Presentation on theme: "Numerical General Equilibrium Analysis of China’s Impacts from Possible Mega Trade Deals Department of Economics Chunding Li 1 Jing Wang 1 John Whalley."— Presentation transcript:
Numerical General Equilibrium Analysis of China’s Impacts from Possible Mega Trade Deals Department of Economics Chunding Li 1 Jing Wang 1 John Whalley 1,2 1. Western University 2. Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Background-1 The term “mega deal” has been widely used in relation to large prospective trade deals between the US and Europe (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership; TTIP) and in Asia and the Pacific (Trans-Pacific Partnership; TPP). Here we both argue that the phenomenon of mega deal is much broader than just these two (admittedly large) prospective deals, and we discuss the implications for China of the potential changes in the global trade regime spreading mega deals could imply.
Background-2 The impacts of mega trade deals, stressed by traditional trade theory, include both the benefits of improved and more secure access to export markets abroad, and the benefits to both consumers and producers at home of increased specialization and improved variety and quality of products imported, reduced in price by the reductions in tariffs toward bilateral trading partners. Other effects, including terms of trade effects also enter.
Background-3 We use numerical general equilibrium simulation methods to explore possible mega trade deal impacts on both China and other main big countries in this paper. The analytical novelty of the paper relative to present literature lies in two directions. The first is we divide trade costs into tariff and non-tariff barriers and calculate trade costs between countries empirically with gravity model methodology. The second is to use an inside money structure to form an endogenous trade imbalance model which is more consistent with reality given China’s large imbalances in trade.
Background-4 We use a 13-country Armington type global general equilibrium model. Each country produces two-goods (Tradable goods and Non-tradable goods) and has two- factors (capital and labor). The model captures trade costs and uses a monetary structure of inside money both so as to also endogenously determine trade imbalance effects from the trade initiative and also allow calibration to a base case capturing China’s large trade surplus. We use a trade cost calculation method that recognizes limitations of data by using an estimation procedure that follows Wong (2012) and Novy (2008).
Background-5 We capture endogenously determined trade imbalances by incorporating both current consumption and expected future incremental consumption into the model using an analytical structure attributed to Patinkin (1956), also adopted in Archibald and Lipsey (1960), and used more recently in Whalley et al (2011) and Li and Whalley (2012, 2014). We calibrate the model to 2011 data and use counterfactual simulations to explore the effects.
Flow of Presentation China’s Possible Mega Deals Model Structure Data and Parameters Calibration Simulation of the Effects from Possible Mega Deals Concluding Remarks
Table 1: Regional Trade Agreements in Place for China as of 2013 RTADate Concluded China-Pakistan Bilateral-with Developing Countries November 2006 China-Chile FTANovember 2005 China-Peru FTAApril 2009 China-Costa Rica FTAApril 2010 China-New Zealand FTA Bilateral-with Developed Countries April 2008 China-Singapore FTAOctober 2008 China-Iceland FTAApril 2013 China-Switzerland FTAJuly 2013 China-ASEAN FTAMultilateralNovember 2004 CEPA Domestic FTAs March 2003 ECFAJune 2010 China Pilot Free-trade ZoneSeptember 2013
Table 2: Existing and Prospective Mega Trade Deals for China, The EU and The US (Where All Partners Have GDP above 1 Trillion USD) ChinaThe EUThe US In Place ASEAN-China; EU-Mexico; EU-Korea; US-Canada-Mexico NAFTA; US-Australia; US-Korea; Under Negotiation or Discussion Australia –China (RCEP); China-Japan-Korea; China-India; China-US (Not officially started, but has been discussed in media and research papers); EU-ASEAN; EU-US TTIP; EU-India; EU-Japan; EU-Canada; US-EU TTIP; US-Japan (under TPP); US-ASEAN (effectively under TPP); US-China;
Table 3: China’s Main Possible Mega Deals Mega DealStageContents RCEP Under negotiation; began from 2012 and scheduled to conclude by the end of 2015 RCEP will cover trade in goods, trade in services, investment, economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute settlement and other issues. RCEP will have broader and deeper engagement with significant improvements over the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. CJK FTA Under negotiation; began from 2012 Three rounds of talks were held in 2013. The pace of the negotiations has been slowed by the island disputes between China-Japan and Japan-Korea. No specific negotiation contents are known. China-TPP Research level discussion China-TPP trade deal is under consideration and discussion by researchers. China-US FTA Research level discussion There are as yet no official statements concerning or discussions of a China-US free trade agreement, but at a research level, a China-US free trade agreement has been discussed. China-US bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiation is in process and it will lay a foundation for possible FTA negotiation. China-India FTA Formal mutual research stage China and India have conducted a Joint Study Group which finalized a report on the feasibility of a China-India Regional Trading Arrangement (RTA) in October 2007.
