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1 Airpower Through The Post Cold War (Part 2). 2 Overview  Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue  Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Background to conflict.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Airpower Through The Post Cold War (Part 2). 2 Overview  Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue  Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Background to conflict."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Airpower Through The Post Cold War (Part 2)

2 2 Overview  Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue  Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation SOUTHERN WATCH Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE Background to conflict and lessons learned  History of the Balkans Background Ethnic Groups

3 3Overview  Operation DENY FLIGHT Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation ALLIED FORCE Background NATO Actions Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins  Operation ALLIED FORCE Lessons learned by U.S. Military Political Lessons Learned Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget  CFD Review

4 4 “Beyond the Wild Blue” Video

5 5 “Beyond the Wild Blue”

6 6 The Crisis in Iraq  UN Security Council established a “no-fly zone” over northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish people from attacks by Saddam Hussein  Operation Provide Comfort began on 5 Apr 91 as a humanitarian relief effort to deliver food, clothing, and supplies to Iraq’s Kurdish refugees  C-130s began airdropping supplies on 7 Apr 91  Lasted approximately eight years and was then replaced by Operation Northern Watch

7 7 The Crisis in Iraq Lessons Learned - ONW  The need to avoid “Fratricide”  The limitations of airdrops  Host-country tensions  The need for alternate bases  Lack of an “exit strategy”

8 8 The Crisis in Iraq  Operation Southern Watch (OSW) was a Combined Task Force enforcing the “no-fly zone” below the 36th parallel in southern Iraq  Not an aggression against Iraq – executed as a self-defense measure  Coalition partners included the U.S., UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait  More than 850 Iraqi SAM and AAA fire directed at coalition aircraft  Iraq violated the “no-fly zone” more than 160 times  More than 150,000 USAF sorties by 1998

9 9 “What we’ve effectively done since 1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country…” Gen Fogleman, Jul 1995

10 10 The Crisis in Iraq Lessons Learned - OSW  Became a test for USAF AEF concept in Oct 1995  Quality of life changes needed due to high “Ops-Tempo”  Reorganized Security Forces

11 11 The Crisis in Somalia  In-mid 1992, drought and civil war devastated Somalia  Food supplies became a weapon of war  Operation Provide Relief began on 22 Aug 1992 by the U.S. to deliver food to Somali refugees  Military and civilian aircraft used  Over 2,000 sorties, carrying 48,162 metric tons of food

12 12 The Crisis in Somalia  Although a humanitarian effort:  44 American soldiers lost their lives  175 were injured or wounded  Danger of failure due to warlord interference  Operation Restore Hope  Coalition peacekeeping operation from 9 Dec 92 – 4 May 93  First test of Rapid Global Mobility from the CONUS

13 13 The Crisis in Somalia Lessons Learned  First large scale test of newly formed AMC and the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC)  Difficulties evolved in the planning, coordinating and managing of the operation  Austere infrastructure of Somalia added to the lack of adequate bases for strategic airlift aircraft

14 14 A Brief History - After World War II, monarchy abolished - - Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed - - the country the Federal People's Republic - - of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime - - minister - Eliminating opposition, the Tito government executed Mihajlovic in Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent Tito

15 15 Three ethnic groups fell into conflict Serbs - dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia. Croats - Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western influences Muslims - living mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia -Herzegovina.

16 16

17 17 The Crisis in Bosnia  Oct 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 781, established a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Operation Deny Flight Enforced the no-fly zone Provided close air support to UN troops Conducted approved air strikes under a "dual-key” command arrangement with the U.N.  28 Feb 94, NATO aircraft shot down four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance.

18 18 The Crisis in Bosnia  NATO objectives Bosnian Serb compliance to cease attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo Complete freedom of movement for UN Forces and personnel, and non-government officials Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport

19 19 The Crisis in Bosnia  NATO missions of Operation Deny Flight To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 816 To provide close air support to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces. To conduct approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas.

20 20 The Crisis in Bosnia  Operation Deny Flight lasted from 12 Apr 1993 to 20 Dec 1995 Almost 100,000 sorties flown  A formal closure ceremony was held in Vicenza, Italy on 21 Dec 1995 Forces associated with Operation Deny Flight were then transferred to Operation Decisive Endeavor -- as part of the overall NATO operation Joint Endeavor.

21 21 The Crisis in Bosnia Lessons Learned  Lack of doctrine  Tactical air and space power problems  Bases weren’t large enough to accept the contingency surges  Coalition/Joint problems  Technological problems

22 22 KOSOVO

23 23 Kosovo Crisis  Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population of which the majority are ethnic Albanians (Muslims)  Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital  The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move

24 24 U.S. and NATO Interests at stake  Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region  Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions  President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO

25 25 NATO Action  After the failure of repeated international diplomatic efforts since the Spring of 1998 to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo  North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes  Aimed at strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to end the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government.

