1. Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door
Vi Lipski, FAA
Matt Schack, FAA
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

2. Topics for Discussion Background Design Issues Procedural Issues
Airplane Security Regulatory Actions
Accomplishments
Design Issues
Flight Deck Bulkhead
Other Design for Security Issues
Transponders
Procedural Issues
Monitoring/Crew Alerting
Flightdeck Access
Use of Non-Lethal and Lethal Weapons
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

3. Background
March ICAO design security requirements went into effect
September 11, urgent need arose to provide increased security to the flight deck
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

4. Background
September Airplane Security Rapid Response Team Formed
October Rapid Response Team Recommendations Published
Flight Deck Doors
Transponders
Video Cameras/Alerting Systems
Crew Training
Aircraft Defensive Methods
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

5. Background
November U.S. Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
Act affects both airplane design and operational procedures, including requirements to:
Reinforce flight deck doors
Evaluate video monitoring, transponders, and crew alerting
Investigate use of firearms by flightcrews
Take any necessary action to ensure safety and security of the aircraft
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

6. Reinforced Flight Deck Doors
As of April 9, 2003, over 30 FAA design approvals for reinforced flight deck doors are on over 7,000 airplanes
Collaboration between industry and national authorities allowed for expeditious certification and installation of reinforced flight deck doors
Part 121 Planned vs. Actual Reinforced flight deck Door Installations
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

7. Doors for Other Aircraft
Act requested investigation of reinforced flight deck doors on other aircraft and other types of operation
Comments were solicited from public
Risk assessment concluded reinforced flight deck doors not necessary beyond what has already been mandated
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

8. Design Issues
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

9. Flight Deck Bulkhead
Flight deck door most critical element of flight deck security
Flight deck vulnerability is greater than just the door
A final standard needs to address the complete boundary on new airplanes
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

10. Flight Deck Bulkhead (cont.)
Notice of proposed rulemaking in work
Adopt part 25 standard for intrusion and ballistic penetration resistance for the remainder of the boundaries between the flight deck and cabin (bulkhead, floor, ceilings, etc.)
Consistent with ARAC harmonized recommendations
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

11. Design for Security Amendment 97 to Annex 8
Adopts design requirements relating to security into ICAO standards
Eight different issues addressed
FAA/JAA/TCCA agree to harmonize on standards to meet ICAO requirements
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

12. The Eight Issues Least risk bomb location (design)
Least risk bomb location (identification)
Flight deck protection (being addressed separately)
Flight deck smoke penetration
Cabin smoke evacuation
Cargo fire protection
Separation of vital systems and controls
Design to facilitate searches
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

13. Least Risk Bomb Location
Design provision
Currently a fuselage door through voluntary practice
Proposal would permit continued use of doors, provided:
Operation issues are considered
Consequences of door loss are considered
Intended to minimize damage, not necessarily eliminate it
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

14. Flight Deck Smoke Penetration
Rule would require flight deck to not permit smoke penetration
Slight positive pressure is means of compliance
Existing rules address smoke evacuation rather than penetration from other occupied areas
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

15. Cabin Smoke Evacuation
No current rules address cabin smoke evacuation
Current approach would permit compliance using a rate of air change, with no further demonstration
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

16. Cargo Fire Protection Two Facets: Agent System survivability
As good as Halon
System survivability
Either shock or fragment damage
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

17. Separation of Vital Systems and Controls
ICAO requirement goes beyond security threat
Not addressed by current rules
Approach is “damage based” (rather than “threat based”)
Rule assumes damage within a “sphere”
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

18. Design to Facilitate Searches
Current ICAO rules require search of interior
Design should facilitate searches
Areas of concern include:
Life vest pouches
Lavatories
Area above Stowage compartments
Should focus on making search easier (rather concealment more difficult)
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

19. Intended Applicability
“Commercial” operation
60 or more Passengers
100,000 lbs or more MTGW
All-cargo airplanes not subject to all proposed requirements
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

20. Rulemaking Status
ARAC HWG tasked with developing recommendations to implement ICAO standards
Recommendations accepted by the Transport Airplane and Engine Issues Group (with one exception)
FAA is waiting for transmittal of recommendations
Notice of proposed rulemaking planned to address ARAC recommendations
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

21. Transponders Notice of proposed rulemaking issued January 8, 2003
Requires continuous operating transponders
Applicable to all Part 121 operated airplanes
Proposed compliance date March 29, 2005
FAA evaluating comments to determine next actions
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

22. Procedural Issues
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

23. Monitoring/Alerting
ICAO Annex 6, Amendment 27 adopted retrofit requirements for flight deck doors:
New standards for monitoring area outside flight deck
New standards for alerting for security purposes
Effective for existing operations November 2003
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

24. Monitoring/Alerting (cont.)
Notice of proposed rulemaking to address ICAO amendments targeted for June of 2003
Proposed requirements for flight deck door monitoring and crew alerting
JAA coordination in work
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

25. Lethal & Non-Lethal Weaponry
U.S. Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act in 2002
TSA establishing voluntary program to deputize pilots
Small group of pilots trained and authorized to carry guns in flight deck
FAA to assess risk of catastrophic failure of airplane design as a result of discharge
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

26. Lethal & Non-Lethal Weaponry
Notice : Access to current and past SD’s
All offices have access
Notice : Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) – Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act
First Class completed 4/19/03
FFDO SOP
Issued on 4/18/03
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

27. Flight Deck Access
Notice 8400.xx: Procedures for Opening, Closing, and Locking of Flight Crew Compartment Doors
Comprehensive Security Program for All-Cargo Carriers Regardless of Doors – FY03
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

28. Personnel Licensing
FAA to study the feasibility of requiring all pilot licenses to incorporate a photograph of the license holder and appropriate biometric imprints
Status: Under review by Flight Standards
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

29. Flight Standards Issues
New 110A will be issued to ASI starting in May 2003
NPRM – Cabin Door Monitoring (June 2003)
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door

30. Summary
Reinforced flight deck doors are installed on airplanes operating under parts 121 & 129
FAA continues to actively work on other rulemaking related to future security initiatives
FAA seeks industry and national authority input on security related initiatives
Aircraft Security: Beyond the Flight Deck Door