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)-1 The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the 10 ASEAN Member countries and its FTA Partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand). RCEP aims to be a significant step in the evolution of trade policy frameworks in East Asia. RCEP started as a study group for an FTA between ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea (known as ASEAN+3), with a parallel study process for an ASEAN+6 FTA, which included the ASEAN+3 partners plus Australia, India, and New Zealand. It has now formalized itself as a 16 country negotiation.
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)-2 The participants in the RCEP FTA negotiations have a total population of over 3 billion people and a share of around 27 per cent of global trade (based on 2012 WTO figures), covering GDP of around $US21 trillion (2012 IMF figures).China is one of 16 countries participating in this mega deal negotiation. There have been two rounds of RCEP negotiations thus far in May 2013 and September 2013 respectively. Three working groups (on Goods, Services and Investment) were established in the first round. During the second round of negotiation, discussions continued on a services chapter. In goods, among other topics sessions were held on Customs Procedures, Rules of Origin, and initial exchanges on tariff negotiations and on non-tariff barriers to market access. A third round of negotiation was held in January 2014 and RCEP negotiations are targeted to conclude by the end of 2015.
China-Japan-South Korea FTA-1 The China–Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement is a proposed trilateral free trade agreement between China, Japan and South Korea. Negotiations on the agreement were started in 2012. Three rounds of talks were held in 2013. The pace of the Japanese-Chinese element of the negotiations has, however, been slowed by the Diaoyu islands dispute with Japan.
China-Japan-South Korea FTA-2 In the first two rounds, the three sides discussed key issues such as ways to lower tariffs and the scope of future negotiations based on terms of reference adopted at the first round of talks. The second round of negotiations included working-group meetings on goods, services and competition along with expert dialogue on intellectual property rights and e-commerce. The three Asian countries talked about the trilateral FTA's modality, such as how to draft liberalization for goods at the third round of negotiation. Working group meetings were held to discuss a wide range of topics such as indications of origin, customs, trade remedy, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) along with services, investment, competition, general rules and intellectual property rights. Discussions among experts were on e-commerce, environment, government procurement and food sectors.
China-India Regional Trade Agreement-1 China and India have conducted a Joint Study Group which finalized a report on the feasibility of a China- India Regional Trading Arrangement (RTA) in October 2007. It is claimed in this report that the RTA will promote economic growth, enhance welfare gains and increase bilateral trade through efficient allocation of resources. And the India-China RTA would be mutually advantageous and the bilateral trade liberalization will bring welfare gains of one billion dollars to India and 1.5 billion dollars to China. The report also indicates that the two countries enjoy strong complementarities in their trade in services, a statement said here today.
China-India Regional Trade Agreement-2 After the finalization of the joint study on an India-China FTA, there is no movement on launching negotiations on this FTA. According to an Chinese researcher’s opinion, there are mainly three reasons for this: competitiveness in industrial structure of two countries; political mutual trust and strategic consensus; and differences in geopolitical objectives. He also argues that maybe there is opportunity for China and India to deepen their bilateral trade cooperation during RCEP negotiations. India and China launched the first round of strategic economic dialogue in September 2011. The third round of the strategic economic dialogue was held on March 18 2014. Bilateral cooperation in sectors like railways infrastructure, information technology, energy, and finance was emphasized. Both sides decided to set up a task force under the SED to enable Chinese companies to invest in industries and industrial zones in India. Action Plans on joint studies in sustainable urbanization and energy planning were also signed for completion before the next round of the Dialogue.
