Presentation on theme: "Economic Dimensions. Sudanese Poverty 1. Sudan is one of the 25 poorest countries on the planet; 90% live below the poverty line. 2. A lethal combination."— Presentation transcript:
Sudanese Poverty 1. Sudan is one of the 25 poorest countries on the planet; 90% live below the poverty line. 2. A lethal combination of droughts and flooding contributes to this situation. 3. Over 80% of the Sudanese population is rural. 4. Since the famous famine of 1984, Sudan has suffered severe droughts in 1989, 1990, 1997, and 2000. Source: Tessa Morrod, Practical Action Sudan Communication Team
The Darfurian Economy 1. Geography: Darfur is basically a vast plain about 900 meters below sea level. Mainly subsistence agriculture. 2. Rainfall and soils roughly divide the province into 3 distinct areas: –A. The northern dry belt: 300 mm of rain/yr. Minimal agriculture; many nomads. –B. Second is the Central Qoz. About 500 mm of annual rainfall. Low-yield agriculture. Crops include millet, maize, okra, tomatoes, and onions. Inhabitated by settled peasants. –C. Third is the southern and southwestern. Annual rainfall ranges between 800 and 900 mm. Groundnuts = cash crop. Mango and citrus trees common. Inhabited by the Baggara and sedentary peasants. –Source: Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide
Investment in Sudan Ranked #2 – World’s Most Attractive Countries for Investment. New (2001) Economic policy which privatized public corporations and ended the State’s monopoly on business. Major investors: Siemens, PetroChina, Chevron China is the primary import/export partner Sources: Ministry Of Investment, Sudan; UN Sudan IG
“The China Factor” China’s goal is to secure inexpensive resources in Africa. Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest shareholder in the GNPOC (Primary owner of the oil pipeline along the Nile). China has invested over US 20 Billion in Sudan. China does not follow international lending guidelines which were designed to stave off corruption. There have been reports that China has been trading guns for oil. Source: The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security
Economic Power of Military The Central Government has used the influx of money from oil (primarily Chinese money) to arm local militias throughout the Sudan. These local militias have now become de facto political/economic power in the villages they control.
Investment in Darfur The Western Savanna Development Corp., Jebel Marra Rural Development project, and the USAID (Save the Children) had larger budgets, more vehicles, and a greater capacity to operate in rural areas than the (not funded) Darfur Regional Gov’t). The Sudanese government is soliciting outside investment in hopes of stabilization.
Government Mr. Bashir an army general seized power in 1989 through a military coup. Struggling to fix infrastructure. 70% of the government’s share of oil profits are spent on defense. This is important because the government is involved in a self arms buildup in case it is cut off from its suppliers. Military power is stressed in Sudan, where the soldier is of higher class and foreigners are forced to have register with the police in order to enter the country. The military is a stable job that pays and puts food on the table, which is not to be downplayed in a society that is so dependant on food through imports.
Government Services (or lack thereof) Each of the 26 States has its own fiscal autonomy... So, those States with the most money are able to provide services. Khartoum has the most stability and thus the best services. The aim is to impress outside investment. Social services in rural areas are non- existent. In Darfur, the Sudanese Government does not provide ANY services……… unless bombings count!!
Fighting for RESOURCES Water is the most economically important resource. High variability in rainfall between the north and the south. (25mm/yr north – 1600mm/yr south) Drought in mid to northern regions can cause great disparity in food supply between the north and south. North Darfur is one of the most at-risk regions for drought because it is at the fringes of available irrigation systems. Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization
Development Prospects/ Foreign Aid Projects Sudanese-backed militias control most of the movement of arms and money, and thus control what can be done by humanitarian/aid organizations. Development in the Darfur region, especially in the embattled West, is at a standstill. A recent problem (2006) for Darfur is that much of the aid money is going to the southern states of Eastern Equatoria, Jabel and Jonglei to aid these areas affected by the LRA incursion. Source: UN Sudan IG
Aid for Darfur Top Donor Countries are the United States with 41% of total registered Funding, EC/ECHO with 16% and United Kingdom with 12%. These donor countries are followed by Netherlands with 4% and Germany and Canada with approx. 3% each. Arab countries accounts for 2.5% (US$ 33.5 million) of total contributions, mainly in the form of in kind bilateral humanitarian aid. Distribution of contributions towards the Darfur Crisis on calendar year and region. All amounts are in US Dollars YEARCHADDARFURTotal in US $ 20038,117,23238,509,45946,626,691 2004204,300,900890,213,9411,094,514,841 200550,000195,217,714195,267,714 TOTAL212,468,131 1,123,941,115 1,336,409,246 Source: UN Resource Tracking Service
Gezira Scheme Facts Originally started by British in 1925 This network of canals and ditches is 2,700 miles (4,300 kilometers) long, and the irrigated area covers 8,800 km². Cotton is the main crop
Gezira Scheme Covers 882,000 hectares, water is irrigated through gravity irrigation. 100,000 tenant households farm the Gezira Scheme Crop Rotation from tenant farmers
Gezira Scheme It is centered on the Sudanese Stat of Al Jazirah, just southeast of the confluence of the Blue and White Nile rivers at the city of Khartoum. One of the biggest irrigation systems in the world, 1/3 the size of Belgium World’s least efficient working at less that 50% Uses 30% of Sudan’s allocation of Nile River. By allocating this percentage of water to the scheme you are taking a chance with a large amount of water on an inefficient system in a country where water is a high commodity.
