Army is working hard to resource our own bills as they relate to the transformation. We need support beyond internal resources.


19 Senior Army Planning Group
Organization SA/CSA Organization Modernization is one of four task forces chartered by VCSA, and working closely with SAPG and Vision TF FD covers other three with FDF and Dir, Force Programs on the manning TF, FDL on LOGTF and the Deputy on the SVCC and HQ Redesign DAMO-SS stays plugged into the Mod TF to keep SVCC and Mod synchronized USA/VCSA Reduce Footprint Logistics Task Force Senior Army Planning Group HQ Army Redesign Task Force Optimize Efficiency Vision Manning Task Force Modernization Task Force Full Spectrum Capability Man the Force

20 Achieving A Full Spectrum Force
Full Spectrum Capability Achieving Full Spectrum Capable Force The spectrum of operations describes a need for land forces for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theaters of war. Responsive and dominant at every point on the operations spectrum Structure flexible organizational structure enables us to generate formations capable of succeeding at any point on this spectrum and provides the nation an array of forces that are versatile, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable, equipped and trained for effectiveness in any mission tasked to the Army. Deployability Lethality Objective Capability Heavy Force Light Force Required Capability

21 Future Combat System Development
Lethality Robotics Mobility Survivability Hybrid Electric Sensors Human Engineering C4ISR Leap-Ahead Technologies FUE We are already on the path to Future Combat Systems development MS1 decision point in FY 03 is critical for FY 12 FUE Technology derivation from current and future systems is already under development should impact time required and cost LRIP EMD ATD MS I FY01-05 50/50 Cost Share DARPA/Army 3 Demo 2 Contractors Mobility Demo Virtual Prototype Path to Revolutionary FCS 1 Decision Events 1. Launch Revolutionary Program with DARPA 2. Pursue Feasible & Affordable Approach 3. Meet Milestone I Requirements Design Concepts 3-4 Contractors System Trade Studies 2

22 Interim Brigades Milestones
Event 03 Nov 99 01 Dec 99 31 Dec 99 09 Jan 00 31 Jan 00 15 Feb 00 10 Mar 00 24 Mar 00 30 May 00 30 Jun 00 4th QTR 00 Commerce Business Daily Announcement Industry Day Issue Draft Request For Proposal (RFP) Begin Platform Performance Demonstration (Ft. Knox) Submit White Papers Operational Requirement Document to HQDA 2nd Draft RFP for Coordination Issue Formal RFP Receive Proposals Down Select Award Contract(s)* * Subject to New Start Authority & Availability of Funds

23 IBCT Brigade Signal Company
1/0/7/8 BDE HQ Brigade Headquarters 3rd Brigade, 2nd Inf Div S6/G6 Proposal FDU 99-2 1/1/3/5 +68 No DIV SIG BN Assets at Ft Lewis Enhanced Signal Equip in O&O plan Legacy systems will not support Brigade O&O Concept COHORT resourcing concept (modified) I ~80 HQ Transmission Switching Network Mgmt S6 CMD PLT HQ PLT HQ TACSAT Tactical Comms WIN POC Switch Electronic Maint 37

24 Restructuring Crusader
Reduce weight to 40 tons or less (vice 55T) Reduce 8-12 rounds (2.3T)…Minimal operational impact Common engine with proposed tank engine Reduce armor protection (3.7T)…Minimal impact 7th road wheel, different track and suspension (2T)…2nd order effect of reduced weight Structural changes (3T)…2nd order effect from reduced weight Reducing one projectile magazine will enable us to reduce the size and corresponding weight (2.3 tons) of the vehicle. The estimated range of projectile reduction is rounds. This reduction, validated through analysis will have minimal operational impact. Changing our automotive approach from a diesel engine to a lightweight turbine engine will further reduce the weight by 3 tons. This new approach is envisioned to be a joint effort with the M1A2 SEP Program that will reduce overall life-cycle costs for each program. “Kitting” survivability packages (Non Ballistic Protection and Top Attack Armor) will enable us to reduce 3.2 tons. These survivability packages will be “kitted” on the vehicle depending on the threat and will be shipped separately into theater based on METT-T. The reduced size of the vehicle from the changes above will allow us to eliminate one road wheel and utilize different/smaller track and suspension. This will reduce the weight by 2 tons. With the reduced size and weight of the vehicle, we will be able to optimize the overall structure of the vehicle that will reduce the weight by 3 tons. Crusader Program has been executing an aggressive weight reduction program for several years. All design decision to date factor in weight, cost, and performance in order to achieve an optimal design solution for the system. The program will continue to leverage past weight reduction efforts to achieve out weight reduction goals

25 Crusader Decreased Quantity
Reduce total buy to approximately 450 One Corps (three divisions, Armored Cavalry Regiment) plus 6 Field Artillery brigades (317) Log, training base, National Training Center (130) Reduce resupply vehicle basis of issue Change from 1 per howitzer to no more than 1 per 2 howitzers Coupled with howitzer reduction reduces from 1124 to approx 250 Maintains the indirect fire requirements for III Corps; which serves as strategic hedge during transition Resupply vehicle changes accomplished with minimal system capability degradation.

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