Presentation on theme: "Government Civilian Programs"— Presentation transcript:
1Government Civilian Programs Moderator: CPT Mike AdamsPresenters:Neilesh Shelat: USAID/CFSOCC-A DEVAD/VSNCCKristin Cairn: USAID/ SOTF-W DEVADGeorge Hale: Former USAID/ SOTF-S and SE DEVADMeredith Wotten: USAID OTIGuy Ewald: FAF DevelopmentNeed Names: Regional DAT/PATs
2Agenda Introductions USAID Overview Development Agency Disposition Interagency RelationshipsPlanning for the use of civilian AID assets/ Open discussion
3Terminal Learning Objective #2 USAID’s current plan for Afghan development going into transition how this will impact at the provincial and district level contrasted with USAID’s past approach.
4Neilesh Shelat USAID SOF Academic Week Orlando, FL March 2012 First and foremost, our SOF have been outstanding to work with. There is an enormous amount of common ground and mutual interests between SOF and USAID and our skills sets are (perhaps somewhat surprisingly) entirely complimentary. (USAID RC-N)USAID has a long and productive history working with SF, from the Vietnam CORDS program to El Salvador to Africa to the present. We have the opportunity to write a new and fruitful chapter. (USAID-RC-S)I started this process by reaching out to field officers and asking them three questions – and I’ve sprinkled their quotes out throughout the brief. The questions were:What are the things you would want incoming SOF units to know prior to deploymentWhat are some examples of best practices/worst practices in your interactions with SOF?If you were able to brief the incoming SOF, what would you want them to know about working with interagency?
5USAID Field Officer 2007: Helmand, Kandahar & Herat : Ghazni PRT (US/US & US/Polish): Wardak FOB /Sayedebad DST (US/Turkish): Kabul/DevAd to CFSOCC-A: Washington DC Afghanistan Desk: Back to Afghanistan
6Essentials on USAID - www.usaid.gov Who are we?How do we work?Where are we?
7USAID Assistance Supports Afghan and US Strategy Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)USAID Assistance Supports Afghan and US StrategyPresident’s StrategyThe core goal of the U.S. is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan, as well as to pursue a more effective civilian strategy in Afghanistan which will ensure that: the Afghan population is free to determine its future; the government has the monopoly on the use of force; citizens recognize the government as legitimately representative of their interests; and, the government is able to provide basic requirements for population and confidence to pursue broader development objectives.COM ISAF StrategyISAF, in partnership with GIRoA, conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations, enables an expanded and effective ANSF, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability.Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)By 2020, the ANDS aims to create: a stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors, standing with full dignity in the international family; a tolerant, united, and pluralistic nation that honors its Islamic heritage and the deep seated aspiration toward participation, justice, and equal rights for all; a society of hope and prosperity based on a strong, private-sector led market economy, social equity, and environmental sustainability.SRAP Af/Pak Stabilization StrategyIn Afghanistan, our focus is building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance – especially in the agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield.USAID’s StrategyUSAID supports the development of a politically inclusive system of governance that provides security and freedom of movement, justice for serious crimes and facilitation of peaceful resolution of conflicts, delivery of some basic services, and creation of an enabling environment for economic growth.7
9Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) GIRoA Spending Expectations are Inconsistent with Future Budget Restrictions9*Source GIRoA 1389 Budget, (Total Pending = Operational Budget + Development Budget)** Source: Afghan National Development Strategy , (Budgeted Core + External Expenditure)
10Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Recent Cases Show a Sharp Decrease in U.S. Development Assistance Once International Military Drawdown Begins69% decrease52% decrease43% decrease60% decreaseFollowing the withdrawal or significant reduction in troop levels, Iraq, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia saw significant decreases in development assistance levels.10
12Commanders Emergency Response Program Battalion, PRT, CJSOTF, DST The InteragencyQuick Response Funds (QRF)Public Diplomacy grants (PD)Afghan Women’s Empowerment GrantsAmbassador’s Small Grants FundDifferent contractsDelegation of AuthoritiesNo dedicated funds, but can tap into CERP/DoS/USAIDProvision of advice to CERP/DoS/USAID on how to spend ag-related project fundsBasic idea here is that although most entities have money, even if you are missing a USAID officer, you still have DoS/CERP. If you are missing a DoS, you have USAID/USDA, etc etc.Commanders Emergency Response ProgramBattalion, PRT, CJSOTF, DST
