2Objectives and Deliverable Understand the concept of firewalls and the three major categories: packet filters (stateless vs. stateful) and application level proxyCan apply them to detect different attacksBe able to write the stateless packet filter rules
3What is a Firewall? A choke point of control and monitoring Interconnects networks with differing trustImposes restrictions on network servicesonly authorized traffic is allowedAuditing and controlling accesscan implement alarms for abnormal behaviorItself immune to penetrationProvides perimeter defence
4Classification of Firewall Characterized by protocol level it controls inPacket filteringCircuit gatewaysApplication gateways
6Firewalls – Packet Filters Simplest of componentsUses transport-layer information onlyIP Source Address, Destination AddressProtocol/Next Header (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc)TCP or UDP source & destination portsTCP Flags (SYN, ACK, FIN, RST, PSH, etc)ICMP message typeExamplesDNS uses port 53No incoming port 53 packets except known trusted servers
7Usage of Packet Filters Filtering with incoming or outgoing interfacesE.g., Ingress filtering of spoofed IP addressesEgress filteringPermits or denies certain servicesRequires intimate knowledge of TCP and UDP port utilization on a number of operating systems
8How to Configure a Packet Filter Start with a security policySpecify allowable packets in terms of logical expressions on packet fieldsRewrite expressions in syntax supported by your vendorGeneral rules - least privilegeAll that is not expressly permitted is prohibitedIf you do not need it, eliminate it
9Every ruleset is followed by an implicit rule reading like this. Example 1:Suppose we want to allow inbound mail (SMTP, port 25) but only to our gateway machine. Also suppose that traffic from some particular site SPIGOT is to be blocked.
10Solution 1:Example 2:Now suppose that we want to implement the policy “any inside host can send mail to the outside”.
11Solution 2:This solution allows calls to come from any port on an inside machine, and will direct them to port 25 on the outside. Simple enough…So why is it wrong?
12What can be a better solution ? Our defined restriction is based solely on the outside host’s port number, which we have no way of controlling.Now an enemy can access any internal machines and port by originating his call from port 25 on the outside machine.What can be a better solution ?
13The ACK signifies that the packet is part of an ongoing conversation Packets without the ACK are connection establishment messages, which we are only permitting from internal hosts
14Security & Performance of Packet Filters Tiny fragment attacksSplit TCP header info over several tiny packetsEither discard or reassemble before checkDegradation depends on number of rules applied at any pointOrder rules so that most common traffic is dealt with firstCorrectness is more important than speed
16Port Numbering TCP connection Permanent assignment Variable use Server port is number less than 1024Client port is number between 1024 and 16383Permanent assignmentPorts <1024 assigned permanently20,21 for FTP for Telnet25 for server SMTP for HTTPVariable usePorts >1024 must be available for client to make any connectionThis presents a limitation for stateless packet filteringIf client wants to use port 2048, firewall must allow incoming traffic on this portBetter: stateful filtering knows outgoing requests
17Firewalls – Stateful Packet Filters Traditional packet filters do not examine transport layer contextie matching return packets with outgoing flowStateful packet filters address this needThey examine each IP packet in contextKeep track of client-server sessionsCheck each packet validly belongs to oneHence are better able to detect bogus packets out of contextA traditional packet filter makes filtering decisions on an individual packet basis and does not take into consideration any higher layer context. A stateful inspection packet filter tightens up the rules for TCP traffic by creating a directory of outbound TCP connections, and will allow incoming traffic to high-numbered ports only for those packets that fit the profile of one of the entries in this directory. Hence they are better able to detect bogus packets sent out of context.
18Stateful FilteringNow can you look at this figure and tell me why the first response is allowed while the 2nd not?
20Firewall Gateways Firewall runs set of proxy programs Proxies filter incoming, outgoing packetsAll incoming traffic directed to firewallAll outgoing traffic appears to come from firewallPolicy embedded in proxy programsTwo kinds of proxiesApplication-level gateways/proxiesTailored to http, ftp, smtp, etc.Circuit-level gateways/proxiesWorking on TCP levelGateway is like a NAT box, ie, a home router.
22Application-Level Filtering Has full access to protocoluser requests service from proxyproxy validates request as legalthen actions request and returns result to userNeed separate proxies for each serviceE.g., SMTP ( )NNTP (Net news)DNS (Domain Name System)NTP (Network Time Protocol)custom services generally not supported
23App-level Firewall Architecture FTP proxyTelnet proxySMTP proxyTelnet daemonFTP daemonSMTP daemonNetwork ConnectionDaemon spawns proxy when communication detected
24Enforce policy for specific protocols E.g., Virus scanning for SMTPNeed to understand MIME, encoding, Zip archives
25Where to Deploy App-level Firewall Bastion Host: highly secure host systemPotentially exposed to "hostile" elementsHence is secured to withstand thisDisable all non-required services; keep it simpleRuns circuit / application level gatewaysInstall/modify services you wantOr provides externally accessible services
28Firewalls Aren’t Perfect? Useless against attacks from the insideEvildoer exists on insideMalicious code is executed on an internal machineOrganizations with greater insider threatBanks and MilitaryCannot protect against transfer of all virus infected programs or filesbecause of huge range of O/S & file types
29QuizIn this question, we explore some applications and limitations of a packet filtering firewall. For each of the question, briefly explain 1) can stateless firewall be configured to defend against the attack and how?2) if not, what about stateful firewall ?3) if neither can, what about application-level proxy?Can the firewall prevent a SYN flood attack from the external network?Can the firewall prevent a Smurf attack from the external network? Basically, the Smurf attack uses the broadcast IP address of the subnet.Can the firewall block P2P applications, e.g., BitTorrent?Stateless cannot, but stateful one can.YesNo. And hard to get app-level proxy for this, have to listen on many port #s!No. Yes for app-level gateway.
