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INFORMATION & RECORDED SYMBOLS Robert M. Hayes 2007.

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1 INFORMATION & RECORDED SYMBOLS Robert M. Hayes 2007

2 Overview §I. Definition & nature of recorded symbolsDefinition & nature of recorded symbols l Definition of “recorded symbol” Definition of “recorded symbol” l Exploration Exploration §II. The role of structureThe role of structure §III. The role of processesThe role of processes §IV. Recorded symbols & WittgensteinRecorded symbols & Wittgenstein §V. The cycle of referenceThe cycle of reference l Wittgenstein Wittgenstein l Proust Proust l Proust—Volume II Proust—Volume II l Henry Adams Henry Adams l Thinking with the Heart, Feeling with the Head Thinking with the Heart, Feeling with the Head l The Structure of Language The Structure of Language

3 I.Definition & Nature Of Recorded SymbolsDefinition & Nature Of Recorded Symbols §INTRODUCTION §DEFINITION OF “RECORDED SYMBOL” §EXPLORATION §STAGES IN DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLS §IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE

4 INTRODUCTION §This examination of some philosophical issues began when I considered more closely the implications of a definition of information that I had formulated many years before: Information is that property of data (i.e., recorded symbols) which represents (and measures) effects of processing of them. §The question I faced was, “What are recorded symbols and what makes them so?” §It seemed to me that something, recorded or otherwise, became a “symbol” only when someone interpreted it as representing something else. And that led into what I will now present.

5 Definition Of “Recorded Symbol” §The Definition §Recorded Symbol §Constituent Elements §Interpretation §Entity §Observor §Context §Representation §Other Thing

6 DEFINITION OF "RECORDED SYMBOL" S = (E,O,C/R,T)

7 Examples of Recorded Symbols §Printed characters and words §Images §Numbers §Signs (e.g., a “STOP” sign) §Persons §Pieces of paper, metal, or plastic

8 Examples of Elements §Observers: humans, animals, constructs (e.g., computers) §Contexts: physical, symbolic, mixed §Representations: name, description, surrogate, cause/effect §Things: real or imaginary, true or false, physical or symbolic §Interpretations: physical, mental, emotional responses

9 Stages in Development of Symbols §Physical World §Sense Images §Immediate Interpretation §Awareness §Ideation §Conceptualization—Symbol to Process

10 Implications for Information Science §The Role of Structure §The Role of Process

11 II. The Role Of StructureThe Role Of Structure §Structure §Equivalence Classes l Conceptual Entities l Interior Vs. Exterior Entities l Levels of Symbolization l Relationship to Entity Being Represented l Equivalence Classes and Classifications §Syntactical Structures §Structure Derived From Analysis §The Philosophical Issues

12 III. The Role of ProcessesThe Role of Processes §Levels of Processing §Structures & Processes l Equivalence Classes l Syntactic Structures l Analytical Structures §The Philosophical Issues l Whether Propositions Are Well-formed l The Effect of Error l The Issue of Measurement l The Issue of Purpose

13 Processes §Levels of Processing l Data Transfer l Data Selection l Data Analysis l Data Reduction §The Philosophical Issues §Measurement l Data Transfer -- The Shannon Measure l Data Selection -- Weighted Entropy l Data Analysis -- Semantic & Syntactic l Data Reduction -- Dimensional Structure

14 The Proactive Context §The Bases for Motivations, for Goals §Personal Wishes §Ethical Obligations §Leaps of Faith §The Means for Determining Goals §Built-in Goals -- Survival §Force-field of Goals §Experiental Goals

15 IV. Recorded Symbols & WittgensteinRecorded Symbols & Wittgenstein §Introduction: Wittgenstein §Review of Definitions §Tractatus & The Definition Of "Recorded Symbol" §Tractatus & Levels Of Context §Tractatus & Symbolic Structures §Tractatus & Processes

16 Tractatus & the Definition of "Recorded Symbol" §Interpretation §Entity §Observer & Context §Representation.

17 Tractatus & Levels of Context §Real, Empirical World §Sense Images §Thoughts

18 Tractatus & Symbolic Structures §Equivalence Class Structures §Syntactic Structures §Analytic Structures

19 The Tractatus & Processes

20 V. The Cycle of ReferenceThe Cycle of Reference §Introduction §Real World Objects to Sense Images l My Concept l Proust l The Eastern Religions

21 Schematic §The following schematic is intended to illustrate the succession of stages in symbolization (interpretation by an observor of an entity as representing another entity). The Sense Image is the internal symbol for the Real World; the Idea is the symbol for the Sense Image; the Equivalence Class is the symbol for the Idea; the Real World is the symbol for the Equivalence Class.

22 The Cycle of Reference

23 Equivalence Class to Real World §The tricky step in this succession is that from the equivalence class to the real world, but clearly this is Platos's view. There is a fascinating new development by the religionists in their battle with evolution theory. It is called “intelligent design” and is oriented toward finding evidence that life was designed by an intelligent force rather than by a random process. As I see it, it focuses on D, the transition from the equivalence class (which I am going to call “concept”) to the real world, l Watanabe, Teresa. “Enlisting science to find fingerprints of a creator”. LA Times, 25 Mar 2001.