Gezira Scheme Covers 882,000 hectares(2.1 feddans), water is irrigated through gravity irrigation. 100,000 tenant households farm the Gezira Scheme Crop Rotation from tenant farmers, these tenant farmers are put on this rotation through a specific rotation decided by the government. The land given to the tenants is about 20 feddans per tenant which has proven to provide tenants with an income marginally above the poverty line if at all.
Problems with the Gezira Scheme Silt leads to inefficient irrigation Deteriorating because of silt deposits, the reason for the increase of silt deposits is the amount of water being routed into irrigation has increased from past years. Silt deposits between 5-10 million cubic meters, most of the silt settles in the minor canals. This decreases the amount of water that reaches the tenants who use these minor canals, and silt is responsible for putting some canals and tenants out of production. Expensive $2.1 Billion SD ($8.2 million AD) spent on the removal of silt, however, over recent years the process of removing the silt has slowed down which is putting the Sudanese at a fight to catch up.
More Problems- Transportation There are 18,000 kilometers of roads along canal system and 30,000 kilometers along farm tracks. Majority are dirt, and unpaved. With these unpaved roads they are often impassable after rain or during the rainy season. Light Railway covers about 75% of Gezira Scheme. Inadequate maintenance has led to depletion of locomotives and wagons. The Schemes tracks have been damaged due to floods and vehicle traffic. In order to fix the railways the private sector would have to become involved, but it seems that it is an unlikely appealing investment. It has been recommended that the railways undergo improvements.
International Monetary Fund In 1990 IMF declares Sudan non- cooperative. 1992-93 IMF threatens to expel Sudan Sudan already owes the fund the equivalent of more than $467 million in hard currency Sudan recently allowed to borrow an additional $225 million over the next year. Is it possible that the continued foreign investment and the increase in oil production have lead to the continued lending of the IMF?
Economic Divestment The Sudanese government has shown an historic responsiveness to economic pressure political pressure and diplomacy have largely failed to stop violence in Darfur. The divestment movement has already triggered behavioral changes in a number of companies.
Reasons for Divestment Genocide is an expensive venture. The Sudanese government relies heavily on foreign investment to fund its military and the brutal militias seeking to eliminate the non-Arab population of Darfur. it is estimated that 70-80% of oil revenue in Sudan, fueled by foreign direct investment, goes to the country’s military.
The Jonglei Canal 1.Heavy water flow through Sudan from East Africa flows through south; never reaches north 2.1974: Egypt and Sudan resumed an old plan and in 1974 proposed the digging of the canal. 3.The Canal would supposedly improve trans., agriculture for cash crops, drinking water, and hygiene. 4.High hopes that Sudan would become the “breadbasket” of the Middle East were matched with Saudi Investment 5. 1983: Canal construction halted due to Sudanese Civil War. 6. Government was forced to focus on rain- fed agriculture instead. Source: War and Slavery in Sudan
Implications of a failed Canal 1. The opening up of Sudanese agriculture to the international market made subsistence crops cash crops. 2. The advent of mechanized agriculture damaged Baggara livelihoods because it dispossessed them of land rights. 3. Baggara kidnapped women, children, sold them into slavery. 4. The government was complicit and in denial. 5. The Dinka slaves were forced to do herding of livestock in Kordofan and Darfur. Source: War and Slavery in Sudan
Foreshadowing Genocide 1. 95,000 of a population of 3.1 million Darfurians died 2. The drought shrunk the grazing resources for the nomads, who encroached on the landed peasantry. 3. Farmers carrying out the traditional practice of burning unwanted wild grass were attacked by the Baggara. 4. Khartoum successfully pitted two imagined communities against each other: –The nomadic Baggara and the “Africans.” Source: Gerard Prunier, War and Slavery in Sudan
Denial is not a river in Egypt 1. 1983: Rainfall diminishes dramatically 2. President Nimeiry warned that famine was imminent without foreign aid. 3. The FAO estimated the food deficit at 39,000 tons. 4. Khartoum denied this figure, estimating the food deficit at 5400-7000 tons 5. Nimeiry could no longer deny the obvious –Proclaimed Darfur a disaster zone –Asked the world for 160,000 tons of aid 6.Large IDP camps developed; 60-80,000 starving people marched toward Khartoum. 7.Khartoum declared them Chadian refugees, and deported them to Kordofan. Source: Gerard Prunier: Darfur, the Ambiguous Genocide