14Army Corps of Engineers DoS QRF and other Grants The other funders in your AO who must spend their money and may/may not coordinateIntelUSAIDUS Maneuver CERPINLArmy Corps of EngineersYouUS Special Forces CERPNon-US Mil entitiesOther CountriesUS PRT CERPDoS QRF and other GrantsUS ADT CERPNGOs
15What to expect when you get out there KandaharBaghlanZabulDaikundiUSAIDSeveral120**DoSUSDA>3ADTRoL>2PRTHungarianBnVSCCDAT/PAT?PlatformThe point here, is that each location varies tremendously regarding # of civilian/military assets. Kandahar is clearly the spoiled child whereas Baghlan lacks the inputs – but has a veteran field officer who has been there for 2+ years – and this asset, in many ways, is MUCH more valuable to an ODA team, than all those inputs.** Indicates that Daikundi is supported via Uruzgan
16Pitfalls You wanting a project more than the Afghans wanting a project Being an ‘expert’ in your technical areaDealing with non-US PRTs/military/governmentsProjects started vs projects completedProject monitoring stopping at the ribbon cuttingAssuming the Afghans will “take it over” when you leaveBuy-in vs acknowledgement (having an Afghan at the table)Being a believer in, “if you build it, give them something, do good things, then good things will happen”The other funders in your AO who must spend their money and may/may not coordinate
17Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Realistic Planning Parameters Need to Inform Future Assistance PlanningBy 2015…The coalition military presence will be reduced; Afghan-led security in most of the country.USAID’s civilian assistance levels will decrease; programs will focus on development objectives in support of transition.Security and development gains in the south and east may lag behind the rest of the country, although positive trends will continue.As Afghan self-sufficiency increases, USAID’s role shifts to supporting GIRoA and other Afghan institutions as they build capacity, engage the private sector, and leverage donor support.17
18Address policy trade-offs to deal with competing demands for resources Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)USG and GIRoA Must Prioritize Assistance Among Competing Resource DemandsIdentify minimum development conditions that should be in place by 2015 to ensure that Afghanistan can successfully continue along its chosen development pathAlign USG and GIRoA resource expectations based on realistic planning parametersFocus security, governance, and development interventions so as to increase the legitimacy of GIRoA in the eyes of AfghansAgree with GIRoA on near-term opportunities for foundational investments that can induce sustainable, long-term growthAddress policy trade-offs to deal with competing demands for resources18
19Relevant PoCsRC – E: Greg Huger:RC – W: Randall Peterson:RC – SW: Christian Barrett:RC – S: Tom Pope:RC – N: Chris Edwards:
22Snapshot 2015: Governance & Rule of Law Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)Snapshot 2015: Governance & Rule of Law“Inclusive governance, effective dispute resolution, andaccountability for impunity at the local level”Formal and informal mechanisms provide basic access to justice and dispute resolution.Metric: Number of conflicts brought to and resolved in formal and informal forums with attention to cases involving land, serious crimes, and women.*Legitimate and representative forums provide citizens, including marginalized groups, an opportunity to participate in governance.Metric: Number and inclusivity of government offices, local councils, and civil society organizations present at the provincial/district/community level.Afghan government has the reach and ability to facilitate local solutions to local problems and execute basic programs.Metric: Role of local officials in decision-making, dispute resolution, and program/budget execution.Basic needs of the population are being actively addressed.Metric Number of Afghans who state that their community possesses the basic requirements of a secure life.Egregious government acts of impunity are punished.Metric: Number of arrests/convictions for corruption and human rights crimes.Foundational Investments:Commitment to public administration and training in civil service.Develop downstream applications of ID card for voting, access to services and identification.Policy Tradeoffs:Prioritize Informal vs. Formal JusticeBudgetary Impacts of a Large Civil Service Payroll (Civil Service needs to be expanded).USAID and ANDSWhile USAID’s governance objectives complement the ANDS by supporting Afghanistan’s newly-adopted SNG policy, GIRoA’s commitment to its own policy on decentralization remains unclear.22*Note: Representation of women in justice and government will likely show inevitable lags in the south and east.