24 Natural Philosophers §The first set of foci of philosophical investigation is on the four stages. For example, the Greek "natural philosophers" (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides, Zeon of Elea, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus) were concerned with the nature of the real world.

25 Sense Images §The Sense Image is the body's response to the external world; it is the most immediate, and the recall of it serves to recall the entire array of associations. Now, who was concerned with sense images?

26 Ideas §Who was concerned with ideas?

27 Equivalence Classes §Who was concerned with equivalence classes? (I must find a better term than "equivalence class", not to replace it but to refer to it.)

28 Transitions §The arrows between successive stages identify the transition from one stage to the next. Of more importance, though, they represent the focus of philosophical attention, and it is to that I now turn. §The arrow labeled A is the focus of attention by Proust, by the Eastern philosophers, by Wittgenstein (when he refers to "what we cannot know").

29 Wittgenstein §Wittgenstein says, § Thus the picture is linked to reality; it reaches up to it. § It is like a scale applied to reality. § Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object to be measured. § According to this view the representing relations which makes a picture, also belongs to the picture. § The representing relations consist of the co- ordinations of the elements of the picture and the things. §These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality.

30 Proust §The entire focus of Proust is on A: l Proust, Marcel. Remembrance of Things Past. New York: Random House, §P 64. A 'real' person, profoundly as we may sympathize with him, is in a great measure perceptible only through our senses, that is to say, he remains opaque, offers a dead weight which our sensibilities have not the strength to lift. §P 134. Meanwhile I was endeavoring to apply to this image, … to this fresh and unchanging image the idea: "It is Mme. de Guermantes"; but I succeeded only in making the idea pass between me and the image, as though they were two discs moving in separate planes, with a space between.

31 Proust §But this Mme. de Guermantes of whom I had so often dreamed, now that I could see she had a real existence independent of myself, acquired a fresh increase in power over my imagination. Which, paralyzed for a moment by contact with a reality so different from anything that it had expected, began to react and say within me … §P 159. But at a given moment, without being able to distinguish any clear outline, or to give a name to what was pleasing him, suddenly enraptured, he had tried to collect, to treasure in his memory the phrase or harmony -- he knew not which -- that had just been played, and had opened and expanded his soul, just as the fragrance of certain roses, wafted upon the moist air of evening, has the power of dilating our nostrils.

32 Proust §Perhaps it was owing to his own ignorance of music that he had been able to receive so confused an impression, one of those that are, notwithstanding, our only purely musical impressions, limited in their extent, entirely original, and irreducible to any other kind. An impression of this order, vanishing in an instant is, so to speak, an impression sine materia. Presumably the notes that we hear at such moments tend to spread out before our eyes, over surfaces greater or smaller according to their pitch and volume; to trace arabesque designs, to give us the sensation of breath of tenuity, stability or caprice.

33 Proust §But the notes themselves have vanished before these sensations have developed sufficiently to escape submersion under those which the following, or even simultaneous notes have already begun to awaken in us. … if our memory, like a laborer who toils in the laying down of firm foundations under the tumult of the waves, did not, by fashioning for us facsimiles of those fugitive phrases, enable us to compare and contrast them with those that follow.

34 Proust §P 344. But at the same time, all my pleasure had ceased; in vain might I strain towards Berma's eyes, ears, mind, so as not to let one morsel escape me of the reasons which she would furnish for my admiring her, I did not succeed in gathering a single one. … I listened to her as though I were reading Phedre, or as though Phaedra herself had at that moment uttered the words I was hearing, without it appearing that Berma's talent had added anything at all to them.

35 Proust §P 404. And yet when, later on, this sonata had been played for me two or three times I found that I knew it quite well. And so it is not wrong to speak of hearing a thing for the first time. If one had indeed, as one supposes, received no impression from the first hearing, the second, the third would be equally 'first hearings' and there would be no reason why one should understand it any better after the tenth. Probably what was wanting, the first time, is not comprehension but memory. For our memory, compared to the complexity of the impressions which it has to face while we are listening, is infinitesimal, as brief as the memory of a man who in his sleep thinks of a thousand things and at once forgets them,… Of these multiple impressions our memory is not capable of furnishing us with an immediate picture.

36 Proust §P 465. … he will find that the love of which he can speak unmoved he did not, at the moment of speaking, feel, and therefore did not know, knowledge of these matters being intermittent and not outlasting the actual presence of the sentiment.

37 Proust §P 488. And as Habit weakens every impression, what a person recalls for us most vividly is precisely what we have forgotten, because it was of no importance, and had therefore left in full possession of its strength. That is why the better part of our memory exists outside us, in a blatter of rain, in the smell of an unaired room or of the first crackling brushwood fire in a cold grate: whenever, in short, we happen upon what our mind, having no use for it, had rejected, the last treasure that the past has in store, the richest, that which when all our flow of tears seems to have dried at the source can make us weep again. Outside ourselves, did I say; rather within ourselves bu hidden from out eyes in an oblivion more or less prolonged.

