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Introduction and a Brief History

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1 Introduction and a Brief History
Analytic Philosophy Introduction and a Brief History

2 Introduction About this course
Analytic philosophy in the history of philosophy and the history of analytic philosophy Areas of philosophy and central philosophical issues Analytic philosophy is just Anglo-American philosophy in the 20th century to the present.

3 Mechanics, requiements and expectations
About this course Mechanics, requiements and expectations

4 Syllabus Office Founders 165c
Telephone (619) [USD]; (619) [mobile] Class Website Message Board Info class ID: ; enrollment password: analytic Office Hours Thu Thu 12:15 – 2:15 pm; Wed 1:15 – 2:15; and by appointment. Class Meetings Tue Thu 2:30 – 3:50 Serra 312 from USD account! Turnitin info may need revision—not yet relevant.

5 Syllabus Readings There are no hard-copy textbooks for this class! All readings, handouts and powerpoints are linked to the class website. Grade Your grade for the semester will be based upon two tests and a term paper. In addition, you must submit a written proposal for your term paper to be discussed in class and approved by your instructor. Test I Thu Mar % of final grade Test II Thu May % of final grade Proposal due Tue Apr 26 must be approved Presentations May 8, May 10 required Term Paper due Tue May % of final grade

6 Term Papers & Turnitin Legal Notification of Policy USD subscribes to, a web-based application that compares the content of submitted papers to the database and checks for textual similarities. All required papers for this course will be subject to submission to for textual similarity review and to verify originality. All submitted papers will be included as source documents in the reference database solely for the purpose of detecting textual similarities and verifying originality. Each student is responsible for submitting his or her papers in such a way that no identifying information about the student is included. A student may not have anyone else submit papers on the student’s behalf to A student may request in writing that his or her papers not be submitted to However, if a student chooses this option, the student may be required to provide documentation in a form required by the faculty member to substantiate that the papers are the student’s original work.

7 Schedule: Topics & Readings
A schedule of topics and readings, subject to revision, is available at the class website at Class Website:

8 Analytic Philosophy Analytic philosophy is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United States the overwhelming majority of university philosophy departments self-identify as "analytic" departments. This situation is mirrored in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. [Wikipedia— but if you don’t trust Wikipedia…] Brian Leiter, the “philosophical gourmet,” notes: "All the Ivy League universities, all the leading state research universities, all the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that overwhelmingly self-identify as "analytic": it is hard to imagine a "movement" that is more academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy.” See also John Searle's judgment (in Bunnin & Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1): "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers."

9 A History of Philosophy
The Analytic Philosopher’s Version

10 Western Philosophy Timeline
Continental Philosophy Hellenistic/ Medieval Ancient Rationalists Empiricists Kant Plotinus Augustine Anselm Abelard Aquinas Ockham Descartes Leibniz Spinoza Locke Berkeley Hume Kant Plato Aristotle Analytic Philosophy Our Esteemed Ancestors Our esteemed ancestors

11 Anglo-American Philosophy
Continental Philosophy British Idealists Empiricists Locke Berkeley Hume Analytic Philosophy Early 20th Century Rejection of Idealism (Defense of Commonsense) Logical Atomism Logical Positivism Ordinary Language Philosophy Contemporary Analytic Philosophy

12 Subfields of Philosophy
Traditional Subfields Logic Ethics Metaphysics Epistemology History of Philosophy Additional Special Fields Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Science “Applied Ethics” specialties Aesthetics Philosophy of Language

13 Our Philosophical Issues
Skepticism and the External World Meaning and Reference The Logical Positivist Program The Mind-Body Problem The Problem of Universals Externalism and the mental Identity (including personal identity) Time and time-travel