23Snapshot 2015: Economic Growth Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)Snapshot 2015: Economic Growth“Diversified and Resilient Economic Growth”Foundational Investments:Automated business registryDigital/ automated tax and tariff mechanism for utilities, point of sale, and customsBoth of these investments are necessary to successfully implement the Afghanistan Pakistan Trade Agreement, reduce corruption, regularize economic activity, and bolster consumer and business confidence of market system.Afghan consumer demand drives economic growth.Metric : Per capita GDP is growing faster than inflation.Afghans are actively engaged in licit and economically productive activities within and across borders.Metric : Formal sector employment rate, particularly in agriculture-related professions, is increasing while illicit crop production is decreasing.Afghan economy leverages the international economy.Metric : Exports as a percent of GDP are increasing, particularly on value added products and high value agricultural goods such as pomegranates.Afghan business is actively investing in the economic growth.Metric : (a) Domestic credit (loans) to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is increasing. (b) Loans figures are disaggregated by gender with the number of loans to women increasing.Policy Tradeoffs:Diversification across sectors vs. intense focus on agriculture-related sectors.USAID and ANDSThe ANDS focuses on a top-down approach of establishing the policy and legal regime necessary to enable economic growth. USAID does this as well, but also focuses on stimulating economic growth from the bottom-up, by strengthening agricultural livelihoods, stimulating local markets, and increasing job skills training, access to credit, and other inputs needed for economic growth.2323
24Snapshot 2015: Agriculture “Meeting basic food security needs and growing rural economies”Food security nationwide is improved through increased crop yields, due to new technologies and improved inputs.Metric : Percentage change in annual production of key cropsA growing economy supports agricultural sector jobs and incomes, providing licit opportunities for Afghans.Metric : Net increase in private sector employment for farms and agribusinesses.Metric : Percentage increase in household income from licit agriculture activitiesValue chains support an increase in agricultural exports to strengthen Afghanistan’s role in the regional economy.Metric : Total value of agricultural exports.Viable agricultural alternatives contribute to a licit economy and provide options other than poppy cultivation.Metric : UNODC reports annual decreases in poppy cultivation.Afghanistan fosters its own agricultural development through a robust education, research and extension networkMetric : Percentage increase in disbursement of MAIL’s development assistance budget at sub-national levelsFoundational Investments:Establish high-value crops and full value chains for exportsPromote watershed management for improved irrigation.Improvement of agricultural research, education and extension.Policy Tradeoffs:Promotion of agricultural production for exports versus domestic consumption.USAID and ANDSThe USAID agricultural strategy is in line with the goals for agriculture in the ANDS.24
25Snapshot 2015: Infrastructure Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)Snapshot 2015: Infrastructure“Improved Infrastructure Services in Support of Economic and Social Development”Foundational Investments:Investment in domestic energy supplies (e.g. Sheberghan, Kajaki)Investment in domestic capacity to channel outside energy (e.g. NEPS-SEPS)Investment in creating the GIRoA capacity to finance, operate, and maintain infrastructure services.Key urban economic centers have access to reliable supplies of electricity. Increased access to electricity for key off grid communities.Metric : 12 to 16 hours of electricity per day for Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif communities/700,000 beneficiaries in the south and the east have access to reliable, renewable sources of electricity.Networks of roads connect key district and market centers to the national transportation system to enable economic growth and improved service delivery.Metric : District and market centers connected through roads in key agricultural and commercial areas and population centers.Policy Tradeoffs:Energy vs. RoadsUSAID and ANDSUSAID plans consistent with ANDS though other donor resources would be necessary to achieve the much broader ANDS goals.25
26Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Snapshot 2015: Education“Developing Human Capital for Economic Growth”Access to primary education is comparable to other countries in the region.Metric : Net Enrollment Rate (increased percentage of male and female* school-age children enrolled in school.)Basic literacy skills of male and female students continues to progress.Metric : Proportion of students who demonstrate sufficient reading fluency and comprehension to “read to learn.”Increase supply of trained and educated workers to support business and industry.Metric : The percentage of male and female* grade nine graduates who matriculate to a Technical Vocational School.Qualified scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and technologists available within Afghanistan.Metric : Percentage of male and female* Afghan university graduates hired in positions that support the Afghan government or economy.Foundational InvestmentsUse telecommunication networks to support teaching, learning, and collaboration in both Basic & Higher Education settings.Policy Tradeoff:Higher education versus primary education.USAID and ANDSNote: Well-aligned with ANDS.*Note: Education progress, including female access to education and presence in the workforce, will likely show inevitable lags in the south and east.26
27Snapshot 2015: Health “Improving the Health of the Afghan Population” Basic health services offered by GIRoA to Afghan men and women* maintained.Metric : More than 75% of population has access to basic package of integrated health services.Sustain presence of skilled birth attendants present at deliveriesMetric : Over 97,400 deliveries assisted by a skilled birth attendant.Maintain progress in reducing child and maternal mortality rates.Metric : 90% of population, especially women*, has access to health services within a 2 hour walk.Metric : Double the trained midwife population.Foundational Investments:Large-scale training of community health workers and midwivesPolicy Tradeoffs:Primary vs. tertiary careUSAID and ANDSComplementary investments to meet MDGs and continued coordination of development assistanceAccess, quality, use of health services in equitable and sustainable manner*Note: Access to healthcare, particularly for females, will likely show inevitable lags in the south and east.27
28Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) The Critical Path for Sustainable Development in Afghanistan Will Rely on Effective Rule of Law and Agriculture-Driven Economic GrowthOur core goals for successful and sustainable development in Afghanistan are:Effective resolution of conflicts in a peaceful and legitimate manner by linking formal and informal institutions at the national and local levels; and,Robust agriculture-driven economic growth that will generate jobs and trade opportunities.Focusing on these core goals will not detract from our efforts to foster a healthy, educated population, as well as the basic infrastructure needed to support economic growth and governance.Finally, this critical path is only attainable so long as we engage the Afghans in a transparent, ongoing dialogue to develop a shared vision of our enduring development partnership.28
29Terminal Learning Objective #3-6 TLO#s 3-6: Country-wide disposition of development assets as they relate to VSO.MRRD/NSP overviewOTI overview
32FAF DevelopmentGuy Ewald & Ralph Schweizer Mar 2012
33FAF Specializes In Post-Conflict Recovery and Reconstruction Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)Agricultural DevelopmentDrainage RehabilitationWater Systems DevelopmentDebris/Waste Removal7 years experience in Afghanistan.FAF Development
34Agriculture Development Agriculture Markets and Value Chain Development (Pomegranate, Raisins, Nuts and Figs)Agribusiness and Enterprise DevelopmentDemonstration Farm/ CMO ProjectIrrigation AdviceFood SecurityFAF Development
36Terminal Learning Objective #1,7 TLO#1:Understanding the optimal relationship between civilian AID agencies, MRRD and VSO sites.TLO# 7: Understanding the significance of interagency cooperation at the VSP.