Presentation on theme: "Army Transformation A Full Spectrum Force"— Presentation transcript:
1Army Transformation A Full Spectrum Force 10/06/99DAMO-FD“Soldiers On Point for the Nation”Army Transformation A Full Spectrum ForceInformation BriefingCopy __ of __ Copies
2Purpose Agenda To outline the transformation strategy Why change This briefing provides information on the Army’s transformation from it’s current force (equipment, structure, doctrine, etc.) to a new, lighter, more lethal, full spectrum capable force. Specific points contained in the briefing :How the Army has changed since Desert Storm, and why those changes, even though needed and accomplished, are not enough to ensure the Army remains a force fully responsive to the National Security Strategy.Articulates key aspects of the Army Vision.Details the strategy to transition the Army, as well as information on budgetary and operational impacts.AgendaWhy changeArmy VisionTransformation Strategy
3The Environment Has Changed WMD Useon HomelandMore NuclearStatesMajorCompetitorInformationWarfareAsymmetric WarfareDisintegratedTransnationalDangersWMDProliferation?RoguePast:Cold WarFocused on EuropeNear-term ( ) the United States does not expect to confront a major competitor.Threats emerge from regional instability and conflicts emerging from the fragmentation of states.Potential regional competitors will field industrial age forces with a relatively limitedproliferation of advanced military technologies. Asymmetric threats will emerge but thosethreats will remain largely limited to traditional concepts and techniques including WMD,missiles, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism.Mid-term ( ) global competitor may emerge . Advanced military technologies will be more destructive and more difficult to discern from commercial technologies. Regional threats will continue to consist primarily of industrial age forces but with some highly evolved capabilities derived from the proliferation of advanced technologies. Some expansion of asymmetric concepts and doctrine to include the employment of yet unforeseen esoteric techniques, which may exploit social, cultural, and environmental change, e.g. urbanization. The proliferation of information technologies will also provide the catalyst for limited information warfare capabilities that can be used for coherent, operational purposes.Far-term ( ) emergence of a major military competitor with advanced, post-industrial age forces. Still unlikely to challenge the U.S. military symmetrically but will attempt to develop asymmetric challenge. Regional competitors will have gained some post-industrial age capabilities in addition to their traditional forces. This era will also see the development of advanced asymmetrical capabilities and significantly more sophisticated information warfare capabilities.Near-term:No major competitorAsymmetric threats will developRegionalCompetitorInformationWarfareAsymmetric WarfareWMDProliferationRogueStatesTransnationalDangersThreat to U.S.HomelandProliferation ofAdvancedTechnologiesKey Uncertainties--Russia & ChinaMid-term:Competitor may emergeAsymmetric threat expandsFar-term:Major military competitor emergesAdvanced asymmetrical capabilities
4The Army Has Changed…. …So We Must Do More We have maintained our ability to win the Theater Wars…We Have Changed…The changes to the Army since Desert Storm should not go unrecognized.We are currently implementing a change in the heavy division structure that reduces it’s size by almost 20%. These changes reduce significantly the deployment requirements for these forces, as well as the in theater logistical support.We have taken steps to improve the lethality of lighter forces. We have fielded night vision devices, modular weapons, Javelin Anti-Tank missiles, and C2 improvements. We treat the soldier as a system and develop and distribute equipment keenly aware of the synergism (both positive and negative) of these developments. Last year we conducted a comprehensive review and analysis of our light force modernization strategy and made adjustments.We have fielded brigade sets of equipment at potential hot spots as well as afloat. This effort has greatly reduced the time required to get heavy forces into theater. LTG Kern has remarked that it took brigades in the 24th ID 60 days to deploy from FT Stewart to Kuwait in support of Desert Storm, we have done that 6 times, deploying brigade in less than 6 days.But the changes we made aren’t enough.It will take us >15 years to modernize the AC, and full RC modernization is unfunded.The deployment improvements are mostly in support of MTW’s, and movement of forces with mobility, lethality and survivability to SASO’s is slower than we would like.Modernization effort is hampered by huge recapitalization bill…a bill that grows as the equipment ages.Changed Heavy Division design-reduced 3.5 divisionsFielded 7+ brigade sets of Prepo (APS)Embedding digitization in our equipmentDevelop light force modernization planBut it isn’t enough to meet contingency requirements ...Our equipment must be more deployableModernization programs stretchedRecapitalization cost unfinanced…So We Must Do More
5The Army VisionA vision points direction, provides focus and promotes changeIt enables strategic alignment, synchronization and synergyProvides the fundamental basis for strategic thinking, planning and programmingProvides a context for decision and guidance for RDA, resource allocation and organizational developmentIntentIncrease strategic responsivenessImprove operational jointnessDevelop leaders for war fighting as well as changeComplete full AC\RC integrationMan war fighting unitsSoldiers/civilian/family member well being“...light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.”“Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint…”“When we deploy, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight.”