26 26 NATO’s Objectives  A stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;  The withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;  The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence

27 27 NATO’s Objectives cont’d  The unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons  Establish political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law

28 28 Military Objective “Degrade and damage the military and security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo” William Cohen, SECDEF 15 April 99

29 29 NATO Strategic Objectives  Demonstrate seriousness of their opposition to Belgrade’s aggression in Balkans  Deter Milosevic’s attacks on helpless civilians and reverse ethnic cleansing  Damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

30 30 Lessons Learned on Kosovo War Objectives U.S. Grand Strategy  Maintain a peaceful, prosperous U.S.-led Europe  Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition  Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct “out of area” military ops European Strategy  Maintain a peaceful, prosperous & independent Europe  Prevent spillover into Albania & Macedonia,thence to Greece & Turkey  Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis  Demonstrate European unity Kosovo War Aims   Stop the Serbian slaughter & expulsion of ethnic Albanians   Remove Milosevic from power   Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives

31 31 Lessons Learned by U.S. Military  U.S. air refuelers were stretched thin during the operation  Force structure “numbers” & resources are inadequate for current level of commitments (all services); Support and training as important to victory as strike  Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough, smart weapons may be better than smart platforms  Need the right force structure for the future  C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint & coalition ops  On the brink of another hollow force

32 32 Political Lessons Learned by Europeans  Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans Best technology, weapons & platforms “Made in U.S.A.” Pols unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique U.S. capabilities  U.S. cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests U.S. focus shifted with opinion polls Fear U.S. commitment could falter if U.S. forces take heavy casualties  EU can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day) Many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations Refugee issue Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing) Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism Need to build external identity  Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945 Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases

33 33 Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget Trends  No DOD/Allied spending surge like post Desert Storm  International defense market continues to shrink  Readiness & Retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for Modernization  Inevitable Tax Cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets  Services must eventually deal with the bow wave  Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough  Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms(JSF, F-22, CVX, DD- 21)  Support Forces will need big $$$$ too “We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.” Jacques Gansler “We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.” Jacques Gansler

34 34 Review of CFD Model  Distinctive Capabilities-Air and space expertise, capabilities, and technological know-how  Functions- Broad, fundamental, and continuing activities of air and space power  Doctrine- fundamental principles which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives

35 35 CFD Model Time PeriodDistinctive Capabilities Functions (missions) Doctrinal Emphasis DESERT STORM  Air Superiority  Precision Engagement  Global Attack  Information Superiority  Agile Combat Support  Rapid Global Mobility  Strategic Attack  Air Refueling  Command and Control (C2)  Counterair  Surveillance and Reconnaissance  Strategic air attack (precision weapons/stealth)  Suppress enemy air defenses PROVIDE COMFORT/ NORTHERN WATCH  Rapid Global Mobility  Air Superiority  Airlift  Counter Air  Strategic attack  Surveillance and Reconnaissance  Protect northern Iraqi no fly zone  Humanitarian airdrops for refugees SOUTHERN WATCH  Precision Engagement  Air Superiority  Counter Air  Strategic attack  Surveillance and Reconnaissance  Theater attack, of military targets PROVIDE RELIEF/ RESTORE HOPE  Rapid Global Mobility  Global Attack  Air Superiority  Agile Combat Support  Surveillance & Reconnaissance  Counter Air/Land  Strategic Attack  Airlift/Special Operations  AEF concept  Strategic Attack  Humanitarian airdrops for refugees

36 36 CFD Model Time PeriodDistinctive Capabilities Functions (missions) Doctrinal Emphasis DENY FLIGHT  Air Superiority  Information Superiority  Agile Combat Support  Counterair  Surveillance and Reconnaissance  Counterland  No defined doctrine ALLIED FORCE  Air Superiority  Precision Engagement  Strategic Attack  Counterland  Intelligence  Strategic attacks on ethnic cleansing Serbs and military capabilities

37 37 Summary  Background to the Conflict  Iraqi threats  Air Defense Threat  The Plan of Attack  Concept of Operations  Five Strategic Rings  Targets  Campaign Overview  Video Clip/Beyond the Wild Blue

38 38 Summary  Operation PROVIDE COMFORT/NORTHERN WATCH Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation SOUTHERN WATCH Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE Background to conflict and lessons learned  History of the Balkans Background Ethnic Groups

39 39 Summary  Operation DENY FLIGHT Background to conflict and lessons learned  Operation ALLIED FORCE Background NATO Actions Operation ALLIED FORCE Begins  Operation ALLIED FORCE Lessons learned by U.S. Military Political Lessons Learned Impact of Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget  CFD Review


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