Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

“Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza”

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "“Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza”"— Presentation transcript:

1 “Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza”

2 I Neka teorijska pojašnjenja II Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza III Literatura

3 I Neka teorijska pojašnjenja - O Hladnom ratu - O transatlantskim odnosima - O savezima

4 O Hladnom ratu - Pojam - Škole proučavanja - Razvoj i faze

5 Autor termina hladni ratVreme nastanka terminaPoznati teoretičari koji podržavaju taj stav Don Huan ManuelXIV vekFred Halidej, Volter Lipman 1939 – Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, Ronald Steel Bernard Baruh1947. G. R. Berridge, Alan James, Jan Palmowski, Tabela 1. Različita gledišta o tome ko je autor termina hladni rat

6 Različlita shvatanja značenja pojma hladni rat Glavne odlike jednog takvog shvatanja Poznati teoretičari koji zastupaju jedno takvo shvatanje Shvatanje hladnog rata u širem smislu "svevremensko" značenje pojma važno je stanje intenzivnog neprijateljstva između aktera a ne vreme u kojem se ono dešava ili njegovi akteri Džozef Naj; Oxford Advanced Learner`s Dictionary of current English, Editor Jonathan Crowther, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, Fifth Edition Hana Arent; Ljubivoje Aćimović Shvatanje hladnog rata u užem smislu "konkretno vreme u kojem se hladni rat odvijao (1945 – 1990.) konkretni akteri koji su učestvovali u hladnom ratu – SAD i SSSR dr Andreja Miletić; Jan Palmovski; G. R. Berridge, Alan James; Radovan Vukadinović; Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham Shvatanje hladnog rata kao posebnog međunarodnog sistema Hladni rat kao poseban međunarodni sistem Okvir u kojem se odigrava celokupan međunarodni život od 1945 – Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George; Thomas L. Friedman Tabela 2. Različita gledišta o značenju pojma hladni rat

7 "Škole" hladnog rataKriterijum razlikovanja: "Ko je kriv" Vreme u kom je škola bila aktuelna Glavni predstavnici "Radikalna škola" Sovjetski Savez i StaljinNeposredno po izbijanju hladnog rata i pedesete godine prošlog veka Herbert Fajs "Revizionistička škola" Sjedinjene Američke Države i kapitalizam Od 1960 – ih do početka ihDžojs i Gabrijel Kolko Vilijem A. Vilijams "Postrevizionistička škola" Kriva je bipolarna struktura moći u međunarodnom sistemu posle drugog svetskog rata ali i pogrešne percepcije u odnosima između velikih sila Od kraja 1970 – ih pa do završetka hladnog rata, odnosno otvaranja sovjetskih arhiva Džon Luis Gedis, Melvin Lefler "Postradikalna škola" Krivi su svi, ali su Staljin i Sovjetski Savez ipak najviše krivi Od kraja hladnog rata i otvaranja sovjetskih arhiva pa do danasDžon Luis Gedis Tabela 3. Različite "škole" proučavanja hladnog rata

8 Faze hladnog rata Vreme trajanjaGlavni događaji Glavne ličnosti I Postepeni početak Od vremena drugog svetskog rata pa do februara (britansko povlačenje iz građanskog rata u Grčkoj) Pitanje Poljske; Pitanje Nemačke; Pitanje moreuza; Nuklearno oružje; Ukidanje "lend – liz akta„; Daleki Istok; "Dugački telegram" Frenklin D.Ruzvelt; Vinston Čerčil; Josif V. Staljin; Hari S. Truman Klement Atli; Džordž F. Kenan; Džejms Brns II Proglašenje hladnog rata Od vremena Trumanove doktrine (11. III 1947.) do osnivanja NATO- a (4. IV 1949.) Grčka i Turska; Blokada Berlina; Nasilna promena vlasti u Čehoslovačkoj; Maršalov plan; Strategija kontejnmenta; Sovjetska atomska bomba; Komunistička Kina Hari S. Truman; Josif V. Staljin; Džordž F. Kenan; Ernest Bevin Džordž K. Maršal; Andrej Ždanov Din Ačeson; Vjačeslav Molotov III Vrhunac hladnog rata Od vremena izbijanja rata u Koreji (jun 1950.) do vremena kubanske raketne krize, uključujući i samu krizu (oktobar 1962.) NSC68; Hidrogenska bomba; Strategija masovne odmazde; lansiranje Sputnjika; podizanje berlinskog zida; kubanska raketna kriza; Hari S. Truman ; Josif V. Staljin Mao Ce Tung; Daglas Makartur Džozef Mekarti; Dvajt Ajzenhauer; Nikita Hruščov; Džon F. Kenedi; Džon Foster Dals IV Postepeni detant Od vremena završetka kubanske raketne krize pa do vremena ulaska sovjetkih trupa u Avganistan godine Strategija elastičnog odgovora; KEBS Detant – Kisindžerova triangularna diplomatija; SALT I (ABM) Leonid Brežnjev; Ričard Nikson Henri A. Kisindžer; Josip Broz Tito Helmut Zonenfeld; Džimi Karter V Drugi hladni rat Od vremena posle ulaska sovjetskih trupa u Avganistan do dolaska Mihaila Gorbačova na vlast (mart 1985.) Ponovno naoružavanje; Rakete srednjeg dometa u Evropi; Rat zvezda; SSSR kao žiža zla; Pad cena nafte Zbignjev Bžežinski; Ronald Regan Vilijem "Bil" Kejsi; Jurij Andropov Konstantin Černjenko VI Kraj hladnog rata Od vremena dolaska Gorbačova na vlast u Sovjetskom Savezu do kraja hladnog rata (1989/90/91) INF CFE sporazumi; Talas revolucija u Istočnoj Evropi;START I; Samit KEBS-a u Parizu 1990.; Rušenje berl. Zida Ronald Regan; Džordž H. W. Buš; Mihail Gorbačov; Eduard Ševarnadze Leh Valensa; Vaclav Havel; Erih Honeker Tabela 4. Faze hladnog rata