6MOD Task Force Process Dep Chief of Staff for Intel Threat Briefing Briefed to:Senior Army Planning Group4 Star ConferenceArmy Commanders Conference2 Star ForumOffice Secretary of DefenseDep Chief of Staff for Intel Threat BriefingBegan with June with issue of CSA visionSystematic evaluation of requirements, goals and opportunities for changeEvery modernization program was evaluated based upon:Capability required by TAPCSA’a intentArmy’s visionPrograms with high pay off were recommended for accelerationPrograms with acceptable alternatives or risk were nominated for cancellation based upon affordability. Although cancelled the operational requirement for every one of these programs remains.Working Integrated Product Team AnalysisThe Army Plan - capability to system crosswalkSystem AnalysisRecommendationsOverarching Integrated Product Team AnalysisOperational FeasibilityTechnological FeasibilityQuantitative/Qualitative analysisImpact AnalysisOperationalPoliticalIndustrial BaseOtherAcceleration PackageRestructure PackageDraft Program Budget Decision
7Strategic Responsiveness Goals 1 Brigade Hours1 Division Hours5 Divisions DaysImproving Strategic Responsiveness.CAA conducted an additional analysis of the actual deployment for Task Force Hawk utilizing the proposed courses of action. This analysis demonstrated the significant differences in deployability to a SSC of these options. This analysis indicated:Heavy brigades (Bde XXI) does not improve deployability of the force over that of Task Force Hawk’s.Medium brigades provide significant improvement over current performance.The CSA’s goal of placing a force anywhere in the world within 96 hours can be achieved with a medium force, given no significant restriction in Maximum on Ground (MOG).
8Modernization Strategy Maintain the Army’s ability to do anything the American people ask of us while improving our capability to do it better, faster and more cheaply than any other option available. Retain the capability to win two near-simultaneous theater wars by maintaining critical combat overmatch in legacy systems. Transform the Army from its current Cold War organization and equipment into a force that better utilizes its full spectrum capabilities in a more strategically deployable force. Organize this force around a common unit design and common family of combat systems that is C130 deployable. Develop the objective system that is both deployable and enjoys the combat overmatch and survivability of the combat systems of today.This transformation process will begin immediately! Investments in today’s technology allow us to form surrogate units to stimulate doctrine development, organization design, and leadership training. Ultimately, heavy and light forces will converge on similar capability in a family of systems on a common platform. When technology permits, transformation to an all wheeled force will erase the line between light and heavy units. Throughout the process, transformation actions will retain today’s light force deployability while providing it the lethality and mobility for decisive outcomes our heavy forces currently enjoy. Continued upgrades and selective new procurement will retain heavy force lethality through overmatch while transitioning its deployability to that of the light forces.Refocused research, development, and acquisition support this transformation with the ultimate goal of producing a family of combat systems that are C130 deployable yet capable of fighting and surviving like the combat systems of today. This ultimate goal will allow us to significantly lighten the force without compromising combat capability. As an interim measure, creation of a new, medium type unit that is strategically deployable yet capable of sustained combat upon arrival in the theater of operations will begin the transformation. Organizational redesign and equipment enhancement will improve the lethality of light and early entry forces.
9IBCT Operational Concept Full spectrumRapidly deployableCombat capable on arrivalMaintains freedom of maneuverDecisive action from deliberate maneuver & dismounted Infantry assaultOperational mobility via C-130Internetted combined armsComplex and urban terrainIncreased deployability and decreased sustainment footprintReach backOperates under a Division, Corps or ARFOR HQThe initial Brigade is a full spectrum, combat force. It is a divisional brigade .Its two core qualities are high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through dismounted Infantry assault.The major fighting components are its motorized infantry battalions. The brigade has a unique Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron to enhance situational awareness.
