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**Multi-player, non-zero-sum games**

4,3,2 4,3,2 1,5,2 4,3,2 7,4,1 1,5,2 7,7,1 Utilities are tuples Each player maximizes their own utility at each node Utilities get propagated (backed up) from children to parents

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Game theory Game theory deals with systems of interacting agents where the outcome for an agent depends on the actions of all the other agents Applied in sociology, politics, economics, biology, and, of course, AI Agent design: determining the best strategy for a rational agent in a given game Mechanism design: how to set the rules of the game to ensure a desirable outcome

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**Simultaneous single-move games**

Players must choose their actions at the same time, without knowing what the others will do Form of partial observability Normal form representation: Player 1 0,0 1,-1 -1,1 Player 2 Payoff matrix (row player’s utility is listed first) Note: this is a zero-sum game

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Prisoner’s dilemma Two criminals have been arrested and the police visit them separately If one player testifies against the other and the other refuses, the one who testified goes free and the one who refused gets a 10-year sentence If both players testify against each other, they each get a 5-year sentence If both refuse to testify, they each get a 1-year sentence Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify -5,-5 -10,0 Bob: Refuse 0,-10 -1,-1

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**Prisoner’s dilemma Alice’s reasoning:**

Suppose Bob testifies. Then I get 5 years if I testify and 10 years if I refuse. So I should testify. Suppose Bob refuses. Then I go free if I testify, and get 1 year if I refuse. So I should testify. Dominant strategy: A strategy whose outcome is better for the player regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify -5,-5 -10,0 Bob: Refuse 0,-10 -1,-1

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Prisoner’s dilemma Nash equilibrium: A pair of strategies such that no player can get a bigger payoff by switching strategies, provided the other player sticks with the same strategy (Testify, testify) is a dominant strategy equilibrium Pareto optimal outcome: It is impossible to make one of the players better off without making another one worse off In a non-zero-sum game, a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal! Alice: Testify Alice: Refuse Bob: Testify -5,-5 -10,0 Bob: Refuse 0,-10 -1,-1

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**Prisoner’s dilemma in real life**

Cooperate Defect Win – win Win big – lose big Lose big – win big Lose – lose Price war Arms race Steroid use

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**Is there any reasonable way to get a better answer?**

Superrationality (Douglas Hofstadter) Assume that the answer to a symmetric problem will be the same for both players Maximize the payoff to each player while considering only identical strategies Not a conventional model in game theory

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**Stag hunt Is there a dominant strategy for either player?**

Hunter 1: Stag Hunter 1: Hare Hunter 2: Stag 2,2 1,0 Hunter 2: Hare 0,1 1,1 Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Is there a Nash equilibrium? (Stag, stag) and (hare, hare) Model for cooperative activity

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**Prisoner’s dilemma vs. stag hunt**

Prisoner’ dilemma Cooperate Defect Win – win Win big – lose big Lose big – win big Lose – lose Cooperate Defect Win big – win big Win – lose Lose – win Win – win Players can gain by defecting unilaterally Players lose by defecting unilaterally

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**Coordination game (Battle of the sexes)**

Wife: Ballet Football Husband: 3, 2 0, 0 Husband:Football 2, 3 Wife: Ballet Football Husband: 3, 2 0, 0 Husband:Football 1, 1 2, 3 or Is there a dominant strategy? Is there a Nash equilibrium? (Ballet, ballet) or (football, football) How do we figure out which equilibrium to choose?

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**Game of Chicken Is there a dominant strategy for either player?**

-10, -10 -1, 1 1, -1 0, 0 Straight Chicken Is there a dominant strategy for either player? Is there a Nash equilibrium? (Straight, chicken) or (chicken, straight) Anti-coordination game: it is mutually beneficial for the two players to choose different strategies Model of escalated conflict in humans and animals (hawk-dove game) How are the players to decide what to do? Pre-commitment or threats Different roles: the “hawk” is the territory owner and the “dove” is the intruder, or vice versa

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THE “CLASSIC” 2 x 2 SIMULTANEOUS CHOICE GAMES Topic #4.

THE “CLASSIC” 2 x 2 SIMULTANEOUS CHOICE GAMES Topic #4.

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