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The Cold War at its Height, 1953- 1963 Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945.

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Presentation on theme: "The Cold War at its Height, 1953- 1963 Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945."— Presentation transcript:

1 The Cold War at its Height, 1953- 1963 Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945

2 The paradox of a ‘thaw’ and a Cold War Intensification after Stalin Improved Soviet-American relations – ‘thaw?’ - the importance of avoiding Hot War - Molotov’s peace offensive - Khrushchev’s reformist ambition and rise to domestic pre- eminence - Khrushchev’s commitment to peaceful co-existence - disarmament proposals and diplomacy Cold War intensification - spies, psy-war, covert ops and propaganda - growing Soviet interest in the non-European world - the strengthening of the blocs

3 Tensions over the future of Germany before the East German revolt The dangers and opportunities of unification - harnessing united Germany’s economic and military strength - less control through better integration in the Soviet Eastern zone - more control through better integration in the American Western zones Soviet fears - German revanchism - West German acquisition of nuclear weapons - the creation of a West European Defence Community with a rearmed West Germany Soviet aims - demilitarization - unity only through a provisional government before elections - preventing the ratification of the EDC US fears - negotiations bringing divisions in the alliance and - the strengthening of communism in a united Germany Western aims - strengthening West Germany - West German rearmament - the Eden plan to allow a united Germany to take over W Germany’s alliance commitments

4 Instability in the Soviet bloc: the East German Revolt 1953 The East German challenge - to reduce the attractiveness of the Berlin gateway to the West - to make East Germany more controllable through rigid economic discipline The intensified collectivization The Soviet East German challenge - to make communism a more successful movement by displaying its alleged achievements - to make East Germany more attractive through reducing controls The liberalization proposals from Beria The 1953 revolt - more extensive than first believed Consequences - greater Soviet incentive to consolidate and formalize the division of Germany - slowing of the pace of change in East Germany

5 Instability in the Soviet bloc: the initial Hungarian Revolt 1956 Nagy’s reforms - against concentration on heavy industry - release of some political prisoners - led to replacement by Rakosi Workers wanted factory committees not control through Communist party Protests wide ranging - resentment at Moscow control - student demo in Budapest 23 October spreads to other areas Soviet troops arrive 24 October after Nagy appeal to demonstrators As armed resistance grows 25 October Mikoyan and Suslov call for political solution 28 October: Soviet withdrawal of troops from Budapest

6 The revolt’s bloody conclusion in Hungary Domestic opposition to withdrawal in Moscow - Soviet bloc cohesion and the forms of control - personalities in the Kremlin - ideological competition with the West and anti-colonial opportunities New international developments - Israeli invasion of Egypt 29 October - British bombing of Egypt 31 October - US announcement of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries Soviet fear of losing out in Europe and the Middle East influencing Moscow’s troop redeployment in Hungary - no confidence in Egyptian resistance Hungarian decision to withdraw from Warsaw Pact I November AFTER Soviet forces redeployed around Budapest

7 Early post–Stalin peace efforts and arms control Soviet proposals - Malenkov’s 1953 call for an international body to supervise comprehensive disarmament after the creation of the UN Disarmament Commission in 1951 - no first use agreement, 1954 The American response - 5 point plan Anglo-American plan for arms reduction - Eisenhower’s ‘Chance for Peace’ speech, April 1953 - Dulles and European neutral zones - Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech, December 1953 Genuineness of the Soviet and American plans - links to Cold War ‘liberation’ US views on the role of talks and the Disarmament Dilemma

8 Improved Soviet-American relations in 1955 The Post ‘New Look’ position - disarmament and the ending of the Cold War – cause or consequence for the future of U S Cold War policy - Soviet disarmament priorities - Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections 1955 Geneva Summit and the Austrian peace treaty Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ speech July 1955 and the reactions in Washington and Moscow Malenkov, Khrushchev and peaceful co-existence The situation by the end of 1956 - success or failure for peace progress

9 American fighting of the Cold War through new Hot War strategies Defining the ‘New Look’ strategy autumn 1953 - the deterrent value of thermo-nuclear weapons - the cost benefits - the covert operations Cold War emphasis of the ‘New Look’ - the importance of allies in the ‘New Look’ Sputnik 1957 - US hysteria after the launch - its value to the Soviet Union The Gaither Committee - the hydrogen bomb and civil defence - Curtis Le May and nuclear weapons Eisenhower and the bomber and missile gaps - The rationale for Cold War and Hot War strategy

