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Democratic Transition and Consolidation Kathryn Stoner-Weiss July 27, 2012.

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Presentation on theme: "Democratic Transition and Consolidation Kathryn Stoner-Weiss July 27, 2012."— Presentation transcript:

1 Democratic Transition and Consolidation Kathryn Stoner-Weiss July 27, 2012

2 Structural or Precondition Theories Modernization (Lipset) * Positive relationship between wealth and democracy: Why? * Literacy * Urbanization * Demands of Greater Number of Owners Middle Class (Marx, Barrington Moore) * “ No Bourgeois, no democracy. ” (Moore) Equality (Aristotle) * Change in government does not have major distributional consequences * “ oil curse ” * oligarchy (big landowners) inhibits democracy *Increasing capital mobility helps democracy (Boix)

3 Structural or Precondition Theories (Cont.) Culture * “ Civic Culture ” needed (Almond and Verba) * Some religions, cultures, traditions more conducive to democracy than others ??? Geography * proximity to “ West ” Borders (Rustow) * Must know who is in polity and who is not * Ethnic Homogeneity

4 Structures Versus Agents Preconditions vs. Precipitants Preconditions vs. Precipitants Environments vs. Actors Environments vs. Actors Institutions vs. Individuals Institutions vs. Individuals

5 The “Third Wave” Paradigm (Rustow, O’Donnell & Schmitter, Przeworski, Karl) Actors = Elites Actors = Elites Splits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus HardlinersSplits in Ancien Regime --Softliners versus Hardliners Moderates versus Radicals (in society)Moderates versus Radicals (in society) Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts Key Ingredient for Successful Transition = Pacts “ Limit agenda of policy choice ”“ Limit agenda of policy choice ” Share proportionally in the distribution of benefitsShare proportionally in the distribution of benefits Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making.Restrict the participation of outsiders in decision-making. * Equal Balance of Power between incumbents and challengers * Process Is Cooperative, Non-Zero Sum * Strategic Interaction Creates Democracy ( “ democracy without democrats ” )

6 Manezh Square, Moscow March 10, 1991

7 The “Fourth Wave” Paradigm (Bunce, Fish, McFaul,) Actors = Elites AND Masses Actors = Elites AND Masses Pacts Not a Key Ingredient for Success Pacts Not a Key Ingredient for Success Agenda of policy choice was not limited Agenda of policy choice was not limited Distribution of benefits NOT shared proportionallyDistribution of benefits NOT shared proportionally Participation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to elitesParticipation of outsiders in decision-making not limited to elites Mobilization not a threat to democratizationMobilization not a threat to democratization Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success Equal BOP not a Necessary Condition for Success Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum Process Is Non-Cooperative, Often Zero Sum You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) “ Democrats ” You Get Democracy only with (Powerful) “ Democrats ”

8 DictatorshipsPartialDemocraciesDemocracies BOP in favor of Challengers Armenia Bosnia- Herzegovnia Georgia Croatia * Czech Republic EstoniaHungaryLatviaLithuaniaPolandSlovakia*Slovenia BOP Equal TajikistanMoldovaRussiaUkraineAlbaniaAzerbaijanMacedoniaBulgariaMongolia BOP in favor of Incumbents BelarusKazakhstanTurkmenistanUzbekistanFRY/SerbiaRomania Paths from Communism (At point of transition – not all of these regimes consolidated)

9 The Missing Variable in 3 rd and 4 th Waves: “The International System” Bi-Polar System Bi-Polar System Two Great PowersTwo Great Powers Heterogeneity of Regimes/IdeologiesHeterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies Unipolar System Unipolar System One PoleOne Pole One Regime Type/IdeologyOne Regime Type/Ideology Multipolar (19 th Century) Multiple Poles of PowerMultiple Poles of Power Heterogeneity of Regimes/IdeologiesHeterogeneity of Regimes/Ideologies

10 Bipolarity/Cold War Constraints on “Third Wave” * Agenda of Change Must Be Limited Evolutionary Change NecessaryEvolutionary Change Necessary “ Anti-systemic ” actors kept out of transition“ Anti-systemic ” actors kept out of transition Mobilization DangerousMobilization Dangerous Violators Squelched by US and USSRViolators Squelched by US and USSR Iran 1953 Iran 1953 Hungary 1956 Hungary 1956 Czechoslovakia 1968 Czechoslovakia 1968 Chile 1973 Chile 1973 Poland, (even idea of self-limiting revolution did not work) Poland, (even idea of self-limiting revolution did not work)

11 Unipolarity/Post-Cold War Lack of Constraints on “Fourth Wave” Agenda of Change Less LimitedAgenda of Change Less Limited Property rights and borders on the table Property rights and borders on the table Evolutionary Change Not NecessaryEvolutionary Change Not Necessary Czechoslovakia 1989 Czechoslovakia 1989 Romania 1989 Romania 1989 Philippines??? Philippines??? “ Anti-systemic ” actors not as feared“ Anti-systemic ” actors not as feared Liberals in Eastern Europe Liberals in Eastern Europe Communists in South Africa Communists in South Africa Hamas Hamas Mobilization not as fearedMobilization not as feared Czechoslovakia 1989 Czechoslovakia 1989 Serbia 2000 Serbia 2000 Lebanon 2005 Lebanon 2005 Egypt? (2011) Egypt? (2011)