9 O transatlantskim odnosima

10 Transatlantic relations refers to the historic, cultural, political, economic and social relations between countries on both side of the Atlantic Ocean, specifically between the United States, Canada and the countries in Europe. Zapadna Evropa, Petrovska Evropa ili Evropa do Urala ??? Zajedničko poreklo, religija, kultura, pretnje bezbednosti, zajednički neprijatelji Zajednički interesi i zajedničke vrednosti

11 President Barroso Visit to the White House 8 January 2007, Washington DC

12

13

14 Istorijat transatlantskih odnosa - Charles A. Kupchan, The Fourth Age - The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations

15 - Early History – Mit o Eneji na američki mačin The first of the British colonies to take hold in North America was Jamestown. On the basis of a charter which King James I granted to the Virginia (or London) Company, a group of about 100 men set out for the Chesapeake Bay in Seeking to avoid conflict with the Spanish, they chose a site about 60 kilometers up the James River from the bay.

16

17 In 1620, a group of Leyden Puritans secured a land patent from the Virginia Company, and a group of 101 men, women and children set out for Virginia on board the Mayflower. A storm sent them far north and they landed in New England on Cape Cod. Believing themselves outside the jurisdiction of any organized government, the men drafted a formal agreement to abide by "just and equal laws" drafted by leaders of their own choosing. This was the Mayflower Compact. In December the Mayflower reached Plymouth harbor; the Pilgrims began to build their settlement during the winter. Nearly half the colonists died of exposure and disease, but neighboring Wampanoag Indians provided information that would sustain them: how to grow maize. By the next fall, the Pilgrims had a plentiful crop of corn, and a growing trade based on furs and lumber.

18

19 Balance of Power Era:

20 During the first phase of interaction between the United States and Europe, trans-atlantic relations were guided by balance- of-power logic. The Atlantic order was one of militarized rivalry, with the major players—the United States, Great Britain, France and Spain—regularly jockeying for territory, trade and geopolitical influence. Each balanced against the power of the other, capitalizing on opportunities for individual gain.

21 For the most part, America steered clear of intra- European struggles. However, to defend its hemispheric interests, the United States fought two major wars with Britain and one with Spain. A host of other militarized disputes among the Atlantic powers punctuated the nineteenth century. No sense of community existed between the two sides of the Atlantic. On the contrary, the European powers and the United States saw their respective interests as separate and divergent, embracing a zero-sum view of the security environment.

22 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 11, Europeans "have gravely asserted that all animals, and with them the human species, degenerate in America—that even dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our atmosphere.“ “The choice is between an endless multitude of little insignificant clans and tribes at eternal war with one another for a rock, or a fish pond…and a nation, coextensive with the north American continent, destined by god and nature to be the most populous and most powerful people ever combined under one social compact” (John Quincy Adams, 1811)

23 Balance of threat Era TEORIJA РАВНОТЕЖE ПРЕТЊИ-STEPHAN WALT (power, proximity, offensive capabilities, aggressive intentions)

24 The players no longer balanced against any concentration of power, but only those that they deemed threatening. Regime type started to matter in shaping great-power alignments; the United States and Europe's democracies began to enjoy pacified relationships. National interests were still viewed as separate, but were becoming contingently convergent. The strategic environment was no longer zero-sum, enabling militarized rivalry to give way to peaceful coexistence.

25 Compatible identities replaced oppositional ones, furthered by a growing sense of racial and political affinity. On both sides, talk of Anglo-American "kinship“ became commonplace. As early as 1896, Arthur Balfour, leader of the House of Commons, ventured that "the idea of war with the United States carries with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil war... The time will come, the time must come, when someone, some statesman of authority... will lay down the doctrine that between English- speaking peoples war is impossible."

26 But the Atlantic democracies were not yet prepared for deeper forms of peacetime cooperation; they had banded together only as necessary to respond to common threats. The United States entered World War I and World War II only after coming under direct attack. Britain was similarly reluctant to fight alongside France in both wars. And the interwar period made all too clear the contingent nature of common interest. The Senate rejected U.S. participation in the League of Nations, unwilling to take on standing obligations to collective action. Europe's democracies were more willing to undertake such commitments in principle, but their reluctance to uphold them through action readily became clear during the 1930s. The interwar period proved to be the era of fragile "coalitions of the willing", not collective security.