China-India Regional Trade Agreement-3 As two main emerging countries, China and India have much benefit to gain from an RTA, and they are near each other in geography (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2005). These factors might suggest that China and India may take further a regional trade agreement negotiation in the reasonably near future, but with higher tariffs in India Indian manufacturing interests remain cautious.
China-TPP Free Trade Agreement-1 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is one of the most important FTA arrangements under negotiation in the Asia Pacific region; and it has received global attention in recent years. China is, for now, not involved in the TPP negotiation, but some Chinese researchers have proposed that China should take part in the TPP negotiation (Song and Yuan, 2012). There is substantial secrecy about the possible content of TPP, with as yet no official documents released.
China-TPP Free Trade Agreement-2 Despite the secrecy, there are many debates about whether China should join the TPP negotiations and they are lively. Not only Chinese media but also some commentators from the US and Europe have expressed interest in this topic and published comments. Newspaper commentary on one side of the debate has argued that “the unstated aim of the TPP is to create a ‘high level’ trade agreement that excludes the world’s second-biggest economy, China” and doubted such an attempt would be successful (David Pilling, Financial Times, May 22 2013). Some media in the US, however, have expressed the opposite view that the US never had any intention to exclude China and that the US would welcome China's participation in the negotiation. A Spokesman for the Chinese Commerce Ministry has claimed that China would consider positively any proposal inviting China to join the TPP negotiation.
China-TPP Free Trade Agreement-3 The objective of the TPP negotiations remains to develop an FTA agreement which will be able to adapt and incorporate current issues, concerns and interests of members. Since the initiation of TPP in 2010, 18 formal rounds of negotiations have been held. Working groups have been established in areas of market access, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of origin, customs cooperation, investment, services, financial services, telecommunications, e-commerce, business mobility, government procurement, competition policy, intellectual property, labor, environment, capacity building, trade remedies, and legal and institutional issues. A unique departure from other FTAs is the group’s additional focus on cross-cutting “horizontal issues” such as regional integration, regulatory coherence, competitiveness, development and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
China-TPP Free Trade Agreement-4 TPP member countries are home to more than 500 million people; one fifth of APEC’s population. With Japan’s recent TPP entry, the 12 participating economies will account for nearly 40 percent of global GDP and about one-third of all world trade. This regional FTA could have significant impacts on the global economy, and China’s participation would enlarge this impact.
China-US Free Trade Agreement There are as yet no official statements concerning, or discussions of, a China-US free trade agreement, but at a research level, a China-US free trade agreement has been discussed. Although there will be a lot of difficulties, as the two biggest countries in the world it may be possible to initiate a free trade agreement negotiation in the future. Trade and investment between the U.S. and China have continued to grow at a substantial rate. As with any relationship between major powers, there is friction and concern on both sides about how the trade relationship is conducted. US negotiating concerns would likely focus beyond tariffs with such issues as alleged currency manipulation and its effects on the trade surplus, and state owned enterprises and their trade impacts. Chinese objectives could potentially focus on security of access to US markets, and restrictions on foreign ownership and investment.
Model Description We use a 13-country Armington type global general equilibrium model. These 13 countries are China, the US, the EU, Japan, Korea, Canada, Mexico, India, AN (Australia plus New Zealand), CP (Chile plus Peru), BMSV (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore plus Vietnam), CILMPT (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippine plus Thailand) and the rest of the world (ROW). Each country produces two-goods (Tradable goods and Non-tradeable goods), and has two-factors (capital and labor) which are intersectorally mobile but internationally immobile.
Fig. 1 Nesting Structure In Production and Consumption Functions
(1) Endogenous Trade Imbalance General Equilibrium Model with Inside Money In our global general equilibrium model, we add a monetary structure using inside money following Whalley et al (2011) and Li and Whalley (2014) to endogenously determine the trade imbalance, which is offset through inter-temporal trade across countries in money and also allows for a calibration to a base case where China has a large trade surplus.