38 Proust §P 544. I looked at the three trees; I could see them plainly, but my mind felt that they were concealing something which it had not grasped, as when things are placed out of our reach, so that our fingers, stretched out at arm's length, can only touch for a moment their outer surface, and can take hold of nothing. §P 686. It would require so immense an effort to reconstruct everything that has been imparted to us by things other than ourselves -- were it only the taste of a fruit -- that no sooner is the impression received than we begin imperceptibly to descend the slope of memory and, without noticing anything, in a very short time, we have come a long way from what we actually felt. So that every fresh encounter is a sort of rectification, which brings up back to what we really did see.

39 Proust §P 720. At the age when a Name, offering us an image of the unknowable which we have poured into its mould, while at the same moment it connotes for us also an existing place, forces us accordingly to identify one with the other to such a point that we set out to seek in a city a soul which it cannot embody but which we no longer have the power to expel from its name … §P 749. We feel in one world, we think, we give names to things in another; between the two we can establish a certain correspondence, but not bridge the interval. It was quite narrow, this interval, this fault that I had to cross when, that afternoon on which I went first to hear Berma …

40 Proust §P 760. … the truth has no need to be uttered to be made apparent, and that one may perhaps gather it with more certainty, without waiting for words, without even bothering one's head about them, froma thousand outward signs, even from certain invisible phenomena, analogous in the sphere of human character to what in nature are atmospheric changes. §P 815. We never see the people we are dear to us save in the animated system, the perpetual motion of our love for them, which before allowing the images that their faces present to reach us catches them in its vortex, flings them back upon the idea that we have always had of them, makes them adhere to it, conincide with it.

41 Proust—Volume II §P 991. Engrossed in the unhappy meditations I described a moment ago, I had entered the court of the Guermantes residence and, in my absorption, failed to notice an automobile that was coming in; at the chauffeur’s cry I had barely time to get out of the way and, in stepping back, struck my foot against some unevenly cut flagstones leading to a carriage house.

42 Proust—Volume II §In recovering my balance, I put my foot on a stone that was a little lower than the one next to it; immediately all my discouragement vanished before a feeling of happiness which I had experienced at different moments of my life, at the sight of trees I thought I recognised when driving around Balbec, or the church spires of Martinville, or the savor of a madeleine, dipped in herb tea, or from many other sensations I have mentioned, which had seemed to me to be synthesised in the last works of Vinteuil. Just as when I tasted the madeleine, all anxiety as to the future, all intellectual doubt was dispelled. The misgivings that had been harassing me a moment before concerning the reality of my literary gifts, and even of literature itself, were suddenly banished as if by magic.

43 Proust—Volume II §But this time I made a firm resolve that I would not be satisfied to leave the question unanswered (as I did the day I tasted of a madeleine dipped in herb tea) as to why, without my having worked out any new line of reasoning or found any decisive argument, the difficulties that had seemed insoluble a short time before had now lost all their importance. The feeling of happiness which had just come over me was, indeed, exactly the same as I had experienced while eating the madeleine, but at that time I put off seeking the deep- lying causes for it. There was a purely material difference in the mental images evoked.

44 Proust—Volume II §A deep azure blue intoxicated my sight, impressions of coolness and dazzling light hovered near me and, in my eagerness to seize them, not daring to move-just as when I tasted the flavour of the made IIleine and tried to bring back to my mind what it suggested to me-I stood there, swaying back and forth, as I had done a moment before, one foot on the higher stone and the other on the lower. indifferent to the possible amusement of the large crowd of chauffeurs.

45 Proust—Volume II §Each time that I merely repeated the action physically, the effort was in vain; but if I forgot the Guermantes reception and succeeded in recapturing the sensation I had felt the instant I placed my feet in that position, again the dazzling, elusive vision brushed me with its wings, as if to say, "Seize me in my flight, if you have the power, and try to solve the riddle of happiness I propound to you.”

46 Proust—Volume II §And almost immediately I recognized it; it was Venice, about which my efforts at description and the supposed 'snapshots' taken by my memory had never yielded me anything, but which was brought back to me by the sensation I had once felt as I stood on two uneven flagstones in the baptistry of Saint Mark's, and with that sensation came all the others connected with it that day, which had been waiting in their proper place in the series of forgotten days, until a sudden happening had imperiously commanded them to come forth. It was in the same way that the taste of the little madeleine had recalled Combray to my mind.

47 Proust—Volume II §But why had the mental images of Combray and Venice at their respective moments given me a joy like a sense of certainty, sufficient, without other proofs, to make me indifferent to death? While I was still putting this question to myself, determined this time to find the answer to it, I entered the Guermantes mansion-for we always put ahead of the subjective task we have to perform the outward r6le we are playing, and mine that day was that of an invited guest. But, when I reached the second story, a butler asked me to step for a moment into a small library adjoin- ing the buffet, until the selection they were playing was finished, the Princess having forbidden that the dors be opened while it was being played.