27 Cooperative Security Era:

28 During the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies had common interests, not just contingently convergent ones, making their security indivisible and encouraging them to take on institutionalized obligations. Whereas the League of Nations foundered on the shoals of America's reluctance to formalize its foreign commitments, the United Nations enjoyed near- unanimous support in the Senate. Whereas the United States steered clear of Europe's troubles in the 1930s, during the Cold War the United States deployed troops in Germany, legally bound itself to Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty, and took other steps to ensure that the two sides of the Atlantic would not be decoupled. The compatible identities of the interwar period gave way to a shared Western identity during the Cold War.

29 Individual countries maintained their own national institutions and symbols, but they also worked hard to build a transnational sense of unity and solidarity. Backed up by a discourse of shared values, common culture and durable partnership, transatlantic cohesion took on a taken-for-granted quality during the Cold War years. The Atlantic community was not just an alliance, but also a security community— an international society knit together by a sense of "we-ness."

30 Balance of Threat Era II: ?

31 The Atlantic community has suffered a serious reversal, rather than an advance. The deterioration began well before the election of George W. Bush and the tragedies of September 11. The reasons are no surprise. The strategic priorities of America and Europe started to diverge soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the absence of a common external threat, Europe and America no longer relied on each other to defend first-order security interests. NATO has continued to exist as a military alliance only in name, its provisions for collective defense having become moot after it shifted its focus to out- of-area missions.

32 Cooperative security—the linchpin of the Cold War order—is no longer the exclusive logic governing relations. Balance-of-threat thinking is making a distinct comeback. Europe is not balancing against American power, but it is balancing against U.S. behavior. Europe's resistance to U.S. policy. The Atlantic order has suffered similar setbacks on matters of identity. The sense of "we-ness" that emerged amid World War II and the Cold War has dimmed considerably. On paradise and Power – Robert Kagan

33 - O savezima - Pojam - značaj - kontroverze

34 O pojmu saveza u međunarodnim odnosima

35 Савез (Alliance): “Две или више држава формирају савез (alliance) када закључе уговор који обавезује земље потписнице да предузму одређене акције у случају рата.” (James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them Down?, Annual Review of Political science, 2000, Volume 3, p. 63.) “ Савези су формални или неформални споразуми у које суверене државе улазе у циљу осигурања узајамне безбедности.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, Longman, New York, 1997, Second Edition, p. 58.)

36 Савезништво (Аlignment): “Савезништва не подразумевају закључење уговора између држава чланица односно потписе њихових представника. Разлог за то је чињеница да је заједнички интерес између тих држава очигледан.” (James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them Down?, оп. цит., p. 64.)

37 Одбрамбени пакт (Defense Pact): “Одбрамбени пактови су узајамне обавезе које државе прихвате на себе, a које подразумевају да прискоче једна другој у помоћ ако су нападнуте.” (James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them Down?, оп. цит., p. 63.)

38 partners and allies – Lord Robert Skidelski The first lesson is that, in thinking about foreign policy, we need to distinguish between partners and allies. Of the four countries that made up the Grand Alliance, two (the United States and Britain) became partners, and the other two (Russia and China) ceased even to be allies. Allies are for temporary objectives; partners are for the long haul. Wars between partners are unthinkable; future wars between allies remain possible. What converts allies into partners? Shared values and past associations are obviously important. But they are not enough. The argument that democracies never go to war with each other should be treated skeptically. Nor does free trade automatically guarantee international amity, as 19th-century liberals fondly believed. As long as there are nation-states, there will be conflicts of national interest, and therefore the possibility of war.

39 Just as important as shared values in converting allies into partners--and this is the second lesson suggested by the wartime alliance--is asymmetry of power. Great Britain did not really become a "reliable" partner of the United States until it was no longer powerful enough to be a serious rival. To adapt Harry Dexter White's phrase, the "going" powers have to be "gone" before they become partners in a joint enterprise. The relationship between the United States and Western Europe had reached this point by the end of the Second World War. The partnership was consolidated in the NATO treaty during the Cold War and is now unbreakable. Talk of setting up Europe as a "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union after the Second World War was never realistic. The historical moment had passed.

40 Asymmetry of power does not negate the need for partners to be treated with consideration. They must believe they have some influence over the partnership. Otherwise, the full value of the partnership is lost. Partners can also be very useful as intermediaries or go-betweens. Such was the role played by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her shuttles between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. Today, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has been playing the same kind of role in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In any partnership, there will always be an awkward member. In the Western alliance, this part has been played by France with great elegance and to the frequent irritation of the United States, but with some benefit to the partnership as a whole by making it appear as not wholly subservient to U.S. wishes.

41 States, though perhaps Russia would like to be. But Russia is still very different from the West and is right to think of itself as a coming, not going, power. Both of these things are even more obviously true of China. There is no reason to anticipate that either country will become actively hostile to the United States. But they are, or will soon be, in a position to bargain their place in the international order, and therefore to shape its future. The same will be true of India. In its relations with these powers, the United States will be much more in that intermediate area of international relations--more like a balance-of-power situation--in which it has never been comfortable.