(2) Some Other Model Structures for Sensitivity Analysis I. Endogenous Monetary Trade Imbalance GE Model To accommodate a trade surplus or deficit as an endogenous variable in the model structure, we also use a monetized extension of this structure incorporating a fixed exchange rate and non- accommodative monetary policy following Whalley and Wang (2010), and Li and Whalley (2014). We only consider transactions demand for money in each country and for simplicity assume unitary velocity.
II. Exogenous Fixed Trade Imbalance GE Model Exogenous fixed trade imbalance general equilibrium structure is a traditional assumption, which assumes that trade imbalances for all countries are fixed all the time.
Non-tariff trade are different from the import tariff: They do not collect revenue, and importers need to use actual resources to cover the costs involved. In the numerical model, we assume that the resource costs involved in overcoming all other non-tariff barriers are denominated in terms of domestic non-tradable goods. We incorporate this resource using feature through use of non-tradable goods equal in value terms to the cost of the barrier. We assume reduced non-tariff trade costs (including transportation cost) will thus occur under trade liberalization as an increase in non-tradable goods consumption by the representative consumer in importing countries. (3) Trade Cost Calculation in the Model
Trade costs calculations follow a procedure set out in Novy (2008) and Wong (2012). Their method is to take the ratios of bilateral trade flows over local trade, scaled to parameter values from a gravity model. This measure is consistent with a gravity equation and robust across a variety of models.
Fig. 2 Representative Trade Costs Structure Source: Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and De (2006).
Table 4: Ad Valorem Tariff-Equivalent Trade Costs Between Large Countries in 2011 (%) CountryThe USThe EUChinaJapanCanadaIndia The US-25.326.534.415.185.4 The EU25.3-26.842.340.872.8 China26.526.8-25.242.773.3 Japan34.442.325.2-51.5102.9 Canada15.140.842.751.5-1.194 India85.472.873.3102.9119.4-
Data -1 We use 2011 as our base year in building a benchmark general equilibrium dataset There are 13 economies in our model, AN -Australia and New Zealand, CP - Chile and Peru, BMSV - Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam, CILMPT - Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippine and Thailand. For the two goods, we assume secondary industry (manufacturing) reflects tradable goods, and primary and tertiary industries (agriculture, extractive industries, and services) yield non-tradable goods. For the two factor inputs, we use total labor income (wage) to denote labor values for inputs by sector.
Data -2 We divide trade costs into two parts, import tariffs and all other non-tariff barriers. For ROW, we cannot obtain its import tariff directly, and so we use European Union’s tariff rate to denote these values. We calculate all other non-tariff barriers by using trade costs minus import tariffs. There are no available estimates of elasticities for individual countries on the demand and production sides of the model. We set all these elasticities in our model to 2 (according to (Betina et al, 2006)), We change these elasticities later in sensitivity analysis to check their influence on simulation results.
Table 5: Import Tariffs for Countries in 2011 (Unit: %) CountryUSAEUChinaJapanKoreaCanadaMexico Tariff184.108.40.206.3220.127.116.11 CountryIndiaANCPBMSVCILMPTROW/ Tariff18.104.22.168.88.17.8/ Notes: (1) Import tariffs here are simple average MFN applied tariff rates. (2) We use the average individual country’s import tariff to get country groups’ import tariff. (3) AN denotes Australia+New Zealand, CP denotes Chile+Peru, BMSV denotes Brunei+Malaysia+Singapore+Vietnam, CILMPT denotes Cambodia+Indonesia+Laos+Myanmar+Philippine+Thailand. (4) We use import tariff of the world to denote the tariff for the ROW. Source: WTO Statistics Database.