48 Proust—Volume II §At that very moment a second signal came to reinforce the one I had received from the two uneven flagstones, and urged me to persevere in my task. YVhat happened was that a servant, trying in vain to make no noise, struck a spoon against a plate. The same kind of felicity as I had received from the uneven paving stones now came over me; the sensations were again those of great heat, but entirely different, mingled with the odour of smoke, tempered by the cool fragrance of a forest setting, and 1 recognized that what seemed to me so delightful was the very row of trees which I had found it wearisome to study and describe

49 Proust—Volume II §and which, in a sort of hallucination, I thought now stood before me as I uncorked the bottle of beer I had with me in the railway carriage, the sound of the spoon striking the plate having given me-until I came to myself again the illusion of the very similar noise of the hammer of a workman who bad made some repairs to a wheel while our train stopped before that little clump of trees. Then one would have said that the signs which were to lift me out of my discouragement that day and restore my faith in literature had determined to come thick and fast, for when a butler who had been for a long time in the service of the Prince de Guermantes recognised me and, in order to save my going to the buffet, brought to me in the library a small plate of petits jours and a glass of orangeade, I wiped my mouth with the napkin he had given me;

50 Proust—Volume II §but immediately, like the character in The Arabian Nights who unwittingly performs precisely the rite that calls up before him, visible to his eyes alone, a docile genie, ready to transport him far away, a fresh vision of azure blue passed before my eyes; but this time it was pure and saline and it rounded upward like bluish breasts. The impression was so vivid that the moment I was re- living fused with the real present and, more dazed than on that day when I wondered whether I was really going to be received by the Princesse de Guermantes or was everything going to crash about my head, I thought the servant had just opened the window toward the beach and everything called me to go down and stroll along the embankment at high tide;

51 Proust—Volume II §the napkin which I had taken to wipe my mouth had precisely the same sort of starchy stiffness as the towel with which I had had so much trouble ying myself before the window the first day of my stay at Balbec, and 3W, in this library of the Guermantes mansion, it spread out in its various folds and creases, like a peacock's tail, the plumage of a green and blue ocean. And I drew enjoyment, not only from those colours, but from a whole moment of my life which had brought them into being and had no doubt been an aspiration toward them, but which perhaps some feeling of fatigue or sadness had prevented me from enjoying at Balbec and which now, pure and disembodied, freed from all the imperfections of objective perception, filled me with joy.

52 Proust—Volume II §The piece they were playing was to finish at any moment and I be obliged to enter the salon. Therefore I made an effort to try as quickly as possible to see clearly into the nature of the identical pleasures I had just felt three separate times within a few minutes, and then to draw from them the lesson they had to give. The great difference there is between the actual impression we received from something and the artificial impression we create for ourselves when we endeavour by an effort of the will to bring the object before us again '".4' did not pause to consider;

53 Proust—Volume II §remembering only too well the comparative indifference with which Swann used to be able to speak of the period in his life when he was loved (because this expression suggested something so different to him) and the sudden pain caused him by Vinteuil's lit phrase, which brought to mind those days themselves just as he had them, I understood too clearly that the sensation of the uneven flagstone the stiffness of the napkin and the savour of the madeleine had awaken in me something that had no relation to what I used to endeavour to rec to mind about Venice, Balbec, Combray with the aid of a colourless, distinguishing memory.

54 Proust—Volume II §And I understood how one can come to judgement and this disparaging conclusion are based on something entire different from life itself, on mental images which have retained no tri of life. At the most, I noted incidentally that the difference between ea of these real impressions and the corresponding artificial difference which explain why an even-toned painting of life cannot be a true likeness-was probably due to this cause, namely, that the slightest word' moment in our life was surrounded and illumined by things that logica had no relation to it and were separated from it by our intelligence, whi had no need of them for reasoning purposes; and yet, in the midst these irrelevant objects- here, the rosy glow of eventide on the flower for women, the pleasant sensation of luxury;

55 Proust—Volume II §there, blue volutes of t morning sea, wrapped in spirals around strains of music which only part 4. emerge, like mermaids' shoulders-the most insignificant gesture, t. simplest act remain enclosed, as it were, in a thousand sealed jars, ea' filled with things of an absolutely different colour, odour and temper bygone years-years during which we have been constantly changing, only in our dreams and thoughts-stand at very different altitudes ar have gone through these changes imperceptibly, but between our prese'.1:: state and the memory that suddenly comes back to us, just as betwec two recollections of different years, places or hours, there is such a wie U!,'difference that that fact alone, regardless even of any specific individualit would suffice to make comparison between them impossible.

