Presentation on theme: "August 14, 2003 Blackout Final Report"— Presentation transcript:
1August 14, 2003 Blackout Final Report U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task ForceFinal Report Summary
2Overview The blackout and the investigation Findings – how the blackout happenedWhy the blackout happenedReport recommendations
3The blackout August 14, 2003, starting at 16:05:57 EDT Over 50 million people out of power in northeast US and Ontario, Canada61,800 NW of load lostMillions of work hours and billions of $ in economic costs
4The investigationDirected by President Bush and Prime Minister Chrétien on 8/15/03Task Force headed by US Secretary of Energy and Canadian Minister of Natural Resources, with US and Canadian officialsThree work groups – Electric System Outage, Nuclear and SecurityInvestigators from both nations, public and private sectorElectric system investigation team composed of NERC, industry experts across US and Canada, US and Canada federal staff
5Computer problemsAt 12:15 EDT, MISO began having problems with its state estimator; it didn’t return to full functionality until 16:04 EDT.Sometime after 14:14 EDT, FirstEnergy began losing its energy management system (EMS) alarms but didn’t know it.At 14:20 EDT, parts of FE’s EMS began to fail – first remote sites, then core servers – but FE system operators didn’t know and FE IT support didn’t tell them.Without a functioning EMS, FE operators didn’t know their system was losing lines and voltage until perhaps 15:45 EDT.
6Reactive power problems At 13:31 EDT, FirstEnergy lost the Eastlake 5 plant, a critical source of real and reactive power for the Cleveland-Akron area.FE did not perform contingency analysis after this trip.FE did not have sufficient understanding of the Cleveland-Akron area to know their system was seriously deficient in reactive power for voltage support.
8Line outagesBetween 15:05 and 15:41 EDT, FE lost kV lines in the Cleveland-Akron area under normal loading due to contact with too-tall trees – but didn’t know it without EMS.Line loading shifted and reactive power demands increased with each line loss.Between 15:39 and 16:08 EDT, FE lost kV lines in the Cleveland-Akron area due to overloads and ground faults.
9The Ohio tipping pointAt 15:57:05 EDT, FE lost the Sammis-Star 345 kV line due to overload.This shut down a major path for power imports into the Cleveland-Akron area and was the starting point for the full cascade.
10The cascadeA cascade is a dynamic phenomenon in an electric system that can’t be stopped by human intervention once it startsPower swings, voltage fluctuations and frequency fluctuations cause sequential trips of numerous transmission lines and generators, and automatic load-shedding in a widening geographic area.System oscillations grow so large the system can’t rebalance and stabilize.
13Why did Ohio start happen? The Ohio phase began because:1. FirstEnergy and ECAR failed to study and understand the inadequacies of the FE system and FE didn’t operate the system with appropriate voltage criteria.2. FE had inadequate situational awareness and didn’t recognize its system deteriorating.
14Why did Ohio start happen? 3. FE failed to trim trees in its rights of way, so each early 345 kV line faulted on a tree that was too tall.4. MISO and neighboring PJM didn’t provide effective real-time diagnostic support to FE.5. FE didn’t act to restore its system to a secure condition (due to the other causes).
15Why the cascade happened Sammis-Star and the Cleveland-Akron line trips shifted load burden onto limited pathsAfter Sammis-Star, Zone 3 (and 2) relays in Ohio and Michigan caused 13 line trips between 15:57:05 and 16:10: EDT that would not have happened so quickly without those relays.
16The cascade (2)3. Relay settings on lines, generators and load-shedding across the northeast were not coordinated and integrated to reduce the likelihood of a cascade, so the grid’s elements and regions couldn’t rebalance.4. Physics – once the frequency, voltage and power swings started, the grid couldn’t recover
17Report recommendations for better reliability Institutional issues (14 recommendations), including:Make reliability standards mandatory and enforceableDevelop an independent funding mechanism for NERCStrengthen reliability institutions, including NERC and regional councils, and define minimum requirements and cleaner footprints for control areas and reliability authoritiesReliability investments should be recoverable in transmission rates
18Reliability recommendations Strengthen and support NERC’s actions of February 14, 2004 (17), including:Correct the direct causes of the blackoutStrengthen NERC compliance programSupport NERC’s Reliability Readiness AuditsImprove operator training and certificationUse better system protection measuresUse better real-time tools for grid monitoring and operationAccelerate and improve reliability standards
19Reliability recommendations Physical and cyber-security (13):Implement NERC IT standardsDevelop IT management proceduresImprove IT forensic and diagnostic capabilitiesEstablish authority for physical and cyber securityControl access to critical equipmentCanadian nuclear power (2)
20Will More Blackouts Occur? System is man-made, and subject to mechanical failure and human error.NERC’s readiness audits are a key preventive measure.The U.S – Canada Task Force has been extended for a year to provide oversight for implementation of recommendations.