Table 6: Non-Tariff Barriers between Countries in 2011 (Unit: %) Countr y USEUChinaJapanKorea Canad a Mexic o IndiaANCPBMSVCILMPTROW US00.2180.230.3090.2580.1160.1070.8190.190.3760.4330.6790.597 EU0.200.2150.370.2660.3550.3380.6750.2090.4310.4090.6930.596 China0.1690.17200.1560.0750.3310.3160.6370.0790.3180.2390.3930.34 Japan0.2910.370.19900.1940.4620.4880.9760.2140.5440.2810.5380.485 Korea0.1720.1980.050.12600.340.2620.670.0560.3180.1430.370.318 Canada0.1060.3630.3820.470.41600.2671.1490.3790.5050.7480.9380.843 Mexico0.0590.3080.3290.4580.30.22901.1050.350.4030.6560.9750.873 India0.7280.6020.6070.9030.6651.0681.06201.0181.0930.8751.4760.499 AN0.2010.2380.1510.2430.1530.40.4091.1200.7170.1930.6940.614 CP0.3620.4350.3650.5480.390.5010.4371.170.69200.9271.0450.938 BMSV0.3210.3140.2870.2860.2160.5450.6910.3530.1690.62800.2870.268 CILMP T 0.6330.6650.4080.510.410.9020.9771.5210.6371.0130.45400.358 ROW0.5540.5710.3580.460.3610.810.8780.5470.560.9090.4380.3610
Part 4------ Simulation of the Effects from Possible Mega Deals
China’s actual and potential mega deals Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) China-Japan-South Korea FTA China-India Regional Trade Agreement China-TPP Free Trade Agreement China-US Free Trade Agreement
(1) Impacts of Mega Deals on Welfare On the welfare effects restricted to tariff, all free trade agreement participation countries will gain except China in China-India FTA and China-US FTA. All FTA non- participation countries will lose. For China, under only tariff elimination situation, almost all FTA arrangement can benefit China’s welfare except China-India FTA and China-US FTA. Under the trade cost elimination welfare effects, all FTA participation countries will gain from China’s potential participation in mega deals including China, and all FTA non-participation countries will lose. For China, China-TPP will generate the highest welfare outcome on our model, the next highest is RCEP, and then CJK.
Table 7: Welfare Impacts Restricted to Tariffs (Hicks Equivalent Variation as a % of GDP) FTAs/CountryChinaUSEUJapanKoreaIndia (1) China-India FTA -0.014-0.013-0.014 -0.0531.683 (2) China-Japan-Korea FTA 0.014-0.008-0.010.0282.059-1.982 (3) China-TPP 0.1390.003-0.040.009-0.381-0.146 (4) RCEP 0.085-0.058-0.054-0.0492.7651.791 (5) China-US FTA -0.0290.0090.0010.0120.039-1.934 (6) 1+2+4+5 0.145-0.06-0.057-0.0502.7671.787 (7) All Mega Deals 1-5 0.077-0.043-0.08-0.0632.5911.691
Figure 3: Welfare Impacts on China of Mega Deals Restricted to Tariffs
Table 8: Welfare Impacts for Trade Cost Changes (Hicks Equivalent Variation as a % of GDP)---EV/GDP FTAs/Country ChinaUSEU ABABAB (1) China-India FTA0.0600.148-0.01-0.017-0.004-0.006 (2) China-Japan-Korea FTA0.2460.505-0.013-0.019-0.012-0.015 (3) China-TPP0.5521.010.3430.735-0.062-0.086 (4) RCEP0.5381.065-0.092-0.13-0.079-0.106 (5) China-US FTA0.1080.2720.1380.2890.0020.003 (6) 1+2+4+50.7151.3760.0380.155-0.078-0.099 (7) All Mega Deals 1-50.5961.3780.2790.712-0.115-0.09 FTAs/Country JapanKoreaIndia ABABAB (1) China-India FTA-0.014-0.023-0.038-0.0641.4583.05 (2) China-Japan-Korea FTA0.2750.5652.6963.382-1.686-1.298 (3) China-TPP0.5571.219-0.542-0.719-0.226-0.33 (4) RCEP0.5711.3454.0265.4734.568.697 (5) China-US FTA0.0180.0250.0840.138-1.625-1.215 (6) 1+2+4+50.5761.3564.0835.6024.5818.756 (7) All Mega Deals 1-50.7591.9943.7645.7764.4448.599 A- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 25% of non-tariff barriers; B- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 50% of non-tariff barriers.