56 Proust—Volume II §Yes, if, thanks to our ability to forget, a past recollection has been able to avoid any ti any link with the present moment, if it has remained in its own place ar time, if it has kept its distance, its isolation in the depths of a valley on the tip of a mountain peak, it suddenly brings us a breath of free air-refreshing just because we have breathed it once before~f th purer air which the poets have vainly tried to establish in Paradis whereas it could not convey that profound sensation of renewal if it hi not already been breathed, for the only true paradise is always the par dise we have lost. And, in passing, I noted that the work of art which already felt myself prepared to undertake, but without my having mac

57 Henry Adams §Henry Adams is a fascinating example of focus on A: l Adams, Henry. The Education of Henry Adams. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, pp , 474, 484. §P “Pearson (i.e., Karl Pearson) shut out of science everything which the nineteenth century had brought into it. He told his scholars that they must put up with a franction of the universe, and a very small fraction at that – the circle reached by the senses, where sequence can be taken for granted … ‘Order and reason, beauty and benevolence, are charactersitcis and concepts which we find solely associated with the mind of man.’

58 Henry Adams §The assertion, as a broad truth, left one’s mind in no doubt of its bearing, for order and beauty seemed to be associated also in the mind of a crystal, if ones senses were to be admitted as judge; but the historian had no interest in the universal truth of Pearson's or Kelvin's or Newton's laws; he sought on]y their relative drift or direction, and Pearson went on to say that these conceptions must stop: "Into the chaos beyond sense- impressions we cannot scientifically project them." We cannot even infer them: "In the chaos behind sensations, in the 'beyond' of sense-impressions, we cannot infer necessity, order or routine, for these are concepts formed by the mind of man on this side of sense-impressions"; but we must infer chaos: "Briefly chaos is all that science can logically assert of the supersensuous."

59 Henry Adams §The kinetic theory of gas is an assertion of ultimate chaos. In plain words, Chaos was the law of nature; Order was the dream of man. §“No one means all he says, and yet very few say all they mean, for words are slippery and thought is viscous; but since Bacon and Newton, English thought had gone on impatiently protesting that no one must try to know the unknowable at the same time that every one went on thinking about it. The result was as chaotic as kinetic gas; but with the thought a historian had nothing to do. He sought only its direction. For himself he knew, that, in spite of all the Englishmen that ever lived, he would be forced to enter supersensual chaos if he meant to find out what became of British science - or indeed of any other science.

60 Henry Adams §From Pythagoras to Herbert Spencer, every one had done it, although commonly science had explored an ocean which it preferred to regard as Unity or a Universe, and called Order. Even Hegel, who taught that every notion included its own negation, used the negation only to reach a "larger synthesis," till be reached the universal which thinks itself, contradiction and all. The Church alone had constantly protested that anarchy was not order, that Satan was not God, that pantheism was worse than atheism, and that Unity could not be proved as a contradiction.

61 Henry Adams §P A dynamic theory, like most theories, begins by begging the question it defines Progress as the development and economy of Forces. Further, it defines force as anything that does, or helps to do work. Man is a force; so is the sun; so is a mathematical point, though without dimensions or known existence. §Man commonly begs the question again by taking for granted that he captures the forces. A dynamic theory, assigning attractive force to opposing bodies in proportion to the law of mass, takes for granted that the forces of nature capture man.

62 Henry Adams §The sum of force attracts; the feeble atom or molecule called man is attracted; be suffers education or growth; he is the sum of the forces that attract him; his body and his thought are alike their product; the movement of the forces controls the progress of his mind, since he can know nothing but the motions which impinge on his senses, whose sum makes education. §For convenience as an image, the theory may liken man to a spider in its web, watching for chance prey. Forces of nature dance like flies before the net, and the spider pounces on them when it can; but it makes many fatal mistakes, though its theory of force is sound.

63 Henry Adams §The spider-mind acquires a faculty of memory, and, with it, a singular skill of analysis and synthesis, taking apart and putting together in different relations the meshes of its trap. Man had in the beginning no power of analysis or synthesis approaching that of the spider, or even of the honey-bee; but he had acute sensibility to the higher forces. Fire taught him secrets that no other animal could learn; running water probably taught him even more, especially in his first lessons of mechanics; the animals helped to educate him, trusting themselves into his hands

64 Henry Adams §P when, after centuries of license, the Church reformed its discipline, and, to prove it, burned Giordano Bruno in 1600, besides condemning Galileo in 1630-as science goes on repeating tous every day - it condemned anarchists, not atheists. None of the astronomers were irreligious men; all of them made a point of magnifying God through his works; a form of science which did their religion no credit. Neither Galileo nor Kepler, neither Spinoza nor Descartes, neither Leibnitz nor Newton, any more than Constantine the Great - if so much - doubted Unity. The utmost range of their heresies reached only its personality.