42 Појмовно разграничење: Савезе треба разликовати од савезништва Савези се потписују а савезништва не Нека савезништва, као што је оно између Израела и САД-а, подразумева блиске односе између те две државе током дужег временског раздобља, док је рецимо савезништво између САД-а и Сирије у Првом заливском рату, прошло са престанком рата. ДАКЛЕ, САВЕЗНИШТВО НЕ ПОДРАЗУМЕВА ОЧЕКИВАЊЕ СТАЛНОГ КВАЛИТЕТА У ОДНОСИМА МЕЂУ ДРЖАВАМА; ЗАЈЕДНИЧКИ ИНТЕРЕСИ ТУ НОСЕ ЦЕЛОКУПНЕ ОДНОСЕ, ТЕ ОНИ НЕ ТРЕБА ДА СЕ ПРЕГОВАРАЈУ ФОРМАЛНО.

43 Савези подразумевају формално обавезивање између држава, док се одређене специфичне обавезе стављају на папир и потписују Савези захтевају спецификације обавеза због тога што савазници, треба да разјасне степен њихових заједничких интереса и између себе, и према другима изван савеза Од савезништва до савеза је значајан корак напред у формализацији обавеза, и даљи кораци су могући ка већем степену обавезе. Савези се могу сматрати као део једног континуума безбедносних односа између држава, од савезништва до федерације.

44 “Државе које су формирале савез, увећале су сопствену безбедност.” ((James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them Down?, оп. цит., p. 65.) “Државе могу улазити у савезе и из невојних разлога. Идеологија на пример, често држи државе заједно. Економија такође може бити још један разлог за улазак у савезништво са неким, особито у оним деловима света где су чисто војни проблеми у односима између држава у повлачењу.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, оп. цит., pp )

45 “ У ствари, арапске државе су водиле политику уравнотеживања једне против других не путем повећања броја војника, већ повећавањем броја гласача. Стога војно безначајни савези између различитих арапских држава, имају дубоке политичке ефекте.” (Michael Barnett, Alliances, Balances of Threats, and Neorealism- the Accidental Coup, in, John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, (Eds.), Realism and the Balancing of Power, A New Debate, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003, pp )

46

47

48 Summary Characteristics of Security Relationship – David Lake RELATIONSHIPDEFINING CHARASTERISTIC AllianceBoth Parties retain full decision making authority Sphere of InfluenceSubordinate polity restrained from entering into security relationship, of whatever form with third parties ProtectorateSubordinate polity cedes decision-making authority over foreign policy to the dominant state Informal EmpireSubordinate polity cedes decision-making authority over foreign policy and areas of domestic policy to the dominant state. Subordinate polity conducts relations with others on basis of sovereignty EmpireSubordinate polity cedes decision-making authority over both foreign and domestic policy and areas of domestic policy to dominant state. Subordinate polity does not conduct relations with others on basis of sovereignty.

49 Značaj saveza “Ратови су мање вероватни кад је моћ савеза већа и кад су савези укључивији, док је рат вероватнији онда када моћ најјаче државе (у систему) није повезана у ширу коалицију.” (Richard N. Rosecrance, “Review Article: War and Peace”, World Politics, Volume 55 No 1, October 2002, pp ) “Постоје савези који су средство уравнотеживања и савези који су средство управљања... Често је жеља да се врши контрола над политикама савезника, била главни узрок уласка у савезе.” (Paul Schroeder, “Alliances : Weapons of Power and Tools of Management”, in, Klaus Knor, (Ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security, University Press of Cansas, Lawrence, 1975) Питања достизања моћи- виђење Хане Арент Проблематика људске природе О могућностима сарадње између људи, група људи и политичких јединица “Лов на мамуте” и првобитни људи

50 Ото фон Бизмарк и његов чувени “Kissinger Diktat”: “Треба створити универзалну политичку ситуацију у којима смо ми неопходни свим силама осим Француске, а које ћемо помоћу, наших међусобних односа, држати што је могуће даље од формирања коалиције против нас.” (Josef Joffe, Defying History and Theory: The United States as the “Last Remaining Superpower”, in, G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled- the Future of Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, pp ) Ото фон Бизмарк: “Правило Шабулов”- “Целокупна политика може се свести на ово правило: Покушај да будеш у тројству док год светом управља непоуздана равнотежа између пет великих сила. То је стварна заштита против каолиција.” (Josef Joffe, Defying History and Theory: The United States as the “Last Remaining Superpower”, оп. цит. P. 162.)

