Presentation on theme: "The Reduction On: van Manen 2014; Chapter 8 N Friesen Jan. 21, 2015."— Presentation transcript:
The Reduction On: van Manen 2014; Chapter 8 N Friesen Jan. 21, 2015
Heuristic Reduction Eidetic Reduction Bracketing the Self – self and other in language Ethics of the reduction Merleau-Ponty and “intersubjectivity”
“Natural Attitude” and the Heuristic Reduction “the lifeworld, for us who wakingly live in it, is always there, existing in advance for us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis, whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world.” (1970, p. 142) “Phenomenology is the method to break through this taken-for- grantedness and get to the meaning structures of our experiences. This basic method is called the reduction.” (van Manen, 2014) In wonder we see the unusual in the usual, the extraordinary in the ordinary. (van Manen, 2014; examples of “wonder?”)
Heuristic Reduction: van Manen But it requires that the various dimensions of lived meaning of some selected human experience are investigated for their various sources and layers of meaning, rather than being overlaid with a particular frame of meaning. Most theories contain some phenomenological material, or they are built on certain intuitions that presume phenomenological understandings. It may be necessary to explicate assumptions and interests to “exorcise” them, in an attempt to let speak that what wishes to speak.
Eidetic Reduction: Husserl …we vary the perceptual object, table, with a completely free optionalness, yet in such a manner that we keep perception fixed as perception of something… [E.g.,] by fictively changing the shape or the color of the object quite arbitrarily, keeping identical only its perceptual appearing. In other words: Abstaining from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of this perception into a pure possibility, one among other quite ‘optional’ pure possibilities - but possibilities that are possible perceptions.” (1970, S ).
Eidetic Variation: Example “Imagine a situation in which two mothers are speaking to one another by telephone. Their respective children are playing together in an area between their two houses. As neighbors, both mothers can watch the children through their own open windows. The subject of the telephone conversation is the behavior of the children at play and the behaviors of the children in general.” “Imagine an altered situation in which the two mothers have opened the windows and are calling back and forth. In reference with the objective aspect of space, this structure of social praxis is labelled, face-to-face-communication- from-a-distance.” Calling across to one another through the open window obviously includes the acoustical space in between.
Linguistic Variation and Analysis Secrecy, privacy, reserve, stealth, furtiveness, solitude, isolation, covertness, Tact - reserve: privacy, protection, “giving” space, neglect, freedom, independence, dependence, afar, near,. Online, offline; virtual, real, physical; cyberspace, meatspace; asynchronous, realtime (Echtzeit); on the screen, presence, distance, etc. Videoconference, online conference, chat, (threaded) discussion,
Bracketing the Self To do this I need to bracket my self, and at the level of intersubjectivity ask, "How does childhood remembrance appear in consciousness or show itself in lived experience?" And I will have to observe that this memory is contained or held in the "things" (in this case, my experience of the autumn leaves), and I need to realize that memories are released by sensory organs and limbs (touch, sound, smell, vision). In other words, when I ask, "where and how do childhood memories show themselves?" then I have to describe how "the memories are experienced in the things and the spatial contexts of our world, and we may release them with our bodies. However, this is a contingent event.”
Friesen on 4 relations to “Self” (Irrgang, 2007) 1.The first-person perspective of the “I,” which corresponds to subjective knowledge; 2.The second-person perspective of “you,” which corresponds to ethical concerns; 3.The third-person perspective of “it” or “one,” corresponding to objective knowledge; 4.The first-person plural perspective of “we,” corresponding to intersubjective knowledge.
Ethical Dimension “…phenomenological meaning and understanding have to be produced constantly anew by the writers and the readers of phenomenological texts and other media.” (van Manen, 2014) “This also means that the writer needs to become aware of the potential effects of the text on different readers.” “In other words, it is also possible to experience the other in the vocative: as an appeal, as someone who stirs and touches me. This is especially true of situations where we meet the other in his or her vulnerability, as when we happen to be handed a hurt and helpless child or when we suddenly see a person fall in front of us.”
Ethical Dimension Peppers (2006) explains that we “is a dangerous pronoun when it hides histories of internal conflict under false or superficial commonality.” Leaving little or no opportunity for confirmation or qualification, saying “we” in a text often simply assumes that the reader is a part of the superficial agreement. It tacitly but unmistakably asks the reader to align. In doing so tacitly or implicitly—rather than forthrightly or explicitly—it does not readily allow for conflict and disagreement. By using “we” in this book, I am aware of this dilemma.
Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity The phenomenological world is… the sense which is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and other people’s intersect and engage each other like gears... It is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take up my past experiences in those of the present, or other people’s in my own. …We witness every minute the miracle of related experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network of relationships. (2002, p. xxii) Intersubjectivity, as Merleau-Ponty indicates, designates the intersection, “blending,” or mutual conformity of plural subjectivities (2002, p. xii): “perspectives blend, perceptions confirm each other, a meaning emerges” (2002, p. xxii).
Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity We witness every minute the miracle of related experiences, and yet nobody knows better than we do how this miracle is worked, for we are ourselves this network of relationships. The world and reason are not problematical. We may say, if we wish, that they are mysterious, but their mystery defines them: there can be no question of dispelling it by some “solution” (2002, p. xxiii, emphases added) Friesen: “Phenomenological writing as an ethical engagement; we address the other as ‘you’ in saying ‘we.’”
Michel Foucault O.F. Bollnow H-G GadamerHannah Arendt B Waldenfels M. Merleau-Ponty Eugen Fink Edith Stein E. Husserl Martin Heidegger