65 Henry Adams §This persistence of thought-inertia is the leading idea of modern history. Except as reflected in himself, man has no reason for assuming unity in the universe, or an ultimate substance, or a prime-motor. The a priori insistence on this unity ended by fatiguing the more active-or reactive-minds; and Lord Bacon tried to stop it. He urged society to lay aside the idea of evolving the universe from a thought, and to try evolving thought from the universe. The mind should observe and register forces-take them apart and put them together - without assuming unity at all. "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." "The imagination must be given not wings but weights." As Galileo reversed the action of earth and sun, Bacon reversed the relation of thought to force. The mind was thenceforth to follow the movement of matter, and unity must be left to shift for itself. §The revolution in attitude seemed voluntary, but in fact was as mechanical as the fall of a feather. Man created nothing. After 1500, the speed of progress so rapidly surpassed man's gait as to alarm every one, as though it were the acceleration of a falling body which the dynamic theory takes it to be. Lord Bacon was as much astonished by it as the Church was, and with reason. Suddenly society felt itself dragged into situations altogether new and anarchic - situations which it could not affect, but which painfully affected it. Instinct taught it that the universe in its thought must be in danger when its reflection lost itself in space. The

66 Henry Adams §The revolution in attitude seemed voluntary, but in fact was as mechanical as the fall of a feather. Man created nothing. After 1500, the speed of progress so rapidly surpassed man's gait as to alarm every one, as though it were the acceleration of a falling body which the dynamic theory takes it to be. Lord Bacon was as much astonished by it as the Church was, and with reason. Suddenly society felt itself dragged into situations altogether new and anarchic - situations which it could not affect, but which painfully affected it. Instinct taught it that the universe in its thought must be in danger when its reflection lost itself in space. The

67 Schematic §The following schematic is intended to illustrate the succession of stages in symbolization (interpretation by an observor of an entity as representing another entity). The Sense Image is the internal symbol for the Real World; the Idea is the symbol for the Sense Image; the Equivalence Class is the symbol for the Idea; the Real World is the symbol for the Equivalence Class.

68 Equivalence Class to Real World §The tricky step in this succession is that from the equivalence class to the real world, but clearly this is Platos's view. There is a fascinating new development by the religionists in their battle with evolution theory. It is called “intelligent design” and is oriented toward finding evidence that life was designed by an intelligent force rather than by a random process. As I see it, it focuses on D, the transition from the equivalence class (which I am going to call “concept”) to the real world, l Watanabe, Teresa. “Enlisting science to find fingerprints of a creator”. LA Times, 25 Mar 2001.

69 Natural Philosophers §The first set of foci of philosophical investigation is on the four stages. For example, the Greek "natural philosophers" (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides, Zeon of Elea, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus) were concerned with the nature of the real world.

70 Sense Images §The Sense Image is the body's response to the external world; it is the most immediate, and the recall of it serves to recall the entire array of associations. Now, who was concerned with sense images?

71 Ideas §Who was concerned with ideas?

72 Equivalence Classes §Who was concerned with equivalence classes? (I must find a better term than "equivalence class", not to replace it but to refer to it.)

73 Transitions §The arrows between successive stages identify the transition from one stage to the next. Of more importance, though, they represent the focus of philosophical attention, and it is to that I now turn. §The arrow labeled A is the focus of attention by Proust, by the Eastern philosophers, by Wittgenstein (when he refers to "what we cannot know").

74 Thinking With the Heart, Feeling with the Head §Sunday, November 4, 2001 l By Richard Wollheim §Richard Wollheim Teaches in the Philosophy Department at UC Berkeley and Is the Author of Numerous Books, Including "On the Emotions," "The Mind and Its Depths" and "The Thread of Life."

75 Upheavals Of Thought: The Intelligence Of Emotions §By Martha C. Nussbaum, Cambridge University Press: 752 pp., $39.95

76 What, exactly, are the emotions? §The poverty of philosophy on this question is perennial, though the reasons differ from age to age. Aristotle, in the "Rhetoric," writes as though the emotions were something that other people have, and his interest is in how the clever orator can manipulate them. Seneca concedes that emotions are the common possession of humanity, but this is his prelude to telling us that we should rid ourselves of them if we are not to be unhealthily dependent on things outside ourselves. For the Ancients then, the emotions were second-class citizens of the mind because they were thought to have so little to contribute either to the life of the intellect or to the good life.

77 What, exactly, are the emotions? §The philosophical neglect of the emotions in our day is for a different reason. Not so long ago, philosophers held the belief that there was a rigid distinction between the first-order activities of life, such as ordinary inquiry and science and art which engage reality head-on, and the lonely second-order activity of philosophy, the sole concern of which was to inquire into the concepts and the forms of argument employed in these first-order activities. If no one believes this any longer in its full rigor, the shadow of this distinction hangs over the subject.

78 Nussbaum §Nussbaum unites in an original and altogether personal way the philosophy of the emotions with the texture of life and the experience of art. How unexpected it is to open a book by a professor of philosophy and to find that it begins with an account of her, on a foreign lecture engagement, learning that her mother is dying, of the grief that she lived through on the plane back, of how she arrived at the deathbed too late and of the subsequent days and nights of mourning; that it then goes on to a sustained analysis of two of Mahler's "Kindertotenlieder"; and that it devotes the last 250 pages to a discussion of the theme of love

79 Theme of love §St. Augustine, §Dante, §Emily Bronte, §Walt Whitman and §Joyce.

80 Marcel Proust is Virgil to Nussbaum's Dante. §The book shows an impressive familiarity with the classics, with psychology, with anthropology, with the law and with its own version of psychoanalysis. "Upheavals of Thought" is what Henry James, one of Nussbaum's favorite authors, would have called "a great, glittering thing."