10Interim Brigade Combat Team DIV/CORPSAUGMENTATIONC4ISRCASPTHUMINTAL/MRocket/CannonMPO O OHHCThe new Brigade will be full Spectrum CapableIt will be rapidly deployable (anywhere in the world 96 hours from notification)It maintains a freedom of maneuver through high tactical mobility and situational understandingIt is capable of combat upon its arrival in combatC130 deployableIt is effective in complex urban terrainCommon platform increases deployability and decreases sustainment footprintRequires reach back for Joint effects and C4ISRIt operates under a Division, Corps or R4 HeadquartersBSBO O OO O OO O OO O OMIO O OSIG
11Achieving the Vision THE ARMY’S INTENT MODERNIZATION GOALS Full Spectrum Capable : Responsive and dominant at every point on the operations spectrum Structureflexible organizational structure enables us to generate formations capable of succeeding at any point on this spectrum and provides the nation an array of forces that are versatile, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable, equipped and trained for effectiveness in any mission tasked to the Army.Strategic Responsiveness: Strategic responsiveness is achieved through the combination of forward deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, engagement and force projection. In addition to organizational changes we will aggressively reduce our deployed logistics footprint. Near term actions focus on accelerating key systems that enable strategic depolyability. These systems will enhance logistics C2 necessary to achieve just-in time logistics. This provides dual benefit of enhancing strategic deployability through reducing the amount of equipment to be moved and reducing the logistical footprint by reducing the amount of material in theater.Focused RDA: Focused and consistent investments that exploit technological development to provide the most critical desired capabilities within the required timeframe to ensure a technological superior force over all potential adversaries.MODERNIZATION GOALSFull Spectrum Capable ForceLight forces more lethal, survivable and tactically mobileEarly entry forces capable of decisive combat operationsStrategic ResponsivenessMake heavy forces more deployableReduce deployed logistics footprintFocused Research Development and AcquisitionScience and TechnologyCritical recapitalization
12Light, Lethal Initiatives “...light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile.”Budget Estimate Submission - BES 01-05Recommended initiatives to make the light force more lethal, survivable, and mobile consist of:Continue the TOW Fire and Forget program initiated in the FY01 budget.Accelerate HIMARS from one battery in FY05 to 2 battalions. The system will be fielded in the light Corps Artillery units of the AC and the NG.Accelerate LW155 from an FUE of FY05 to FY03. This completes the buy in FY06. The system will be fielded in the light Corps Artillery units of the AC and the NG.Accelerate LOSAT from one battalion in FY06 to a FUE of FY04 with 2 battalions equipped by FY06.In POM02, examine Land Warrior for possible buyback. The program was decremented in the FY01 budget build due to technological problems. If these problems are resolved, restore the program.In POM02, accelerate TUAV. The program is currently in competition. Once a contractor is selected, acceleration can be determined.Fire & Forget Anti-Tank missile Initiate ProgramAccelerate High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 2 Battalions by FY05Accelerate Light Weight 155MM Howitzer 2 years to FY 03Line Of Sight Anti-Tank buy Adds Battalionsin FY04/FY06Program Objective Memorandum - POM 02-07Land Warrior BuybackTactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Acceleration
13Strategic Responsiveness “Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint…”Budget Estimate Submission - BES 01Logistics Command and Control (C2) Accelerate programsGlobal Combat Support System - ArmyCombat Service Support Control SystemMovement Tracking SystemTransportation Coord Auto Info for Movement IIDeployability Interim BrigadesRecommended initiatives to make the heavy forces more responsive consist primarily of logistics C2 systems. The OIPT recommends accelerating the procurement of GCSS-A, CSSCS, MTS, TC AIMS II.In POM02, if feasible, accelerate the Joint Modular Lighter System to provide for enhanced JLOTS.Program Objective Memorandum - POM 02-07Joint Modular Lighter System Initiates procurementAerocraft Science & TechnologyJoint Transport Rotorcraft Science & Technology