51 “Kontroverze” “Постоји само једна ствар гора од борбе са савезницима, то је борба без њих” (Винстон Черчил)

52 Проблем људске природе Проблем варања Проблем апсолутних и релативних добитака Проблем обезбеђивања”општег добра” и проблем “слободних јахача” Проблем поделе терета Разликовање партнер- савезник (Лорд Роберт Скиделски)

53 Balancing/ buck passing Balancing/ chain ganging Balancing/ bandwagoning Однос старог Рима према савезницима

54 “Alliance Security Dilemma- то је тензија између страха да се може остати напуштен или пак бити ухваћен у клопку од стране неког савезника.” (Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’ s World- Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security- A Review Essay”, International Security, Vol. 27 No 1, Summer 2002, pp ) Проблем управљања савезништвима

55 II Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza

56 Veoma zanimjlivo viđenje hladnog rata daju Gordon Krejg i Aleksander Džordž u njihovoj poznatoj knjizi  Sila i Državništvo (Force and Statecraft) . Oni smatraju da je  Hladni rat opisni termin koji je bio opšte prihvaćen kasnih 40-ih da okarakteriše neprijateljski odnos koji se razvio između Zapada i Sovjetskog Saveza.  Ono što njihovo viđenje ovog problema izdvaja od prethodnih shvatanja jeste shvatanje hladnog rata kao međunarodnog sistema. Ispitujući da li su postojala tri preduslova koja oni postavljaju da bi jedan međunarodni sistem bio efikasan i uopšte postojao (usaglašeni ciljevi, odgovarajuća struktura i opšte prihvaćene procedure), autori su utvrdili sledeće:

57 1) Jedini zajednički cilj Sovjetskom Savezu i Zapadnim silama bio je izbegavanje III svetskog rata 2) Struktura međunarodnog sistema bila je bipolarna, pošto nije bilo dovoljno jakih drugih velikih sila da organizuju multipolarni sistem. Treba napomenuti da su postojale i države izvan domašaja supersila, ali je preovlađujuća struktura međunarodnog sistema bila bipolarna 3) Što se tiče procedura koje su bile opšte prihvaćene to su zastrašivanje (odvraćanje) i upravljanje krizama da ne bi eskalirale u nuklearni sukob širih razmera.

58 Hladni rat “kao specifičan fenomen posleratnih međunarodnih odnosa“ posmatra i poznati zagrebački profesor međunarodnih odnosa i spoljne politike, Radovan Vukadinović. Glavna obeležja hladnog rata on vidi u dugotrajnom suočavanju supersila bez upotrebe oružja, u snažnoj bipolarizaciji snaga te striktno uniformnim gledanjima na sva zajednička pitanja

59 Hladni rat kao poseban međunarodni sistem Shvatajući međunarodni sistem kao "dominantni okvir u kome se organizuju i dešavaju međunarodni poslovi... ali i unutrašnja politika... koji ne oblikuje sve, ali oblikuje mnogo stvari", Fridman iznosi mišljenje da je proces globalizacije kao glavno obeležje poslednje decenije XX veka, poseban međunarodni sistem koji je nasledio sistem hladnog rata.

60 KriterijumMeđunarodni sistem Hladnog rataMeđunarodni sistem globalizacije Struktura moćiravnoteža snaga između Sjedinjenih Država i Sovjetskog Saveza Ravnoteža između nacionalnih država, tržišta i MNC, kao i pojedinaca Pravila u vođenju spoljnih poslovaneuplitanje u suparničke zone uticaja Intervencionizam ekonomijaNerazvijene zemlje – razvoj, zemlje u razvoju - povećanje izvoza, komunističke zemlje na autarkiju a zapadne ekonomije na regulisanje trgovine Deregulacija; privatizacija; liberalizacija; slobodna trgovina; tržišna ekonomija Glavne idejeKapitalizam, komunizam, detant, nesvrstanost, pererstrojka Amerikanizacija – univerzalizacija zapadne (američke) kulture – McDonalds, Miki Maus... Demografski trendoviOd Juga ka SeveruKa svim stranama sveta Izgled sveta - perspektivaPodela: Blokovi + neutralni + nesvrstani Integracija Definicija tehnologijeNukl. oružje; srp i čekić; industrijaminijaturizacija, digitalizacija, sateliti, fiber optika i internet,

61 Šta je ono što se meriTežinabrzina Glavni ekonomistiDžon Majnard Kejnz; Karl MarksJozef Šumpeter; Endi Grou Definišući dokumentiSporazumi – paktovi (Treaty)Posao (Deal) Glavni zakonE= m x c2E= m x c2 Murov zakon Glavno pitanjeKoliko je velika vaša raketaKoliko je brz vaš modem, procesor Glavni sportSukob SAD i SSSR kao boks mečTrka na sto metara Odnosi između rivalaSvet prijatelja i neprijatelja – Karl Šmit Odnos konkurencije i takmičarstva SimbolZidWorld Wide Web Od čega ljudi strahujuStrah od nuklearnog uništenja od dobro poznatog neptrijatelja Neizvesnist, strah od nepoznatog neprijatelja, gubitka posla

62 Characteristics of the Cold War International System – Donald Snow First, the Cold War political and military competition dominated International Politics Second, the conflict was viewed as protracted, a long term competition for which only great patience would suffice and the management of which required great vigilance. A third characteristic of the Cold war system was that it became global

63 “The Cold War was fought at different levels in dissimilar ways in multiple places over a very long time” – Any attempt to reduce its history exclusively to the role of great forces, great powers, or great leaders would fail to do it justice. Any effort to capture it within a simple chronological narrative could only produce a mash.” – John Lewis Gaddis