14 The External World Epistemological, metaphysical questions and philosophy of language issues. Do we know there’s an external world? If so, how? What are the constituents of this external world? How should we analyze talk about these things? History It is noteworthy that the other minds problem came to prominence as a philosophical problem only as recently as the nineteenth century, when John Stuart Mill gave us what is generally regarded as a version of the analogical inference to other minds. Mill's version has as its centrepiece the causal link between our mental states and our behaviour. The problem was clearly enough waiting to be noted as far back as Descartes and his separation of mind from body and his view that only human animals had minds. However, it does not seem that Descartes noticed it as a separate problem. A similar situation would seem to apply with John Locke, given his belief that the mind of another is invisible (Locke, 111.ii.1,pp., ). Before Mill, it would seem that Thomas Reid (Avramides, 2001, ch., VI) should be credited with seeing that there was a serious philosophical issue concerning other minds. Indeed, it seems that the first frequent use of the words ‘other minds’ is to be credited to him (Somerville, 1989, p. 249). However, those minds are not observable. Nor is our belief that they exist to be reached or supported by reasoning. For Reid it is self-evident, an innate belief, that there are minds other than one's own. The analogical inference to other minds held sway until about the middle of the twentieth century. Increasingly argued to be problematic, the analogical inference lost ground within philosophy. It was widely thought to be inadequate because of two of its features. The first was that the conclusion was not only uncheckable but was such that it was logically impossible to check up on it. The second was that the argument seemed to be an inductive generalisation based on one only case. This second feature was thought to be problematic in itself but was thought by many to have as a consequence that each of us learns from our own case what it is to be in pain or some other mental state. This consequence was thought to be completely unacceptable. The more favoured notion that emerged from these difficulties besetting the anological inference was (strongly influenced by Wittgenstein's writings on the nature of first and third person psychological statements) that criterial evidence could deal with the problem in a way that avoided the problems besetting the analogical inference. An adjacent view, thought distinct, was that we are able, at least in enough cases, to know directly that other human beings had minds. Widespread dissatisfaction with the views outlined so far increasingly led Anglo-American philosophers to the view that the best explanation for how other human beings behave is that they behave as they do because their behaviour is caused by (their) mental states. However, all of the views remain in play and (variously) contested.

15 The Epistemological Question
External world: mind-independent objects Immediate experience and inference (I hear a screeching when I step on the brakes and infer that the pads are worn and metal is grinding on metal. Sight is no different. Veridical and non-veridical experience Do we have any good reason to believe that any of our experiences are veridical? How could we know?

16 Representative Theory of Perception

17 The Veil of Perception

18 Thought Experiments We want to know what is logically (or metaphysically) possible E.g. Is it possible for persons to “exchange bodies”? Survive bodily death? Reappear in resurrection worlds? Be reincarnated? Conceivability is (roughly) a criterion for logical possibility so… We produce and consider thought experiments to ascertain what is conceivable. These thought experiments—stories about zombies, transport via Startrek Machine, Brains in Vats and life in the Matrix, apparent cases of body-exchange, etc. are fictions intended to pump our intuitions.

19 The Mind-Body Problem Zombies: physical duplicates of “normal” humans who do not have qualia. Qualia: contents of immediate experience, “raw feels” or “sense- data” The Mind-Body Problem (crude version): is the mind the brain? (or, are mental states just brain states?) Conceivability as a criterion for (“logical”) possibility

20 Zombies Argument for Mind-Body Dualism
Zombies are logically possible (we can conceive of them, right?) A zombie’s brain states are perfect duplicates of the brain states of normal individuals experiencing qualia There must be something more then that brain state when an individual has qualia The mind is not just the brain (mental states are not just brain states)

21 More Mind-Body Problem
The Knowledge Argument, Reversed Spectrum, etc. Can machines think? The Turing Test and Searle’s Chinese Room Are meanings in the head? Hilary Putnam and the Twin Earth problem

22 The Problem of Universals
Statements of the form “x is P” can be true or false. Intuitively, what makes them true or false is an object’s having a property Intuitively, when objects are similar it is because they “share” properties But are there “properties” and, if so, what are they? And how can they be shared?

23 All standard solutions are unintuitive!
Nominalism makes it difficult to account for the fact that some ways of grouping are correct while others incorrect. Conceptualism begs the question: What is it in the object that corresponds to my idea and what is that correspondance? What makes my idea of red the same as your idea? Realism posits crazy, immaterial objects

24 Reference Plato’s question: “how can I think the thing that is not?”
Fictional entities: What makes it true that Pegasus is a flying horse-- and not a unicorn or magic mushroom? What makes it true that Pegasus doesn’t exist? Again, construing Pegasus, et. al. as “ideas” doesn’t help so we seem stuck with the existence of crazy, non-existant objects. Russell’s theory of descriptions & the Russell-Strawson debate.

25 Logical Positivism Metaphilosophical issues: Hume’s Fork and the rejection of “metaphysics” Hume’s Fork and the Analytic/Synthetic distinction Phenomenalism: objects as “permanent possibilities of sensation” Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”

26 Identity An equivalence relation Reflexivity: x = x
Symmetry: if x = y then y = x Transitivity: if x = y and y = z then x = z An indiscernibility relation: if x = y then they have all the same properties Is the converse true also, i.e. if x and y have all the same properties does x = y?

27 Identity Puzzles Indiscernibility of Identicals and Frege’s puzzle
Identity of Indiscernibles, symmetrical worlds (“Black’s Balls”) and Eternal Return “Branching Cases”: the Ship of Theseus, etc. Personal identity: Locke’s identity problem, survival, “fission,” etc.

28 And now for some solutions…
…none of which are conclusive!

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