14Recapitalization Initiatives BES 01-05 “When we deploy, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight.”Recapitalization recommendations are shown on this chart. All of these will extend the service life of critical equipment while reducing O&S costs. The Apache recommendation is under study at TRADOC with a recommendation forthcoming.Vehicles What Recapitalization AccomplishesAbrams: New engine. Corrects obsolescence problem with M1A1/ vehicle overhaul/service life extension - near zero timeAH-64 Apache Longbow: A to D Model SLEP addressing air worthiness & common configurationCH-47Chinook: New Engines, remanufactured fuselage, digital cockpitUH-60 Black Hawk: Upgrade A to L(+) configuration: replace engine and drive-train, digitize cockpit, new wide chord blade, advanced flight control computer, cockpit airbag system, engine and IPU particle separators, and advanced fuel cellHEMTT: New EPA engine, Anti Lock Brake System, lube for life components and LED lightsHercules: New engine, improved transmission & brakes, improved boom & wenchTank improvementRestore ApacheAccelerate CH47FAccelerate UH60L+Accelerate HEMTT Extended Service ProgramRestore Hercules program
15Proposed Divestitures Base KillsMLRS Smart Tactical Rocket (MSTAR)Stinger Block IICommand & Control Vehicle (C2V)Army Tactical Missile System Block IIAHeliborne Prophet (Air)* Wolverine (Bridger System)* Grizzly (Breacher System)RestructureFuture Scout & Cavalry System (becomes an ATD w/UK)Crusader (40 tons from 55 tons & reduce the buy qty )Recommended divestitures or restructure actions were developed based on assessment of operational and programmatic risks; and identifiable redundant or similar capability, in either the Army or through joint systems.MSTAR: ATACMS BLK II/BAT or attack aviation mitigates risk.Stinger BLK II: BLK I is an acceptable alternative. Saves ~$1B. MEADs partially mitigates.C2V: Not C-130 deployable; currently only programmed for one corps cannot conduct C2 on the move.ATACMS BLK IIA: Other Army systems have similar capability (at reduced range) or similar range (with less capability). Joint Systems have similar ranges and capability but may be limited by weather and responsiveness.Prophet (AIR): Alternatives exist (EP-3, RC-135m, U2, ARL). Can best be used with TUAV.FSCS: System on partially consistent with transformation effort. New start, limited cost.Crusader: See slides* Kill Per OSD
16Modernization Transformation Strategy This transformation is supported by, the ongoing digitization effort. Situational awareness will be critical to this force and the interim brigades will ultimately have that capability. However, for a number of reasons continuing with our current digitization plan enhances overll army operational capability and reduces or mitigates risk.The initial and interim brigades will trade some operational capability for increased strategic mobility. Technology available in the near to mid term (now to ~2010) will not allow the medium brigade to have capabilities throughout the spectrum equal to today's heavy brigade. Therefore we will retain 2 AC Corps, equipped with improved versions of Abrams, Bradley's, etc. to ensure our capability in MTWs, until the FCS is fielded.No decision has been made, or discussed as to what vehicle will be selected for MAV. That process is ongoing.In conjunction with our determination to retain III and XVIII Corps as a strategic hedge until later in the transition, the schedule beyond the initial brigade transition is still being coordinated.Digitization priority unchangedRetain III Corps as counterattack Corps and XVIII Corps as contingency CorpsInterim vehicles…no predecisions, full and open competitionDetermine sequence for transformation of other units
17SummaryThe Army will become Full Spectrum… Common Chassis… Common Organizations… meeting the National Security requirements of the futureA phased approach coupled with a sound investment strategy will facilitate transformationWe have a vision.We have a plan and program to get there.The Army is working hard to resource our own bills as they relate to the transformation.We need support beyond internal resources.