10 The 1958 Berlin Crisis Importance of Berlin - important enough for US to risk general war - centre of western offensive Cold War measures - tunnel for eavesdropping Soviet concerns over Berlin in the 1950s - western subversion - the flow of refugees to the West - the construction of West German nuclear storage facilities and West German bomber units becoming nuclear capable US concerns - maintaining access through East Germany - no practical conventional defence for Berlin in Hot War Soviet aims - enhancing East Germany’s position by changing Berlin’s position in Germany - preventing domestic hard line opponents of peaceful co-existence benefiting from any apparent weakness in Germany and Berlin -preventing West German economic or military pre-eminence affecting Berlin Soviet attempts to achieve them November 1958 - transferring Soviet occupation rights to East Germany - demanding Berlin become a free city in 6 months or East Germany should be given full sovereignty over the city

11 The 1961 Berlin Crisis Expiring of Soviet ultimatum 1959 - Eisenhower and Macmillan summit and CFM suggestions - Khrushchev waiting to exploit the new Kennedy administration Pressure from Ulbricht to solve the growing exodus problem - by making Berlin a free city - by formalizing the division of Germany in a 4 power treaty - by giving East Germany control of the access routes Khrushchev’s ultimatums - a separate peace with East Germany if no solution - Vienna meeting with Kennedy 1961- intimidation tactic American determination to preserve the status quo - attitudes of De Gaulle and Macmillan and fear of war - vital to preserve Western sector - preventing any change in Berlin affecting the Cold War balance in ways appearing beneficial to the Soviets The growing crisis - US conventional arms build up - Soviet defence budget increases - Shelepin’s offensive proposals - the defensive solution with the building of the wall

12 Fighting the Cold War: the US Offensive Strategies Criticism of NSC 68 in 1953 - no disintegration of Soviet power - no transformation of Soviet ideology and diplomacy - no psychological war plan to overthrow the Soviet regime Operation Solarium defines the Cold War/Hot War options and the choices of means of realizing them in June 1953 -Teams A and C and the choices of fighting the Cold War -Team B and the nuclear issue Solarium Team A - the aim of East European rollback but a willingness to accept the means of peaceful co-existence in the interim Solarium Team C - the aim of destroying the Soviet Union and the rejection of medium term peaceful co-existence US doubts over an offensive Cold War strategy and its modification - NSC 162 - aim of getting arrangements in accordance with US interests - NSC 5501 Tensions and contradictions between subversion and peaceful coexistence in the Cold War

13 Stability in the Western bloc: European unity The failure of EDC The Western European Union - German rearmament and NATO - Britain’s European military role The Messina Conference and the European Economic Community - different European approaches to closer economic integration - The Spaak Committee The British rejection of a Common Market - EFTA and the Commonwealth US policy to European nuclear co-operation - the MLF idea - Britain’s ‘independent’ deterrent - ‘Grand Designs’

14 Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies: the first Offshore Island crisis China’s position in the communist world The Formosa problem - sovereignty - Beijing’s quest for status US relations with Formosa Mao’s aims in the First Offshore Island Crisis -in shelling Jinmen Sept ember1954 -in attacking Dachen January 1955 US response and the divisions in Washington - use of force - role of tactical nuclear weapons Chinese relations with Moscow

15 Offensive Cold War Chinese strategies: the 2nd Offshore Is Crisis Mao’s aims in the Second Offshore Island Crisis August 1958 -changes in Chinese foreign policy 1957 - policy to the US - policy to the Soviet Union and dislike of peaceful coexistence US reactions - the dilemma of needing to assist Chiang while restraining him - the ambiguous nature of US military commitments Stalemate and compromise autumn 1958 Consequences Effect on the Sino-Soviet split - the nature of military force and strategy (Hot War) in the Cold War as seen in Beijing and Moscow

16 Offensive Cold War Soviet strategies and the Missile Crisis Explanations for Khrushchev’s decision to install the missiles April1962: - Khrushchev’s penchant for brinkmanship and risk taking - to protect Castro from American aggression and assassination - to create the impression of reducing the Soviet nuclear disadvantage - to appease domestic critics - Khrushchev’s perceptions of Kennedy as a weak president US reactions to the discovery of the missiles in October 1962 - nature of the Executive Committee - the initial reactions and support for an air strike - Kennedy, McNamara and quarantine - the Soviet letters and Robert Kennedy’s role - Khrushchev’s retreat and the secret Jupiter deal Consequences for the Cold War -increased need to reduce the risk of Hot War and the renewed peaceful co-existence commitment - more disarmament pressures - protection of Cuba

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