Who Benefits From Foreign Aid? 1. In this case, the Baggara did. 2. By seizing the food aid, the Baggara forced the Dinka to remain slaves. 3. This creates a double-bind situation: –Scenario 1: The Dinka receive the food aid, or… –Scenario 2: The Dinka do not receive the food aid. If the Dinka did not receive food aid, they would have no reason to work for the Baggara. If the Dinka did receive food aid, they would have no reason to work for the Baggara. This is the reason for Baggara ambivalence toward international aid intended for this Dinka. This is also the reason the Baggara attempted to control the rationing of such aid. Source: Gerard Prunier, War and Slavery in Sudan
Is global warming to Blame? YES! British Home Secretary John Reid publicly fingered global warming as the driving force behind the Darfur genocide. It is certainly true that desertification, increasingly regular drought cycles, and a lack of water and arable land are aggravating factors. Not Quite… This is an oversimplification according to Richard Reeve, a leading advocate and professor of English literature at Smith College. Michael Klare, a global security specialist at Hampshire College argued that Darfur is part of an emerging pattern of resource conflict (because of global warming). Source: Josh Braun, Seed Magazine
Global Warming: Experts Weigh In Michael Horne, British Home Secretary “Environmental changes make the emergence of a violent conflict more rather than less likely.” “The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur” Eric Reeves, Professor of English at Smith College “The greater cause, by far, lies in the policies of the current National Islamic Front regime.” Mark Lavergne, from the University of Khartoum: “ The problem is not a water shortage as such, and water shortages don’t necessarily lead to war. The real problem is the lack of agricultural and other development policies to make the best use of available water resources since colonial times.” Michael Klare, Global Securities Specialist, Hampshire College “Climate Change, consumption, globalization…it’s one phenomenon. Conflicts occur among ethnic or religious lines because that’s how communities are organized. In Darfur, they’re fighting the inexorable reach of an expanding desertification.” Source: Josh Braun, Seed Magazine
Darfur and Game Theory Are “the rebels willing to let genocide continue against their own people rather than compromise their demand for power?” Is “the optimal strategy for the United States [and others] to disengage from the process? What is the economic payoff/incentive for the Rebels to forgo the opportunity to end the genocide? Does this make sense? Source: Chris Makler: Aplia Econ Blog (Game Theory from Alan Kuperman, a professor at the University of Texas
Game Theory Continued According to Kuperman, the rebel leaders in the Darfur region of Sudan share responsibility for the continued atrocities befalling their own people. This means that… Concerned westerners should stop interfering if they want it to end. In June 2006, international mediators proposed a peace deal. The Sudanese government agreed to it. But the rebels rejected the deal because it did not give them sufficient autonomy over their own lands. Mediators returned and extracted further concessions from the Sudanese government. One of the rebel groups agreed to the new terms, but then various rebel groups began fighting amongst themselves. The game theory diagram on the previous slide is Kuperman’s economic model because it deals with incentives. According to Kuperman, the rebels have an incentive to “provoke genocidal retaliation,” and that the rebels would have pursued peace a long time ago. But because of the Save Darfur movement, they wait for western pressure to hand them control of the region instead, prolonging the genocide. Source:Chris Makler: Aplia Econ Blog (Game Theory from Alan Kuperman, a professor at the University of Texas
Braun, Josh. “A Hostile Climate: Did Global Warming Cause a Hostile Climate in Darfur?” Seed Magazine 2 August 2006. 4 December 2006. http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2006/08/a_hostile_climate.php Damu, Jean. “Does God work for the CIA?: U.S. Policy toward Darfur and Sudan.” FinalCall.com News Nov 7, 2006. 4 December 2006. de Waal, Alex. Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan: Revised Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Gailey Jr., Harry A. History of Africa: Volume III from 1945 to present. Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1989. Gettleman, Jeffrey. "War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows." The New York Times 10/24/2006: Works Cited
Works Cited (Continued) "Gezira Scheme." Wikipedia. 11/15/2006. Government of Sudan and the World Bank. "Sudan: Options for the Sustainable Development of the Gezira Scheme (PDF)." Wikipedia. 2000. 11/13/2006. Jok, Madut Jok. War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Morrod, Tessa. “Too little: the vicious cycle of drought in North Darfur.” Political Action: Technology changing poverty. 26 November 2006. Prunier, Gérard. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. Reeves, Eric. "The Economics of Genocide in Sudan." Sudan Tribune Oct 11,2006 10/11/2006.