64

65

66

67

68

69 Global Posture Transformation: Cold War 1985 > 5,000 Personnel > 15,000 Personnel > 25,000 Personnel LEGEND Europe: 358,000 personnel East Asia: 125,000 personnel Legacy from the end of 20 th century wars Forces were located and equipped to fight where they were based. Legacy from the end of 20 th century wars Forces were located and equipped to fight where they were based. > 100,000 Personnel Persian Gulf: 9,000 personnel (afloat)

70 Global Posture Transformation: Post-Cold War > 5,000 Personnel > 15,000 Personnel > 25,000 Personnel LEGEND Europe: ~118,000 personnel East Asia: ~89,000 personnel US no longer assumes we know where our forces will have to operate —and no longer assumes they will fight where they are based. Persian Gulf: 8,000-25,000 personnel Force concentrations

71 U. S. Presidential Doctrines

72 Monroe doctrine In close conformance with Adams’ recommendation, Monroe’s message to the Congress on December 2 set forth three essential points. The first committed the United States to a policy of noncolonization by affirming that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects to future colonization by any European powers.” The second endorsed a policy of “hands off ” while arguing that the monarchical system of the Old World “is essentially different from that of America” and that “any attempt” by the Europeans to “extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere” would appear as “dangerous to our peace and safety” and as evidence of “an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” The third recalled Washington’s farewell address by embracing a policy of abstention from European political affairs.

73 “In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.” A related policy of “no transfer” already had taken shape in April 1823 when Adams warned Spain against selling Cuba to Great Britain. In his words, “Cuba, once disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can only gravitate towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from its bosom.” Such an expectation guided U.S. policy all through the nineteenth century.

74 The Theodore Roosevelt Corollary of Monroe doctrine In his annual message of December 6, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt enunciated not a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine but an entirely new principle which epitomized his “big stick” view of foreign relations: the United States was to act as sole policeman of the Western Hemisphere and deny the European powers any right of interference in what it regarded as its rightful “zone of influence,” given Washington’s obvious supremacy in that part of the world at the dawn of the twentieth century. An initially defensive dictum had therefore been turned into an aggressive policy by a man who had long pondered over America’s standing and role in the world. Strictly speaking, it was a “perversion” of Monroe’s original intent, but fundamentally it reflected a new, innovative conception of security and defense, as well as changing geopolitical conditions.

75 The catalysts of that drastic mutation were the necessary protection of the projected isthmian canal and Germany’s aggressiveness in the Caribbean. In time the United States would tighten its grip on some of its “sister republics” and incur the charge of imperialism by developing a “protectorate policy” that belied its oft-proclaimed commitment to self-determination. Repeated interventions in the name of law and order would leave an enduring legacy of anti- Americanism in South America. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine would guide hemispheric diplomacy throughout World War II and during the Cold War, assurances to the contrary notwithstanding.

76 Truman Doctrine Addressing a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S Truman requested $400 million in military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey. Convinced that both countries faced Communist aggression, the president enunciated a old new foreign-policy doctrine: “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

77 Eisenhower doctrine The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 declared that the United States would distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to stop the spread of communism in the Middle East. Eisenhower found it difficult to convince leading Arab states or Israel to endorse the doctrine’s purpose or usefulness. Nonetheless, he applied the doctrine in by dispensing economic aid to shore up the Kingdom of Jordan, by encouraging Syria’s neighbors to consider military operations against it, and by sending U.S. troops into Lebanon to prevent a radical revolution from sweeping over that country. The doctrine consisted of a major commitment by the United States to the security and stability of the Middle East and signaled a new level of U.S. resolve to exert influence in international affairs. By issuing the doctrine, Eisenhower raised the prospect that the United States would fight in the Middle East and accepted responsibilities in the region that the United States would retain for decades to come.

78 Johnson doctrine In May 1965, when U.S. troops landed in the Dominican Republic, President Lyndon Johnson pronounced his “Johnson Doctrine,” declaring that the United States would never again permit the establishment of a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere. Although the Dominican intervention marked the first armed, overt U.S. intervention in Latin America in over three decades, the intervention and the Johnson Doctrine did not mark a signal departure in inter-American relations. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has maintained a sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere, exercising predominant influence in the region and limiting the freedom of action of Latin American nations.

79 Nixon doctrine Nixon delivered his first public comments about what would later become known as the Nixon Doctrine in Guam on the evening of July 25, The island was at the end of the second leg of a thirteen-day around-the- world political and diplomatic voyage, on which Nixon had embarked from Washington, DC on July 23.

80 Nixon opened the press conference in Guam telling reporters that before he took their questions he wanted to give them his “perspective” on the U.S. “role in Asia and in the Pacific,” because Asian leaders were wondering whether Americans’ “frustration over the war in Vietnam” would cause the United States to “withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role” in the future. “This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end,” but he pointed out that in any case the administration needs to take the “long- range view” and make plans ahead of time. Rejecting the option of withdrawing from the Pacific as had the British, French, and Dutch, Nixon argued that he “was convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.” Like it or not, he pointed out, the United States sits astride the Pacific Ocean and has historically been a Pacific power. “As we look at Asia today,” Nixon continued, “the peace of the world” is threatened by China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Considering these “factors,” he said, we must therefore realize that “down the long road”—four to twenty years from now—“potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific.” At the same time, he observed, “We should not let that obscure the great promise that is here” for economic development. Look, he said, at the progress already made in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. Therefore, he concluded, “We need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the conditions that we will find.” Among those conditions were “national pride” and “regional pride.”