FTAs/Country ChinaUSEU ABCABCABC (1) China-India FTA -0.0150.0350.07-0.014-0.01-0.017-0.014-0.004-0.006 (2) China-Japan- Korea FTA -0.1240.0810.287-0.009-0.014-0.019-0.01-0.013-0.016 (3) China-TPP 0.0580.3730.68-0.0110.2730.545-0.041-0.067-0.098 (4) RCEP 0.0060.3540.694-0.061-0.097-0.141-0.057-0.084-0.116 (5) China-US FTA -0.129-0.0010.1280.0030.0970.1780.0010.002 (6) 1+2+4+5 0.0460.4850.918-0.069-0.0130.019-0.059-0.085-0.114 (7) 1+2+3+4+5 -0.0180.3790.841-0.0570.2090.473-0.083-0.125-0.112 Table 9: Welfare Impacts for Trade Cost Changes (Hicks Compensation Variation as a % of GDP)---CV/GDP A-Assume FTA eliminated tariff only; B- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 25% of non-tariff barriers; C- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 50% of non-tariff barriers.
(2) Impacts of Mega Deals on Total Trade On the trade aspect, nearly all FTA participating countries’ trade are positively impacted, but almost all FTA non-participation countries’ trade are hurt. For China, all mega deals together will generate the highest trade benefit in our model. RCEP will generate the highest trade benefit among single FTAs under only tariff elimination situation, and China-TPP will generate the highest trade benefit among single FTAs under trade cost elimination situation. Comparing trade effects of these different possible mega deals, positive impacts of China-TPP is the most significant one in the model simulation results; RCEP is the next most one, and then are sequentially China- Japan-Korea FTA, China-US FTA and China-India FTA
Fig. 4 Trade Impacts for China of Possible Mega Deals Source: Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and De (2006).
FTAs/Country ChinaUSEU ABCABCABC (1) China-India FTA 0.2880.7681.425-0.002-0.015-0.025-0.014-0.031-0.055 (2) China-Japan- Korea FTA 1.3572.5163.819-0.006-0.017-0.0280.001-0.015-0.033 (3) China-TPP 3.2926.51610.2093.6776.88410.515-0.071-0.321-0.589 (4) RCEP 3.6296.3639.608-0.067-0.107-0.15-0.108-0.173-0.248 (5) China-US FTA 0.1261.5523.1730.9261.7732.727-0.027-0.199-0.397 (6) 1+2+4+5 4.6198.61513.2770.8311.6282.521-0.17-0.405-0.677 (7) 1+2+3+4+5 4.6598.59913.3013.6816.91910.782-0.122-0.396-0.541 Table 10: Trade Impacts of China’s Potential Mega Deals (Unit: % Change) A-Assume FTA eliminated tariff only; B- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 25% of non-tariff barriers; C- Assume FTA eliminates tariff and 50% of non-tariff barriers.
(3) Impacts of Mega Deals on Exports and Imports The results are similar to the results for total trade. On the export (or import) side, all FTA participation countries will benefit from potential mega deals, but non-participating countries will lose. For China, China-TPP and RCEP have generated the most significant positive export (or import) effects in our model, the next most significant one is China-US FTA, and then is China-Japan-Korea FTA. China-India FTA will generate the lowest export (or import) benefit.
Fig. 5 Export Impacts for China of Possible Mega Deals
Table 11: Export Impacts of China’s Potential Mega Deals (Unit: % Change) Note ： A -% change in exports assuming FTA restricted to tariff changes only. B - % change in exports assuming FTA includes tariffs plus 25% of trade costs. C - % change in exports assuming FTA includes tariffs plus 50% of trade costs.
Fig. 6 Import Impacts for China of Possible Mega Deals
Table 12: Import Impacts of China’s Potential Mega Deals (Unit: % Change) Note: A - % change in exports assuming FTA restricted to tariff changes only. B - % change in exports assuming FTA includes tariffs plus 25% of trade costs. C - % change in exports assuming FTA includes tariffs plus 50% of trade costs.