19Senior Army Planning Group OrganizationSA/CSAOrganizationModernization is one of four task forces chartered by VCSA, and working closely with SAPG and Vision TFFD covers other three with FDF and Dir, Force Programs on the manning TF, FDL on LOGTF and the Deputy on the SVCC and HQ RedesignDAMO-SS stays plugged into the Mod TF to keep SVCC and Mod synchronizedUSA/VCSAReduce FootprintLogistics Task ForceSenior Army Planning GroupHQ Army Redesign Task ForceOptimize EfficiencyVisionManning Task ForceModernization Task ForceFull Spectrum CapabilityMan the Force
20Achieving A Full Spectrum Force Full Spectrum CapabilityAchieving Full Spectrum Capable ForceThe spectrum of operations describes a need for land forces for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theaters of war.Responsive and dominant at every point on the operations spectrum Structure flexible organizational structure enables us to generate formations capable of succeeding at any point on this spectrum and provides the nation an array of forces that are versatile, agile, lethal, survivable and sustainable, equipped and trained for effectiveness in any mission tasked to the Army.DeployabilityLethalityObjective CapabilityHeavy ForceLight ForceRequired Capability
21Future Combat System Development Lethality Robotics MobilitySurvivability Hybrid Electric Sensors Human Engineering C4ISRLeap-Ahead TechnologiesFUEWe are already on the path to Future Combat Systems developmentMS1 decision point in FY 03 is critical for FY 12 FUETechnology derivation from current and future systems is already under development should impact time required and costLRIPEMDATDMS IFY01-0550/50 Cost ShareDARPA/Army3Demo2 ContractorsMobility DemoVirtual PrototypePath to Revolutionary FCS1Decision Events1. Launch Revolutionary Program with DARPA2. Pursue Feasible & Affordable Approach3. Meet Milestone I RequirementsDesignConcepts3-4 ContractorsSystemTradeStudies2
22Interim Brigades Milestones Event03 Nov 9901 Dec 9931 Dec 9909 Jan 0031 Jan 0015 Feb 0010 Mar 0024 Mar 0030 May 0030 Jun 004th QTR 00Commerce Business Daily AnnouncementIndustry DayIssue Draft Request For Proposal (RFP)Begin Platform Performance Demonstration (Ft. Knox)Submit White PapersOperational Requirement Document to HQDA2nd Draft RFP for CoordinationIssue Formal RFPReceive ProposalsDown SelectAward Contract(s)** Subject to New Start Authority & Availability of Funds
23IBCT Brigade Signal Company 1/0/7/8BDE HQBrigade Headquarters3rd Brigade, 2nd Inf DivS6/G6 ProposalFDU 99-21/1/3/5+68No DIV SIG BN Assets at Ft LewisEnhanced Signal Equip in O&O planLegacy systems will not supportBrigade O&O ConceptCOHORT resourcing concept (modified)I~80HQTransmissionSwitchingNetworkMgmtS6CMDPLT HQPLT HQTACSATTacticalCommsWIN POCSwitchElectronicMaint37
24Restructuring Crusader Reduce weight to 40 tons or less (vice 55T)Reduce 8-12 rounds (2.3T)…Minimal operational impactCommon engine with proposed tank engineReduce armor protection (3.7T)…Minimal impact7th road wheel, different track and suspension (2T)…2nd order effect of reduced weightStructural changes (3T)…2nd order effect from reduced weightReducing one projectile magazine will enable us to reduce the size and corresponding weight (2.3 tons) of the vehicle. The estimated range of projectile reduction is rounds. This reduction, validated through analysis will have minimal operational impact.Changing our automotive approach from a diesel engine to a lightweight turbine engine will further reduce the weight by 3 tons. This new approach is envisioned to be a joint effort with the M1A2 SEP Program that will reduce overall life-cycle costs for each program.“Kitting” survivability packages (Non Ballistic Protection and Top Attack Armor) will enable us to reduce 3.2 tons. These survivability packages will be “kitted” on the vehicle depending on the threat and will be shipped separately into theater based on METT-T.The reduced size of the vehicle from the changes above will allow us to eliminate one road wheel and utilize different/smaller track and suspension. This will reduce the weight by 2 tons.With the reduced size and weight of the vehicle, we will be able to optimize the overall structure of the vehicle that will reduce the weight by 3 tons.Crusader Program has been executing an aggressive weight reduction program for several years. All design decision to date factor in weight, cost, and performance in order to achieve an optimal design solution for the system. The program will continue to leverage past weight reduction efforts to achieve out weight reduction goals
25Crusader Decreased Quantity Reduce total buy to approximately 450One Corps (three divisions, Armored Cavalry Regiment) plus 6 Field Artillery brigades (317)Log, training base, National Training Center (130)Reduce resupply vehicle basis of issueChange from 1 per howitzer to no more than 1 per 2 howitzersCoupled with howitzer reduction reduces from 1124 to approx 250Maintains the indirect fire requirements for III Corps; which serves as strategic hedge during transitionResupply vehicle changes accomplished with minimal system capability degradation.