81 Carter doctrine The Carter doctrine was policy proclaimed by the President of the United States Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980 which stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. “Let our position be apsolutely clear: An attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force”

82 Reagan doctrine Ronald Reagan never planned to announce what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. Two months after Reagan declared in his 1985 State of the Union address that the United States should not “break faith” with anti-Communist resistance groups, a political commentator called that declaration the Reagan Doctrine. What Reagan said that February evening on his seventy-fourth birthday was a version of what he had said many times before: that anti-Communist resistance movements deserved U.S. support. That idea had shaped his thinking since the beginning of his presidency and, indeed, from the time that he became involved in national politics in the mid 1960s.

83 Clinton doctrine Clinton doctrine is not a clear statement in the way that many other United States Presidential doctrines were. However, in February 26, 1999 speech, President Bill Clinton said the following, which was considered the Clinton doctrine. “It’s easy… to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so” Enlargement and fighting “rogue states”

84 George W. Bush doctrine The Bush doctrine is name given to a set of foreign policy guidelines first unveiled by President George W. Bush in his commencement speech to the graduating class of West Point on June 1, Strategy of preemption, unilateral use of force Ko nije sa nama, taj je protiv nas

85 USA Strategy Landmarks 1944 Bretton Woods World Order: Economic Underpinnings 1947 Truman Doctrine Containment: Policy Commitment Marshall Plan Containment: Economic Instruments NSC 4/A Containment: Covert Political Instruments 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) Containment: Military Commitment 1950 NSC-68 Containment: Grand Strategy 1951 U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty Intra-Alliance Containment 1952 NATO Lisbon Conference Conventional Defense: Dreams 1953 NSC 162/2 “The New Look” 1954 NATO MC 48 The New Look on the Ground Manila Pact/SEATO “Pactomania” 1957 NATO MC 14/2 Prelude to Flexible Response 1961 Berlin Contingency Planning Flexible Response: Nightmares NSAM 2 Counterinsurgency 1962 McNamara Ann Arbor Speech Nuclear Counterforce McNamara Athens Speech Dissembling to Allies

86 DoD General Purpose Forces Study “2 _ Wars:” Apex of Military Ambitions 1963 “Assured Destruction” DPM Condition vs. Strategy 1967 NATO MC 14/3 Flexible Response: Diplomatic Blessing 1969 Nixon Doctrine “1 _ Wars”: Orderly Retreat 1972 Shanghai Communiqué Rebalancing Power ABM Treaty Codifying Strategic Contradiction 1977 PD-18 Petroleum and a New Front: Pre-Strategy 1978 PD-30 World Order: Human Rights 1980 PD-59 Reinvigorating Flexible Response 1982 Reagan Doctrine Toward Rollback 1983 SDI Strategic Dreams vs. Realistic Irrationality 1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance Strategy for Primacy 1994 NSSUS, "Engagement and Enlargement” Primacy and World Order Arm in Arm 2002 NSSUS, “Preemption” Primacy in Your Face 2006 NSUS, “Preemption” Primacy in Your Face II – “Speak easy, but carry a big stick”

87 Literatura: Ambrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism - American Foreign Policy since 1938, Penguin Books, New York, 1993, Seventh Revised Edition Arent, Hana, O revoluciji, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 1991 Aron, Remon, Mir i rat među nacijama, Izdavačka Knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci, 2001 Avramov, Smilja, Postherojski rat Zapada protiv Jugoslavije, Idi, Veternik, 1997 Balkan posle drugog svetskog rata, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd, 1996 Berend, Ivan, Centralna i istočna Evropa, CID, Podgorica, 2001 Berridge, G. R., James, Alan, A Dictionary of Diplomacy, Palgrave, London, 2003, Second Edition

88 Craig, Gordon, A., George, Alexander, L., Force and Statecraft – Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995, Third Edition Dimitrijević, Vojin, Stojanović, Radoslav, Međunarodni odnosi, Centar za publikacije Pravnog fakulteta, Beograd, 1988 Evans, Graham, Newnham, Jeffrey, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, London, 1999 Fajs, Herbert, Čerčil, Ruzvelt, Staljin, Vojnoizdavački zavod, "Vojno delo", Beograd, 1962 Friedman, Thomas, L., Lexus and Olive Tree, Farrar Sraus Giroux, New York, 1999 Gaddis, Lewis, John, Rethinking Cold War History – We know now, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997 Gates, Scott, Humes, Brian, D., Games, Information amd Politics – Applaying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 1997 Gedis, Luis, Džon, Hladni rat, KLIO, Beograd, 2003