(4) Sensitivity Analysis with Different Model Structures Endogenous monetary trade imbalance model Exogenous Fixed Trade Imbalance Model Almost all results show the same direction (positive or negative). The differences between results from two model structures are significant for the exogenous trade imbalance case.
Table 13: Impacts for China of Different Inside Money and Monetary Structures FTAs/CountriesEV/GDP (%)EXPORT (% Change)IMPORT (% Change)TRADE (% Change) Model StructureInside MMonetaryInside MMonetaryInside MMonetaryInside MMonetary (1) China-India FTA 0.0600.0811.2201.1220.2520.2910.2520.737 (2) China-Japan-Korea FTA 0.2460.6061.7371.6573.4053.7883.4053.788 (3) China-TPP 0.5521.2407.3767.1345.5346.5405.5346.859 (4) RCEP 0.5381.3996.4495.3666.2667.4566.2666.334 (5) China-US FTA 0.1080.1812.0282.6601.0081.1121.0081.943 (6) 1+2+4+5 0.7151.6409.5969.0017.4978.8187.4978.917 (7) All Mega Deals 1-5 0.5961.7279.7638.6767.2728.9617.2728.808
Table 14: Impacts for China of Different Inside Money and Fixed Imbalance Model Structures FTAs/CountriesEV/GDP (%)EXPORT (% Change)IMPORT (% Change)TRADE (% Change) Model StructureInside MExogenousInside MExogenousInside MExogenousInside MExogenous (1) China-India FTA 0.0600.1401.2200.7430.0600.4221.2200.580 (2) China-Japan-Korea FTA 0.2460.0871.7372.6560.2462.8291.7372.744 (3) China-TPP 0.5521.3807.3764.2270.5526.5637.3765.410 (4) RCEP 0.5381.4136.4493.0230.5387.0706.4495.072 (5) China-US FTA 0.1080.1692.0281.6840.1081.2072.0281.442 (6) 1+2+4+5 0.7151.7269.5965.4370.7158.6239.5967.050 (7) All Mega Deals 1-5 0.5962.2309.7634.0070.5969.2679.7636.670
(5) Sensitivity Analysis with Elasticities Elasticities value to separately equal 1.6, 2 and 2.4; Upper bound inside money value to separately equal 1000, 2000 and 3000; All the impact directions are the same; bigger elasticity value / upper bound inside money value will generate more severe and significant influence.
Table 19: Impacts on China for Elasticity and Inside Money Sensitivity Analysis FTAs ElasticityInside Money E=1.6E=2E=2.4100020003000 (1)CN-INDIA0.0540.0600.0660.0600.0650.070 (2)CJK FTA0.1870.2460.3060.2460.3610.455 (3)CHINA-TPP0.4950.5520.6160.5520.7100.846 (4)RCEP0.4820.5380.6010.5380.7310.895 (5)CHINA-US0.0810.1080.1380.1080.1130.126 (6)1+2+4+50.6380.7150.8000.7150.9161.096 (7)All 1-50.5440.5960.6580.5960.8010.985
1. Overview of Results Simulation results show that almost all FTA participation countries will gain from possible mega deals, but nearly all FTA non-participation countries will lose from these mega deals. In the meanwhile, as non-tariff barrier are eliminated more, the impacts will be more significant. Most Impacts on China on welfare, trade, export and import are positive. Comparatively China- TPP and RCEP will generate the highest welfare outcome in our model for China, the next highest is China-Japan-Korea FTA, and then China-US FTA.
1. Overview of Results - Continued For the US, China-TPP will generate the highest welfare outcome in our model and the next highest is China-US FTA. For the EU, all China involved mega deals have negative welfare outcomes except China-US FTA. For Japan, RCEP will generate the highest welfare outcome and the next highest is China-TPP. For Korea, RCEP will generate the highest welfare outcome and the next highest is China-Japan-Korea FTA. For India, RCEP will generate the highest welfare outcome and the next highest is China- India FTA.