81 The book falls into two sections. §The first is analytic and is concerned with understanding what the emotions are. §The second section is normative, which for Nussbaum means grappling with the place emotions occupy in our lives.

82 View of the emotions is complex. §First and foremost, they are a kind of judgment or thought. §Second, they have an object, or there is some thing that they are about. Third, the object of the emotions is not just a thing as such: It is a thing seen by the person in a certain light. §Fourth, there are beliefs that the person has about the object which account for the way the object is seen. §Fifth, the way the object is seen, and the beliefs that the person holds about it, ascribe value, positive or negative, to the object: Emotions always involve appraisal or evaluation. §Sixth, this value derives from the way the object impinges, favorably or unfavorably, but always in an important way, upon the person's flourishing.

83 Emotions are eudaimonistic. §For her the Greek word, eudaimonia, means not happiness, as it is conventionally translated, but well- being. Nussbaum also connects the notion of flourishing with need and the satisfaction of need, where need is contrasted with desire or want. Need opens us up to the world, and "neediness," she suggests, need not be a bad word. To illustrate this account, we need look no further than her own experience. When she grieves, she grieves for someone, for her mother; she grieves for her mother as someone wonderful and now dead; she believes her mother to be both these things, and the wonderfulness that her mother had, and of which Nussbaum's life is now robbed, is inseparable from her mother's centrality to that life.

84 Two strategies §The first strategy is to set up an alternative view of the emotions, or what she calls "the adversary," to challenge and defeat this view in open intellectual combat, and then to conclude that, the adversary routed, the field is hers. Her arguments against her adversary are undoubtedly sound, but the declaration of victory is premature. For what does the adversary believe? The adversary believes that the emotions are "non-reasoning movements," emerging from the depths of the body, involving no particular way of seeing the world, floating free of belief and reason. §If that is so, it is surely more than likely that there is a whole range of views about the emotions that lie in the terrain between Nussbaum and her adversary. Might not the truth lie with any one of them?

85 Two strategies §Nussbaum does not deny these intermediate views. In fact, when it comes to her second strategy, she depends on them, for her second strategy is to listen to every reasonable objection to her original view, and to accept it, provided that it doesn't land her in the camp of the adversary. Accordingly, we find her moving into No- Man's Land, forward of her initial entrenchment but short of the enemy. §So, for instance, having initially claimed that emotions depend for their existence upon beliefs that precede them, Nussbaum is, in the course of the book, ready to give up both parts of this claim so long as she can still, by hook or by crook, somehow connect emotions with belief.

86 Concessions §Her first concession is that an emotion can produce the very belief upon which it seems to depend, as when grief can lead me, for instance, against all evidence, to believe that there is someone responsible for what has befallen me. So I can now enjoy the solace of blame. §Her second concession is that an emotion, originally dependent upon a certain belief, can outlive the erosion of that belief. An ancient Athenian, for example, who was angry with his Persian enemy for the harm done to his people, could remain angry even when he recognized that he personally had not been harmed.

87 Value and flourishing §But the major difficulties that beset the first part of "Upheavals of Thought" lie in the vital corner of the book that is occupied by the twin notions of value and flourishing. Each is troubled by several fundamental questions: §Is emotion always a response to the perception of value, or cannot emotion sometimes bring value into existence? Nussbaum thinks it is always a response, for it is only then that the emotions have a right to be seen as "part and parcel" of the system of ethical reasoning, which is what she ultimately wants to show.

88 Value and flourishing §But the priority of value cannot be generally true: Sometimes emotion generates value. Consider love. Love, it is generally agreed, does not normally arise for a reason, therefore it does not arise in response to any perception of value. On the contrary, it is usually enough that I love someone for me to find the loved one of value. §Is flourishing always a matter of realizing values that the person already accepts as his own, or cannot a person be completely in ignorance about what is important for him, so that he thinks he is flourishing when he is not? Again Nussbaum needs the first answer, because it is only then that she can account for the fact on which the adversary depends that emotions can act on us so violently: They can transport us into a state of bliss; they can hurl us to the ground.

89 Value and flourishing §However, the subjectivity of flourishing cannot be generally true: Sometimes people can be bad guides as to whether they are flourishing or not. Consider, as Nussbaum does, the Indian village woman, sunk in poverty. She, who knows no better, may very well think that she is flourishing. But Nussbaum, with her attachment to the cause of social progress, and her commitment to the emotions, cannot agree that she is.

90 Normative §Such considerations take us straight into the second, or "normative," part of the book. The word "normative" is frequently heard in philosophy these days, and it means different things in different mouths. With Nussbaum it means confronting the question, which has hovered over the first part of the book, whether the emotions really deserve a place in our lives. Should she follow those philosophers who have been her mentors in the analysis of the emotions, the Stoics of antiquity, and advise the extirpation of the emotions, or, at least, recommend their exclusion from ethical and social reasoning?