89 Grant, Džejms, "Bernard Baruh – sujeta i avanture drkadžije Volstrita", M magazin, "Glob" D.O.O., Beograd, 1999, str. 80 – 86. Guzzini, Steffano, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, Routhledge, London, 1998 Halliday, Fred, "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analityc and Theoretical Conclusions", in, Ken Booth, Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsilvania, 1995, pp. 38 – 61. Hariman, W. E., Abel, E. Specijalni poslanik kod Čerčila i Staljina 1941 –1946, Globus, Zagreb, 1978, Harris, Owen, "The Collapse of the West", Foreign Affairs, Volume 72, No. 4, September/ October 1993, pp. 41 – 53. Hobsbaum, Erik, Doba ekstrema, Dereta, Beograd, 2002 Hook, Steven, W., Spanier, John, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, CQ Press, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D. C., 2000, Feefteenth Edition,

90 Hughes, Stuart, H., Wilkinson, James, Contemporary Europe – A History, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1987 Kegley, Charles, Jr., Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy – Pattern and Process, St. Marin’s Press, New York, 1991, Fourth Edition Kegley, Charles, Jr., Eugene R. Wittkopf, Scott, James, M., American Foreign Policy – Pattern and Process, Wadsworth Company, Belmont, Ca., 2003, Sixth Edition Kenedi, Pol, Uspon i pad velikih sila, CID, Podgorica, Službeni List SRJ, Beograd, 1999

91 Kisindžer, Henri, Diplomatija, I, II, Verualpress, Beograd, 1999 Kornjijenko, Georgij, Holodnaja Vajna – svideteljstvo jejo ućastnjika, Olma – Press, Moskva, 2001 Longvort, Filip, Stvaranje Istočne Evrope, CLIO, Beograd, 2002 Mearsheimer, John, J., "Back to the Future – Instability in Europe after the Cold War", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 5 –55. Mearsheimer, John, J., The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton, New York, 2003 Miletić, Andreja, "Rat", u, Milan Matić, Milan Podunavac, (Prir.), Enciklopedija političke kulture, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993, str. 953 – 964.

92 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of current English, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, Fifth Edition Palmowski, Jan, A Dictionary of Twentieth Century World History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998 Perkins, Bredford, "Holodnaja vajna zakončilas, što daljše", u, Amerikanskij Ježegodnjik – 1994, Rossijskaja akademija nauk, Institut Sveobšćej Istoriji, Moskvam 1995, str. 162 – 179. Pfaltzgraph, Robert, L., Dougherty, James, E., Contending Theories of International Relations – A Comprehensive Survey, Addidon Wesley Longman, New York, 2001, Fifth Edition Politička enciklopedija, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1975

93 Povijest svijeta – od početka do danas, Napred, Zagreb, 1990, Drugo izdanje Ruggie, Gerard, John, Constructing the World Polity, Routhledge, London, 1998 Skidelsky, Robert, Lord, The Imbalance of Power, Foreign Policy, March/ April 2002, pp. 46 – 55. Smith, Steve, Baylis, John, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, Second Edition Sojuznjiki v vajnje 1941 – 1945, Rossijskaja Akademija Nauk, Institut Sveobšćej Istoriji, Nauka, Moskva, 1995 Steel, Ronald, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, AN Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Little Brown and Company, Boston – Toronto, 1980 Stefanović, Jelica, D., Osobenosti diplomatske prakse razvijene u okviru Konferencije o bezbednosti i saradnji u Evropi, doktorska disertacija, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 1995

94 Stojković, Momir, Gavranov, Velibor, Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije, Savremena administracija Beograd, 1972 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold war- A New History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005 Donald M. Snow, National Security for a New Era, Longman, New York, 2007 David A. Lake, Entangling Relations – American Foreign Policy in its Century, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1999 Džordž Frost Kenan, Memoari – , BMG, Beograd, 2007 Charles A. Kupchan, “The Fourth Age, “The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations”, The National Interest, September/ October 2006, pp Robert Kejgan, O raju i moći, Čarobna knjiga, Beograd, 2003

95 Svet posle Drugog svetskog rata, I, II, Sloboda, Beograd, 1975 Vukadinović, Radovan, Sila i interesi – vanjska politika SAD, Centar za kulturnu djelatnost omladine, Zagreb, 1972 Vukadinović, Radovan, Nuklearne strategije supersila, August Cesarec, Zagreb, 1985 Vasquez, John, A., Elman, Colin, Realism and the Balancing of Power – A New Debate, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003 Šuvar, Mira, Vladimir Velebit – svjedok historije, Razlog d.o.o., Zagreb, 2001 Šušić, Slavoljub, Balkanski geopolitički košmar, Novinsko izdavačka ustanova "Vojska", Beograd, 1995 Švajcer, Peter, Victory, SP "Avest", Minsk, 1995 Young, John, Kent, John, International Relations since 1945 – A Global History, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004 Zdanov, Andrei, Address to the Communist Information Bureau, September 1947, in Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, House of Representatives’ Document # 619, 80th Congress, 2nd session1948, pp. 212 – 220. Navedeno prema, Paul Seabury, (ed.), Balance of Power, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1965, pp. 156 – 157.

96 Internet sajtovi: The Center for Transatlantic Relations – Johns Hopkins University CNN – Cold War e e Cold War International History Project The National Security Archive, the George Washington University Intervjui s najpoznatijim akterima Hladnog rata Cold War Studies at Harvard University Journal of Cold War Studies

97 Hvala na pažnji!


Download ppt "“Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza”"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google