12 Democratic Triggers? Defeat in War Decolonization/Collapse of Empire External Occupation Economic Growth Economic Crisis

13 Does Prior Regime Type Matter? Conventional Wisdom before 1989 Authoritarian Regimes Can Democratize (Totalitarian cannot) Authoritarian Regimes Can Democratize (Totalitarian cannot) Private Sector ExistsPrivate Sector Exists “ Resurrection ” of Civil Society“ Resurrection ” of Civil Society Restoring democratic institutionsRestoring democratic institutions Changing “ regime ” easier than changing whole systemChanging “ regime ” easier than changing whole system

14 Does Priori Regime Type Matter? (Cont.) Totalitarian Regimes Cannot Democratize Totalitarian Regimes Cannot Democratize No Private SectorNo Private Sector No Civil Society to “ Resurrect ”No Civil Society to “ Resurrect ” Stakes of Change Too HighStakes of Change Too High Political and economic power intertwined Political and economic power intertwined

15 Does Prior Regime Type Matter? The New Conventional Wisdom, (Geddes) Military Juntas Easier to democratize Military Juntas Easier to democratize Soldiers go back to barracksSoldiers go back to barracks Old institutions can be revivedOld institutions can be revived “ Re ” democratization easier “ Re ” democratization easier Personalist Regimes Personalist Regimes Small group relying on state for wealthSmall group relying on state for wealth Who governs after death of dictator?Who governs after death of dictator? Hegemonic Party Systems Hegemonic Party Systems Have bigger “ selectorate ”Have bigger “ selectorate ” Can withstand crises better than generals, personalist dictators: cooptionCan withstand crises better than generals, personalist dictators: cooption

16 Survivability Rates of Autocracies ( ) Military Regimes: 9 years Military Regimes: 9 years Personalist Regimes: 15 years Personalist Regimes: 15 years Single-party regimes: 23 years Single-party regimes: 23 years Theocracies Theocracies Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years)Islamic Republic of Iran (27 years) Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)Taliban in Afghanistan (5 years)

17 Different Outcomes, Different Theories No One Path to Democracy (Equifinality) No One Path to Democracy (Equifinality) No Single Theory of Democratization No Single Theory of Democratization

18 Democratic Transitions vs. Democratic Consolidation The causes of democratic transition are not necessarily the same factors as the causes of democratic consolidation

19 Factors Facilitating Democratic Stability Pacted Transitions (Schmitter & O ’ Donnell); elites work together Pacted Transitions (Schmitter & O ’ Donnell); elites work together Non-Violent Transitions (Ackerman & Karatnycky) Non-Violent Transitions (Ackerman & Karatnycky) Levels of Wealth (Przeworski et al) Levels of Wealth (Przeworski et al) Income Equality (Boix) Income Equality (Boix) Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (Fish) (procedural legitimacy) Institutional Choices: Parliamentary Democracy (Fish) (procedural legitimacy) Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”) Ethnic Homogeneity (but not a specific “culture”) Democratic Neighborhoods (Kopstein and Reilly) Democratic Neighborhoods (Kopstein and Reilly) Performance (political and economic) (Diamond) Performance (political and economic) (Diamond) Time (Huntington): Two turnover test? Time (Huntington): Two turnover test? What to do with old elites? “torturer problem” and “praetorian problem”What to do with old elites? “torturer problem” and “praetorian problem” Performance legitimacy (better than old regime?)Performance legitimacy (better than old regime?)

20 Wealth and Democratic Stability Per Capital Income Per Capital Income Less than $1000 = Less than $1000 = $1,000-2,000 = $1,000-2,000 = Over $4000 = Over $4000 = (wealthiest subverted democracy: Argentina, 1975, $6,055) Life Expectancy of Democracy Life Expectancy of Democracy 8 Years 8 Years 18 Years 18 Years Forever Forever

21 Income and Sustaining Democracy “ …there is no doubt that democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed. ” (Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106) “ …there is no doubt that democracies are more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries. Yet the reason is not that democracies are more likely to emerge when countries develop under authoritarianism, but that, however they do emerge, they are more likely to survive in countries that are already developed. ” (Przeworski, et al, 2000, p. 106)

22 Why Is Wealth Good for Democracy? Performance of Democracy? Performance of Democracy? Education Levels Rise? Education Levels Rise? Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Conflicts? Lowers the Intensity of Distributional Conflicts? ??? ???

23 New Democracies and Economic Performance Life expectancy of democracy with decline in incomes: 19 yearsLife expectancy of democracy with decline in incomes: 19 years Life expectancy of democracy with rise in incomes: 64 yearsLife expectancy of democracy with rise in incomes: 64 years

24 Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems Transitions to Dictatorship Transitions to Dictatorship Presidential Systems 39 Presidential Systems 13 Parliamentary Systems 13 Parliamentary Systems 2 Mixed Systems 2 Mixed Systems

25 Expected Life of Democracies Parliamentary Systems: 73 Years Parliamentary Systems: 73 Years Presidential Systems: 21 Years Presidential Systems: 21 Years

26 Democracy Results from Struggle Not an Engineering Problem


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