91 Normative §To resolve this issue, which we might think has a certain artificiality to it, Nussbaum considers two emotions: compassion, where she thinks the best case for the emotions lies, and erotic love, where she thinks the hardest case is to be found. §In a way, the section on compassion belongs to, indeed it makes up, another book. Nussbaum dutifully engages in what she calls "the philosophical debate," which is whether compassion should be discarded as a depravity, in that it insults the dignity of others, it gives too much importance to contingent turns of fortune and it fosters anger, resentment and revenge.

92 Normative §But her thoughts are elsewhere, and her main concern is not so much with whether compassion is of value but when it is. The kind of compassion that should be cultivated is identified by the absence of just those qualities for which critics of compassion, like Nietzsche, have thought it should be rejected. §It is then the lengthy discussion of love, and of how love must be reformed so as to fit into the reasonable life, that forms the true core of Nussbaum's normative project, and this discussion is equally remarkable for its method and for its content.

93 Normative §To arrive at her reformed conception of love, Nussbaum enlists the greatest thinkers and artists who have offered visions of love in our tradition, and, though her arrangement is not linear, later writers are broadly corrective of earlier writers. History has its own therapy. Plato's excessively pure conception of love is rectified by Augustine's insistence on the flawed individual, and Dante goes beyond Augustine by reintroducing the Aristotelian notion of the agent and the respect due to agency. Bront reveals how acceptance of earthly passion can lead either to disgust or to a romantic solipsism. For Mahler, love offers not a final state, but an endless struggle, and Whitman somewhat the same, but with a grand sense of human inclusiveness.

94 Normative §And then the therapy comes to an end, not with a further ascent, but with an abrupt descent. We end with Molly Bloom in bed, soliloquizing about her lovers, real and imaginary, adequate and insufficient, with her husband curled up by her side, his feet near her face, his face near her bottom, on which, just before he fell asleep, he deposited a kiss. §To many readers there will be something deeply sympathetic about this sudden plunge into what Nussbaum calls "ordinariness." Nevertheless, for at least two reasons her reformed conception of love is more comic than she intended.

95 Love is Comic §In the first place, reformed love is modeled a little too closely upon reformed compassion. It is good to say that love should be as free as possible from narcissism, ambivalence and indifference to the rest of the world, but to justify this by saying that only on these terms will love foster liberal democracy makes the passions rather too much the slave of reason. §The second reason takes us deeper. In recent years, a number of moral philosophers of otherwise different persuasions have considerably changed our view of morality by insisting on the plurality of values.

96 Love is Comic §There are many values, they assert, and there is no reason to believe, and much reason to disbelieve, that they are all consistent. Those who devote themselves to the cause of social justice may allow their hearts to grow cold, their voices to get shrill. Those who are assiduous in their concern for their friends and display loyalty beyond all expectations may be indifferent to the cries of the poor and the oppressed. A fine and imaginative musician may be a brute. We may deplore this, but it is an ineradicable fact of human nature, with which morality should come to terms.

97 Pluralism §It is important to understand that pluralism about values is not necessarily relativism. We listen, it is true, to those values which speak loudest to us, or most eloquently. But this does not mean that the values to which our ears are closed have nothing to tell us. If in the past Nussbaum's work has been loosely associated with pluralism, it is not to the fore in "Upheavals of Thought," where the charge of moral incompleteness is rather freely thrown at those who fail to make their lives sufficiently well-rounded. But it is not the departure from pluralism, but something closely related to it, that somewhat destabilizes the book.

98 Pluralism §Pluralism calls for a revolution in our understanding of morality. But arguably it also calls for a parallel revolution in the practice of moral philosophy. For, once we recognize the pull of competing values in life, once we recognize the variety of ways that there are of responding to these pulls, is it still so clear that we should continue to think of something called the moral life, which moral philosophers depict, and ordinary people lead, as the all-purpose unit of appraisal? For is this the form within which our pursuit of value, or what Nussbaum calls "moral effort," can be contained? Might not moral effort be more improvisatory so that now we attend to this value, now to that?

99 Pluralism §For some, unity of life will continue to be the ideal, just as some will never experience the tug of irreconcilable values. But others will be less, or perhaps more, fortunate. The truth surely is that Molly Bloom does not offer a picture of life that is superior to Dante's vision of Paradise. For she does not offer a picture of life at all, though perhaps she does offer, or Joyce offers, a reason why not. That reason has something to do with a value that is not allowed to disturb "Upheavals of Thought": the spirit of comedy.

100 The Structure of Language §The structure of language can be visualized in terms of four spectra of description: l Imposed vs. Derived l Explicit vs. Implicit l Explained vs. Understood l Theoretical vs. Pragmatic §Wittgenstein wants us to move from the left of each of those spectra to the right, from those in which to concept determines the structure to those in which the reality does so. §The distinction perhaps is between the “perception” of a word and the “effect” of that word. Thus, is the “meaning” of a word internal to the speaker or external in the response? §All of the investigators seem to ignore the process of “learning”. Plato, indeed, assumes that it is all “built-in”.

101 THE END


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