31Firewalls - Circuit Level Gateway Relays two TCP connectionsImposes security by limiting which such connections are allowedOnce created usually relays traffic without examining contentsTypically used when trust internal users by allowing general outbound connectionsSOCKS commonly used for thisOne advantage over normal packet filters: the IP addr is changed. So no internal IP addr is leaked out.A circuit-level gateway relays two TCP connections, one between itself and an inside TCP user, and the other between itself and a TCP user on an outside host. Once the two connections are established, it relays TCP data from one connection to the other without examining its contents. The security function consists of determining which connections will be allowed. It is typically used when internal users are trusted to decide what external services to access.One of the most common circuit-level gateways is SOCKS, defined in RFC It consists of a SOCKS server on the firewall, and a SOCKS library & SOCKS-aware applications on internal clients.
32Firewall Outlines Packet filtering Application gateways Circuit gatewaysCombination of above is dynamic packet filter
33Dynamic Packet Filters Most commonProvide good administrators protection and full transparencyNetwork given full control over trafficCaptures semantics of a connection
34Firewall Redialing on a dynamic packet filter. The dashed arrow FirewallRedialing on a dynamic packet filter. The dashed arrowshows the intended connection; the solid arrows show the actualconnections, to and from the relay in the firewall box. TheFirewall impersonates each endpoint to the other.
35Firewall Intended connection from 18.104.22.168 to 22.214.171.124 Application ProxyFirewallIntended connection from toA dynamic packet filter with an application proxy. Note the change in source address
36Network TopologyFilter Rule: Open access to Net 2 means source address from Net 3Why not spoof address from Net 3?Figure 9.2: A firewall router with multiple internal networks.
37Address-SpoofingDetection is virtually impossible unless source-address filtering and logging are doneOne should not trust hosts outside of one’s administrative control
38External Interface Ruleset Allow outgoing calls, permit incoming calls only for mail and only to gateway GWNote: Specify GW as destination host instead of Net 1to prevent open access to Net 1
39Net 1 Router Interface Ruleset Gateway machine speaks directly only to other machines running trusted mail server softwareRelay machines used to call out to GW to pick up waiting mailNote: Spoofing is avoided with the specification of GW
40How Many Routers Do We Need? If routers only support outgoing filtering, we need two:One to use ruleset that protects against compromised gatewaysOne to use ruleset that guards against address forgery and restricts access to gateway machineAn input filter on one port is exactly equivalent to an output filter on the other portIf you trust the network provider, you can go without input filtersFiltering can be done on the output side of the router
41Routing Filters All nodes are somehow reachable from the Internet Routers need to be able to control what routes they advertise over various interfacesClients who employ IP source routing make it possible to reach ‘unreachable’ hostsEnables address-spoofingBlock source routing at borders, not at backbone
42Routing Filters (cont) Packet filters obviate the need for route filtersRoute filtering becomes difficult or impossible in the presence of complex technologiesRoute squatting – using unofficial IP addresses inside firewalls that belong to someone elseDifficult to choose non-addressed address space
43Firewall Outlines Packet filtering Application gateways Circuit gatewaysCombination of above is dynamic packet filter
47Asymmetric RoutesBoth sides of the firewall know nothing of one another’s topologySolutions:Maintain full knowledge of the topologyNot feasible, too much state to keepMultiple firewalls share state informationVolume of messages may be prohibitive, code complexity
48Are Dynamic Packet Filters Safe? Comparable to that of circuit gateways, as long as the implementation strategy is simpleIf administrative interfaces use physical network ports as the highest-level constructLegal connections are generally defined in terms of the physical topologyNot if evildoers exist on the insideCircuit or application gateways demand user authentication for outbound traffic and are therefore more resistant to this threat
49Distributed Firewalls A central management node sets the security policy enforced by individual hostsCombination of high-level policy specification with file distribution mechanismAdvantages:Lack of central point of failureAbility to protect machines outside topologically isolated spaceGreat for laptopsDisadvantage:Harder to allow in certain services, whereas it’s easy to block
50Distributed Firewalls Drawback Allowing in certain services works if and only if you’re sure the address can’t be spoofedRequires anti-spoofing protectionMust maintain ability to roam safelySolution: IPsecA machine is trusted if and only if it can perform proper cryptographic authentication
51Where to Filter? Balance between risk and costs Always a higher layer that is hard to filterHumans
52Dynamic Packet Filter Implementation Dynamically update packet filter’s rulesetChanges may not be benign due to orderingRedialing method offers greater assurance of securityNo special-case code necessaryFTP handled with user-level daemonUDP handled just as TCP except for tear downICMP handled with pseudoconnections and synthesized packets
53Per-Interface Tables Consulted by Dynamic Packet Filter Active Connection TableSocket structure decides whether data is copied to outside socket or sent to application proxyOrdinary Filter TableSpecifies which packets may pass in stateless mannerDynamic TableForces creation of local socket structures