Presentation on theme: "Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions"— Presentation transcript:
1 Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions Tools of StatecraftMilitary intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions
2 I. Military Intervention Predicting interventionEscalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflictBest predictor: Prior third-party interventionAlliance Portfolios predict side choice
3 What is an alliance portfolio? All of the allies of a stateSimilar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperationBetter predictor than dyadic alliance!
4 I. Military Intervention Predicting interventionEscalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflictBest predictor: Prior third-party interventionAlliance portfolios predict side choiceMore likely when existing parity between combatants
6 I. Military Intervention Predicting interventionEscalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflictBest predictor: Prior third-party interventionAlliance portfolios predict side choiceMore likely when existing parity between combatantsGreat powers intervene much more frequently!
7 2. Predicting War Initiation What factors increase the probability of war?
8 a. Contiguity and Proximity Contiguity: Sharing common borderMID = Use, threat, or display of force short of war
9 Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Wealthy/Advanced StatePoor StateResources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distanceShift in gradient due to technology or development
10 b. Different Regime Types Regime Country ARegime Country BProbability of WarDemocracyLowestAutocracyHighestMiddleState level finding that magnifies dyadic effects:Democracies more stable than autocracies, which in turn are more stable than intermediate regimes
12 d. Power Parity: A “Balance of Power” Produces War, Not Peace! Disparity = Low RiskParity = High Risk
13 War initiators since 1980 United States (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) Iraq (1981 and 1990 attacks on Iran and Kuwait)Israel (1982 and 2006 invasions of Lebanon)Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands)Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on definition)China (1987 attack on Vietnam)Ecuador (1995 war with Peru)Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)Georgia (2008 war with Russia)Pakistan (1999 Kargil War with India)Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC)(Note: War is defined as minimum 1000 battle-deaths/year)
14 B. When does intervention work? Who wins interstate wars?Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars.Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors)Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)
15 Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely Source = Slantchev, AJPS, Oct 2004
16 2. Intervention in Civil Wars No Pro-Rebel InterventionPro-Rebel InterventionNo Pro-Government Intervention119(60.41%)24(12.18%)Pro-Government Intervention29(14.72%)25(12.69%)
17 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise?
18 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Probability of Compromise,Intervention for governmentNo intervention
19 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? YesDoes intervention prolong wars?
20 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? YesDoes intervention prolong wars? YesIs intervention getting more common?
21 Intervention Over Time Number of Civil Wars22281623213943InterventionFrequency36%25%31%35%24%49%51%
22 2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? YesDoes intervention prolong wars? YesIs intervention getting more common? YesThe intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. JusticeWant to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weakWant to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people
23 II. Sanctions and Pressure Predicting SanctionsUS Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with USDomestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevantInteresting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions
25 II. Sanctions and Pressure Predicting SanctionsUS Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with USDomestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevantInteresting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctionsGeneral: Asymmetric dependenceIf I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction youIf you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction youProblem: Measuring dependence is hard
26 Example: US-South Africa 1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US tradeIssue: ApartheidUS backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctionsUS imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones)Question: Why not sanction?
27 Example: US-South Africa Answer: MineralsUSSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals
28 Example: US-South Africa US needed imports of critical minerals:
29 F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals (F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s) Titanium5,366 lbs77%(Australia, South Africa)Cobalt910 lbs73%(Norway, Finland)Tantalum3 lbs80%(China)Columbium171 lbs100%(Brazil)Aluminum720 lbs100%(Australia)Chromium1,656 lbs80%(South Africa)Nickel5,024 lbs63%(Canada)(Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine)212121212121212121
30 Example: US-South Africa Best case: end trade = price increasesWorst case: end trade = inferior hardware
31 Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure? No: Fear of resource conflict nuclear proliferation1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence): US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid“laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation proliferation: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test)1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule
32 B. Do sanctions work?The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposedKeys to successSanction must be large % of target’s GDPSanction must not harm sender (very much)Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm senderSuccess usually takes less than 5 years
33 III. Foreign Aid Predicting foreign aid In general (who gets the most aid?)Free market countries (especially during Cold War)Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization)Poverty and DebtSpecific relationshipsUS: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003)Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and tradeWestern Europe: Former coloniesSource = Alesina and Weder
38 3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request) 2002200320042005200620072008200920101stIsraelIraq2ndEgyptAfgh3rdJordPakIsrael and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?
39 C. Does foreign aid work?Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negativeMore corrupt countries tend to attract US aidLess corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and ScandinaviaAid and growth“Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect“Bad policies:” Aid has no effectProblem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why?Source = Alesina and Weder 2002